ECCC-Report TR12-136https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136Comments and Revisions published for TR12-136en-usWed, 11 Sep 2013 17:52:01 +0300
Revision 2
| Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes |
Dan Boneh,
Mark Zhandry
https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136#revision2We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.Wed, 11 Sep 2013 17:52:01 +0300https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136#revision2
Revision 1
| Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes |
Dan Boneh,
Mark Zhandry
https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136#revision1We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.Mon, 11 Mar 2013 02:01:12 +0200https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136#revision1
Paper TR12-136
| Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes |
Dan Boneh,
Mark Zhandry
https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.Fri, 26 Oct 2012 18:17:38 +0200https://eccc.weizmann.ac.il/report/2012/136