



Chinese Remaindering with Errors

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Abstract

The Chinese Remainder Theorem states that a positive integer m is uniquely specified by its remainder modulo k relatively prime integers p_1, \dots, p_k , provided $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$. Thus the residues of m modulo relatively prime integers $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_n$ form a redundant representation of m if $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ and $k < n$. This gives a number-theoretic construction of an “error-correcting code” that has been considered often in the past (see [50, 27, 44]). In this code a “message” (integer) $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ is encoded by the list of its residues modulo p_1, \dots, p_n . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, if a code-word is corrupted in $e < \frac{n-k}{2}$ coordinates, then there exists a unique integer m whose corresponding code-word differs from the corrupted word in at most e places. Furthermore, Mandelbaum [35, 36] shows how m can be recovered efficiently given the corrupted word. In this work we describe an efficient decoding algorithm for the case in which the error e may be larger than $\frac{n-k}{2}$. Specifically, given n residues r_1, \dots, r_n and an agreement parameter t , we find a *list of all integers* $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ such that $(m \bmod p_i) = r_i$ for at least t values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, provided $t = \Omega(\sqrt{kn \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}})$. For $n \gg k$ (and $p_n \leq p_1^{O(1)}$), the fraction of error corrected by the algorithm is almost twice that corrected by the previous work. More significantly, the algorithm recovers the message even when the amount of agreement between the “received word” and the “codeword” is much smaller than the number of errors. One consequence of our result is a strengthening of the relationship between average-case complexity of computing the permanent and its worst-case complexity. Specifically we show that if a polynomial time algorithm is able to guess the permanent of a random $n \times n$ matrix on $2n$ -bit integers modulo a random n -bit prime with inverse polynomial success rate, then $P^{\#P} = BPP$. Previous results of this nature typically worked over a fixed prime moduli or assumed success probability very close to one (as opposed to bounded away from zero).

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1 Introduction

The Chinese Remainder Theorem states that a positive integer m is uniquely specified by its remainder modulo k relatively prime integers p_1, \dots, p_k , provided $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$. Thus if we pick $n > k$ relatively prime integers $p_1 < \dots < p_n$ such that $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, then the remainders of m modulo the p_i 's form a redundant representation of m . Specifically, m can be recovered given any k of the n remainders.

This redundancy property of the Chinese remainder representation has been exploited often in theoretical computer science. The Karp-Rabin pattern matching algorithm is based on this redundancy [24]. This representation was used to show the strength of probabilistic communication over deterministic communication protocols (cf. [28, Exercise 3.6]). The representation allows for easy arithmetic — addition, multiplication, subtraction and division — on large integers and was even proposed by Watson and Hastings [50] as a potential representation for numbers in computers¹. The ability to reduce computation over large integers to that over small integers is also employed in complexity-theoretic settings, with a notable example being its use in showing the hardness of computing the permanent of 0/1 matrices [48].

In the context of error correction, this representation of integers yields a natural *error-correcting code* that has been studied extensively in the literature (see [44, 27] and the references therein). The central property that allows for the correction of error is that for any two integers $m, m' < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, the sequences $\{(m \bmod p_1), \dots, (m \bmod p_n)\}$ and $\{(m' \bmod p_1), \dots, (m' \bmod p_n)\}$ (which we view as *encodings* of m and m' , respectively), differ in at least $n - k + 1$ coordinates. This difference (or distance) has the following implication. Consider a sequence of integers $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ that are obtained by taking residues of an integer $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ modulo $p_1 < \dots < p_n$, where e of the residues are *erroneous*. In other words, $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ differs from the code-word representing m in e coordinates. Then the Chinese Remainder Theorem indicates that for $e < \frac{n-k}{2}$ there exists a *unique* code-word that differs from $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ in at most e coordinates. Thus, for such bounded error, m is uniquely specified by the vector $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$.

The first algorithmic question that arises is whether, under the above conditions, it is possible to recover m in polynomial time (i.e., in time polynomial in n and $\log p_n$). This question was answered affirmatively by Mandelbaum [35, 36]. Mandelbaum gives an efficient algorithm for the above *Unique Decoding* problem when $e \leq (n - k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$ (which is approximately $\frac{n-k}{2}$ when $p_n = p_1^{1+o(1)}$).

In this work we study the decoding problem for larger error. In this case there is no unique code-word that differs in at most e coordinates from the received word $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$. However, as long as $e \leq n - \sqrt{nk}$, there exists a small list containing all integers whose Chinese remainder representations differ from the vector $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ in at most e coordinates [19]. In this paper we present an efficient algorithm for recovering this list in polynomial time. More precisely, the algorithm solves the following task:

List Decoding (for large error): Given n relatively prime integers $p_1 < \dots < p_n$; n residues r_1, \dots, r_n , with $0 \leq r_i < p_i$; and an integer k ; construct a list of all integers m satisfying $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ and $(m \bmod p_i) = r_i$ for at least $\sqrt{2n(k+2)} \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1} + \frac{k+3}{2} + 2 \log n = \Theta(\sqrt{nk} \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1})$ values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. (Theorem 11.) (We comment that this list contains at most $\sqrt{2n/k}$ integers; cf., [19].)

¹Unfortunately, it does not allow for easy inequality comparisons — which is presumably why it was not employed.

Coding theory context. The better known examples of asymptotically good error-correcting codes with efficient algorithms can be classified in one of two categories:

1. **Algebraic codes:** These are codes defined using the properties of low-degree polynomials over finite fields and include a wide variety of codes such as Reed-Solomon codes, BCH codes, Alternant codes and algebraic-geometry codes. Such codes admit efficient error-correction algorithms; in fact all the algorithms (for unique-decoding) are similar in spirit and can be unified quite nicely [38, 26, 13].
2. **Combinatorial codes:** A second class of codes with efficient decoding algorithms evolve from combinatorial concepts such as expanders, super-concentrators etc. Examples of this family include the codes of Sipser and Spielman [43], and Spielman [45]. In both cases, the description of the code is captured by a graph; and the existence of a decoding algorithm is then related to combinatorial properties of the graph.

By extending the work of Mandelbaum [35, 36] (see also [5]), our work contributes to broadening the study of efficiently decodable error-correcting codes, to include a number-theoretic code. To the best of our knowledge – this is the only example which does not fall into one of the two classes above.

For sake of the presentation, in addition to our list-decoding algorithm, we also provide and analyze an algorithm for unique decoding (which is only slightly different from Mandelbaum’s algorithm). Our algorithms are obtained by abstracting from known paradigms for correcting algebraic codes: The unique-decoding algorithm abstracts from a large collection of (unique) error-correcting algorithms for algebraic codes [39, 6, 37, 51, 7]. In fact, an elegant unification of these results (see [38, 26, 13] or Appendix A) provides the inspiration for our algorithm. The list-decoding algorithm abstracts from the recent works on list-decoding algorithms for algebraic codes [3, 46, 42, 21]. We stress however, that the translation of the above mentioned algorithms to our case is not immediate. In particular, the usual “interpolation” methods, that come in very handy in the algebraic case are not applicable here. In fact the Chinese Remainder code is not even linear in the usual sense and so linear algebra is not applicable in our case. Thus for solving analogies of “simple” problems in the algebraic case, we employ the continued-fraction method for the Unique Decoding task, and the approximate basis reduction algorithm [29] for the List Decoding task. Our final algorithms achieve decoding capabilities comparable to those in algebraic cases. In particular, the list-decoding algorithm recovers from $n - o(n)$ errors, provided $p_n = p_1^{O(1)}$ and $k = o(n)$.

Permanent of random matrices. One motivation for studying the Chinese remainder representation of integers was to study the “random self-reducibility” property of the permanent [31].

The standard presentation of this property *fixes* a prime $p > n + 1$, and consists of a randomized reduction of computing the permanent modulo p of a given $n \times n$ matrix to computing the permanent modulo p over uniformly distributed $n \times n$ matrices. Thus we are taking a two parameter problem (such as Quadratic Non-Residuosity and DLP) and the process of self-reduction fixes one parameter (here, the prime p) and randomizes over the second (here, the matrix). This is analogous to the results of [20, 8] but not to the recent result of Ajtai [1]. Thus, unlike Ajtai’s result, the above only relates the average and worst case complexities of computing the permanent modulo p for any fixed p . What we want is a relation between the average and worst case complexities, when average-case complexity refers to all parts of the input.

Consider, for example, the product distribution on pairs (M, p) , parameterized by size n , where p is a uniformly distributed n -bit prime and M is a uniformly distributed n -by- n matrix with $2n$ -bit entries.

A naive analysis of the complexity of the permanent on such instances would work as follows. Suppose we have a heuristic to compute the permanent on instances from the above distribution. Then, given any pair (M, p) , pick at random many primes p_1, \dots, p_t , and then compute the permanent of M modulo p_i for every i . In each case use the random-self-reducibility of the permanent modulo p_i to reduce the computation of the permanent of M modulo p_i to $n + 1$ “random” (but not independent) instances of the permanent modulo p_i . If the heuristic does not make errors very often (say has error probability less than $\frac{1}{3(n+1)t}$) then with high probability (resp., probability at least $2/3$) all calls to the heuristic get answered correctly. Thus if t is large enough (e.g., $t = O(n)$ will do), then (applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem) we obtain the value of the permanent of M (over the integers), and can now reduce this modulo p to get the desired output.

However the reduction as described above is not very tolerant of errors. This problem has been addressed before in the case of one of the two parameters, namely in the choice of the matrix: The results of [16, 17, 46] imply that if for any prime p , the heuristic computes (M, p) on even a tiny but non-negligible fraction of the instances correctly then the permanent can be computed correctly on worst case instances of matrices, but over the same fixed prime p .

Our result complements the above, by allowing a similar treatment of the second parameter as well. Thus by combining the two results, we get the following natural statement (see Theorem 14):

If there exists a heuristic that computes the permanent of a random pair (M, p) , from the above distribution, with non-negligible probability (over the choice of (M, p)), then $\text{P}^{\#P} = \text{BPP}$.

In independent related work, Cai et al. [11], provide an alternate formulation of the average-case hardness of the permanent, which is also hard on all parts of the input. They consider the hardness of computing the permanent directly over the integers. They show that if a BPP algorithm computes the permanent (over the integers) of a random $n \times n$ matrix with its entries chosen uniformly from among n -bit integers with non-negligible probability then $\text{P}^{\#P} = \text{BPP}$. In fact their techniques also extend to providing an alternate proof of Theorem 14 that does not use the decoding algorithm for the Chinese Remainder code.

Other applications. In Section 6.2, we describe the applicability of the Chinese Remainder code and the decoding algorithm in “secret sharing” as an alternate to Shamir’s scheme [41]. (The latter used the properties of the Reed-Solomon code). One more case where the list-decoding algorithm for the CRT code has been utilized is in a result of Håstad and Näslund [22] who utilize the list-decoding algorithm for the CRT code (as part of a more involved algorithm) that shows that all the individual bits of $ax + b \bmod p$ are secure (i.e., hard to predict with non-negligible advantage) given a, b, p and $f(x)$ for any one-way function f .

Organization of this paper. In Section 2 we define the Chinese Remainder Code. In Section 3 we describe the unique decoding algorithm for the Chinese Remainder Code (in case of small error), and in 4 we give the list-decoding algorithm (in case of large error). Section 5 gives the application to the permanent, and Section 6 gives an improved (nearly linear time) decoding algorithm for small error, and an application of the Chinese Remainder Code to secret sharing.

2 The Chinese Remainder Code

Notation: For positive integers M, N , Let \mathbb{Z}_M denote the set $\{0, \dots, M-1\}$, and let $[N]_M$ denote the remainder of N when divided by M . Note that $[N]_M \in \mathbb{Z}_M$.

Definition 1 (Chinese Remainder Code) Let $p_1 < \dots < p_n$ be relatively prime integers, and $k < n$ an integer. The Chinese Remainder Code with basis p_1, \dots, p_n and rate k is defined for message space \mathbb{Z}_K , where $K \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$. The encoding of a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$, denoted $E_{p_1, \dots, p_n}(m)$, is the n -tuple $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$.

Thus the Chinese Remainder Code does not have a “fixed alphabet” (the alphabet depends on the coordinate position) and it is not linear in the usual sense (as the natural arithmetic here is done modulo p_i for the i 'th coordinate). Distance of a code can however be defined as usual; i.e., the distance between two “words” of block length n is the number of coordinates on which they differ; and the distance of a code is the minimum distance between any pair of distinct codewords. The distance properties of this code are very similar to those of Reed-Solomon and BCH codes; and follow immediately from the Chinese Remainder Theorem:

Theorem 2 (Chinese Remainder Theorem — CRT) If q_1, \dots, q_ℓ are relatively prime positive integers and r_1, \dots, r_ℓ are integers such that $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{q_i}$, then there exists a unique integer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{\prod_{i=1}^\ell q_i}$ such that $[r]_{q_i} = r_i$. Furthermore, $r = \left[\sum_{i=1}^\ell c_i \cdot Q_i \cdot r_i \right]_Q$, where $Q = \prod_{j=1}^\ell q_j$, $Q_i = Q/q_i$, and c_i is the multiplicative inverse modulo q_i of Q_i .

Corollary 3 For any n relatively prime integers p_1, \dots, p_n and any integer $k < n$, the Chinese Remainder Code with basis p_1, \dots, p_n and rate k has distance $n - k + 1$. That is, for any two messages m_1, m_2 , the code words $E_{p_1, \dots, p_n}(m_1)$ and $E_{p_1, \dots, p_n}(m_2)$ disagree on at least $n - k + 1$ coordinates.

Thus if p_1, \dots, p_n are all $(1 + o(1)) \cdot \log n$ -bit primes, then the information rate and the distance of the Chinese Remainder Code are comparable with those of the Reed-Solomon code or the BCH code. For our purposes, it is more useful to consider a variant of the notions of block length, rate and distance as defined below.

Definition 4 (amplitude) For a Chinese Remainder Code with basis p_1, \dots, p_n and rate k , the amplitude of the encoding is defined to be $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$; the amplitude of the message space is defined to be $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$. For vectors $\vec{v} = \langle v_1, \dots, v_n \rangle$ and $\vec{w} = \langle w_1, \dots, w_n \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ with $v_i, w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i}$, the amplitude of the distance between \vec{v} and \vec{w} is defined to be $\prod_{i: v_i \neq w_i} p_i$. The amplitude of agreement between \vec{v} and \vec{w} is defined to be $\prod_{i: v_i = w_i} p_i$. Notice that the product of the amplitudes of agreement and distance equals the amplitude of the encoding.

It is easy to see that if the distance between \vec{v} and \vec{w} is d , and the amplitude of the distance between \vec{v} and \vec{w} is D ; then $d \log p_1 \leq \log D \leq d \log p_n$. In case of traditional codes that are defined over fixed alphabets, i.e., $p_1 = p_2 = \dots = p_n$, d is directly proportional to $\log D$ and hence there is no need to consider the latter separately. In our case, the latter parameter provides a more refined look at

the performance of the algorithms. From the Chinese Remainder Theorem it follows immediately that the amplitude of distance between any two codewords is larger than N/K .

Our goal is to solve the following error-correction problems (for as large an error parameter as possible).

The Error-correction/List decoding Problem

Given: (1) n relatively prime integers $p_1 < \dots < p_n$ and rate parameter k specifying a Chinese Remainder Code; (2) n integers r_1, \dots, r_n , with $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i}$ and an error-parameter e .

Task: Find (all) message(s) $x \in \mathbb{Z}_K$, where $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, s.t. $[x]_{p_i} \neq r_i$ for at most e values of i .

It follows from the distance of the Chinese Remainder Code that the answer is unique if $e < \frac{n-k}{2}$. In this case the problem corresponds to the traditional error-correction problem for error-correcting codes. If e is larger, then there may be more than one solution. We will expect the algorithm to return a list of all codewords x with at most e errors.

3 The Decoding Algorithm for Small Error

The first algorithm we present is a simple algorithm to recover from a small number of errors. The algorithm is very similar to Mandelbaum's algorithm [36], but is presented and analyzed slightly differently. In particular, we simplify the description of the algorithm by invoking a powerful algorithm for integer programming in small dimensions, due to Lenstra [30]. The algorithm recovers from error of amplitude at most $\sqrt{N/K}$. Translating to classical measures this yields an error-correcting algorithm for $e \leq (n-k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$ (and in particular, if $p_n = p_1^{O(1)}$, then the algorithm can handle a constant fraction of errors).

The algorithm is described below formally. The inspiration for the algorithm comes from a general paradigm for decoding of many algebraic codes (see [38, 26, 13] or Appendix A). Given a received word $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ that is close to the encoding of (a unique) message m , the algorithm **Unique-Decode** tries to find two integers y and z such that $y \cdot m = z$. To this end it first reconstructs the integer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ that corresponds to the received word $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ (i.e., $[r]_{p_i} = r_i$, for every i). It then searches for integers y and z such that $y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N}$ (where $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$), and both y and z are of bounded sizes. In the analysis of the algorithm we show that the equality (modulo N) between $r \cdot y$ and z together with the restrictions on the sizes of y and z implies that $y \cdot m$ is equal to z (over the integers). Furthermore, (as we show in Appendix B), y has the following *error-detection* property: For every index i such that $r_i \neq [m]_{p_i}$, it holds that $[y]_{p_i} = 0$, and moreover, the message m can be reconstructed from the remaining r_i 's. Though we do not use this property explicitly in the algorithm described below (as well as in its analysis), it can be used to obtain a variant of the algorithm, (described in Appendix B), which is more clearly related to the general decoding paradigm.

Unique-Decode($p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n$).

Set $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$, and let E be an integer to be determined later.

Let $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ be s.t. $r_i = [r]_{p_i}$ (as defined by CRT).

1. Find integers y, z s.t.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1 \leq y \leq E \\ 0 \leq z < N/E \\ y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N} \end{array} \right\} \quad (1)$$

2. Output z/y if it is an integer.

The above algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time in the bit sizes of p_1, \dots, p_n . Step 2 is straightforward. The main realization is that Step 1 can be computed using an algorithm for integer programming in fixed number of variables, due to Lenstra [30]. To see how to formulate our problem in this way, we let the final equality be expressed as $y \cdot r = z + x \cdot N$. Our task thus reduces to computing y and x s.t. $0 < y \leq E$ and $0 \leq y \cdot r - x \cdot N < N/E$. In Section 6.1 we show how this task can actually be performed in nearly linear time (using the ‘‘continued fractions method’’). The resulting algorithm for unique decoding is very similar to that of Mandelbaum [35, 36].

We now analyze the performance of this algorithm. We first describe it in terms of the amplitude of the distance between the message m and the received word r .

Lemma 5 *If r is such that for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ the amplitude of the distance between $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ and $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$ is at most E , and $E < \sqrt{N/(K-1)}$, then $\text{Unique-Decode}(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$ returns m .*

We prove the lemma using the following two claims.

Claim 5.1 *Under the premises of Lemma 5 there exist y, z satisfying Eq. (1).*

Claim 5.2 *Under the premises of Lemma 5, for any pair (y, z) satisfying Eq. (1) it holds that $y \cdot m = z$.*

We prove the two claim momentarily, and first show how Lemma 5 follows from the claims.

Proof of Lemma 5: By Claim 5.1, Step 1 of the algorithm always returns a pair (y, z) satisfying Eq. (1). By Claim 5.2, any pair (y, z) that may be the outcome of Step 1 satisfies $y \cdot m = z$. Thus $z/y = m$ is an integer and the output of the algorithm is m . ■

We now prove Claims 5.1 and 5.2.

Proof of Claim 5.1: Let $y = \prod_{\{i | r_i \neq [m]_{p_i}\}} p_i$ (so that y equals the amplitude of the distance between $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ and $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$), and $z = y \cdot m$. Then notice that $y \neq 0$, and $y \leq E$, and so the first item of Eq. (1) holds. Since $m \leq K - 1$, we have $z = m \cdot y \leq (K - 1) \cdot E$. Using $E < N/((K - 1)E)$ (so that $(K - 1) \cdot E < N/E$), and since $z \geq 0$, the second item of Eq. (1) also holds. Finally, by CRT, the condition $y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N}$ holds since the condition holds modulo every p_i : For any fixed $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, either $r_i = [m]_{p_i}$ or $[y]_{p_i} = 0$. In either case, we have $z = ym \equiv yr \pmod{p_i}$. ■

Proof of Claim 5.2: For every i s.t. $[m]_{p_i} = r_i$, we have

$$y \cdot m \equiv y \cdot [m]_{p_i} \equiv y \cdot r_i \equiv y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{p_i}.$$

Thus, by CRT, $y \cdot m \equiv z \pmod{T}$ where $T = \prod_{\{i \mid [m]_{p_i} = r_i\}} p_i \geq N/E$ is the amplitude of the agreement between $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ and $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$. But $z < N/E$ and $m \cdot y \leq (K-1)E < N/E$. Thus $z = m \cdot y$. \blacksquare

As an immediate consequence of Lemma 5, and the observation relating amplitudes of distance to classical distance, we get the following theorem.

Theorem 6 *Unique-Decode* $(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$ solves the error-correction problem in polynomial time for any value of the error parameter $e \leq (n-k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$, with the setting $E = \prod_{i=n-e+1}^n p_i$.

Proof: Using $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$, $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ and $E = \prod_{i=n-e+1}^n p_i$, Lemma 5 can be applied if $E^2 \leq N/K$ (as $N/K < N/(K-1)$). Namely, it suffices that $(\prod_{i=n-e+1}^n p_i)^2 \leq \prod_{i=k+1}^n p_i$, which is equivalent to $\prod_{i=n-e+1}^n p_i \leq \prod_{i=k+1}^{n-e} p_i$. In turn this condition holds if $p_n^e \leq p_1^{n-k-e}$. The theorem follows by taking logarithms of both sides. \blacksquare

4 Decoding for Large Error

In this section we will describe an algorithm that recovers from possibly many more errors than described in the previous section. In particular, if we fix $k = \epsilon n$ and let $n \rightarrow \infty$, the fraction of errors that can be corrected goes to $1 - \sqrt{2\epsilon \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}}$. As $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, this quantity approaches 1. This algorithm is inspired by the recent progress in list-decoding algorithms [3, 46, 42, 21]. Our algorithm and analysis follow the same paradigm, though each step is different.

The algorithm *List-Decode* can be viewed as a generalization of *Unique-Decode*. In both algorithms, given the received word $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$, the algorithm first finds, using CRT, an integer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ corresponding to the received word (i.e., $[r]_{p_i} = r$ for every i). In *Unique-Decode* the algorithm then attempts to find integers y and z (restricted in size), such that $y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N}$, and outputs z/y . In other words, the algorithm searches for integers y, z satisfying $y \cdot r - z \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$, and outputs the (unique) root of the (degree-1) polynomial $y \cdot x - z$. In *List-Decode*, the algorithm instead searches for a *sequence* of integers c_0, \dots, c_ℓ (of certain bounded sizes), such that $\sum_i c_i r^i \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ and outputs *all* roots of the polynomial $\sum_i c_i x^i$. As we show subsequently, the increase in the degree of the polynomial that the algorithm searches for (together with the particular restrictions on the sizes of its coefficients) allows us to decode for much larger error.

List-Decode $(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$.

Set $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$; $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$; and $F = 2^{\frac{\ell+2}{2}} \cdot \sqrt{\ell+2} \cdot N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$, with ℓ to be determined shortly.

Let $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ s.t. $[r]_{p_i} = r_i$ for every i (as defined by CRT).

1. Find integers c_0, \dots, c_ℓ satisfying

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \forall 0 \leq i \leq \ell \quad |c_i| \leq \frac{F}{K^i} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i r^i = 0 \pmod{N} \\ \quad \langle c_0, \dots, c_\ell \rangle \neq \vec{0} \end{array} \right\} \quad (2)$$

2. Output all roots of the integer polynomial $C(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i x^i$.

The running time of Step 2 above is easily bounded by a polynomial in $n, \ell, \log N$ and $\log F$. For example, one can use the algorithm for factoring polynomials over the integers due to Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovasz [29] (LLL). Faster algorithms are also known for the simpler task of “root-finding”.

The more involved task is Step 1 and we will show how to implement it in polynomial time. Mainly the idea is to set up a lattice whose short vectors correspond to small values of the coefficients c_i 's. We show first that very small vectors of this form exist; and then use the basis reduction algorithm of LLL [29] to find short (but not shortest) vectors in this lattice; and this will suffice for Step 1.

Lemma 7 (Algorithm for Step 1.) *c_i 's as required in Step 1 of List-Decode exist and can be found in polynomial time.*

Proof: We set up an $\ell+2$ -dimensional integer lattice using basis vectors v_0, \dots, v_ℓ and w described next. Let M be a very large integer (to be determined later as a function of N and ℓ). For $j \in \{0, \dots, \ell+1\}$, the j th coordinate of the vector v_i , denoted $(v_i)_j$ is given by:

$$(v_i)_j = \begin{cases} K^i & \text{if } j = i \\ M \cdot r^i & \text{if } j = \ell + 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The vector w is zero everywhere except in the last coordinate where $(w)_{\ell+1} = M \cdot N$.

A generic vector in this lattice is of the form $u = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i v_i + dw$, for integers c_0, \dots, c_ℓ and d . Explicitly the j th coordinate of u is given by:

$$(u)_j = \begin{cases} c_j K^j & 0 \leq j \leq \ell \\ M \cdot (\sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i r^i + dN) & \text{if } j = \ell + 1. \end{cases}$$

We are interested in showing that this lattice contains “short” vectors whose last coordinate equals 0, and every other coordinate has absolute value at most F (thus satisfying Eq. (2)). Furthermore, we would like to show that such vectors can be found efficiently. To his end, we first prove the following technical lemma.

Lemma 8 *For integers r, N if B_0, \dots, B_ℓ are positive integers such that $\prod_{i=0}^{\ell} B_i > N$, then there exist integers c_0, \dots, c_ℓ , such that $|c_i| < B_i$, $\langle c_0, \dots, c_\ell \rangle \neq \vec{0}$ and $\sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i r^i \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$.*

Proof: Consider the function $f : \mathbb{Z}_{B_0} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{B_\ell} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ given by $f(c_0, \dots, c_\ell) = [\sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i r^i]_N$. Since the domain has larger cardinality than the range, there exist different $\langle d_0, \dots, d_\ell \rangle$ and $\langle e_0, \dots, e_\ell \rangle$ s.t. $f(d_0, \dots, d_\ell) = f(e_0, \dots, e_\ell)$. Setting $c_i = d_i - e_i$, we get $|c_i| < B_i$, $\sum_i c_i r^i = 0$, and $\langle c_0, \dots, c_\ell \rangle \neq \vec{0}$ as required. \blacksquare

Using Lemma 8 with $B_i = N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}-i}$, we observe that the lattice defined above has a (short) non-zero vector (where the c_i 's are as guaranteed by the lemma and $d = -\sum_{i=0}^{\ell} c_i r^i / N$) with the last coordinate identically 0, and each other coordinate has absolute value at most $B_i \cdot K^i = N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. Thus, the L_2 -norm of this vector is at most $\sqrt{\ell+2} \cdot N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. By using the ‘‘approximate shortest vector’’ algorithm of [29], we find, in polynomial time, a vector of L_2 -norm at most $F = 2^{\frac{\ell+2}{2}} \cdot \sqrt{\ell+2} \cdot N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. For sufficiently large M (any $M > F$ will do), all ‘‘short’’ vectors (i.e., with L_2 -norm at most F) have a last coordinate identical to 0, and thus yield a sequence of c_i 's satisfying $\sum_i c_i r^i \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ and $|c_i \cdot K^i| \leq F$. This sequence is as required in Step 1. \blacksquare

Now we move on to Step 2 of **List-Decode**. We argue next that any solution to the list-decoding problem is a root of the polynomial whose coefficients are given by *any* solution to Step 1. Instead of performing the analysis in terms of the amount of error in the received word, we do so in terms of the amount of agreement with some message.

Lemma 9 *If r is such that for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ the amplitude of the agreement between $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ and $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$ is greater than $2(\ell+1)F$, and c_0, \dots, c_ℓ are integers satisfying Eq. (2), then $\sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j m^j = 0$ (i.e., m is a root of the polynomial $C(x)$).*

Proof: We first observe that since the c_j 's are small, $\sum_j c_j m^j$ is small in absolute value:

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j m^j \right| &\leq (\ell+1) \cdot \max_j \{|c_j m^j|\} \\ &\leq (\ell+1) \cdot \max_j \{|c_j K^j|\} \\ &\leq (\ell+1) \cdot F. \end{aligned}$$

Now we observe that for i such that $[m]_{p_i} = r_i$ it holds that

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j m^j \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j [m]_{p_i}^j \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j r_i^j \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j r^j \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i}.$$

Define $P = \prod_{\{i | r_i = [m]_{p_i}\}} p_i$. By CRT, $\sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j m^j \equiv 0 \pmod{P}$. Since the sum $\sum_{j=0}^{\ell} c_j m^j$ has absolute value at most $(\ell+1)F$, the hypothesis $P > 2 \cdot (\ell+1)F$ implies that the sum is identically zero as required. \blacksquare

As an immediate consequence of the last two lemmas, we get a proof of the correctness of **List-Decode**. The following proposition describes the performance in terms of amplitude (for any choice of ℓ).

Proposition 10 *For any choice of the parameter ℓ , **List-Decode**($p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n$) produces a list of up to ℓ integers which includes all messages $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ such that the amplitude of agreement between $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$ and \vec{r} is at least $2(\ell+2)^{3/2} 2^{\frac{\ell+2}{2}} N^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} K^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$.*

Proof: By Lemma 7, c_i 's satisfying Eq. (2) exist and are found in Step 1. By Lemma 9, any m as in the lemma is a root of the polynomial $\sum_j c_j x^j$, and thus is included in the output. \blacksquare

The following theorem is obtained by optimizing the choice of the parameter ℓ in the above proposition.

Theorem 11 List-Decode($p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n$) with parameter $\ell = \left\lceil \sqrt{\frac{2n \log p_n}{k \log p_1}} - 1 \right\rceil$ solves the error-correction problem in polynomial time, for $e < n - \sqrt{2(k+3)n \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1} - \frac{k+6}{2}}$.

Remark: If $k/n = \epsilon$, then the above theorem indicates that approximately $1 - \sqrt{2 \cdot \left(\frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}\right) \cdot \epsilon} - \epsilon/2$ fraction of errors can be corrected. In particular this fraction approaches 1 as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$.

Proof: Suppose we want to find all codewords which agree with $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ on t coordinates. Setting $f_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\ell + 2)^{3/2}$ and $f_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2^{\frac{\ell+2}{2}}$, and applying Proposition 10, it suffices to show that

$$\prod_{i=1}^t p_i \geq f_1 \cdot f_2 \cdot \left(\prod_{i=1}^n p_i \right)^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot \left(\prod_{i=1}^k p_i \right)^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$$

Setting $t = t_1 + t_2 + t_3$, we will find t_1, t_2, t_3 s.t.

$$p_1^{t_1} \geq f_1 \tag{3}$$

$$p_1^{t_2} \geq f_2 \tag{4}$$

$$\text{and } \prod_{i=1}^{t_3} p_i \geq \left(\prod_{i=1}^n p_i \right)^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot \left(\prod_{i=1}^k p_i \right)^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}} \tag{5}$$

We start with an analysis of the last inequality. For this we need

$$\left(\prod_{i=1}^{t_3} p_i \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\ell+1}} \geq \left(\prod_{i=t_3+1}^n p_i \right)^{\frac{1}{\ell+1}} \cdot \left(\prod_{i=1}^k p_i \right)^{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$$

Let $q = (\prod_{i=1}^k p_i)^{1/k}$. Then $q \geq p_1$ and $(\prod_{i=1}^{t_3} p_i) \geq q^{t_3}$, provided $t_3 \geq k$. Thus it suffices to show

$$q^{t_3 \ell / (\ell+1)} \geq p_n^{(n-t_3)/(\ell+1)} \cdot q^{k \cdot \frac{\ell+1}{2}} \tag{6}$$

Fact: Eq. (6) holds if $t_3 \geq \frac{k(\ell+1)}{2} + \frac{n \log p_n}{(\ell+1) \log p_1}$ and $\ell \geq 1$.

Proof: By the hypothesis, $t_3 \geq k$ and so

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(t_3 - \frac{k(\ell+1)}{2} \right) \log p_1 \geq \frac{n}{\ell+1} \log p_n \\ \Rightarrow & \left(\frac{\ell}{\ell+1} t_3 - \frac{k(\ell+1)}{2} \right) \log q \geq \frac{n-t_3}{\ell+1} \log p_n \\ \Rightarrow & \frac{\ell t_3}{\ell+1} \log q \geq \frac{n-t_3}{\ell+1} \log p_n + \frac{k(\ell+1)}{2} \log q \end{aligned}$$

and Eq. (6) follows. \square

Setting $\ell + 1 = \left\lceil \sqrt{\frac{2n \log p_n}{k \log p_1}} \right\rceil$, shows that $t_3 = \sqrt{2kn \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}} + \frac{k}{2}$ suffices to achieve Eq. (5). This setting of ℓ also implies that to satisfy Eq. (4), which is equivalent to $t_2 \geq \frac{\ell+2}{2 \log p_1}$, it suffices to set $t_2 = \sqrt{\frac{2n \log p_n}{k \log p_1}} + \frac{3}{2}$. Finally, to satisfy Eq. (3), which is equivalent to $t_1 \geq \frac{3 \log(\ell+2)}{2 \log p_1}$, it suffices to set $t_1 = \frac{\log(2n \log p_n / k \log p_1)}{\log p_1}$, which is smaller than $2 \log t_2 / \log p_1 \ll t_2$.

Thus we find that it suffices to have

$$\begin{aligned} t &= 2\sqrt{\frac{2n \log p_n}{k \log p_1}} + 3 + \sqrt{2kn \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}} + \frac{k}{2} \\ &= \left(1 + \frac{2}{k}\right) \cdot \sqrt{2kn \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}} + \frac{k+6}{2} \\ &< \sqrt{1 + 3 \cdot \frac{2}{k}} \cdot \sqrt{2kn \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}} + \frac{k+6}{2} \\ &= \sqrt{2(k+3)n \frac{\log p_n}{\log p_1}} + \frac{k+6}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Setting $e < n - t$ yields the theorem. \blacksquare

Comparison with [3, 46] Our algorithm `List-Decode` is similar to those of [3, 46] in the basic steps. In their case also, they first find a polynomial “explaining” the corrupted word and then factor it to retrieve a list of messages. However the specifics are quite different: They look for a bivariate polynomial explanation; their criterion is to find a non-zero polynomial of low degree; they find it by solving a linear system; and then employ a bivariate factorization step. We look for a univariate polynomial explanation; our criterion is the size of the coefficients; we find it by (essentially) solving Diophantine systems; and finally employ univariate factorization. Similarly our analysis follows the same steps. The existence proof (Lemma 8) is similar to an analogous step in [46]; though our proof here appears to be more general than his proof. In particular, the pigeonhole argument could also be applied to his case achieving analogous results. Finally, Lemma 9 is also analogous in spirit to similar lemmas in [3, 46] - again our proofs are different since our criteria are different.

5 The Permanent of Random Matrices

In this section we show that computing the permanent of a random matrix modulo a random prime is very hard. The distribution of matrices and primes we consider is the following:

\mathcal{D} is an ensemble of distributions $\{\mathcal{D}_s\}$ where \mathcal{D}_s consists of pairs (T, p) where T is an $s \times s$ matrix whose entries are chosen uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{2s}}$, and p is a prime chosen uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_{2^s} .

The distributional problem we consider is: Given a randomly chosen pair (T, p) from \mathcal{D}_s , compute the permanent of T modulo p . We show that no polynomial time algorithm is likely to have inverse polynomial probability of solving this distributional problem.

Lemma 12 ([2] following [33]; cf., [10]) *Suppose there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A' and a polynomial $r : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ such that on input M , an $s \times s$ matrix of $2s$ -bit integer elements, $A'(M)$ outputs a list of $r(s)$ integers such that the permanent of M is included in this list (with probability at least, say, $\frac{1}{2}$ over the internal coin tosses of A'). Then $\text{P}^{\#P} = \text{BPP}$.*

We complement this lemma with an algorithm that utilizes a subroutine for computing the permanent on random instances, and uses it to compute a list of values of the permanent on worst-case instances.

Lemma 13 *Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A and a function $\epsilon : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that for every positive integer s ,*

$$\Pr_{(T,p) \in \mathcal{D}_s} [A(T,p) = [\text{perm}(T)]_p] \geq \epsilon(s).$$

Then there exists a randomized $\text{poly}(s/\epsilon(s))$ -time algorithm A' that on input an $s \times s$ matrix M with entries from $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{2s}}$, outputs a list of at most $O(1/\epsilon(s)^4)$ integers, which includes the permanent of M with high probability.

Proof: Assume, w.l.o.g, that when given a pair (T,p) , algorithm A first reduces each entry of T modulo p . Our algorithm for reconstructing the permanent of any s -by- s matrix, M , is given below:

Algorithm Perm(M).

- Parameters $n = \text{poly}(s/\epsilon(s))$, $n' = O(s/\epsilon(s)^2)$
- Uniformly select n random primes p_1, \dots, p_n in the interval $[2^{s/2}, 2^s]$.
- For $i = 1$ to n do /* try to obtain $[\text{perm}(M)]_{p_i}$ */

Subroutine Mod-Perm(M, p_i).

- Uniformly select an $s \times s$ random matrix R with entries from \mathbb{Z}_{p_i} .
 - For $j = 1$ to n' do /* try to obtain $[\text{perm}(M + jR)]_{p_i}$ */
 - Let $v_j = A(M + j \cdot R, p_i)$;
 - Reconstruct a list of all degree s univariate polynomials $\{f_1, \dots, f_{\ell'}\}$ that satisfy $f_h(j) = v_j$ for at least an $\epsilon(s)/16$ fraction of the v_j 's.
 - Uniformly select a random $h \in \{1, \dots, \ell'\}$ and set $r_i = f_h(0)$.
 - /* with probability $\text{poly}(\epsilon(s))$ (taken over the choice of p_i and the internal coins of Mod-Perm), we will have $r_i = [\text{perm}(M)]_{p_i}$ */
- Reconstruct a list of all integers $x \leq s!2^{s^2}$ such that $[x]_{p_i} = r_i$ for at least $t = O(\epsilon(s)^4) \cdot n$ of the i 's, and output this list. Namely, apply List-Decode with parameters p_1, \dots, p_n , $k = 6s$ (as $K = s!2^{s^2} < 2^{3s^2}$ and $\forall i, p_i \geq 2^{s/2}$), and r_1, \dots, r_n .

The polynomial reconstruction step may be performed using the algorithm of [46], which requires $n' \geq 2s \cdot (\epsilon(s)/16)^{-2}$. (To recover polynomials of degree s from a list of values at n' places, the algorithm requires the agreement t' to satisfy $t' > \sqrt{2sn'}$.) The reconstruction of integers satisfying the Chinese Remainder Property uses Theorem 11 and works when $n = \Omega(s/\epsilon(s)^8)$. (Here to recover all sequences with agreement t out of n places, the algorithm requires $t = \Omega(\sqrt{kn}) = \Omega(\sqrt{sn})$.)

Let P_s denote the set of primes in the interval $[2^{s/2}, 2^s]$. Let \mathcal{D}'_s be the distribution over pairs (T', p') where p' is chosen uniformly in P_s (rather than among the primes in \mathbb{Z}_{2^s} , as defined by \mathcal{D}_s), and then T' is chosen uniformly from the set of $s \times s$ matrices with entries from $\mathbb{Z}_{p'}$ (rather than by reducing modulo p' a matrix with entries chosen independently and uniformly in $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{2s}}$). We notice that the statistical difference between the two distributions is at most $O\left(\frac{2^{s/2}/(s/2)}{2^s/s}\right) + s^2 \cdot \frac{2^s}{2^{2s}}$, which is negligible (where the first term comes from the probability that in D_s a prime smaller than $2^{s/2}$ is selected, and the second from uneven wrap-around in the reduction modulo a prime). In particular this implies that

$$\Pr_{(T', p') \in \mathcal{D}'_s} [A(T', p') = [\text{perm}(T')]_{p'}] \geq \frac{\epsilon(s)}{2}.$$

Say that a prime p' (from P_s) is *good* if

$$\Pr_{T' \in \mathbb{Z}_{p'}^{s \times s}} [A(T', p') = [\text{perm}(T')]_{p'}] \geq \frac{\epsilon(s)}{4}.$$

A simple counting argument shows that at least $\epsilon(s)/4$ fraction of the primes in P_s are good.

For any fixed good prime p' , and for any $j \in \{1, \dots, n'\}$, we thus have that

$$\Pr_{R \in \mathbb{Z}_{p'}^{s \times s}} [A(M + jR, p') = [\text{perm}(M + jR)]_{p'}] \geq \frac{\epsilon(s)}{4}$$

(recall that we assume that when given a pair (T, p) , algorithm A first reduces each entry of T modulo p). Say that a matrix R is *compatible* with p' if

$$\Pr \left[|\{j : A(M + jR, p') = [\text{perm}(M + jR)]_{p'}\}| > \frac{\epsilon(s)}{16} n' \right] > \frac{\epsilon(s)}{16},$$

(where the probability here is taken only over the coin flips of A). It is not hard to verify that the probability that a random R is compatible with p' is at least $\epsilon(s)/8$. It follows that for any good p' ,

$$\Pr [\text{Mod-Perm}(M, p') = [\text{perm}(M)]_{p'}] \geq \frac{\epsilon(s)}{8} \cdot \frac{\epsilon(s)}{16} \cdot \frac{1}{\ell'}$$

where the first term $(\epsilon(s)/8)$ is the probability that R is compatible with p' ; the second $(\epsilon(s)/16)$ is the probability that A returns the correct output for at least $\epsilon(s)/16$ fraction of the j 's (so that the polynomial reconstruction can work), conditioned on R being compatible; and the third term $(1/\ell')$ is the probability of selecting the correct index h . As $\ell' \leq 2 \cdot (\epsilon(s)/16)^{-1}$ (cf., [46]), the above probability is $\Omega(\epsilon(s)^3)$.

Recall that the probability that each p_i (uniformly selected in P_s) is good is at least $\epsilon(s)/4$. Hence, the probability, taken over the choice of p_i and the random coin flips of **Mod-Perm** that $\text{Mod-Perm}(M, p_i) = [\text{perm}(M)]_{p_i}$, is $\Omega(\epsilon(s)^4)$. Finally, since the success events of the various i 's are independent, by applying a Chernoff bound, we get that with high probability, the number of

p_i 's for which $r_i = [\text{perm}(M)]_{p_i}$ is at least $\Omega(\epsilon(s)^4) \cdot n$. In this case **List-Decode** will succeed in reconstructing a list that includes $\text{perm}(M)$. ■

By combining Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 we get

Theorem 14 *Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A and a positive polynomial function $q : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ such that for every positive s ,*

$$\Pr_{(T,p) \in \mathcal{D}_s} [A(T, p) = [\text{perm}(T)]_p] \geq \frac{1}{q(s)}$$

Then $\text{P}^{\#\text{P}} = \text{BPP}$.

Remark 15 *A quick examination of the proof shows that the theorem continues to hold if the distribution \mathcal{D}_s is altered so that the primes are chosen uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_{f(s)}$, and the entries of the matrix are chosen uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_{f^2(s)}$, where f is any super-polynomial function. For $f(s) > 2^{4s^2}$, there exists a simpler argument which does not use the CRT decoding algorithm. Specifically, For $f, g : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+$, let $\mathcal{D}^{f,g}$ be an ensemble of distributions $\{\mathcal{D}_s^{f,g}\}$ where $\mathcal{D}_s^{f,g}$ consists of pairs (T, p) where T is an $s \times s$ matrix whose entries are chosen uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_{g(s)}$, and p is a prime chosen uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_{f(s)}$. Lemma 13 is replaced by the following lemma.*

Lemma 16 *Suppose there exists a polynomial time algorithm A , functions $f, g : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+$ with $g(s) \geq f(s)^2$ and $f(s) > 2^{4s^2}$ and a function $\epsilon : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that for every positive integer s ,*

$$\Pr_{(T,p) \in \mathcal{D}_s^{f,g}} [A(T, p) = [\text{perm}(T)]_p] \geq \epsilon(s).$$

Then there exists a randomized $\text{poly}(s/\epsilon(s))$ -time algorithm A' that on input an $s \times s$ matrix M with entries from \mathbb{Z}_{22s} , outputs a list of at most $O(1/\epsilon(s)^4)$ integers, which includes the permanent of M with high probability.

Proof [Sketch]: Given any $s \times s$ matrix M with entries from \mathbb{Z}_{22s} , we iterate the following process several times. Pick a random prime p from $\mathbb{Z}_{f(s)}$ and invoke Subroutine **Mod-Perm**(M, p) (from Algorithm **Perm**(M)). Finally, output a list of all integers returned in all invocations of this subroutine.

To see the correctness, notice first that $\text{perm}(M)$ is an integer of magnitude at most $s! \cdot (2^{2s})^s < 2^{3s^2}$. Thus if $p > 2^{3s^2}$, then $[\text{perm}(M)]_p = \text{perm}(M)$. Furthermore, by the choice of f , p is likely to be this large with all but negligibly small probability. The lemma now follows from the usual argument that if p is such that $A(R, p)$ computes $[\text{perm}(R)]_p$ with non-negligible probability, then $\text{perm}(M) = [\text{perm}(M)]_p$ is very likely to be part of the output. ■

6 Improvements and Applications

6.1 Nearly linear time algorithms for the CRT Code

In this section we review some well-known results which yield fast algorithms for tasks associated with the CRT code. In particular, there exist nearly linear time algorithms for encoding and for decoding with $(n - k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$ errors. The following theorem summarizes these results.

Theorem 17 For relatively prime integers p_1, \dots, p_n , let $b = \sum_{i=1}^n (1 + \lfloor \log_2 p_i \rfloor)$. Then the following tasks can be performed in time $O(b \log^c b)$ for some constant c :

1. **Encoding:** Given $k \leq n$ and $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, compute $([m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n})$.
2. **Decoding without errors:** Given $k \leq n$ and (r_1, \dots, r_n) , $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i}$, compute $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ such that $[m]_{p_i} = r_i$ for every $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, in case such m exists.
3. **Decoding with errors:** Given $k \leq n$ and (r_1, \dots, r_n) , $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i}$, compute $m < \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$ such that $[m]_{p_i} \neq r_i$ for at most $(n - k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$ values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, in case such m exists.

Parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 17 follow immediately from the fact that the Chinese remainder representation can be computed and inverted in nearly linear time (cf. [9, Theorems 4.5.3 and 4.5.8]). These results in turn follow from nearly linear time algorithms due to Schonhage and Strassen [40] for multiplying and dividing two integers. (These algorithms are combined with a binary-tree structure in which the residues modulo individual p_i 's are associated with the leaves and the residue modulo $\prod_{i=1}^n p_i$ is associated with the root.) So we just need to prove Part (3); that is, we show that the algorithm **Unique-Decode** can be implemented in nearly linear time.

A nearly linear time implementation of Step 2 (i.e., computing z/y) follows from the nearly linear time algorithm for integer division of Schonhage and Strassen [40] and from the fact that both z and y are at most b -bits long. Thus, we focus on Step 1. In this step we wish to compute y and z subject to the Eqn. (1). Equivalently, given N, E and r , we wish to find integers x, y such that

$$1 \leq y \leq E, \quad x \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad 0 \leq y \cdot r - x \cdot N < N/E. \quad (7)$$

In turn the above can be rewritten as:

$$1 \leq y \leq E, \quad x \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{x}{y} < \frac{r}{N} < \frac{x}{y} + \frac{1}{y \cdot E}. \quad (8)$$

Setting $\alpha = \frac{r}{N}$, the above problem is that of approximating a rational α from *below* by another rational number $\frac{x}{y}$ with denominator no larger than E . (In particular the approximation should be within an additive factor of less than $\frac{1}{y \cdot E}$.) This will be done using the ‘‘continued fractions method’’, and specifically algorithms due to Knuth [25].

We briefly introduce some notation and summarize known results regarding continued fractions. We follow the description in Lovasz [32, pages 9–12]. Given a positive real α , consider the sequence a_0, a_1, \dots , defined as follows: $\alpha_0 = \alpha$ and $a_0 = \lfloor \alpha_0 \rfloor$. For $i = 0, 1, \dots$, if $\alpha_i = a_i$ then the sequence terminates, else we define $\alpha_{i+1} = \frac{1}{\alpha_i - a_i}$ and $a_{i+1} = \lfloor \alpha_{i+1} \rfloor$. Let $\text{CF}(\alpha)$ denote the sequence (a_0, a_1, \dots) . It is well known that this sequence has finite length if and only if α is rational. Furthermore, for every finite sequence (a_0, \dots, a_l) of integers $a_i \geq 1$, there exists a unique rational number α such that $\text{CF}(\alpha) = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_l)$. We use $\text{CF}^{-1}(a_0, \dots, a_l)$ to denote this α . Turning to algorithmics, we recall that the function CF can be computed and inverted in nearly linear time [25]: That is, if α is given as the ratio of two n -bit integers, then $\text{CF}(\alpha)$ can be computed in time $O(n \log^{O(1)} n)$. Conversely, given a sequence of integers (a_0, \dots, a_l) with bit lengths summing to n , a pair of integers p, q such that $p/q = \text{CF}^{-1}(a_0, \dots, a_l)$ can also be computed in time $O(n \log^{O(1)} n)$.

The properties of the continued fraction representation that are of interest to us are the following. For rational α , let $(a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_l) = \text{CF}(\alpha)$. For $0 \leq i \leq l$, let $\frac{p_i}{h_i} = \text{CF}^{-1}(a_0, \dots, a_i)$. Then the following facts hold (see [32, pages 9–12] for proofs):

(CF1) The h_i 's are monotonically increasing.

(CF2) The g_i 's and h_i 's satisfy $g_{i+1} \cdot h_i - g_i \cdot h_{i+1} = (-1)^i = \text{sgn} \left(\alpha - \frac{g_i}{h_i} \right)$. In particular it follows that $|\alpha - \frac{g_i}{h_i}| \leq \frac{1}{h_i \cdot h_{i+1}}$ for every i .

(CF3) For any integer E , let k be the largest index such that $h_k \leq E$. Let $j = \left\lfloor \frac{E - h_{k-1}}{h_k} \right\rfloor$, $\beta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{g_k}{h_k}$, and $\beta' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k}$. Then,

1. the number α lies between $\beta_1 = \min\{\beta, \beta'\}$ and $\beta_2 = \max\{\beta, \beta'\}$ (each being a rational with denominator at most E); and
2. every rational lying strictly between β_1 and β_2 has a denominator strictly larger than E .

It follows that β_1 is the largest rational less than α with denominator at most E .

We show that β_1 as in (CF3) necessarily satisfy Eqn. (8), in case some y', x' satisfying this equation do exist. Furthermore, we show that in case $\alpha = r/N$ and r, N are given, β_1 can be found in almost linear time. This yields the algorithm we were looking for. We comment that β_1 is the *best rational lower bound on $\alpha = \frac{r}{N}$ with denominator bounded by E* . That is, y, x satisfy $\frac{x}{y} \leq \alpha$, $y \leq E$ and every rational between $\frac{x}{y}$ and α has denominator greater than E .

Proposition 18 *Let E be an integer and α be a number so that*

$$1 \leq y \leq E, \quad x \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{x}{y} \leq \alpha < \frac{x}{y} + \frac{1}{y \cdot E} \quad (9)$$

has a solution. Then the rational β_1 as in (CF3) is a solution. Furthermore, given b -bit integers r, N, E , and setting $\alpha = r/N$, it is possible to compute the rational β_1 in time $O(b \log^e b)$.

By the premise of Part 3 of Theorem 17 (concerning the existence of m as desired), and Claim 5.1, we know that there exists a solution to Eqn. (9). Part 3 of Theorem 17 follows using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 6.

Proof: Let us start with the algorithmic part; that is, computing β_1 . It suffices to find integers $k, j, g_{k-1}, h_{k-1}, g_k$ and h_k as described in (CF3), since they determine β, β' via a constant number of operations (additions, multiplications and divisions). Observe that given r, N and i , the pair g_i, h_i (giving the i th approximant to $\alpha = r/N$) can be computed in nearly linear time. (This is done by first computing $(a_0, \dots, a_l) = \text{CF}(r/N)$ and next computing $\text{CF}^{-1}(a_0, \dots, a_l)$ which yields g_i, h_i .) Using (CF1) we may perform binary search to find k . Once k is found, we can compute $g_{k-1}, h_{k-1}, g_k, h_k$ as well as $j = \left\lfloor \frac{E - h_{k-1}}{h_k} \right\rfloor$ in nearly linear time.

We next show that $\beta_1 = \frac{g}{h}$ satisfies Eqn. (9). By (CF3), $g \geq 0$, $1 \leq h \leq E$ and $\frac{g}{h} \leq \alpha$. So all that is left is to show that $\alpha \leq \frac{g}{h} + \frac{1}{h \cdot E}$. In case $\beta_1 = \beta = \frac{g_k}{h_k} (\leq \alpha)$ the claim follows from (CF2):

$$\alpha - \frac{g_k}{h_k} \leq \frac{1}{h_k \cdot h_{k+1}} < \frac{1}{h_k \cdot E} \quad (10)$$

So we are left with the case $\beta_1 = \beta' = \frac{g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k}$ (and $\beta_2 = \beta = \frac{g_k}{h_k}$).

Suppose that $\frac{x}{y}$ is a solution to Eqn. (9). We consider two subcases.

Case 1: $t > h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k$. Since $t \leq E$ and $\frac{s}{t} \leq \alpha$, we can use (CF3) and derive $\frac{s}{t} \leq \beta_1$. So,

$$\alpha - \frac{g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k} \leq \alpha - \frac{s}{t} \leq \frac{1}{t \cdot E} < \frac{1}{(h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k) \cdot E} \quad (11)$$

Case 2: $t \leq h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k$. Since $\beta_2 = \frac{g_k}{h_k} > \alpha$ while $\frac{s}{t} \leq \alpha$, the following rational must be positive and so

$$\frac{g_k}{h_k} - \frac{s}{t} = \frac{g_k \cdot t - h_k \cdot s}{h_k \cdot t} \geq \frac{1}{t \cdot h_k} \quad (12)$$

Combining Eqn. (12) with the hypothesis $\alpha - \frac{s}{t} < \frac{1}{t \cdot E}$, and using the case hypothesis $t \leq h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k$, we get

$$\frac{g_k}{h_k} - \alpha > \frac{1}{t \cdot h_k} - \frac{1}{t \cdot E} \geq \frac{1}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{h_k} - \frac{1}{E} \right) \quad (13)$$

We next observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g_k}{h_k} - \frac{g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k} &= \frac{g_k \cdot (h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k) - h_k \cdot (g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k)}{h_k \cdot (h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k)} \\ &= \frac{1}{h_k \cdot (h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k)} \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where the last equality follows from (CF1). By combining Eqn. (13) and Eqn. (14) we get

$$\alpha - \frac{g_{k-1} + j \cdot g_k}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k} < \frac{1}{h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{h_k} - \frac{1}{h_k} + \frac{1}{E} \right) = \frac{1}{(h_{k-1} + j \cdot h_k) \cdot E} \quad (15)$$

(Proposition 18)

6.2 Secret Sharing based on CRT

The CRT code has been proposed as a alternate method for implementing secret-sharing [12, 4]. The scheme is based on the CRT-code, analogously to the way Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [41] is based on Reed-Solomon codes. The existence of decoding algorithms for the CRT code enhances the power of such a secret-sharing scheme. In this section, we formally analyze the secrecy preserved by such a scheme. First we recall the notion of a secret sharing scheme.

Loosely speaking, a secret sharing scheme is a method for a (honest) dealer to distribute its secret among n parties, giving each party a share of the secret, so that the following two conflicting goals are achieved

1. any large enough collection of parties can efficiently recover the secret; but
2. no small coalition of parties can obtain any information about the secret.

The collection of parties in item (1) is thought of as a collection of available honest parties, whereas the coalition in item (2) refers to a coalition of dishonest parties. Typically, a secret sharing scheme is defined in terms of two thresholds, t_1 and t_2 (s.t., $t_1 > t_2$), corresponding to the above two items. Below we relax item (2), introduce a parameter bounding the information leakage, and require

that the information leaked about the secret to any subset of up-to t_2 parties is bounded by this parameter.² We mention that secret sharing is one of the most widely used tools in Cryptography.

Recall that in Shamir's scheme, for parameters $t < n$ and $q > n$, one is given a secret $s \in \text{GF}(q)$ and shares it among n parties by uniformly selecting a degree t polynomial, p , over $\text{GF}(q)$ with free term s , and handing $p(i)$ to the i^{th} party. Clearly, any $t + 1$ parties can recover the secret (by interpolation), whereas no set of t parties obtains any information about the secret. In abstract terms, Shamir's scheme consists of selecting a random codeword among those of a certain "label", and giving each party a block of bits in the codeword. We can do the same in case of the CRT code, and our secret sharing scheme follows.

Construction 19 (The CRT secret-sharing scheme):

parameters: $t < n$ and primes $p_0 < p_2 < p_1 < \dots < p_n$.

sharing: To share a secret $a_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s \in \text{GF}(p_0)$ one does the following

1. uniformly selects $a_1 \in \text{GF}(p_1), \dots, a_t \in \text{GF}(p_t)$;
2. finds $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{\prod_{i=0}^t p_i}$ so that $x \equiv a_i \pmod{p_i}$, for $i = 0, 1, \dots, t$;
3. sets the i^{th} share to be $x \bmod p_i$, for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

reconstructing: Given any $t + 1$ shares, $s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_{t+1}}$, corresponding to parties i_1, \dots, i_{t+1} , one reconstructs the secret as follows

1. finds $y \in \mathbb{Z}_{\prod_{j=1}^{t+1} p_{i_j}}$ so that $y \equiv s_{i_j} \pmod{p_{i_j}}$, for $j = 1, \dots, t, t + 1$.
2. recover the secret to be $(y \bmod p_0)$.

We first show that the reconstruction indeed works. Consider x and y as computed in Step (2) of the Sharing procedure and Step (1) of the Reconstruction procedure, respectively. Clearly, $y \equiv x \pmod{p_{i_j}}$, for $j = 1, \dots, t, t + 1$. Viewing x and y as non-negative integers, we have $x < \prod_{i=0}^t p_i < \prod_{j=1}^{t+1} p_{i_j}$ and $x = y$. Thus, $y \equiv x \pmod{p_i}$ for every $i = 0, 1, \dots, t$, and $y \equiv s \pmod{p_0}$ follows. On the other hand, the first t shares yield no information about the secret. As for other sets of upto t shares, here some information about the secret is leaked, but we can upper bound its amount.

Proposition 20 Let $s, s' \in \text{GF}(p_0)$, let r_1, \dots, r_t be chosen as in Step (1) of the Sharing procedure, and let $X(s)$ (resp., $X(s')$) denote the value computed in Step (2). Then, for every set $I \subset [n]$ of indices, the statistical difference between $(X(s) \bmod \prod_{i \in I} p_i)$ and $(X(s') \bmod \prod_{i \in I} p_i)$ is at most

$$2 \cdot \frac{\prod_{i \in I} p_i}{\prod_{i=1}^t p_i}$$

Thus, in general, security is provided only for $|I| \leq t - 1$ (rather than for $|I| \leq t$ as in case of Shamir's scheme). An advised choice of parameters is to have p_i 's be of the same magnitude and large enough so that $1/p_i$ is negligible in the security parameter.

²The actual formulation will be slightly different: We will bound the statistical difference between t_2 shares generated for any two possible secrets.

Proof: Let us further generalize the claim and consider, for two integers K, M each relatively prime to p , the randomized process $R : \mathbb{Z}_p \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_{pK}$ which maps each $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ to a uniformly selected member of $\{r \in \mathbb{Z}_{pK} : r \equiv s \pmod{p}\}$. We are interested in the statistical difference between $(R(s) \bmod M)$ and $(R(s') \bmod M)$, for the worst possible pair $s, s' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. (In our case, $p \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} p_0$, $K \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^t p_i$, $R(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} X(s)$, and $M \equiv \prod_{i \in I} p_i$.)

Clearly $R(s) \equiv s + r \cdot p$, where r is uniformly chosen in \mathbb{Z}_K (and same for $R(s')$). So,

$$[R(s)]_M \equiv [s]_M + [r]_M \cdot [p]_M \pmod{M}$$

The point is that $[r]_M$ is the only randomness in the r.h.s., and that multiplying by $[p]_M$ is a permutation over \mathbb{Z}_M (since p is relatively prime to M). Thus, if $[r]_M$ is uniformly distributed over \mathbb{Z}_M then $[R(s)]_M$ and $[R(s')]_M$ are identically distributed. In general, the statistical difference between the latter is bounded by twice the statistical difference of $[r]_M$ (where r is uniformly chosen in \mathbb{Z}_K) from the uniform distribution on \mathbb{Z}_M . In case M divides K the statistical difference is zero, and otherwise it is $(K \bmod M)/K$ which is bounded above by M/K . The claim follows. \blacksquare

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A The paradigm for decoding linear codes

Our algorithm in Section 3 was inspired by the following general method for decoding linear codes (which satisfy some special properties). The exposition below is reproduced from [13] where it is attributed to [38] and [26]. In Appendix B we present a variant of our algorithm that exhibits the relation to the general paradigm more clearly.

Definition 21 For integers n , k , and d and a field \mathbb{F} , a linear code \mathcal{C} over \mathbb{F} of block length n is a linear subspace of \mathbb{F}^n . The rate of the code \mathcal{C} , denoted $r(\mathcal{C})$, is the rank of \mathcal{C} . The distance of \mathcal{C} , denoted $d(\mathcal{C})$, is the largest integer d such that any two vectors in \mathcal{C} disagree on at least $d - 1$ coordinates.

In what follows, we will assume that a linear code \mathcal{C} over \mathbb{F} , of block length n and rate k , is specified by an $n \times k$ matrix $M_{\mathcal{C}} \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times k}$ such that $\mathcal{C} = \{M_{\mathcal{C}} \cdot x \mid x \in \mathbb{F}^k\}$.

For vectors $x, y \in \mathbb{F}^n$, let $x * y \in \mathbb{F}^n$ denote the vector given by $(x * y)_i = x_i \cdot y_i$. For sets $X, Y \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$, let $X * Y \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$ denote the set $\{x * y \mid x \in X, y \in Y\}$.

Definition 22 (*t*-error correcting pair) *A t-error correcting pair for a linear code \mathcal{C} over \mathbb{F} of block length n is a pair of linear codes \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} satisfying:*

$$\mathcal{A} * \mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{B} \tag{16}$$

$$r(\mathcal{A}) > t \tag{17}$$

$$d(\mathcal{A}) > n - d(\mathcal{C}) \tag{18}$$

$$d(\mathcal{B}) > t \tag{19}$$

Theorem 23 *For $t \leq n$, let $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ be linear codes over \mathbb{F} of block length n , such that $(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ form a *t*-error correcting pair for \mathcal{C} . Then, given $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ and a “received word” $r \in \mathbb{F}^n$, a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ that differs from r in at most t locations can be found in $O(n^3)$ time.*

Proof: We start by describing the algorithm for finding the codeword c .

Linear-Decode($\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, r; \mathbb{F}, n$);

1. Find a, b satisfying:

$$a \in \mathcal{A} - \{0^n\}, b \in \mathcal{B} \text{ and } a * r = b \tag{20}$$

2. Let $I \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{i : [a]_i \neq 0\}$. Find $c \in \mathcal{C}$ s.t. $c_i = r_i$ for every $i \in I$ and output it.

Let $M_{\mathcal{A}}, M_{\mathcal{B}}$ and $M_{\mathcal{C}}$ be the generating matrices of \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} and \mathcal{C} respectively. Then Step 1 above amounts to finding vectors $x_{\mathcal{A}} \in \mathbb{F}^{r(\mathcal{A})}$ and $x_{\mathcal{B}} \in \mathbb{F}^{r(\mathcal{B})}$ such that $(M_{\mathcal{A}} \cdot x_{\mathcal{A}})_i r_i = (M_{\mathcal{B}} \cdot x_{\mathcal{B}})_i$. This amounts to solving a linear system with n equations and $r(\mathcal{A}) + r(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2n$ unknowns and can certainly be solved using $O(n^3)$ field operations. Similarly, Step 2 amounts to finding $x_{\mathcal{C}} \in \mathbb{F}^{r(\mathcal{C})}$ such that $(M_{\mathcal{C}} \cdot x_{\mathcal{C}})_i = r_i$ for $i \in I$. Again these form at most n linear equations in $r_{\mathcal{C}} \leq n$ unknowns and can be solved in $O(n^3)$ time. This yields the claim about the running time.

We prove the correctness in the following three claims. The first of the claims shows that if r is in fact close to some codeword c , then a pair satisfying Eq. (20) must exist. The second claim shows that for any pair a, b satisfying Eq. (20), every codeword c that is close to r will satisfy the conditions required in Step 2. The third claim shows that for any pair a, b , there is at most one solution to Step 2, thus completing the proof that c is the unique answer output by our algorithm. (The properties in Eq. (16)-Eq. (19) will be used in the claims below. The property $\mathcal{A} * \mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{B}$ is used everywhere. The property on the rate of \mathcal{A} is used in the first claim. The property on the distance of \mathcal{B} is used in the second and the property on the distance of \mathcal{A} in the third.)

Claim 23.1 *If there exists a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ that differs from r in at most t coordinates, then there exist a, b satisfying Eq. (20).*

Proof: Let $E = \{i \mid r_i \neq c_i\}$. We first claim there exists an $a \in \mathcal{A} - \{0^n\}$ s.t. $a_i = 0$ for $i \in E$. This is true since \mathcal{A} has rank at least $t + 1$ and we have added at most t constraints of the form $a_i = 0$ (for $i \in E$). This yields a linear subspace of \mathbb{F}^n which has rank at least 1 and hence has a non-zero vector.

For such an a , we claim that the vector $b = a * c$ satisfies the conditions of Eq. (20). $b \in \mathcal{B}$, since $\mathcal{A} * \mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{B}$; and $a * r = b$ since for every $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, exactly one of the following holds:

1. $r_i = c_i$ and hence $a_i \cdot r_i = a_i \cdot c_i = b_i$.
2. $r_i \neq c_i$ and hence $a_i = 0$ and hence $a_i * r_i = 0 = a_i * c_i = b_i$.

■

Claim 23.2 *For any solution a, b to Eq. (20), and any codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that c and r disagree on at most t coordinates, $a * c = a * r$ (and hence $c_i = r_i$ if $a_i \neq 0$).*

Proof: Consider the vector $b' \in \mathcal{B}$ given by $b' = a * c$. $(b')_i$ and b_i may differ only if $c_i \neq r_i$ (since $b_i = a_i \cdot r_i$); and this happens for at most t values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. Thus b_i and b'_i differ in at most t locations; but since both are members of a linear code of distance at least $t + 1$, they must be identical. The claim follows. ■

Thus we now know that a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ satisfying the requirements in Step 2 does exist. Finally we need to show that any codeword returned in Step 2 is close to r . Notice that by Step 2, $r_i \neq c_i$ implies $i \notin I$.

Claim 23.3 *For any pair $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $b \in \mathcal{B}$, there exists at most one codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$ satisfying $a * c = b$.*

Proof: Assume $c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$ satisfy $a * c_1 = a * c_2 = b$. Then $a * (c_1 - c_2) = 0^n$. Thus for every index i , it must be that $a_i = 0$ or $(c_1 - c_2)_i = 0$. But $a_i = 0$ for at most $n - d(\mathcal{A})$ values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $(c_1 - c_2)_i = 0$ for at most $n - d(\mathcal{C})$ values of $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. Thus we have that $n - d(\mathcal{A}) + n - d(\mathcal{C}) \geq n$ which contradicts the fact that $d(\mathcal{A}) > n - d(\mathcal{C})$. ■

This concludes the proof of the correctness of algorithm **Linear-decode**; and this yields the theorem. ■

The above paradigm for decoding unifies most of the known (unique) decoding algorithms. For example, the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm [51, 7] (as described in [17]) can be obtained as a special case of the above. Recall the definition of a Reed-Solomon code: For integers n and $k \leq n$ and field \mathbb{F} of cardinality $n + 1$, the Reed-Solomon code $\text{RS}_{n,k}$ over \mathbb{F} and block length n is given by

$$\text{RS}_{n,k} = \{(f(x))_{x \in \mathbb{F} - \{0\}} \mid f \text{ is a polynomial of degree } k - 1\}.$$

It is easy to verify that $\text{RS}_{n,k}$ has rate k and distance $n - k + 1$. Notice further that $\text{RS}_{n,k} * \text{RS}_{n,t} \subseteq \text{RS}_{n,k+t-1}$. Thus setting $t = \lfloor \frac{n-k+1}{2} \rfloor$ we notice that the pair $\text{RS}_{n,t}, \text{RS}_{n,k+t-1}$ form a t -error correcting pair for Reed-Solomon codes; and by Theorem 23 has an efficient algorithm for correcting up to t errors. Decoding algorithms for other algebraically specified codes such as the BCH codes, Alternant codes and algebraic-geometric codes follow by similar constructions of error-correcting pairs.

B A Variant of Unique-Decode

As mentioned previously, our algorithm **Unique-Decode** (presented in Section 3) was inspired by the paradigm described in Appendix A. To gain more intuition about the relation between our algorithm and the general paradigm, we present below a variant of our algorithm, which more directly exhibits this relation. Note that Step 1 of the alternative algorithm is the same as Step 1 of the original algorithm, but the integers y and z found in this step are used differently in the remaining steps. In view of this difference, the goal of Step 1 is interpreted differently. Details follow.

Given a received word $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ that is close to the encoding of (a unique) message m , similarly to what is done in **Linear-Decode**, the algorithm **Unique-Decode'** tries to detect the indices for which $r_i \neq [m]_{p_i}$. It then reconstructs the message, using CRT, from those r_i 's that are assumed to be correct (or more precisely, from $[r]_{p'_i}$, where p'_i is a factor of p_i determined by the algorithm). The above detection is done by finding an integer y that satisfies $[y]_{p_i} = 0$ whenever $r_i \neq [m]_{p_i}$. By restricting y to be relatively small we ensure that $[y]_{p_i}$ does not equal 0 for many i satisfying $r_i = [m]_{p_i}$ (so that CRT can in fact be applied). To find this y , we need some way to (describe and) exploit the fact that there exists some small m s.t., for every i , $[y]_{p_i} = 0$ or $[m]_{p_i} = r_i$; or equivalently $[y]_{p_i} \cdot [m]_{p_i} \equiv [y]_{p_i} \cdot r_i \pmod{p_i}$. The final condition suggest that we may attempt to find $z \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} y \cdot m$ such that $[z]_{p_i} \equiv [y]_{p_i} \cdot r_i \pmod{p_i}$. While ideally we would like to specify further that z is a multiple of y , we relax this and simply use the fact that z is also small (since both y and m are small). This leads to the following algorithm:

Unique-Decode' $(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$.

- Set $K = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$, $N = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$, and $F = (K - 1)E$, with E to be determined later.
- Let $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ be s.t. $r_i = [r]_{p_i}$ (as defined by CRT).

1. Find integers y, z s.t.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1 \leq y \leq E \\ 0 \leq z \leq F \\ y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N} \end{array} \right\} \quad (21)$$

2. Let $I \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{i : [y]_{p_i} \neq 0\}$. For every $i \in I$ let $p'_i = p_i / \gcd(y, p_i)$, and set $x_i = [r]_{p'_i}$. (Note that if p_i is prime, $p'_i = p_i$ and so $x_i = r_i$.)
3. Find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ s.t. $[x]_{p'_i} = x_i$ for every $i \in I$ (if such an x exists) and output it.

Similarly to the algorithm **Unique-Decode**, the above algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time in the bit sizes of p_1, \dots, p_n . Step 1 is as in **Unique-Decode**, Step 2 is straightforward, and Step 3 is just an application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (i.e., find $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{\prod_{i \in I} p'_i}$ via CRT and check if it is smaller than K).

Theorem 24 **Unique-Decode'** $(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$ solves the error-correction problem in polynomial time for any value of the error parameter up to $(n - k) \frac{\log p_1}{\log p_1 + \log p_n}$, with the setting $E = \prod_{i=n-\epsilon+1}^n p_i$.

The proof of Theorem 24 follows from the next lemma exactly as the proof of Theorem 6 follows from Lemma 5.

Lemma 25 *If r is such that for some $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ the amplitude of the distance between $\langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$ and $\langle [m]_{p_1}, \dots, [m]_{p_n} \rangle$ is at most E , and $N > E^2 \cdot K$ then **Unique-Decode'** $(p_1, \dots, p_n, k, r_1, \dots, r_n)$ returns m .*

Proof: We first observe that Claims 5.1 and 5.2, which were used to prove Lemma 5 hold here as well since Step 1 of **Unique-Decode'** is identical to Step 1 of **Unique-Decode**. By Claim 5.1, Step 1 of the algorithm always returns a pair (y, z) satisfying Eq. (1). By Claim 5.2, any pair (y, z) that may be the outcome of Step 1 satisfies $y \cdot m = z$. Since $y \cdot r \equiv z \pmod{N}$, it follows that for every i , $y \cdot r \equiv y \cdot m \pmod{p_i}$, and so for every $i \in I$ (where I is as defined in Step 2), we have $r \equiv m \pmod{p'_i}$ (since y has a multiplicative inverse modulo p'_i). Thus, $m \in \mathbb{Z}_K$ is a valid solution for the task in Step 3 (since $\forall i \in I$, $[m]_{p'_i} = [r]_{p'_i} = x_i$).

It remains to show that m is the only possible solution. For this, let $\bar{I} = \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus I$ (i.e., $\forall i \in \bar{I}$, $y \equiv 0 \pmod{p_i}$). Let $q_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} p_i / p'_i$, and observe (by definition of p'_i) that $y \equiv 0 \pmod{q_i}$ for every $i \in I$. (Note that for the special case in which the p_i 's are prime numbers (and not only relatively prime), $p'_i = p_i$ and so $q_i = 1$). By CRT, $y \equiv 0 \pmod{\prod_{i \in \bar{I}} p_i \prod_{i \in I} q_i}$, and since $y > 0$ it follows that $y \geq \prod_{i \in \bar{I}} p_i \prod_{i \in I} q_i$. Since $y \leq E$, we have $\prod_{i \in \bar{I}} p_i \prod_{i \in I} q_i \leq E$ and

$$\prod_{i \in I} p'_i = \frac{N}{\prod_{i \in \bar{I}} p_i \prod_{i \in I} q_i} \geq \frac{N}{E} > K$$

follows. Thus, again by CRT, the message m is the only solution in \mathbb{Z}_K to the system $\{x \equiv r \pmod{p'_i}\}_{i \in I}$. ■