



# Derandomizing Polynomial Identity Tests Means Proving Circuit Lower Bounds

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September 13, 2002

## Abstract

We show that derandomizing Polynomial Identity Testing is, essentially, equivalent to proving circuit lower bounds for NEXP. More precisely, we prove that if one can test in polynomial time (or, even, nondeterministic subexponential time, infinitely often) whether a given arithmetic circuit over integers computes an identically zero polynomial, then either (i)  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  or (ii) Permanent is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. We also prove a (partial) converse: If Permanent requires superpolynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then one can test in subexponential time whether a given arithmetic formula computes an identically zero polynomial.

Since Polynomial Identity Testing is a coRP problem, we obtain the following corollary: If  $\text{RP} = \text{P}$  (or, even,  $\text{coRP} \subseteq \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ , infinitely often), then NEXP is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. Thus, establishing that  $\text{RP} = \text{coRP}$  or  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  would require proving superpolynomial lower bounds for Boolean or arithmetic circuits.

Our techniques allow us to prove an unconditional circuit lower bound for a language in  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}}$ : we prove that either (i) Permanent is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, or (ii)  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

Finally, we prove that  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  if both  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  and the low-degree testing is in P; here, the low-degree testing is the problem of checking whether a given Boolean circuit computes a function that is close to some low-degree polynomial over a finite field.

**Keywords:** derandomization, circuit lower bounds, BPP, NEXP, polynomial identity testing.

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\*Research supported by a Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada

†Research supported by NSF Award CCR-0098197 and USA-Israel BSF Grant 97-00188

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Derandomization from circuit lower bounds

In the early 1980's, Yao [Yao82, BH89] showed that one-way functions whose inverses have high average-case circuit complexity can be used to construct pseudorandom generators, which suffice for the derandomization of such probabilistic complexity classes as RP and BPP. Yao's approach to derandomization was extended to Boolean functions by Nisan and Wigderson [NW94], and significantly strengthened in a sequence of papers [BFNW93, IW97, ACR98, STV01, ISW99, ISW00, SU01, Uma02], which replaced the assumption of high average-case circuit complexity with that of high *worst-case* circuit complexity. For instance, Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97] showed that  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$ , provided that some language in  $\text{E} = \text{DTIME}(2^{O(n)})$  requires Boolean circuits of size  $2^{\Omega(n)}$ .

These results showing that computational hardness can be used as a source of computational pseudorandomness, termed *hardness-randomness tradeoffs*, are considered as evidence that BPP can be derandomized. However, in order to derandomize BPP using such an approach, one would need to prove superpolynomial circuit lower bounds for some language in EXP. Establishing superpolynomial lower bounds for general models of computation (such as Boolean circuits) is one of the biggest challenges in complexity theory that has withstood several decades of sustained effort by many researchers. If proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds is indeed necessary for derandomizing BPP, then it seems unlikely that such a derandomization result will be obtained in the near future.

This raises an obvious question: Can we derandomize BPP *without* proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds? It is well-known that derandomizing BPP using a pseudorandom generator (as in Yao's original approach) does indeed require proving that  $\text{EXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  [ISW99]. On the other hand, Impagliazzo, Kabanets, and Wigderson [IKW01] showed that derandomizing promise-BPP would require proving that  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ ; here, the derandomized algorithm for a promise-BPP problem is allowed to be nondeterministic subexponential-time.

These results may explain why no unconditional derandomization of promise-BPP has been achieved so far. However, they leave open the case of BPP. Presumably, it is possible to derandomize BPP without derandomizing promise-BPP. However, our results show that even derandomizing RP requires a circuit lower bound of some form.

## 1.2 Polynomial Identity Testing

Deriving general consequences from the assumption  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  seems difficult due to the apparent lack of BPP-complete problems. However, we focus on a particular BPP problem, and argue that derandomizing this problem implies a circuit lower bound.

One of the most natural problems in BPP (in fact, in coRP) is Polynomial Identity Testing: Given an arithmetic circuit, decide if it computes the identically zero polynomial. By the well-known Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80, Zip79], evaluating a degree  $d$  multivariate polynomial on an tuple of random elements from a finite subset  $S$  yields a probabilistic algorithm whose error probability is at most  $d/|S|$ . The importance of this problem is witnessed by a plethora of its applications to perfect matching [Lov79, MVV87, CRS95], equivalence testing of read-once branching programs [BCW80], multiset equality testing [BK95], primality testing [AB99], a number of complexity-theoretic results on probabilistically checkable proofs [LFKN92, Sha92, BFL91, AS98, ALM<sup>+</sup>98], as well as sparse multivariate polynomial interpolation [Zip79, GKS90, CDGK91, RB91].

Recently, a number of probabilistic algorithm for the polynomial identity testing were proposed that use fewer random bits than the standard Schwartz-Zippel algorithm [CK97, LV98, AB99,

KS01]. In the first two papers, the identity testing problem is solved by probabilistically searching for non-zeros of a given multivariate polynomial. Chen and Kao [CK97] argue that a randomly chosen rational approximation of a certain irrational point is likely to be a non-zero of any polynomial of specified total degree; generalizing this idea, Lewin and Vadhan [LV98] consider a randomly chosen polynomial approximation of a certain infinite power series.

While the algorithms in [CK97, LV98, AB99, KS01] achieve some saving in randomness compared with the original Schwartz-Zippel algorithm, they do not imply that Polynomial Identity Testing can be derandomized in the strong sense. That is, it is still a big open problem to come up with a deterministic polynomial-time (or, even, nondeterministic subexponential-time) algorithm for Polynomial Identity Testing.

Our results show that this seemingly innocuous problem is, in fact, basically equivalent to the classic, notoriously difficult problem of proving arithmetic circuit lower bounds.

### 1.3 Extending hardness-randomness tradeoffs

Originally, hardness-randomness tradeoffs were aimed at derandomizing BPP algorithms. Goldreich and Zuckerman [GZ97] showed that the same hardness assumptions imply the derandomization of the class MA introduced by Babai [Bab85, BM88]. Klivans and van Melkebeek [KM99] extended the tradeoffs to another class introduced by Babai, the class AM, as well as to some other randomized algorithms, e.g., the Valiant-Vazirani hashing technique [VV86].

On the other hand, no hardness-randomness tradeoffs are known for the algebraic (rather than Boolean) complexity setting. There are at least two reasons why one might be interested in such algebraic tradeoffs. The first reason is purely esthetic. Showing that hardness-randomness tradeoffs hold in another complexity setting would be another indication of the fundamental nature of the idea of converting computational hardness into computational pseudorandomness.

The second reason is a bit more practical. Suppose that it is eventually shown that Permanent requires superpolynomial-size arithmetic circuits. It would be important to know whether such lower bounds could be used to derandomize some algebraic algorithms. Of course, it is doubtful that derandomized algorithms derived from circuit lower bounds should be useful in practice, but even just proving their existence is interesting.

A final motivation is that it shows another example of duality between meta-algorithms for a model and lower bounds for that same model. Often, the techniques used to prove lower bounds for some class of circuits also yield positive results for algorithms taking such circuits as inputs. For example, [LMN93] give a learning algorithm for constant-depth circuits based on lower bounds for such circuits; [PSZ97, PPZ99, PPSZ98] develop a new algorithm for  $k$ -SAT and a new lower bound for depth-3 circuits, using the same technique analyzing the solution space of CNF's. In his thesis, Zane [Zan98] made the interesting empirical point that progress on meta-algorithms is linked to progress in lower bounds. A few formalizations of this principle are known, e.g., natural proofs [RR97] (“a natural lower bound yields a cryptanalysis tool”) or hardness-randomness tradeoffs. Here, we get a formal statement of such a connection for arithmetic circuits: Identity testing for arithmetic circuits can be derandomized if and only if lower bounds can be proved.

### 1.4 Our results

In this paper, we show that derandomizing Polynomial Identity Testing is essentially *equivalent* to proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds for NEXP. More precisely, we prove that if one can test in polynomial time (or, even, nondeterministic subexponential time, infinitely often) whether a given arithmetic circuit over integers computes an identically zero polynomial, then either (i)

$\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  or (ii) Permanent is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. This implies that proving that  $\text{RP} = \text{ZPP}$  or  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  is *as hard as* proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds for  $\text{NEXP}$ !

For the converse direction, we extend the known hardness-randomness tradeoffs to the algebraic-complexity setting by showing the following. The Polynomial Identity Testing of  $n$ -variate  $\text{poly}(n)$ -degree polynomials computed by  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size arithmetic circuits can be done deterministically in subexponential time, provided that Permanent (or some other family of exponential-time computable multivariate polynomials) has superpolynomial arithmetic circuit complexity.

Our techniques allow us to obtain an unconditional circuit lower bound for the complexity class  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}}$ : we show that either  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  or Permanent is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. Thus,  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}}$  is the smallest known uniform complexity class that is proved to contain a language of superpolynomial (Boolean or arithmetic) circuit complexity.

We also prove that a certain version of Polynomial Identity Testing can be derandomized under the assumption that  $\text{EXP} \neq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ . This is similar to the result of Babai, Fortnow, Nisan, and Wigderson [BFNW93] saying that  $\text{BPP}$  can be derandomized under the assumption that  $\text{EXP} \neq \text{MA}$ . Our assumption is weaker since, by a straightforward argument,  $\text{NP}^{\text{RP}} \subseteq \text{MA}$ .

Finally, we point out the relevance of the Low-Degree Testing (i.e., testing whether a given function is sufficiently close to some low-degree polynomial) to the problem of showing implications such as “ $\text{BPP} = \text{P} \Rightarrow \text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ ”. Namely, we prove that  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ , provided that both  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  and the Low-Degree Testing can be done deterministically in polynomial time.

## 1.5 Our techniques

**Circuit lower bounds from  $\text{RP} = \text{P}$**  The proof that the assumption  $\text{RP} = \text{P}$  implies circuit lower bounds is fairly simple. The main ingredients are the implication  $\text{NEXP} \subseteq \text{P/poly} \Rightarrow \text{NEXP} = \text{MA}$  [IKW01] as well as the downward self-reducibility of the Permanent.

Here is a brief outline of our argument. The main idea is that testing whether a given arithmetic circuit is a correct circuit for the Permanent of  $n \times n$  integer matrices can be reduced to  $n$  polynomial identity tests for multivariate polynomials represented by arithmetic circuits. On the other hand, testing whether a given arithmetic circuit computes an identically zero polynomial is a  $\text{coRP}$  problem, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma. Hence, testing whether a given arithmetic circuit computes the Permanent is a  $\text{coRP}$ -problem.

Thus, any nontrivial (i.e., subexponential-time) derandomization of  $\text{coRP}$  yields an algorithm for testing whether an arithmetic circuit computes the Permanent. Assuming that the Permanent is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, we get a nondeterministic subexponential-time algorithm for the Permanent: we simply guess a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit for the Permanent and check the correctness of our guess.

Finally, the assumption that  $\text{NEXP} \subseteq \text{P/poly}$  yields that  $\text{NEXP} = \text{MA}$  [IKW01] and so, by the results of Valiant [Val79] and Toda [Tod91], we conclude that the Permanent is  $\text{NEXP}$ -complete, contradicting the Nondeterministic Time Hierarchy theorem.

**Derandomization of Polynomial Identity Testing from circuit lower bounds** The conditional derandomization result for the Polynomial Identity Testing is proved by combining the Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94] with the straight-line factorization algorithm for multivariate polynomials by Kaltofen [Kal89].

As in [CK97, LV98], we consider the search problem: Given a multivariate polynomial  $f$  over a field  $F$ , find its non-zero if it exists. The points at which we evaluate  $f$  will be chosen with the

help of a “hard” function, a multivariate polynomial  $p$  of high arithmetic circuit complexity, using the combinatorial designs of Nisan and Wigderson [NW94]. As a result, we convert the polynomial  $f$  into a new polynomial  $g$  on *significantly fewer* variables and of total degree polynomial in the total degrees of  $f$  and  $p$ . The polynomial  $g$  will have the property that  $g \equiv 0$  iff  $f \equiv 0$ . Then we look for a non-zero of  $g$  by a “brute-force” deterministic algorithm; the saving in running time is achieved since  $g$  has few variables.

The proof of correctness of our construction involves showing that any polynomial  $f$  for which our derandomization procedure fails to produce a non-zero can be used in designing a small arithmetic circuit for the supposedly hard polynomial  $p$ . Roughly speaking, if our NW generator based on  $p$  fails for a polynomial  $f$ , then  $p$  is a *root* of a certain polynomial  $\hat{f}$  derived from  $f$ . Thus, an arithmetic circuit for  $p$  can be found by *factoring* the polynomial  $\hat{f}$ , using [Kal89].

## 1.6 Why weren’t these results obtained before?

As the reader might gather from the outlines in the preceding subsection, the proofs of our main results are rather simple. One may wonder why it took the pseudorandomness community so long to find them. For example, all the necessary ingredients for the conditional derandomization of Polynomial Identity Testing, the Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94] and the Kaltofen factoring algorithm [Kal89], have been known for more than a decade.

In the case of derandomizing Polynomial Identity Tests, the main reason it was not done before seems that people tried to get a “full” pseudorandom generator for the algebraic complexity setting, and were bogged down trying to come up with a good definition of such a generator.

In the case of proving circuit lower bounds from the assumption  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$ , the stumbling block (at least for the authors of the present paper) was in focusing only on Boolean (and ignoring algebraic) circuit complexity. In turn, that was because of the lack of known algebraic-complexity hardness-randomness tradeoffs.

**Organization of the paper.** We give the necessary background in Section 2. Section 3 contains the results about testing correctness of arithmetic circuits for the Permanent. In Section 4, we derive circuit lower bounds for NEXP from the assumption that Polynomial Identity Testing can be derandomized. In Section 5, we obtain an unconditional circuit lower bound for a function in  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}}$ . In Section 6, we look at the problem of Low-Degree Testing (LDT), and establish some implications of the assumption that LDT can be done in deterministic polynomial time. In Section 7, we present conditional derandomization of Polynomial Identity Testing. Some concluding remarks are contained in Section 8.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Complexity classes

We use the standard definitions of complexity classes  $\text{RP}$ ,  $\text{BPP}$ ,  $\text{PH}$ ,  $\text{EXP}$ ,  $\text{NEXP}$ ,  $\#\text{P}$ , and  $\text{P/poly}$  [Pap94]; we define  $\text{SUBEXP} = \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{TIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  and, similarly,  $\text{NSUBEXP} = \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ . The class  $\text{MA}$  [Bab85, BM88] contains exactly those languages  $L$  that satisfy the property: there is a polynomial-time computable predicate  $R(x, y, z)$  and a constant  $c \in \mathbb{N}$  such that, for every  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} x \in L &\Rightarrow \exists y : \Pr_z[R(x, y, z) = 1] \geq 2/3, \text{ and} \\ x \notin L &\Rightarrow \forall y : \Pr_z[R(x, y, z) = 1] \leq 1/3, \end{aligned}$$

where  $y, z \in \{0, 1\}^{n^c}$ . For a complexity class  $\mathcal{C}$ , its “infinitely-often” version,  $\text{io-}\mathcal{C}$ , is defined as the set of all languages  $L$  over an alphabet  $\Sigma$  for which there is a language  $M \in \mathcal{C}$  over  $\Sigma$  such that  $L \cap \Sigma^n = M \cap \Sigma^n$  for infinitely many  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

Recall that the *Permanent* of an  $n \times n$  matrix  $A = (a_{i,j})$  of integers is defined as  $\text{Perm}(A) = \sum_{\sigma} \prod_{i=1}^n a_{i,\sigma(i)}$ , where the summation is over all permutations  $\sigma$  of  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ . We need the following results by Valiant and Toda that together show that Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is PH-hard.

**Theorem 1 ([Val79]).** Perm is #P-complete.

**Theorem 2 ([Tod91]).** PH  $\subseteq$  P<sup>#P</sup>.

We say that Perm is computable in NP if the following language is in NP:

$$\{(M, v) \mid M \text{ is a 0-1 matrix and } v = \text{Perm}(M)\}.$$

The definition for other nondeterministic complexity classes is similar.

Babai, Fortnow, and Lund obtained the following.

**Theorem 3 ([BFL91]).** EXP  $\subset$  P/poly  $\Rightarrow$  EXP = MA.

Theorem 3 was extended to the class NEXP by Impagliazzo, Kabanets, and Wigderson.

**Theorem 4 ([IKW01]).** NEXP  $\subset$  P/poly  $\Rightarrow$  NEXP = MA.

Since MA  $\subseteq$  PH, by combining Theorems 1, 2, and 4 we obtain the following.

**Corollary 5.** If NEXP  $\subset$  P/poly, then Perm is NEXP-complete.

We shall also need the following result of Babai, Fortnow, Nisan, and Wigderson.

**Theorem 6 ([BFNW93]).** If MA  $\not\subseteq$  io-NTIME( $2^{n^\epsilon}$ ) for some  $\epsilon > 0$ , then EXP = MA  $\subset$  P/poly.

## 2.2 Arithmetic circuits

We consider arithmetic circuits whose gates can be labeled by  $+$ ,  $-$ ,  $\times$ , and  $\div$ ; multiplication by constants is also allowed. The size of a circuit is determined by the number of its gates together with the sizes of all constants used by the circuit. An arithmetic circuit where each gate has fan-out at most one is called an arithmetic formula.

We will consider arithmetic circuits both over the set  $\mathbb{Z}$  of integers and over a (finite or infinite) field  $\mathbb{F}$ . When the ground (finite) field is not sufficiently large, we shall need to evaluate the circuit on an extension field. For instance, given an arithmetic circuit computing a polynomial  $f \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$  over some field  $\mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(q)$  for a prime power  $q$ , one can efficiently evaluate the polynomial  $f$  at points from an extension field  $\text{GF}(q^k)$  of  $\text{GF}(q)$ , for some  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ , provided that this extension field can be efficiently constructed from the ground field  $\mathbb{F}$ . Also, since every elementary field operation in  $\text{GF}(q^k)$  can be efficiently simulated using the operations from the ground field  $\text{GF}(q)$ , an arithmetic circuit computing  $f$  over  $\text{GF}(q^k)$  of size  $s$  gives rise to an arithmetic circuit for  $f$  over  $\text{GF}(q)$  of size  $\text{poly}(s, k)$ . In other words, the arithmetic circuit complexity of  $f$  over a ground field  $\mathbb{F}$  and over a “small” extension field of  $\mathbb{F}$  are polynomially related.

We will need the following simple lemma that bounds the degree of a polynomial computed by an arithmetic circuit (or formula) of a given size.

**Lemma 7.** An arithmetic circuit (respectively, formula) of size  $s$  on input variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  computes a polynomial of total degree at most  $2^s$  (respectively,  $s$ ).

*Proof.* Every multiplication gate in an arithmetic circuit can at most double the degree of the resulting polynomial, and so the total degree is bounded by  $2^s$ . In the case of arithmetic formulas, each multiplication gate can at most add the degrees of its two subformulas; hence, the total degree of the resulting polynomial is bounded by  $s$ .  $\square$

### 2.3 Polynomial identity testing and self-correction

We will consider multivariate polynomials over some integral domain, e.g., the ring  $\mathbb{Z}$  of integers. The *degree* of a monomial  $x_1^{d_1} \dots x_k^{d_k}$  is defined as  $\sum_{i=1}^k d_i$ ; the total degree of a polynomial is defined to be the maximum degree over all its monomials.

We shall be interested in the two following version of Polynomial Identity Testing Problem.

#### Arithmetic Circuit Identity Testing Problem (ACIT)

**Given:** An arithmetic circuit  $C$  computing a polynomial  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

**Decide:** Is  $p \equiv 0$ ?

The following result is due to Schwartz and Zippel.

**Lemma 8 ([Sch80, Zip79]).** *Let  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$  be any non-zero polynomial of total degree  $d$  over an integral domain  $\mathbb{F}$ . Let  $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  be any finite subset. Then*

$$\Pr_{a \in S^n} [p(a) = 0] \leq \frac{d}{|S|}.$$

Building upon [Sch80], Ibarra and Moran obtained the following result, whose proof is included for completeness.

**Lemma 9 ([IM83]).** *ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in coRP.*

*Proof.* By Lemma 7, a given arithmetic circuit  $C$  computes an  $n$ -variate polynomial  $p$  of total degree at most  $2^s$ , where  $n, s \in O(|C|)$ . Let  $S = \{1, \dots, 2^{s^2}\}$ . We would like to test whether  $C(a) = 0$  for a randomly chosen  $n$ -tuple  $a \in S^n$ , and accept iff the equality holds. Obviously, if  $p \equiv 0$ , then we would accept with probability one. On the other hand, if  $p \not\equiv 0$ , then, by Lemma 8, we would accept with probability at most  $2^s/2^{s^2} < 2^{-s}$ .

The only problem is that, since  $p$  can have degree  $2^s$ , the value of  $p$  on a given  $n$ -tuple  $a \in S^n$  can be as big as  $2^{s^2 2^s}$ , double-exponential in  $s$ ; obviously, such a value cannot be computed in time  $\text{poly}(s)$ . The way out is to use modular arithmetic: carry out the computation of  $p(a)$  modulo a random number  $m \in [2^{s^2}, 2^{s^3}]$ .

Clearly, if  $p(a) = 0$ , then  $p(a) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$  for every  $m$ . To analyze the probability that  $p(a) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$  for a random  $m$  when  $p(a) \neq 0$ , we consider two cases: (i)  $m$  is composite, and (ii)  $m$  is prime. By the Prime Number Theorem, the fraction of primes in the given interval  $[2^{s^2}, 2^{s^3}]$  is at least  $s^{-4}$ , and so the probability that case (i) occurs is at most  $1 - s^{-4}$ . On the other hand, at most  $2^s$  of the primes in our interval can divide  $p(a) \neq 0$ ; therefore, the probability that  $p(a) = 0$  modulo a random prime from our interval is at most  $2^{-s^2}$ . Consequently, the probability that  $p(a) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$  for a random  $m \in [2^{s^2}, 2^{s^3}]$  when  $p(a) \neq 0$  is at most  $(1 - s^{-4}) + 2^{-s^2} \leq 1 - s^{-5}$ .

Thus, if  $p \equiv 0$ , then  $p(a) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$  for every  $a$  and  $m$ . On the other hand, if  $p \not\equiv 0$ , then

$$\Pr_{a,m} [p(a) \equiv 0 \pmod{m}] \leq 2^{-s} + (1 - s^{-5}) \leq 1 - s^{-6}.$$

By repeating the calculations for  $s^7$  independently chosen  $m$ 's and accepting iff  $p(a) \equiv 0$  modulo every  $m$ , this error probability can be made less than  $1/2$ .  $\square$



Another important property of polynomials is their robustness, as witnessed by the following result due to Beaver, Feigenbaum, and Lipton; for completeness, we include the proof. Recall that two functions  $f, g : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , are said to be  $\epsilon$ -close, for some  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $f(a) = g(a)$  for all but an  $\epsilon$  fraction of points  $a \in \mathbb{F}^n$ .

**Lemma 10 ([BF90, Lip91]).** *For a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , let  $f : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  be a function that is  $\epsilon$ -close to some  $n$ -variate polynomial  $p$  of total degree  $d$ . Then there is a probabilistic  $\text{poly}(n, d)$ -time algorithm that, given oracle access to  $f$ , computes  $p(a)$  on every point  $a \in \mathbb{F}^n$  with high probability, provided that  $\epsilon < 1/(4(d+1))$  and  $|\mathbb{F}| > d+1$ .*

*Proof.* Consider the following randomized algorithm. Given an input  $a \in \mathbb{F}^n$ , choose a point  $b \in \mathbb{F}^n$  uniformly at random, and evaluate  $f(a+tb)$  for  $d+1$  distinct values of  $t \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$ . Using these values, interpolate the univariate polynomial  $q(t)$ , and return the value  $q(0)$ .

For the analysis, note that the point  $a+tb$ , for every fixed  $t \in \mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$ , is uniformly distributed in  $\mathbb{F}^n$ . Hence, the probability that  $f(a+tb) = p(a+tb)$  for all  $d+1$  values of  $t$  is at least  $1 - (d+1)\epsilon > 3/4$ . Since the restriction of  $p$  to the line  $\{a+tb \mid t \in \mathbb{F}\}$  is a univariate polynomial in  $t$  of degree at most  $d$ , it follows that  $q(t) \equiv p(a+tb)$  with probability greater than  $3/4$ . Thus, with probability greater than  $3/4$ , the described algorithm will output  $q(0) = p(a)$ , as required.  $\square$

## 2.4 The Nisan-Wigderson designs

Our derandomization procedure for ACIT will use a generalization of the Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94] that is based on the following construction of combinatorial designs.

**Lemma 11 ([NW94]).** *For every  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $n < 2^m$ , there exists a family of sets  $S_1, \dots, S_n \subseteq \{1, \dots, l\}$  such that*

1.  $l \in O(m^2/\log n)$ ,
2. for all  $1 \leq i \leq n$ ,  $|S_i| = m$ , and
3. for all  $1 \leq i < j \leq n$ ,  $|S_i \cap S_j| \leq \log n$ .

*Such a family can be constructed deterministically in time  $\text{poly}(n, 2^l)$ .*

## 3 Testing an Arithmetic Circuit for Permanent

### 3.1 Case of arithmetic circuits over $\mathbb{Z}$ without divisions

Let  $p_n$  be a polynomial on  $n^2$  variables  $\{x_{i,j}\}_{i,j=1}^n$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ . If  $p_n$  computes Perm of  $n \times n$  integer matrices, then appropriate restrictions of  $p_n$  will compute Perm on  $i \times i$  integer matrices, for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ : we can just place an  $i \times i$  matrix  $A$  in the lower right corner, assigning 1 to the diagonal variables above  $A$  and 0 to the rest of variables. Let  $p_i$  denote such a restriction of  $p_n$  to  $i \times i$  matrices, for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ . It follows immediately from the definition of Perm that

$$p_1(x) \equiv x, \tag{1}$$

and, for all  $1 < i \leq n$ ,

$$p_i(X) \equiv \sum_{j=1}^i x_{1,j} p_{i-1}(X_j), \tag{2}$$

where  $X$  is a matrix of  $i^2$  variables  $x_{k,l}$ , and  $X_j$  is the  $j$ th minor of the matrix  $X$  along the first row.

Conversely, by induction on  $i$ , if arbitrary polynomials  $p_1, \dots, p_n$  satisfy all the identities given by (1) and (2) above, then each  $p_i$  computes Perm of  $i \times i$  matrices over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ .

This reasoning leads us to the following.

**Lemma 12.** *The language*

$$ACP \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C \mid C \text{ is an arithmetic circuit computing Perm of integer matrices}\}$$

*is polynomial-time many-one reducible to ACIT.*

*Proof.* Let  $p_n$  be a polynomial on  $n^2$  variables  $\{x_{i,j}\}_{i,j=1}^n$  computed by a given arithmetic circuit  $C$ . Let  $p_i$  be the restrictions of  $p_n$  to  $i \times i$  matrices of variables, defined so that if  $p_n \equiv \text{Perm}$ , then each  $p_i$  computes Perm on  $i \times i$  matrices.

Testing equation (1) and equations (2), for each  $1 < i \leq n$ , is equivalent to testing whether

$$h_1(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} p_1(x) - x \equiv 0$$

and

$$h_i(X) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} p_i(X) - \sum_{j=1}^i x_{1,j} p_{i-1}(X_j) \equiv 0.$$

Equivalently, we need to test whether

$$h(X^1, X^2, \dots, X^n, y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} h_1(X^1) \times y^{n-1} + h_2(X^2) \times y^{n-2} + \dots + h_n(X^n) \equiv 0,$$

where  $X^i$  is a set of  $i^2$  variables (new for each  $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), and  $y$  is a new variable.

Clearly,  $C$  computes Perm of  $n \times n$  integer matrices iff  $h \equiv 0$ . Also note that the polynomial  $h$  is computable by an arithmetic circuit of size  $\text{poly}(|C|)$ , since every  $h_i$  is.  $\square$

**Corollary 13.** *If ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NSUBEXP, then the language ACP of Lemma 12 is also in NSUBEXP.*

*Proof.* This is immediate from Lemma 12.  $\square$

**Corollary 14.** *Suppose that ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NSUBEXP. If Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits (over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , without divisions), then Perm  $\in$  NSUBEXP.*

*Proof.* If Perm is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then, for each  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , we can nondeterministically guess a  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size arithmetic circuit  $C$  computing Perm on  $n \times n$  integer matrices. Since, by our assumption, testing whether  $C$  is indeed computing Perm can be done in NSUBEXP by Corollary 13, we can verify in nondeterministic subexponential time that the guessed arithmetic circuit indeed computes Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$ . Once we have such a circuit, we can deterministically evaluate it at a given 0-1  $n \times n$  matrix in polynomial time, by doing all operations modulo a sufficiently large number, e.g., modulo  $2^{n \log n + 1}$ , since the value of Perm on a 0-1  $n \times n$  matrix is at most  $2^{n \log n}$ . Hence, we conclude that Perm can be computed in nondeterministic subexponential time.  $\square$

By modifying the proof of Corollary 14, one can easily show the following.

**Corollary 15.** *Suppose that ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NP. If Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then Perm  $\in$  NP.*

### 3.2 Case of arithmetic circuits over $\mathbb{Q}$ with divisions

Here we will argue that if ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  can be derandomized, and if Perm over  $\mathbb{Q}$  has polynomial-size arithmetic circuits (possibly using divisions), then we still get the conclusion that Perm of 0-1 matrices is in nondeterministic subexponential time.

Note that, in general, a given arithmetic circuit  $C$  over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with divisions computes a rational function  $f/g$ , where  $f$  and  $g$  are polynomials over  $\mathbb{Z}$ . The assumption that  $C$  computes Perm means that  $f \equiv g\text{Perm}$ . This implies, for any input integer matrix  $M$  such that  $g(M) \neq 0$ , we have  $f(M)/g(M) = \text{Perm}(M)$ . The problem is that  $C$  may be undefined on a particular matrix  $M$  whose permanent we want to compute.

Fortunately, we can use the following result by Strassen [Str73]; Kaltofen [Kal88, Section 7] provides an alternative proof.

**Theorem 16 ([Str73]).** *Given an arithmetic circuit  $C$  (over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with divisions) of size  $s$  computing a degree  $d$  polynomial  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , and a point  $\vec{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$  such that  $C$  is defined at  $\vec{a}$ , one can construct, in time  $\text{poly}(s, d, |\vec{a}|)$ , a new circuit  $C'$  such that*

1.  $C'$  also computes  $f$ ,
2. the only divisions in  $C'$  are by constants (independent of the input to  $C'$ ).

**Corollary 17.** *If there is a family of polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with divisions, computing Perm, then there is a family of pairs of polynomial-size division-free circuits  $(C_1^n, C_2^n)$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$  such that  $C_2^n$  computes an integer constant  $c \neq 0$ , and  $C_1^n \equiv c\text{Perm}$  over all  $n \times n$  integer matrices.*

*Proof.* For any arithmetic circuit  $C$  of size  $s$  computing a rational function  $f/g$ , where  $f, g$  are polynomials over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , we get that both  $f$  and  $g$  are also computable by arithmetic circuits of size  $\text{poly}(s)$ : we can associate with each gate of  $C$  a pair of new gates, one for the numerator and the other for the denominator, and then simulate  $C$  using these pairs of gates. Hence, the denominator  $g$  has bounded degree  $2^{\text{poly}(s)}$  by Lemma 7. It follows by Lemma 8 that there is a tuple of integers  $(a_1, \dots, a_n)$  at which  $g$  is non-zero, and such that the bit complexity of each  $a_i$  is polynomial in  $s$ . We conclude that the size of a “good” point  $\vec{a}$  at which a given arithmetic circuit  $C$  of size  $s$  (over  $\mathbb{Q}$ , with divisions) is defined is bounded by a polynomial in  $s$ .

Assuming that a  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size circuit  $C$  computes Perm of  $n \times n$  matrices, we can obtain from  $C$  by Theorem 16 a new  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size circuit  $C'$  for Perm such that the numerator of  $C'$  computes an integer polynomial  $h(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and the denominator computes an integer constant  $c \neq 0$ . Both the numerator and the denominator of  $C'$  are computable by division-free arithmetic circuits over  $\mathbb{Z}$  of size  $\text{poly}(|C'|)$ .  $\square$

Now, suppose that we have such a pair of  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size division-free arithmetic circuits  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , where  $C_1$  computes an  $n^2$ -variable polynomial and  $C_2$  computes some constant  $c$ . We want to check  $C_1(X) \equiv c\text{Perm}(X)$  over integers, where  $X$  is an  $n \times n$  matrix of variables.

Let us define (as in the previous subsection) restrictions  $C^i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , of  $C_1$  so that if  $C_1$  computes  $c\text{Perm}$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , then each  $C^i$  computes  $c\text{Perm}$  of  $i \times i$  integer matrices. Now, equations (1) and (2) become  $C^1(x) \equiv cx$ , and  $C^i(X) \equiv \sum_{j=1}^i x_{1,j} C^{i-1}(X_j)$  for  $2 \leq i \leq n$ . Note that all these are polynomial identity tests for polynomial-size division-free arithmetic circuits over  $\mathbb{Z}$ . Thus, if ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  can be derandomized, then we can test whether  $C_1(X) \equiv c\text{Perm}(X)$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ .

Finally, once we successfully verified that a given circuit  $C_1$  computes  $c\text{Perm}$ , we would like to be able to compute  $\text{Perm}(M)$  for every particular 0-1 matrix  $M$  efficiently. The obvious problem is

that, as we evaluate  $C_1(M)$  and compute  $c$  using  $C_2$ , we may get intermediate integer values whose bit complexity is exponential in the sizes of  $C_1$  and  $C_2$ . If we use modular arithmetic modulo some  $m$ , we need to make sure that  $m$  does not divide  $c$  (so that we can compute  $C_1(M)/c \pmod m$ ). If we have a prime  $m \geq 2^{n^2}$  that does not divide  $c$ , then we can recover  $\text{Perm}(M)$ . It is not clear how to find such a prime efficiently deterministically, but it is easy to find  $m$  nondeterministically: guess an  $\Omega(n^2)$ -bit prime  $m$  together with its  $\text{polylog}(m)$ -size certificate of primality (which exists by Pratt's result [Pra75]), simulate the computation of the circuit  $C_2$  modulo  $m$ , accepting iff the result is non-zero.

These arguments yield the following strengthening of Corollary 14.

**Theorem 18.** *Suppose that ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NSUBEXP, and that Perm of  $n \times n$  matrices over  $\mathbb{Q}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with divisions. Then Perm is in NSUBEXP.*

*Proof.* First, for any given  $n$ , we nondeterministically guess two polynomial-size division-free arithmetic circuits  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , where  $C_1$  depends on  $n^2$  variables, and  $C_2$  has no input variables (and so  $C_2$  just computes some integer constant  $c$ ). We also guess a prime  $2^{n^2} \leq m \leq 2^{|C_2|^{2+n^2}}$  together with its primality certificate, and test that  $c \not\equiv 0 \pmod m$ ; the latter test can be done efficiently by evaluating the circuit  $C_2$  modulo  $m$ . If  $c \neq 0$ , such a prime  $m$  always exists (since  $c \leq |C_2|^{2|C_2|}$ ). If the primality certificate for  $m$  is correct, and if  $c \not\equiv 0 \pmod m$ , then we continue; otherwise we reject.

By Corollary 17, we know that if Perm is computable by a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit (over  $\mathbb{Q}$ , with divisions), then there exist two division-free polynomial-size circuits  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$  such that  $C_2$  computes a non-zero integer constant  $c$  and  $C_1 \equiv c\text{Perm}$ . We can test whether  $C_1(X) \equiv c\text{Perm}(X)$  for  $n \times n$  integer matrices  $X$ , by verifying identities (1) and (2) (modified as described in our discussion above), using the assumed nondeterministic subexponential-time algorithm for ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$ . If all these identities hold, then we know that  $C_1(M) = c\text{Perm}(M)$  for every 0-1 matrix  $M$ . Moreover, we can compute  $\text{Perm}(M)$  by simulating the computation of  $C_1(M)/c$  modulo our previously guessed prime  $m$ ; remember that  $m$  was chosen so that  $c \not\equiv 0 \pmod m$  and that  $\text{Perm}(M) < m$ , for any 0-1 matrix  $M$ .  $\square$

Similarly, we can strengthen Corollary 15.

**Theorem 19.** *Suppose that ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NP and that Perm is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits over  $\mathbb{Q}$  with divisions. Then  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}$ .*

## 4 Circuit Lower Bounds via Derandomization

### 4.1 If ACIT can be derandomized

**Definition 20.** We say that NEXP is *computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits* if the following two conditions hold:

1.  $\text{NEXP} \subset \text{P/poly}$ , and
2. Perm over  $\mathbb{Q}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits (possibly with divisions).

If, in the definition above, condition (1) holds for  $\text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$  rather than NEXP, we will say that  $\text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.

**Theorem 21.** *If ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in  $\text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for every  $\epsilon > 0$ , then NEXP is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that  $\text{ACIT} \in \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ , and NEXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. It follows by Theorem 4 and Corollary 5 that  $\text{NEXP} = \text{coNEXP}$  and Perm is NEXP-complete. On the other hand, by Theorem 18, we have that  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ , for every  $\epsilon > 0$ . Hence, we obtain that  $\text{coNEXP} \subseteq \text{NTIME}(2^n)$ , which is impossible by the following simple diagonalization argument. On an input  $x$  of length  $n$ , simulate the  $x$ th nondeterministic Turing machine  $M_x$  on  $x$  for  $2^n$  steps, and reject iff  $M_x$  accepts; note that a co-nondeterministic Turing machine can easily “flip” the decision of the nondeterministic machine  $M_x$ . Since we can assume that each nondeterministic Turing machine has descriptions of size  $n$  for all sufficiently large  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , we obtain our result.  $\square$

Assuming stronger derandomization of ACIT, we can strengthen the conclusion of Theorem 21.

**Theorem 22.** *If ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in NP, then  $\text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$  is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* If Perm is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then we are done. Thus, let us suppose that Perm is computable by polynomial size arithmetic circuits.

We know by Theorems 1 and 2 that Perm is PH-hard. On the other hand, our assumptions imply, by Theorem 19, that  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}$ . This means that  $\text{PH} = \text{NP} = \text{coNP}$ . Hence, by padding, we have that  $\text{NEXP} = \text{coNEXP} = \text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$ . Appealing to Theorem 23 concludes the proof.  $\square$

With extra care, we also obtain the “infinitely often” version of Theorem 21.

**Theorem 23.** *If ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in  $\text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for every  $\epsilon > 0$ , then NEXP is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* Suppose that NEXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. Then, by Theorem 4 and Corollary 5, we have  $\text{NEXP} = \text{EXP}$  and Perm is EXP-complete.

A closer look at the proof of Theorem 18 reveals that if  $\text{ACIT} \in \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ , then  $\text{Perm} \in \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})/O(\log n)$ , for every  $\epsilon > 0$ . Indeed, for a given input size  $n$ , the output of the many-one reduction of Lemma 12 has size  $n^d$  for some fixed constant  $d$ . We can use an advice string of size  $(d+1)\log n$  to encode the “good” input size between  $n^d$  and  $(n+1)^d$  at which a given  $\text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  algorithm for ACIT is correct; if there is no good input size in this interval, then the advice string can be arbitrary. By padding up the output of our many-one reduction so that it is of the “good” size, we can construct a correct polynomial-size arithmetic circuit for Perm in nondeterministic subexponential time, for infinitely many input sizes, using logarithmic advice.

Next we will argue that

$$\text{EXP} \subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})/\log^2 n \tag{3}$$

for every  $\epsilon > 0$ . Recall that, by our assumption, Perm is EXP-complete. This means that every language  $L \in \text{EXP}$  is reducible to Perm of 0-1 matrices in time  $n^{c_L}$ . We can use  $O(\log n)$ -size advice string to encode the “good” input size in the interval between  $n^{c_L}$  and  $(n+1)^{c_L}$  at which our  $\text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})/O(\log n)$ -time algorithm for Perm is correct. Then we can pad up to the “good” size all the queries to Perm made by the reduction from  $L$  to Perm. By combining the advice strings of the reduction and the algorithm for Perm, we conclude that

$$L \in \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})/c'_L \log n$$

for some constant  $c'_L$  dependent on  $L$ . Since  $\log^2 n \geq c \log n$  for every constant  $c$  whenever  $n$  gets large, the inclusion (3) follows.

Finally, to derive a contradiction, we employ an argument from [IKW01]. Note that the existence of a universal Turing machine for  $\text{NTIME}(2^n)$  and the assumption that  $\text{NEXP} \subset \text{P/poly}$  imply that there is a fixed constant  $c_0$  such that

$$\text{NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})/\log^2 n \subset \text{SIZE}(n^{c_0}).$$

It follows that  $\text{EXP} \subset \text{io-SIZE}(n^{c_0})$ , which is impossible by a simple diagonalization argument.  $\square$

## 4.2 If RP can be derandomized

Since ACIT over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is in  $\text{coRP}$  by Lemma 9, we immediately obtain the following results.

**Corollary 24.** *If  $\text{coRP} \subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for every  $\epsilon > 0$ , then  $\text{NEXP}$  is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* This is immediate from Lemma 9 and Theorem 23.  $\square$

**Corollary 25.** *If  $\text{coRP} \subseteq \text{NP}$ , then  $\text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$  is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* This is immediate from Lemma 9 and Theorem 22.  $\square$

**Corollary 26.** *If  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  or if  $\text{RP} = \text{ZPP}$ , then  $\text{NEXP} \cap \text{coNEXP}$  is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits.*

*Proof.* If  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  or if  $\text{RP} = \text{ZPP}$ , then  $\text{coRP} \subseteq \text{NP}$ , and the result follows by Corollary 25.  $\square$

## 5 A Hard Language in $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}}$

Currently, the smallest complexity class known to contain a language of superpolynomial Boolean circuit complexity is  $\text{MA-EXP}$ , the exponential-time analogue of the class  $\text{MA}$ . The following result is due to Buhrman, Fortnow, and Thierauf.

**Theorem 27 ([BFT98]).**  $\text{MA-EXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

While we cannot strengthen Theorem 27, we can prove that a (seemingly) smaller complexity class than  $\text{MA-EXP}$  contains a language of superpolynomial *arithmetic* circuit complexity. Namely, we show the following.

**Theorem 28.** *At least one of the following holds:*

1. *Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is not computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, or*
2.  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{RP}} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

First, observe that  $\text{NP}^{\text{BPP}} \subseteq \text{MA}$  by a fairly straightforward argument. Hence, by padding, we have that  $\text{NEXP}^{\text{BPP}} \subseteq \text{MA-EXP}$ , and so Theorem 28 shows the existence of a hard language in a smaller complexity class than  $\text{MA-EXP}$ . As a side remark, we want to point out that  $\text{MA} \subseteq \text{NP}^{\text{promise-RP}}$  (the proof is implicit in [BF99]); hence,  $\text{MA-EXP} \subseteq \text{NEXP}^{\text{promise-RP}}$ .

For the proof of Theorem 28, we shall need the following.

**Lemma 29.** *If Perm is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ .*

*Proof.* By Lemmas 9 and 12, we know that the problem of testing whether a given arithmetic circuit computes Perm of integer matrices is many-one reducible to the coRP problem ACIT. Hence, we can nondeterministically guess a small arithmetic circuit for Perm and test its correctness with access to the RP oracle. It follows that  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ .  $\square$

**Theorem 30.** *If NEXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then  $\text{NEXP} \subseteq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ .*

*Proof.* Recall that our assumption that NEXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits means that both  $\text{NEXP} \subset \text{P/poly}$  and Perm is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. The former yields, by Corollary 5, that Perm is NEXP-complete. By Lemma 29, the latter implies that  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ , which concludes our proof.  $\square$

We are now ready to give a proof of Theorem 28.

*Proof of Theorem 28.* Assume NEXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. By Theorem 30,  $\text{NEXP} \subseteq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ . By padding,  $\text{NEE} \subseteq \text{NE}^{\text{RP}}$ , where  $\text{NEE} = \text{NTIME}(2^{2^{O(n)}})$ . Since  $\text{EE} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$  [Kan82], our claim follows.  $\square$

Later we shall need the following result that is similar to Theorem 30.

**Theorem 31.** *If EXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then  $\text{EXP} \subseteq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ .*

*Proof.* The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 30. If  $\text{EXP} \subset \text{P/poly}$ , then  $\text{EXP} = \text{MA}$  by Theorem 3; hence, by Theorems 1 and 2, we conclude that Perm is EXP-complete. Now, if Perm is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, then  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$  by Lemma 29.  $\square$

## 6 Low-Degree Testing and Derandomization

### 6.1 Testing a Boolean circuit for Permanent

In Section 3, we showed how to test in probabilistic polynomial time whether a given arithmetic circuit computes the Permanent. The main reason our probabilistic algorithm is a coRP-style algorithm is that we are dealing with an *arithmetic* circuit, and hence, we know that the given circuit computes some polynomial of total degree bounded by the size of the circuit. If we could deterministically test whether a given *Boolean* circuit computes a polynomial of low degree, then we would be able to adapt our arguments from Section 3 in the Boolean (rather than arithmetic) setting. We formalize this idea below.

The problem of *Low-Degree Testing* consists in checking whether a given function  $f : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  (e.g., represented by a Boolean circuit) is close to some “low-degree” polynomial  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ . This problem has been extensively studied in the context of program testing and probabilistically checkable proofs (see, e.g., [RS96] and the references therein). We state the Low-Degree Testing as the following promise problem.

#### Low-Degree Testing Problem (LDT)

**Positive inputs:** A Boolean circuit computing a function  $f : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  that agrees with some degree  $d$  polynomial over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ .

**Negative inputs:** A Boolean circuit computing a function  $f : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  that is not  $1/k$ -close to any degree  $d$  polynomial over  $\mathbb{F}$ .

The known randomized algorithms for low-degree testing [BFL91, FGL<sup>+</sup>96, RS96, AS98, ALM<sup>+</sup>98, RS97, AS97] imply that LDT is in promise-BPP. It is not known if LDT is hard for promise-BPP. We will argue below that if LDT can be solved in deterministic polynomial time, and if  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$ , then  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

We say that LDT can be done in polynomial time if there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm accepting all positive inputs and rejecting all negative inputs. More precisely, there must exist a constant  $c_0 \in \mathbb{N}$  and a deterministic Turing machine  $T$  such that, given  $d, k \in \mathbb{N}$  and a Boolean circuit  $C$  of size  $s$  computing a function  $f : \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , where  $\mathbb{F}$  is a finite field of size at least  $(d + k + s)^{c_0}$ , the machine  $T$  runs in time  $\text{poly}(s, d, k, n, \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ , accepting if  $C$  is a positive input, and rejecting if  $C$  is a negative input to LDT.

Next we describe algorithm TEST (see Algorithm 1 below) whose properties will be useful in deriving the main results of this section.

**INPUT:**  $(q, C, M, b)$ , where  $q \in \mathbb{N}$  is given in unary,  $C$  is a Boolean circuit with  $n^2 \log q$  inputs,  $M$  is an  $n \times n$  matrix of elements from  $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ , and  $b \in \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ .

1. Deterministically test if  $q$  is a prime, and that  $q > (n + n^2 + |C|)^{c_0}$ . If  $q$  is not a prime, then REJECT.
2. Viewing  $C$  as a circuit on input  $n \times n$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$ , define  $C_i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , to be the restriction of  $C$  to  $i \times i$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$  satisfying the property: If  $C$  computes Perm of  $n \times n$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$ , then each  $C_i$  computes Perm of  $i \times i$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$ . For every  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , run the deterministic LDT algorithm on  $C_i$  for  $\mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(q)$ ,  $d = i$ , and  $k = n^2$ . If any  $C_i$  is rejected by the LDT algorithm, then REJECT.
3. Probabilistically test that equations (1) and (2) hold for the functions  $f_i$  computed by  $C_i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , when matrix elements are chosen uniformly at random from  $\text{GF}(q)$ . If any  $C_i$  fails the test, then REJECT.
4. Apply Lemma 10 to  $C$ , getting a randomized circuit  $\hat{C}$  that computes a degree  $n$  polynomial over  $\text{GF}(q)$ . Probabilistically test if  $\hat{C}(M) = b$ . If the equality holds, then ACCEPT; otherwise, REJECT.

**Algorithm 1: TEST**

The properties of Algorithm TEST are summarized in the following lemma.

**Lemma 32.** *1. Algorithm TEST is a BPP algorithm.*

- 2. If  $C$  is a Boolean circuit correctly computing Perm of  $n \times n$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$ , then the tuple  $(q, C, M, C(M))$  is accepted by TEST with probability one.*
- 3. If a tuple  $(q, C, M, b)$  is accepted by TEST with probability at least  $3/4$ , then  $\text{Perm}(M) \equiv b \pmod q$ .*

*Proof.* Clearly, the running time of TEST is polynomial in  $q, n, |C|$ . We need to argue that every input to TEST is accepted or rejected with high probability.

Observe that Steps 1 and 2 of TEST are deterministic. If an input is not rejected after these first two steps, then we know that  $C_i$ 's compute functions  $f_i$  that are  $1/n^2$ -close to some (uniquely determined) degree  $i$  polynomials  $p_i$  over the finite field  $\text{GF}(q)$ . At this point there are three possibilities:



- I. for some  $1 \leq i \leq n$ ,  $p_i \neq \text{Perm}$  of  $i \times i$  matrices over  $\text{GF}(q)$ ,
- II. all  $p_i$ 's compute  $\text{Perm}$ , and  $\text{Perm}(M) \equiv b \pmod{q}$ , and
- III. all  $p_i$ 's compute  $\text{Perm}$ , and  $\text{Perm}(M) \not\equiv b \pmod{q}$ .

Below we shall argue that in cases I and III,  $\text{TEST}$  rejects with probability close to one, and in case II,  $\text{TEST}$  accepts with probability close to one.

In Step 3,  $n$  polynomial identity tests are run on  $f_i$ 's. Since each  $f_i$  is  $1/n^2$ -close to a polynomial  $p_i$ , we can assume, with probability at least  $1 - 1/n$ , that all these tests are run on the polynomials  $p_i$ . If at least one of  $p_i$ 's is different from  $\text{Perm}$ , then this will be detected with probability at least  $1 - 1/n$ . Hence, if all  $p_i$ 's compute  $\text{Perm}$ , then Step 3 will pass with probability at least  $1 - 1/n$ ; if, on the other hand, at least one of the  $p_i$ 's is not equal to  $\text{Perm}$ , then Step 3 will fail with probability at least  $(1 - 1/n)^2 \geq 1 - 2/n$ .

If Step 3 did not fail with high probability, then the circuit  $\hat{C}$  correctly computes  $\text{Perm}(M)$  with probability close to one. Thus, Step 4 decides if  $\text{Perm}(M) \equiv b \pmod{q}$  correctly with probability close to one.

Thus, we have proved claim 1 of the lemma. Claim 2 is obvious. Claim 3 follows since  $\text{TEST}$  accepts with high probability only in case II.  $\square$

By analogy with Corollary 14, we obtain the following.

**Corollary 33.** *Suppose that  $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{NSUBEXP}$  and that  $\text{LDT}$  can be done in polynomial time. If  $\text{Perm} \in \text{P/poly}$ , then  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NSUBEXP}$ .*

*Proof.* Observe that our assumptions imply that the language  $L(\text{TEST})$  of the BPP algorithm  $\text{TEST}$  of Lemma 32 is in  $\text{NSUBEXP}$ . The following is a nondeterministic subexponential-time algorithm for  $\text{Perm}$ .

Let  $M$  be a given  $n \times n$  integer matrix; for simplicity, let us assume that each entry of  $M$  can be described using at most  $n$  bits, and so the value  $\text{Perm}(M)$  can be described using at most  $n^3$  bits. We nondeterministically guess a polynomial-size Boolean circuit  $C$  for  $\text{Perm}$  of  $n \times n$  matrices with  $n$ -bit integer entries. Let  $C^i$  be the Boolean circuit computing the value of  $C$  modulo the  $i$ th prime  $q_i$  in the interval  $[|C|^5, |C|^6]$ , for  $1 \leq i \leq n^4$ ; the Prime Number Theorem guarantees that there are sufficiently many primes in the chosen interval. Note that, if  $C$  is indeed a correct circuit computing  $\text{Perm}$  over integers, then each  $C^i$  is a correct circuit computing  $\text{Perm}$  modulo  $q_i$ .

Let  $M_i \equiv M \pmod{q_i}$ , for  $1 \leq i \leq n^4$ . We nondeterministically guess  $b = \text{Perm}(M)$ , and, for each  $1 \leq i \leq n^4$ , we set  $b_i \equiv b \pmod{q_i}$ . Then we nondeterministically check in subexponential time whether  $(q_i, C^i, M_i, b_i) \in L(\text{TEST})$ . If these tests pass for every  $i$ , then we output  $b$ ; otherwise, we reject.

Note that by claim 3 of Lemma 32, any output value  $b$  will be such that  $b_i \equiv \text{Perm}(M) \pmod{q_i}$ , for all  $i$ . Hence, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we have that  $b = \text{Perm}(M)$ .

By claim 2 of Lemma 32, all tests  $(q_i, C^i, M_i, b_i) \in L(\text{TEST})$  will pass for the correct circuit  $C$  computing  $\text{Perm}$  and the value  $b = \text{Perm}(M)$ . Thus, our nondeterministic algorithm will always output  $b = \text{Perm}(M)$ .  $\square$

## 6.2 Derandomization of MA

In general, it is not known whether the assumption that  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  should imply any derandomization of the class  $\text{MA}$ . However, under the additional assumption that the  $\text{LDT}$  is easy, we get the following.

**Theorem 34.** *Suppose that LDT can be done in polynomial time. If  $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{NSUBEXP}$ , then  $\text{MA} \subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ , for every  $\epsilon > 0$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that  $\text{MA} \not\subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for some  $\epsilon > 0$ . Then, by Theorem 6, we have  $\text{EXP} = \text{MA} = \text{PH} \subset \text{P/poly}$ . Since  $\text{Perm} \in \text{EXP}$ , we get that  $\text{Perm}$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$  has polynomial-size Boolean circuits. It now follows by Corollary 33 that  $\text{Perm} \in \text{NSUBEXP}$ .

Since  $\text{Perm} \in \text{EXP}$  and  $\text{Perm}$  is PH-hard by Theorems 1 and 2, we have that  $\text{Perm}$  is EXP-complete. Consequently, we get that  $\text{MA} = \text{EXP} \subseteq \text{NSUBEXP}$ . A contradiction.  $\square$

**Remark 35.** It is possible to prove a version of Theorem 34 with the class MA being replaced by promise-BPP (or the class APP introduced in [KRC00]). That is, the assumptions of Theorem 34 imply that promise-BPP can be computed in nondeterministic subexponential time, infinitely often. It is an interesting open question whether one can achieve a *deterministic* subexponential-time simulation of promise-BPP under the assumptions that both  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  and LDT is in P.

### 6.3 Circuit lower bounds

As a corollary of Theorem 34, we obtain the following result: if both LDT and BPP can be derandomized, then NEXP does not have polynomial-size Boolean circuits.

**Theorem 36.** *Suppose that LDT can be done in polynomial time. If  $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{NSUBEXP}$ , then  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .*

*Proof.* By Theorem 34, we get from our assumptions that  $\text{MA} \subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^n)$ . This implies that  $\text{NEXP} \neq \text{MA}$ .

Indeed, suppose that  $\text{NEXP} = \text{MA}$ . Then  $\text{NEXP} = \text{EXP} = \text{coNEXP} \subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^n)$ . But a simple diagonalization argument shows that  $\text{coNEXP} \not\subseteq \text{io-NTIME}(2^n)$ .

Finally, since  $\text{NEXP} \neq \text{MA}$ , the result follows by Theorem 4.  $\square$

Theorem 36 strengthens one of the results in [IKW01] saying that if promise-BPP can be derandomized, then  $\text{NEXP} \not\subseteq \text{P/poly}$ . This is because the assumption that promise-BPP can be done in deterministic polynomial time implies that both  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$  and that LDT is in deterministic polynomial time.

## 7 Conditional Derandomization of Polynomial Identity Tests

### 7.1 Finding roots of multivariate polynomials

Our derandomization procedure will use the existence of an efficient algorithm for the following problem of finding roots of multivariate polynomials over a field  $\mathbb{F}$ , where  $\mathbb{F}$  is either a finite field  $\text{GF}(q^t)$  of prime characteristic  $q$ , or the field  $\mathbb{Q}$  of rationals.

#### Root Finding

**GIVEN:** An arithmetic circuit computing a non-zero polynomial  $g(x_1, \dots, x_n, y)$  of total degree  $d$  over a field  $\mathbb{F}$ .

**FIND:** A list of arithmetic circuits which contains a circuit for every polynomial  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  such that

$$g(x_1, \dots, x_n, p(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \equiv 0.$$

We need the following result of Kaltofen.

**Theorem 37 ([Kal89]).** *There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given an arithmetic circuit of size  $s$  computing a polynomial  $f \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$  of total degree at most  $d$ , with probability at least  $3/4$  outputs the numbers  $e_i \geq 1$  and irreducible polynomials  $h_i \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq r$ , given by arithmetic circuits of size  $\text{poly}(s, d, \log |\mathbb{F}|)$  such that*

$$f = \prod_{i=1}^r h_i^{e_i}.$$

*In case the characteristic  $q$  of  $\mathbb{F}$  divides any  $e_i$ , i.e.,  $e_i = q^{k_i} e'_i$  with  $e'_i$  not divisible by  $q$ , the algorithm returns  $e'_i$  instead of  $e_i$ , and the corresponding arithmetic circuit computes  $h_i^{q^{k_i}}$  instead of  $h_i$ . For  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Q}$ , the sizes of produced arithmetic circuits are  $\text{poly}(s, d, a)$ , where  $a$  is the maximum size of a coefficient of  $f$ .*

We also use the following basic fact.

**Lemma 38 (Gauss).** *For a field  $\mathbb{F}$ , let  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n, y) \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n, y]$  and  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$  be any polynomials such that*

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n, p(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \equiv 0.$$

*Then  $y - p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is an irreducible factor of  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n, y)$  in the ring  $\mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n, y]$ .*

Now we can prove that the Root Finding problem is efficiently solvable.

**Corollary 39.** *The root finding problem for a polynomial  $g \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_n, y]$  of total degree  $d$  computable by an arithmetic circuit of size  $s$  can be solved probabilistically in time  $\text{poly}(s, d, \log |\mathbb{F}|)$ ; for  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Q}$ , the running time is  $\text{poly}(n, d, a)$ , where  $a$  is the maximum size of a coefficient of  $g$ .*

*Proof.* For the case of  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Q}$ , this follows immediately from Lemma 38 and Theorem 37. Indeed, with high probability, the algorithm of Theorem 37 will produce a small arithmetic circuit computing  $y - p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ . Substituting 0 for  $y$ , and multiplying by  $-1$ , we obtain an arithmetic circuit for  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ .

For the case of a finite field  $\mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(q^t)$  for some prime  $q$ , the same reasoning as above gives us a small arithmetic circuit for  $p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ , provided that the multiplicity  $e$  of the linear factor  $y - p(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  of  $g$  is not divisible by the characteristic  $q$  of the field  $\mathbb{F}$ . If  $q$  does divide  $e$ , i.e., if  $e = q^k e'$  where  $e'$  is not divisible by  $q$ , we will get an arithmetic circuit computing  $\hat{p}(x_1, \dots, x_n) = p(x_1, \dots, x_n)^{q^k}$ . By raising the function  $\hat{p}$  to the power  $q^{t-k}$ , we obtain an arithmetic circuit computing a function that agrees with the polynomial  $p$  over the entire field  $\mathbb{F}$ ; since we do not know  $k$ , we output a circuit for every  $0 \leq k < t$ . The size of the new arithmetic circuit increases by at most  $\text{polylog}(|\mathbb{F}|)$ .  $\square$

**Remark 40.** In the case of a finite field  $\mathbb{F} = \text{GF}(q^t)$  of characteristic  $q$ , the proof of Corollary 39 does not guarantee the existence of a small arithmetic circuit that is *identically equal* to the requisite  $n$ -variate polynomial  $p$ . Instead, we are guaranteed to have a small arithmetic circuit computing a function that *coincides* with the polynomial  $p$  at all tuples from  $\mathbb{F}^n$ . For precisely this reason, whenever we talk about the arithmetic circuit complexity of polynomials over finite fields, we shall adopt the *functional* viewpoint: the complexity of a polynomial  $p$  over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$  is defined as the size of a smallest arithmetic circuit that agrees with  $p$  over the entire domain  $\mathbb{F}^n$ .

## 7.2 Generalized NW generator

First, we define a generalization of the NW generator to arbitrary fields. It is given oracle access to a supposedly hard polynomial  $p$ , and will be denoted  $NW^p$ . The algorithm for  $NW^p$  is described below (see Algorithm 2). We should point out that such a generalization of the NW generator was used earlier by Raz, Reingold, and Vadhan [RRV99] in the context of randomness extractors.

Below, for an  $l$ -tuple  $a = (a_1, \dots, a_l)$  and a subset  $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, l\}$  of size  $m$ , we denote by  $a|_S$  the  $m$ -tuple of the elements of  $a$  indexed by the set  $S$ .

PARAMETERS:  $l, m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ .

INPUT:  $a = (a_1, \dots, a_l) \in F^l$ , where  $\mathbb{F}$  is a field.

ORACLE ACCESS:  $p(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_m]$ .

1. For given  $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ , construct the set system  $S_1, \dots, S_n$  as given by Lemma 11.
2. Output  $(p(a|_{S_1}), \dots, p(a|_{S_n})) \in \mathbb{F}^n$ .

### Algorithm 2: Generator $NW^p$

Given an  $n$ -variate polynomial  $f$  of total degree  $d_f$  over a field  $\mathbb{F}$ , we will search for non-zeros of  $f$  among the outputs of the NW generator. Let  $NW^p$  be the NW generator based on an  $m$ -variate polynomial  $p$  of total degree  $d_p$ , where  $m < n$ . For  $l$  given by Lemma 11, we enumerate all  $l$ -tuples  $a = (a_1, \dots, a_l)$ , where each  $a_i \in S \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  for a subset  $S$  of the field  $\mathbb{F}$  with  $|S| > d_f d_p$ , and check whether  $f(NW^p(a)) \neq 0$ . The running time of this procedure is at most  $\approx 2^{l \log |S|}$ , not counting the time of oracle calls to  $p$ .

Suppose that the polynomial  $f \not\equiv 0$ , but we have not found any zero of  $f$  among the outputs of the NW generator based on a polynomial  $p$ . We shall argue that  $p$  can then be computed by a “small” arithmetic circuit. This is made precise in the following lemma.

**Lemma 41.** *Let  $f \in \mathbb{F}[y_1, \dots, y_n]$  and  $p \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_m]$  be any non-zero polynomials of total degrees  $d_f$  and  $d_p$ , respectively, where  $|\mathbb{F}| > d_f d_p$ . Let  $f$  be computable by an arithmetic circuit of size  $s$ , let  $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}$  be any set of size  $|S| > d_f d_p$ , and let  $l \in \mathbb{N}$  be given by Lemma 11. Suppose that  $f(NW^p(a)) = 0$  for all  $a \in S^l$ .*

*Then the polynomial  $p$  is computable by an arithmetic circuit of size  $\text{poly}(m, n, d_f, d_p, s, \log |\mathbb{F}|, M)$ , where  $M \leq (d_p + 1)^{\log n}$ ; when  $p$  is a multilinear polynomial, we have  $M \leq n$ . For the case  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Q}$ , the size is  $\text{poly}(m, n, d_f, d_p, s, a, M)$ , where  $a$  is the maximum size of a coefficient in  $f$  and  $p$ .*

*Proof.* Our proof is in two parts. First, by a “hybrid” argument, we obtain from  $f$  a non-zero polynomial  $g(x_1, \dots, x_m, y)$  such that  $p(x_1, \dots, x_m)$  is a  $y$ -root of this polynomial  $g$ . Then we appeal to Corollary 39 to conclude that  $p$  is computable by an arithmetic circuit with required parameters.

I. HYBRID ARGUMENT. We define the following collection of polynomials:

- $g_0(x_1, \dots, x_l, y_1, \dots, y_n) = f(y_1, \dots, y_n)$ ,
- for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ ,  $g_i(x_1, \dots, x_l, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_n) = g_{i-1}(x_1, \dots, x_l, p((x_1, \dots, x_l)|_{S_i}), y_{i+1}, \dots, y_n)$ .

Observe that  $g_i(x_1, \dots, x_l, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_n)$  is obtained from  $f$  by replacing the first  $i$  variables in  $f$  by the polynomials  $p((x_1, \dots, x_l)|_{S_j})$  for  $1 \leq j \leq i$ . Thus,  $g_n(x_1, \dots, x_l) = f(NW^p(x_1, \dots, x_l))$ .

The  $l$ -variate polynomial  $g_n$  is of total degree at most  $D = d_f d_p$ . Since  $g_n$  vanishes on  $S^l$  where  $|S| > D$ , we have, by Lemma 8,  $g_n \equiv 0$ .

If  $g_0 \neq 0$ , but  $g_n \equiv 0$ , then there must be the smallest  $0 \leq i \leq n$  such that  $g_i \neq 0$  but  $g_{i+1} \equiv 0$ . Since  $g_i(x_1, \dots, x_l, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_n) \neq 0$ , we can fix the variables  $y_{i+2}, \dots, y_n$  as well as the variables  $x_j$  for  $j \notin S_{i+1}$  to some field elements from the set  $S \subseteq F$  so that the restricted polynomial  $\bar{g}_i(x_{j_1}, \dots, x_{j_m}, y_{i+1})$  remains a non-zero polynomial. For notational convenience, let us denote this new polynomial by  $g(x_1, \dots, x_m, y)$ .

II. FACTORING. Thus, we have that  $g(x_1, \dots, x_m, y) \neq 0$ , but  $g(x_1, \dots, x_m, p(x_1, \dots, x_m)) \equiv 0$ . Hence, by Corollary 39, the polynomial  $p$  is computable by an arithmetic circuit of size polynomial in the degree of  $g$ , the size of an arithmetic circuit computing  $g$ , and either  $\log |\mathbb{F}|$ , for a finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ , or the maximum size of a coefficient of  $g$ , for  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Q}$ .

The degree of  $g$  is at most  $D$ . The arithmetic circuit for  $g$  can be obtained from that of  $f$  together with at most  $n$  circuits computing the restrictions of  $p$ , where each restriction is a polynomial of degree at most  $d_p$  on at most  $\log n$  variables (by condition (3) of Lemma 11). Every such polynomial contains at most  $M = (d_p + 1)^{\log n}$  distinct monomials, and so can be computed by an arithmetic circuit of size  $\text{poly}(M)$ . In the case where  $p$  is a multilinear polynomial, its restrictions to  $\log n$  variables will have at most  $2^{\log n} = n$  distinct monomials. Thus, the size of an arithmetic circuit computing  $g$  is at most  $s + n\text{poly}(M)$ , and the conclusion of the lemma follows.  $\square$

### 7.3 Algebraic hardness-randomness tradeoffs

We shall state our conditional derandomization result for ACIT where the given arithmetic circuit  $C$  computes an  $n$ -variate polynomial of total degree  $\text{poly}(n)$ . Clearly, this condition is satisfied in the case of polynomial-size arithmetic formulas by Lemma 7.

**Theorem 42.** *Let  $p = \{p_m\}_{m \geq 0}$  be a family of exponential-time computable multilinear non-zero polynomials  $p_m \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_m]$  such that the maximum coefficient size of  $p_m$  is in  $\text{poly}(m)$ . Suppose that the arithmetic circuit complexity of  $p$  over  $\mathbb{Q}$  is  $s_p(m)$  for some function  $s_p : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ .*

*Let  $C$  be a  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size division-free arithmetic circuit over  $\mathbb{Z}$  computing an  $n$ -variate polynomial  $f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[y_1, \dots, y_n]$  of total degree  $d_f(n) \in \text{poly}(n)$  and maximum coefficient size in  $\text{poly}(n)$ . Then, for all sufficiently large  $n$ , testing whether  $f_n \equiv 0$  can be done deterministically in time*

1.  $2^{n^\epsilon}$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $s_p(m) \in m^{\omega(1)}$ ;
2.  $2^{\text{polylog}(n)}$ , if  $s_p(m) \in 2^{m^{\Omega(1)}}$ .

*Proof.* (1) For  $m = n^\epsilon$ , Lemma 11 gives  $l \leq n^{2\epsilon}$ . Let  $S$  be a subset of  $\mathbb{Z}$  of size at least  $nd_f \in \text{poly}(n)$ .

The size of the set  $S^l$  is at most  $(nd_f)^l < 2^{n^{3\epsilon}}$ . If  $p$  is computable on an input of size  $w$  in time  $2^{w^c}$ , for some fixed constant  $c$ , then running the generator  $\text{NW}^p$  on the set  $S^l$  takes time  $|S^l| 2^{n^{3c\epsilon}} < 2^{n^{4c\epsilon}}$ . We enumerate all elements of  $S^l$ , computes the output  $\vec{r}$  of  $\text{NW}^p$  on each, and then evaluate the circuit  $C$  at  $\vec{r}$ . We output “ $f_n$  is non-zero” iff  $C(\vec{r}) \neq 0$  for some  $\vec{r}$ .

Note that by our assumption about the degree and the coefficient sizes of  $p_m$ , the outputs  $\vec{r}$  of  $\text{NW}^p$  will have bit size at most  $\text{poly}(n)$ . Also, by our assumption about the degree and the coefficient sizes of  $f_n$ , the values  $f_n(\vec{r})$  will have bit sizes bounded by  $\text{poly}(n)$ , and hence they can be computed by simulating  $C$  on  $\vec{r}$  modulo  $2^{n^d}$ , for some sufficiently large constant  $d$ . Thus, we can test whether  $f_n(\vec{r}) = 0$  in deterministic time  $\text{poly}(n)$ , for every output  $\vec{r}$  of the generator.

Since  $\epsilon$  can be arbitrarily small, this leads to a subexponential-time deterministic algorithm for testing whether  $f_n \equiv 0$ . By Lemma 41, this testing algorithm must succeed for  $f_n$ , since otherwise the arithmetic circuit complexity of  $p$  would be polynomial.

(2) We can choose  $m = (\log n)^d$ , for some sufficiently large  $d$  to be specified later. This choice yields the NW generator on  $l \leq (\log n)^{2d}$  variables, where, as above, each variable assumes values

in a set  $S \subseteq F$  of size at least  $nd_f \in \text{poly}(n)$ . Thus, running the NW generator takes time  $2^{(\log n)^{c'd}}$ , for some constant  $c'$ . If this generator fails for  $f$ , then, by Lemma 41,  $p_m$  is computable by an arithmetic circuit of size  $n^k$ , for some constant  $k$  independent of  $d$ . Since  $d$  can be arbitrarily large, the failure of the NW generator on  $f$  would imply that  $p_m$  is computable by arithmetic circuits of size  $2^{m^\epsilon}$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$ , contrary to our assumption on the hardness of  $p$ .  $\square$

A version of Theorem 42 for the case of finite fields  $\mathbb{F}$  also holds.

**Theorem 43.** *Let  $p = \{p_m\}_{m \geq 0}$  be a family of exponential-time computable multilinear non-zero polynomials  $p_m \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \dots, x_m]$  for some finite field  $\mathbb{F}$ . Suppose that the arithmetic circuit complexity of  $p$  over  $\mathbb{F}$  is  $s_p(m)$  for some function  $s_p : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ .*

*Let  $C$  be a  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size division-free arithmetic circuit over  $\mathbb{F}$  computing an  $n$ -variate polynomial  $f_n$  of total degree  $d_f(n) \in \text{poly}(n)$ . Then, for all sufficiently large  $n$ , testing whether  $f_n \equiv 0$  can be done deterministically in time*

1.  $2^{n^\epsilon}$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $s_p(m) \in m^{\omega(1)}$ ;
2.  $2^{\text{polylog}(n)}$ , if  $s_p(m) \in 2^{m^{\Omega(1)}}$ .

*Proof Sketch.* The proof is similar to that of Theorem 42. If the field  $\mathbb{F}$  is small (less than a polynomial in  $n$ ), then we need to go to an extension field of  $\mathbb{F}$  in order to have a polynomial-size subset  $S$  of field elements. Since we only need a  $O(\log n)$ -degree extension of  $\mathbb{F}$ , we can find such an extension in deterministic time  $\text{poly}(n)$  by exhaustive search.  $\square$

For the special case of Polynomial Identity Testing, called *Arithmetic Formula Identity Testing*, where an input polynomial is given by an arithmetic *formula*, we obtain the following statement.

**Corollary 44.** *Let  $p = \{p_m\}_{m \geq 0}$  be a family of exponential-time computable multilinear non-zero polynomials  $p_m \in \mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_m]$  such that the maximum coefficient size of  $p_m$  is in  $\text{poly}(m)$ . Suppose that the arithmetic circuit complexity of  $p$  over  $\mathbb{Q}$  is  $s_p(m)$  for some function  $s_p : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ .*

*Let  $F$  be a  $\text{poly}(n)$ -size division-free arithmetic formula over  $\mathbb{Z}$  computing an  $n$ -variate polynomial  $f_n \in \mathbb{Z}[y_1, \dots, y_n]$ . Then, for all sufficiently large  $n$ , testing whether  $f_n \equiv 0$  can be done deterministically in time*

1.  $2^{n^\epsilon}$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$ , if  $s_p(m) \in m^{\omega(1)}$ ;
2.  $2^{\text{polylog}(n)}$ , if  $s_p(m) \in 2^{m^{\Omega(1)}}$ .

*Proof.* Note that an arithmetic formula  $F$  of  $\text{poly}(n)$  size computes a polynomial  $f$  of  $\text{poly}(n)$  degree (by Lemma 7). The coefficient sizes of  $f$  are also bounded by  $\text{poly}(n)$  (by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 7). Hence, we can apply Theorem 42 to  $F$ .  $\square$

**Remark 45.** Theorem 42 is stated for the assumption of almost everywhere high circuit complexity of a given polynomial  $p$ . The infinitely often versions of the tradeoffs also hold. That is, if  $p$  has high arithmetic circuit complexity *infinitely often*, then the polynomial identity testing problem is easy also *infinitely often*.

We should point out that, unlike in the Boolean circuit complexity case (cf. [IW97]), the assumption of  $2^{\Omega(m)}$  arithmetic circuit complexity for polynomials  $p_m$  does not seem to imply a polynomial-time derandomization procedure. The reason is that even though we can get an NW generator from  $O(\log n)$  to  $n$  variables, each variable assumes values from some set of size  $\text{poly}(n)$ ,

and we need to enumerate all  $O(\log n)$ -tuples of field elements of bit-size  $O(\log n)$  each. Thus, we still get only quasipolynomial-time algorithm in this case.

We also would like to remark that, as one might suspect, a “uniform” version of Theorem 42 can be proved, along the lines of [IW98]; the details are omitted.

#### 7.4 Derandomization from $\text{EXP} \neq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$

Babai, Fortnow, Nisan, and Wigderson show that BPP can be derandomized if  $\text{EXP} \neq \text{MA}$ .

**Theorem 46 ([BFNW93]).** *At least one of the following holds:*

1.  $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{io-TIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for every  $\epsilon > 0$ , or
2.  $\text{EXP} = \text{MA} \subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

Here we show that a certain version of Polynomial Identity Testing can be derandomized if  $\text{EXP} \neq \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ . We shall use the following notation. We say that *Arithmetic Formula Identity Testing (AFIT)* is in  $\text{io-TIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  if there is a deterministic  $2^{n^\epsilon}$ -time algorithm  $A$  such that, given an arithmetic division-free formula of size  $n$  that computes a multivariate polynomial  $p$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ , the algorithm  $A$  decides whether  $p \equiv 0$  correctly for infinitely many  $n$ .

**Theorem 47.** *At least one of the following holds:*

1. *AFIT* is in  $\text{io-TIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for every  $\epsilon > 0$ , or
2.  $\text{EXP} = \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$ .

*Proof.* If AFIT cannot be done in deterministic subexponential time, then it follows by Corollary 44 that Perm over  $\mathbb{Z}$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. Also, since AFIT is in  $\text{coRP} \subseteq \text{BPP}$ , the lack of derandomization for AFIT means that BPP is not in  $\text{io-TIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$  for some  $\epsilon$ . Hence, by Theorem 46, we know that  $\text{EXP} \subseteq \text{P/poly}$ .

Thus we have that EXP is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits, and the conclusion  $\text{EXP} = \text{NP}^{\text{RP}}$  follows from Theorem 31.  $\square$

Note the following difference between Theorems 46 and 47. Our Theorem 47 says that if a *particular* BPP problem cannot be derandomized, then we get a *deeper* collapse for EXP; the collapse is deeper since, as we mentioned earlier,  $\text{NP}^{\text{BPP}} \subseteq \text{MA}$ . Thus, we get weaker derandomization, or a stronger collapse.

## 8 Conclusions

We proved the necessity of circuit lower bounds for achieving even weak derandomization of RP and BPP. Thus any general derandomization results for RP would need to be preceded by a proof of a superpolynomial circuit lower bound for some language in NEXP. This relation between derandomizing RP and proving circuit lower bounds for NEXP may explain the lack of unconditional derandomization results for RP.

It is worth pointing out that Kabanets [Kab01] proved an unconditional derandomization result for RP in a certain “uniform” setting. Unfortunately, the condition of “uniformity” makes the result in [Kab01] too weak for Corollary 24 to be applicable.

The results in the present paper do not rule out that  $ZPP = P$  can be proved without having to prove any circuit lower bounds first. This leaves some hope that unconditional derandomization of  $ZPP$  could be achieved.

Also, on the positive side, one can view our results as providing another approach towards establishing circuit lower bounds — through derandomization. As we have seen, finding an (even nondeterministic) subexponential-time algorithm for Polynomial Identity Testing would yield non-trivial circuit lower bounds.

We conclude with some open problems. Can our result “ $NEXP$  is computable by polynomial-size arithmetic circuits  $\Rightarrow BPP \not\subseteq \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{io-NTIME}(2^{n^\epsilon})$ ” be strengthened to get “ $BPP = NEXP$ ” in the conclusion? If so, then this would say that even proving that  $NEXP \neq BPP$  is impossible without proving superpolynomial circuit lower bounds.

Does the assumption  $BPP = P$  imply *Boolean* circuit lower bounds for  $NEXP$ ? Does the same assumption imply (possibly arithmetic) circuit lower bounds for  $EXP$ , rather than  $NEXP \cap \text{coNEXP}$ ?

Regarding the low-degree testing, we ask the following questions. Does the assumption that there is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for LDT imply any circuit lower bounds for  $NEXP$ ? The answer is positive if one could show that LDT is *hard* for promise-BPP. This motivates the question: Is LDT hard for promise-BPP? The related question is to decide whether the assumptions that both  $BPP = P$  and LDT is in  $P$  should imply that  $\text{promise-BPP} \subseteq \text{promise-SUBEXP}$ .

Our final question concerns the conditional derandomization of the Polynomial Identity Testing. Assuming the existence of polynomials of high arithmetic circuit complexity, can one test whether a univariate polynomial of degree  $d$  is identically zero in deterministic time *sublinear* (e.g., polylogarithmic) in  $d$ ?

**Acknowledgements** We want to thank Allan Borodin for answering our questions about algebraic complexity. We are especially thankful to Erich Kaltofen for answering our questions about his results. We would like to thank Dieter van Melkebeek for commenting on an early version of this paper. The first author also wishes to thank Avi Wigderson for his encouragement.

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