Tighter Bounds on Multi-Party Coin Flipping via Augmented Weak Martingales and Differentially Private Sampling

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Abstract

In his seminal work, Cleve [STOC ’86] has proved that any r-round coin-flipping protocol can be efficiently biased by Θ(1/r). This lower bound was met for the two-party case by Moran, Naor, and Segev [Journal of Cryptology ’16], and the three-party case (up to a polylog factor) by Haitner and Tsfadia [SICOMP ’17], and was approached for n-party protocols when n < log log r by Buchbinder, Haitner, Levi, and Tsfadia [SODA ’17]. For n > log log r, however, the best bias for n-party coin-flipping protocols remains O(n/√r) achieved by the majority protocol of Awerbuch, Blum, Chor, Goldwasser, and Micali [Manuscript ’85].

Our main result is a tighter lower bound on the bias of coin-flipping protocols, showing that, for every constant ε > 0, an $r^ε$-party r-round coin-flipping protocol can be efficiently biased by $\tilde{\Omega}(1/\sqrt{r})$. As far as we know, this is the first improvement of Cleve’s bound, and is only $n = r^ε$ (multiplicative) far from the aforementioned upper bound of Awerbuch et al.

We prove the above bound using two new results that we believe are of independent interest. The first result is that a sequence of (“augmented”) weak martingales have large gap: with constant probability there exists two adjacent variables whose gap is at least the ratio between the gap between the first and last variables and the square root of the number of variables. This generalizes over the result of Cleve and Impagliazzo [Manuscript ’93], who showed that the above holds for strong martingales, and allows in some setting to exploit this gap by efficient algorithms. We prove the above using a novel argument that does not follow the more complicated approach of [12]. The second result is a new sampling algorithm that uses a differentially private mechanism to minimize the effect of data divergence.

Keywords: multi-party computation; coin-flipping; augmented weak martingales; differential privacy; oblivious sampling;

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1 Introduction

In a coin-flipping protocol, introduced by Blum [9], the parties wish to output a common (close to) unbiased bit, even though some of the parties may be corrupted and try to bias the output. More formally, such protocols should satisfy the following two properties: first, when all parties are honest (i.e., follow the prescribed protocol), they all output the same unbiased bit. Second, even when some parties are corrupted (i.e., collude and arbitrarily deviate from the protocol), the remaining parties should still output the same bit, and this bit should not be too biased (i.e., its distribution should be close to being uniform over \{0, 1\}). We emphasize that the above requirements stipulate that the honest parties should always output a common bit, regardless of what the corrupted parties do, and in particular they are not allowed to abort if a cheat was detected.\(^1\) Coin flipping is a fundamental primitive with numerous applications, and thus lower bounds on coin flipping protocols imply analogous bounds on many other basic cryptographic primitives, including other inputless primitives and secure computation of functions that have input (e.g., XOR).

In his seminal work, Cleve [11] showed that for any efficient two-party \(r\)-round coin-flipping protocol, there exists an efficient adversarial strategy that biases the output of the honest party by \(\Theta(1/r)\), and his bound extends to the multi-party case with no honest majority, via a simple reduction. The above lower bound on coin-flipping protocols was met for the two-party case by Moran, Naor, and Segev [30] and for the three-party case (up to a polylog factor) by Haitner and Tsafadia [25], and was approached for \(n\)-party coin-flipping protocols when \(n < \log \log r\) by Buchbinder, Haitner, Levi, and Tsafadia [10]. For \(n > \log \log r\), however, the smallest bias for \(n\)-party coin-flipping protocol remains \(\Theta(n/\sqrt{r})\), achieved by the majority protocol of Awerbuch, Blum, Chor, Goldwasser, and Micali [5].

1.1 Our Results

Our main result is the following lower bound on the security of coin-flipping protocols.

**Theorem 1.1** (Main result, informal). For any \(n\)-party \(r\)-round coin-flipping protocol with \(n^k \geq r\) for some \(k \in \mathbb{N}\), there exists a fail-stop\(^2\) adversary running in time \(n^k\), corrupting all parties but one, that biases the output of honest party by \(1/(\sqrt{r} \cdot \log(r)^k)\).

As a concrete example, assume the number of parties is \(n = r^{1/100}\). The above theorem yields an attack of bias \(\Omega(1/\sqrt{r}) = \Omega(1/r^{0.5})\), to be compared to the \(n/\sqrt{r} = 1/r^{0.49}\) upper bound of Awerbuch et al. [5]. As far as we know, Theorem 1.1 is the first improvement over the \(\Omega(1/r)\) bound of Cleve [11].

Theorem 1.1 is only applicable when the adversary is able to corrupt all parties but one. However, by grouping parties together, we note that any \(n\)-party protocol is a \([n/s]\)-party protocol, for any \(s < n\), and thus the following theorem dealing with more versatile corruption strategies follows by simple reduction.

**Theorem 1.2** (Main result, fewer corruptions variant, informal). For \(n\)-party \(r\)-round coin-flipping protocol with \((n/s)^k \geq r\) for some \(s < n/2\) and \(k \in \mathbb{N}\), there exists an adversary running in time \((n/s)^k\), corrupting all parties but a subset of size \(s\), that biases the output of honest parties by \(1/(\sqrt{r} \cdot \log(r)^k)\).

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\(^1\)Such protocols are typically addressed as having guaranteed output delivery, or, abusing terminology, as fair.

\(^2\)Acts honestly, but might abort prematurely.
For instance, if \( n^k > r \), by corrupting all parties but a subset of size \( n^{1/2} \), the adversary achieves a bias of \( 1/(\sqrt{r} \cdot \log(r)^k) \). That is, up to a factor of \( 1/\log(r)^k \) in the bias, we derive the same result as Theorem 1.1, but with fewer corrupted parties (only all parties but a subset of size \( n^{1/2} \) instead of all parties but one).

We prove the above theorems using the following two results that we believe to be of independent interest.

1.1.1 Augmented Weak Martingales have Large Gap

A sequence \( X_1, \ldots, X_r \) of random variables is a (strong) martingale, if \( \mathbf{E}[X_i \mid X_{\leq i-1}] = X_{i-1} \) for every \( i \in [r] \) (letting \( X_{\leq j} = (X_1, \ldots, X_j) \)). Cleve and Impagliazzo [12] showed that any strong martingale sequence with \( X_1 = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( X_r \in \{0, 1\} \) has a \( 1/\sqrt{r} \) gap with constant probability: with constant probability, \( |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq \Omega(1/\sqrt{r}) \) for some \( i \in [r] \). This result is the core of their proof showing that there exists an inefficient (fail-stop) attack for any coin-flipping protocol that yields a bias of order \( 1/\sqrt{r} \) (see Section 1.2). The result of [12] is used with respect to the Doob martingale sequence defined by \( X_i = \mathbf{E}[f(Z) \mid Z_{\leq i}] \), for random variables \( Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_r) \) and a function \( f \) of interest. To be applicable in a computational setting, we require that \( X_i = \mathbf{E}[f(Z) \mid Z_{\leq i}] \) is an efficiently computable function of \( Z_{\leq i} \). In many cases however, including the one considered by [12], \( \text{Supp}(Z_{\leq i}) \) is huge, resulting in \( X_i \) not being efficiently computable.

Weak martingales, introduced by Nelson [31], is a relaxation of strong martingales where it is only required that \( \mathbf{E}[X_i \mid X_{\leq i-1}] = X_{i-1} \). Namely, the conditioning is only on the value of the preceding variable, and not on the whole “history”. As in the case of (strong) martingales, for arbitrary \( Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_r) \) and a function \( f \) of interest, we can consider the Doob-like sequence \( X_i = \mathbf{E}[f(Z) \mid Z_i, X_{i-1}] \). The support size of the function for computing \( X_i \) is only of size \( |\text{Supp}(Z_i) \times \text{Supp}(X_{i-1})| \), and we can use discretization to further reduce the support size of \( X_i \) (i.e., we let \( X_i \) be a rounding of \( \mathbf{E}[f(Z) \mid Z_i, X_{i-1}] \)). Hence, if the support of \( Z_i \) is small, the computation of the \( X_i \)'s can be done efficiently. (Discretization is not useful for the (strong) Doob martingale described above, since, even if the support of each individual \( Z_i \) is small, even 2, the domain of \( Z_1, \ldots, Z_r \) is typically huge). Unfortunately, it is unclear whether weak martingales have large gaps, and thus we are unable to apply the attack of Cleve and Impagliazzo [12] using such a sequence.

We prove that a slightly different variant of the Doob construction results in a sequence that is efficiently computable and has a large gap, at the same time. A sequence \( X_1, \ldots, X_r \) of random variables is a sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingales, if

\[
\mathbf{E}[X_i \mid X_{i-1}, \sum_{j \in [i-1]} (X_j - X_{j-1})^2] = X_{i-1}.
\]

Namely, \( X \) has the “martingale property” when conditioning on some small amount of information about the past. For such a sequence, we prove the following result:

**Theorem 1.3** (Informal). Let \( X_1, \ldots, X_r \) be a sequence of sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingale with \( X = 1/2 \) and \( X_r \in \{0, 1\} \), then

\[
\Pr[\exists i \in [r]: |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq 1/\sqrt{r}] \in \Omega(1).
\]

We prove that the above holds for a rounded variant of \( X_i \), i.e., \( X_i \) are rounded to the closest multiplicative of some \( \delta > 0 \).

Consider the sequence of sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingales defined by the Doob-like sequence \( X_i = \mathbf{E}[f(Z) \mid Z_i, X_{i-1}, \sum_{j \in [i-1]} (X_j - X_{j-1})^2] \), for arbitrary \( Z = (Z_1, \ldots, Z_r) \) and a
function $f$ of interest. If the support of the $Z_i$’s small, the computation of the (rounding of) $X_i$’s can be done efficiently. This efficiency plays a critical role in our attack on coin-flipping protocols, allowing us, in some cases, to mount an efficient variant of the attack of [12].

Our proof actually yields the following stronger statement.

**Theorem 1.4 (Informal).** Let $X_1, \ldots, X_r$ be a sequence of sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingales with $X = 1/2$ and $X_r \in \{0, 1\}$, then

$$\Pr\left[ \sum_{i \in [r]} (X_i - X_{i-1})^2 \geq 1 \right] \in \Omega(1).$$

Namely, the sum-of-squares is constant with constant probability. In particular, the probability that $|X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq 1/\sqrt{r}$, for some $i$, is also constant, implying Theorem 1.3. But Theorem 1.4 yields a stronger result: if we are guaranteed that all gaps are at most $1/\sqrt{r}$ (i.e., $|X_i - X_{i-1}| \in O(1/\sqrt{r})$ for all $i$), then Theorem 1.4 implies that, with constant probability, the sequence has a linear number of $1/\sqrt{r}$-gaps (as opposed to only one such gap guaranteed by [12]).

Our proof for Theorem 1.4 is surprisingly simple, and does not follow the more complicated approach of Cleve and Impagliazzo [12].

### 1.1.2 Oblivious Sampling via Differential Privacy

Consider the following $r$-round game in which the goal is to maximize the revenue of the chosen party: in the beginning, a party $H$ is drawn uniformly from $\mathcal{H}$ (for $\mathcal{H}$ being a finite set of parties). In each round $i$, values $\{s_i^h \in [0,1]\}_{h \in \mathcal{H}}$ are assigned to the parties of $\mathcal{H}$, and the values of all parties but $H$, i.e., $\{s_i^h\}_{h \in \mathcal{H} \setminus \{H\}}$, are published. Seeing the published values, you can either decide to abort, and then party $H$ is rewarded with (the unseen) value $s_i^H$, or to continue to the next round. If you never choose to abort, then party $H$ is rewarded with $s_i^H$ (the value of the last round). Your goal is to get a reward as close to the optimal value $\gamma = \max_h \{s_i := \mathbb{E}_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}} [s_i^h]\}$. To make the game reasonable, it is guaranteed that the values assigned to the parties in each round are similar: $|s_i^h - s_i| \leq \sigma$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Namely, the individual values are $\sigma$-close to the mean.

We will be interested in a distributional variant of the above game in which the values of $\{s_i^h\}$ are not fixed, but rather drawn from some underlying distribution (in our setting, the values of $\{s_i^h\}$ will be induced by the randomness of the attacked coin-flipping protocol), while satisfying the above guarantees with regards to $\gamma$ and $\sigma$ with good enough probability. We refer to the resulting game as an oblivious sampling game with parameters $r$, $|\mathcal{H}|$, $\gamma$, and $\sigma$. An aborting strategy for the above game can only depend on the game parameters (i.e., $r, |\mathcal{H}|, \gamma, \sigma$) and the values published online.

The simplest aborting strategy for such a game is to abort if the average value of all other parties, i.e., $\{s_i^h\}_{h \in \mathcal{H} \setminus \{H\}}$, is larger than (roughly) $\gamma - \sigma$. The reward of such a strategy is roughly $\gamma - \sigma$, which is useless if $\sigma \geq \gamma$. As we show next, this linear loss in $\sigma$ is inherent for this strategy; consider a deterministic threshold strategy that aborts if $s_i^{\mathcal{H} \setminus H} = \mathbb{E}_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \setminus H} [s_i^h] \geq tsh$ for some threshold $tsh \in [0, \gamma]$. Namely, an abort occurs if the average value at hand in a given round is greater than $tsh$. Consider the game defined by $\mathcal{H} = [r-1]$, $s_i^h = \gamma$ for all $h$, and for $i \in [r-1]$: $s_i^h = tsh - \sigma$ if

---

To be fair, Cleve and Impagliazzo [12] derive their result by proving an Azuma-like tail inequality for bounded strong martingales that have large gap with only small probability, a bound that we do not prove here.
i = h, and tsh otherwise. It follows that for every value of h, the strategy seeing the values of \( \left\{ s_i^h \right\} \) aborts at round h, and gets reward tsh − γ. Hence, the reward of this strategy is tsh − σ ≤ γ − σ.

We show that using a *differentially private* mechanism, and in particular adding Laplace noise to the estimated revenue \( s_i^h = E_{h' \leftarrow \mathcal{H}\setminus h} \left[ s_i^{h'} \right] \), significantly improves upon the above deterministic strategy. By introducing such noise, the aborting decision is less correlated to the choice of the random party H. More accurately, the value of H is \( \sigma \)-differentially private, according to the definition of Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [19], from the aborting decision, and thus we avoid the pitfalls caused by strong correlation between H and the aborting round, as illustrated by the above example for the deterministic threshold strategy. We exploit this “privacy” guarantee to prove the following improvement in the expected reward.

**Theorem 1.5** (Informal). For every oblivious sampling game, the randomized strategy that adds Laplace noise in every round (whose magnitude depends on the game parameters) to \( s_i^h \), and aborts if the result is greater than \( \gamma/2 \), achieves expected reward \( \gamma/2 - \sigma^2 \).

Namely, the penalty for having imperfect similarity is reduced from \( \sigma \) to \( \gamma/2 + \sigma^2 \), a significant improvement when \( \gamma < \sigma < 1 \). We also prove a generalization of the above theorem where each party has a different similarity guarantee.

### 1.2 Our Techniques

Below, we describe the approach for proving Theorem 1.1 using Theorems 1.3 and 1.5. We do not discuss here the proofs of these theorems, but we do explain in Section 1.2.5 why the weak martingale used by the attack is computable by an efficient uniform algorithm.

Let \( \Pi \) be an \( r \)-round \( n \)-party coin-flipping protocol and let \( \text{out} \) denote the (always common) output of the parties in a random honest execution. By definition, \( \text{out} \in \{0,1\} \) and \( E[\text{out}] = 1/2 \).

Our goal is to obtain an efficient attacker that, by controlling \( n-1 \) of the parties, biases the honest parties’ output by \( 1/\sqrt{r} \) (we ignore log factors). We start by describing the \( 1/\sqrt{r} \) inefficient attack of Cleve and Impagliazzo [12].

#### 1.2.1 Cleve and Impagliazzo’s Inefficient Attack

Let \( n = 2 \) and let \( (P_0, P_1) \) be the parties of \( \Pi \). Let \( T_1, \ldots, T_r \) denote the messages in a random execution of \( \Pi \). Let \( X_i = E[\text{out} \mid T_{\leq i}] \); namely, \( X_i \) is the expected outcome of the protocol given the first \( i \) messages \( T_{\leq i} = T_1, \ldots, T_i \). It is easy to see that \( X_1, \ldots, X_r \) is a (strong) martingale sequence. Hence, the result of [12] described in Section 1.1.1 yields that (omitting absolute values and constant factors)

\[
\text{Jump: } \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r]: X_i - X_{i-1} \geq 1/\sqrt{r} \right] \in \Omega(1). \tag{1}
\]

**Backup values.** For \( b \in \{0,1\} \), let the backup value \( Z_i^b \) denote the output of party \( P_b \) if party \( P_{1-b} \) aborts after the \( i \)th message was sent, letting \( Z_r^b \) be the final output of \( P_b \) (if no abort occurs). Using this notation, \( E[Z_i^b \mid T_{\leq i}] \) is the expected outcome of \( P_b \) if \( P_{1-b} \) aborts after the \( i \)th round. We can assume without loss of generality that

Backup value follows game value: \( \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r]: \left| X_i - E[Z_i^b \mid T_{\leq i}] \right| \geq 1/\sqrt{r} \right] \in o(1). \tag{2} \)
for both $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Otherwise, the attacker controlling $P_{1-b}$ that computes $X_i$ and $E[Z_{i-1}^b \mid T_{\leq i}]$ for each round $i$, and aborts if $X_i - E[Z_{i-1}^b \mid T_{\leq i}] \geq 1/\sqrt{r}$, would bias $P_b$’s output towards 0 by $1/\sqrt{r}$.

The martingale attack. The above two observations yield the following attack. From Equations (1) and (2), it follows that without loss of generality

$$\Pr[\exists i \in [r]: P_b \text{ sends the } i^{th} \text{ message } \land X_i - E[Z_{i-1}^{1-b} \mid T_{\leq i}] \geq 1/2\sqrt{r}] \in \Omega(1).$$

This yields the following attack for party $P_b$ to bias the output of party $P_{1-b}$ towards zero. Before sending the $i^{th}$ message $T_i$, party $P_b$ aborts if $X_i - E[Z_{i-1}^{1-b} \mid T_{\leq i}] \geq 1/2\sqrt{r}$. By Equation (3), under this attack, the output of $P_{1-b}$ is biased towards zero by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r})$.

The clear limitation of the above attack is that, in many cases, the values of both $X_i = E[\text{out} \mid T_{\leq i}]$ and $E[Z_{i-1}^{1-b} \mid T_{\leq i}]$ are not efficiently computable (given $T_{\leq i}$). Indeed (assuming the existence of oblivious transfer), the above $\Theta(1/\sqrt{r})$ lower bound does not hold for $n < \log \log r$ [10, 25, 30].

1.2.2 Towards an Efficient Attack via Augmented Weak Martingales

The first step towards making the above attack efficient is not to define the $X_i$’s as a function of the transcript. Indeed, even given the first message $T_1$, computing $E[\text{out} \mid T_1]$ might involve inverting a one-way function. Our solution is to define $X_i^b = E[\text{out} \mid Z_{i-1}^b]$; namely, the expected outcome given $P^b$’s backup values. The immediate advantage is that the backup values are only bits. Thus, $X_i^b$ has only two possible values, and computing it from $Z_1$ can be done efficiently. Yet, for large values of $i$, the computation of $X_i^b$ (depending on $Z_1^b, \ldots, Z_i^b$) might still be infeasible.

Thankfully, our new result for sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingales (Theorem 1.3) circumvents this problem. Let $f(Z_1^b, \ldots, Z_r^b) = E[\text{out} \mid Z_{\leq r}^b]$. By definition, it holds that $f(Z_1^b, \ldots, Z_r^b) = Z_r^b \in \{0, 1\}$, and thus $E[f(Z_1^b, \ldots, Z_r^b)] = 1/2$. Theorem 1.3 yields that for the Doob-like sequence $X_i^b = E[\text{out} \mid Z_i^b, X_{i-1}^b, \sum_{j \in [i-1]} (X_j^b - X_{j-1}^b)^2]$, it holds that (again, omitting absolute values and constant factors)

$$\Pr[\exists i \in [r]: X_i^b - X_{i-1}^b \geq 1/\sqrt{r}] \in \Omega(1).$$

Using a rounded variant of the $X_i^b$’s, the value of $X_i^b$ is only a function of $|\text{Supp}(Z_i^b)| \cdot r^2 \in O(r^3)$ bits, and thus can be computed efficiently. Namely, the martingale attack of [12] (i.e., aborting in the event of an observed gap) with respect to this definition of $X_i$ is now efficient. Similarly to [12], we obtain an $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r})$ attack if

$$\Pr[\exists i \in [r]: X_i^b - E[Z_{i-1}^{1-b} \mid Z_i^b, X_{i-1}^b, \sum_{j \leq i-1} (X_j^b - X_{j-1}^b)^2] \geq 1/2\sqrt{r}] \in \Omega(1).$$

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4To be more precise, at least one of two attacks would succeed, depending on the aimed direction of the bias.

5In more detail, assume for simplicity that $P_0$ sends the messages $T_1, T_3, \ldots$ and $P_1$ sends the messages $T_2, T_4, \ldots$. For at least one party $P_b$, Equation (3) holds when limiting $i$ to be a round where $P_b$ is supposed to send the $i^{th}$ message. The above attack is effective when executed by the relevant party.
The coin-flipping protocols of [10, 25, 30] show that the equation above does not hold in general. Nevertheless, we show that (for a suitable variant of) the above inequality does hold for the case \( n \geq r \), and thus the ”martingale” attack achieves the desired bias for this case. The case \( n^k \geq r \) for \( k \geq 2 \) is significantly more complex, but follows the same principle. Details below.

### 1.2.3 An Efficient Attack for \( n = r \)

Let \((P_1, \ldots, P_n)\) be the parties of \( \Pi \). For \( b \in [n] \), let \( Z_i^b \in \{0,1\} \) be the output (backup value) party \( P_b \) outputs if all other parties abort right after the \( i \)-th round, and for \( S \subseteq [n] \) let \( Z_i^S = \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{s \in S} Z_i^s \). For a subset \( S \subseteq [n] \), consider the sequence of augmented weak martingales \( X_i^S = E\left[ \text{out} | Z_i^S, X_{i-1}^S, \sum_{j \in [i-1]} (X_j^S - X_{j-1}^S)^2 \right] \). As before, with constant probability \( X_i^S - X_{i-1}^S \geq 1/\sqrt{r} \) for some \( i \in [r] \). Hence, without loss of generality,

\[
\text{Jump: } \quad \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r] : X_i^S - X_{i-1}^S \geq 1/2\sqrt{r} \right] \in \Omega(1). \tag{6}
\]

A crucial observation, and the reason why considering a number of parties that is linear in the round complexity is rewarding, is that, with high probability over the choice of \( S \) of size \( n/2 \), it holds that

\[
\text{Similar backup values: } \quad \forall i \in [r] : \quad Z_i^S = Z_i^S \pm 1/3\sqrt{r}. \tag{7}
\]

Namely, \( Z_i^S \) is a good estimation for \( Z_i^S \), for all rounds \( i \in [r] \) simultaneously.6

Indeed, since \( S \) is chosen at random, \( Z_i^S \) (\( = \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{s \in S} Z_i^s \)) is a \( 1/3\sqrt{r} \) approximation of \( Z_i^{[n]} \) and thus of \( Z_i^S \). Fix such a good set \( S \). The following martingale attack biases the output of a random party \( P_h \) not in \( S \) (i.e., \( h \not\in S \)) towards zero. In the \( i \)-th round, the attacker aborts all parties but \( P_h \) if \( X_i^S - X_{i-1}^S \geq 1/6\sqrt{r} \). Equations (6) and (7) implies that the above adversary biases the output of \( P_h \) towards zero by \( \Omega(1/\sqrt{r}) \).

### 1.2.4 An Efficient Attack for \( n^k \geq r \) via Differentially Private Sampling

We describe the attack for \( n^2 \geq r \), and then briefly highlight the extension for \( k \geq 3 \).

A critical part of the above attack for \( n = r \) (stated in (7)) is that for a random (and thus for some) subset \( S \subseteq [n] \) of size \( n/2 \), it holds that \( Z_i^S \) is at most \( O(1/\sqrt{r}) \)-far from \( Z_i^S \). This is not the case for \( n^2 = r \), where we are only guaranteed that \( Z_i^S \) is at most \( O(1/\sqrt{n}) = O(1/\sqrt{r}) \)-far from \( Z_i^S \), a too-rough approximation for our needs, since the error is larger than the potential gain of \( O(1/\sqrt{r}) \).

Our solution is to consider the joint backup values for pairs of parties. That is, the joint output of such a pair given that all other parties abort. Considering the pairs’ backup values, however, raises a different problem. The adversary can no longer examine the values of a random large subset \( \mathcal{P} \subseteq \binom{[n]}{2} \) of backup values, as we described in the case \( n = r \), since each party in \([n]\) (and, in particular, the honest party) takes part in \( \Theta(1/n) \) fraction of \( \mathcal{P} \), with high probability. Rather, we let the attacker examine the backup values of the pairs \( \binom{S}{2} \), for some subset \( S \subseteq [n] \). If (the average of) these backup values are a good approximation for the backup value of pairs that contain the honest party, then the previous aborting strategy results in a bias of suitable magnitude. If not,

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6Actually, this requires \( n = r \log r \), but we ignore such log factors in this informal discussion.
then we can employ a different type of attack using differentially private sampling (Theorem 1.5). More details follow.

For a pair \( p = (j_1, j_2) \in \binom{[n]}{2} \), let \( Z^P_i \in \{0, 1\} \) be the joint output (backup value) of the parties \( P_{j_1} \) and \( P_{j_2} \), if all parties but them abort right after the \( i \)th round. For \( \mathcal{P} \subseteq \binom{[n]}{2} \), let \( Z^P_i = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}|} \cdot \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}} Z^p_i \). Consider the sequence of augmented weak martingales \( X_i^S = \mathbb{E} \left[ \text{out} \mid Z^{(S)}_{i-1} \right] X_i^{S-1} \cdot \sum_{j \in [i-1]} (X_j^S - X_{j-1}^S)^2 \], for some subset \( S \subseteq [n] \). As before, with constant probability \( X_{i+1}^S - X_i^S \geq 1/\sqrt{r} \) for some \( i \). Assuming that

Similar backup values:

\[
Z^{(S)}_{i/2} = Z_i^{S \times \mathbb{S}} \pm o(1/\sqrt{r}),
\]

for every \( i \). Namely, the average backup values of pairs of parties seen by an attacker controlling all parties in \( S \), is very close to the average of the backup values of pairs containing one party in \( S \) and one party not in \( S \). Similarly to the case \( n = r \), the above assumption enables the following martingale attack biasing the output of a random party \( P_h \) not in \( S \) (i.e., \( h \leftarrow S \)) towards zero by \( \Omega(1/\sqrt{r}) \). In the \( i \)th round, if \( X_i^S - X_{i-1}^S > 1/2\sqrt{r} \) the attacker aborts all parties but \( (P_h, P_s) \), for a random \( s \leftarrow S \).

Unlike the case \( n = r \), Equation (8) might be false (for any set \( S \)). Fortunately, if this happens, we can mount a different attack, described below.

**The differentially private sampling attack.** Assume for simplicity that

\[
\text{Non-similar backup values:} \quad \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r] : Z^{(S)}_i - Z_i^{S \times \mathbb{S}} > 1/\sqrt{r} \right] \in \Omega(1).
\]

This calls for the following attack biasing the output of a random honest party \( P_h \), for \( h \leftarrow S \), towards zero. For a pair-subset \( \mathcal{P} \subseteq \binom{[n]}{2} \), let \( \mathcal{P} \setminus h \) stand for all pairs in \( \mathcal{P} \) that do not include \( h \).

In the \( i \)th round, the attacker checks whether \( G_i^{h} = Z^{(S)}_i - Z_i^{(S \times \mathbb{S}) \setminus h} > 1/2\sqrt{r} \). If so, it aborts all parties but \( (P_h, P_s) \) for a random \( s \leftarrow S \). The attack performs well if the backup values of the corrupted parties are a good approximation of the expected value of the honest party output. In particular, if for every \( h \) and \( i \):

Strong gap similarity:

\[
G_i^{h} = G_i^{h} \pm o(1/\sqrt{r}),
\]

for \( G_i^{h} = Z^{(h) \times (S \setminus \{h\})}_i - Z^{(h) \times \mathbb{S}}_i \). Unfortunately, Equation (10) might be false, without yielding any useful consequences. Rather, we can only assume the weaker guarantee that

Weak gap similarity:

\[
G_i^{h} = G_i^{h} \pm o(1/\sqrt{n}) = G_i^{h} \pm o(1/\sqrt{r}),
\]

for every \( h \) and \( i \). Indeed, if Equation (11) does not hold, then (w.l.o.g) for some party \( h' \in S \) it holds that \( Z^{(h) \times \mathbb{S}}_i \neq Z^{(h') \times \mathbb{S}}_i \pm \Theta(1/\sqrt{r}) \). That is, when restricting our attention to the \( n - 1 \) pairs containing \( h' \), the gap is \( \Theta(1/\sqrt{n}) \). Such gap yields that an attack in the spirit of the one used for the \( n = r \) case induces a large bias on an honest party chosen randomly from \( \mathbb{S} \).

The guarantee of Equation (11) does not suffice for the simple attack described below Equation (9) to go through. Roughly, the reason is that the approximation error (i.e., \( o(1/\sqrt{r}) \)) is larger.
that might achieve no reward for random 

s_i = G_i = E_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[s_i^h], and 

c = |s_i - s_i^h| \in o(1/\sqrt{r}) > 1/\sqrt{r}. As explained in Section 1.1.2, a threshold deterministic attack 

for this sampling game, i.e. seeing the values of \{s_i^h\}_{i \in [r]} one by one, until one decides to abort, 

might achieve no reward for random h, and neither for any fixed h. In particular, it might hold 

that s_i^h = 0 for i being the aborting round.

Fortunately, since we are in the setting of the oblivious sampling game, Theorem 1.5 yields 

that randomized aborting online strategy that adds noise to its halting decision, in every round, 

performs significantly better. Specifically, the strategy that adds the right Laplace noise to 

s_i^h = E_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H\setminus h}}[s_i^h], and aborts if the result is greater than \gamma/2, achieves expected revenue \gamma/2 - \sigma^2 = 

1/2\sqrt{r} - o(1/\sqrt{r})^2 > 1/4\sqrt{r}. The above holds for a random h, and thus for some fixed h as well. 

It follows that the induced attacker on the protocol, controlling all parties by \mathcal{P}_h, and applying the 

same randomized aborting strategy, obtains 

Z_i^{\{h\} \times \{S\setminus \{h\}\}} - Z_i^{\{h\} \times S} \geq 1/4\sqrt{r} where i denotes the 

aborting round. This translates, using the same means as in the deterministic threshold attack for 

choosing the non aborting pair, into a 1/4\sqrt{r}-bias of \mathcal{P}_h’s output.

Intuitively, the point of using the differentially private sampling mechanism is to avoid identi-

fying the choice of honest party. That is, the effect of the back-up values of pairs containing any 

single party on the adversary’s decision to trigger the attack is diminished (Equation (11) keeps 

the sensitivity of this decision small).

**The case n^k \geq r for k \geq 3.** To begin, assume that k = 3 (i.e., n^3 \geq r). For such value 
of n, it holds that 1/\sqrt{n^3} = 1/\sqrt{r} \gg 1/\sqrt{r}. Thus, the promise \mathcal{G}_i = G_i^h \pm o(1/\sqrt{n}) does not 
suffice for the differentially private based attack to go through. Rather, we need to assume that 

G_i = G_i^h \pm o(1/\sqrt{r}) = G_i^h \pm o(1/n^{3/4}). We show that if the latter does not hold, the attacker can 

fix a party and never abort it (i.e., we restrict the subset of all backup values to those containing 

this party) we are essentially in the setting of \mathcal{n^2 \geq r}. Namely, either we have differentially private 

based attack, or we have a martingale attack (both with respect to the above fixing of a never 

aborting party).

For larger values of k, we iterate the above, fixing non-aborting parties one after the other, until 
one of the differentially private based attacks or the martingale attack go through.

**1.2.5 Computing Doob-like Weak Martingales**

In Section 1.1.1, we claimed that if the support size of the Z_i’s is small, then the sum-of-squares-augmented weak martingales \{X_1, \ldots, X_r\} defined by the rounded Doob-like sequence 

X_i = \text{rnd}(\mathbb{E}[f(Z) | Z_i, X_{i-1}, \sum_{j \in [i-1]}(X_j - X_{j-1})^2]) can be efficiently computable, where \text{rnd} is a 
small support rounding function. We use this guarantee above to argue that our attack is efficient. 

While this claim trivially holds when considering non-uniform algorithms, the argument for unii-

form algorithms is more subtle, and since we believe it to be of independent interest, we highlight 
it below.

For simplicity, we focus on the weak martingales defined by the Doob-like sequence 

X_i = \text{rnd}(\mathbb{E}[f(Z) | Z_i, X_{i-1}]). Consider the mappings \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_r inductively defined by \chi_i(z) = 

\text{rnd}(\mathbb{E}[f(Z) | Z_i = z_i, X_{i-1} = \chi_{i-1}(z)]). It is easy to verify that \chi_i = \chi_i(Z_{\leq i}), and since each of 

these mappings has a small description, the sequence X_0, \ldots, X_r can be computed from Z_1, \ldots, Z_r.
Awerbuch et al. [5] presented an upper bounds. Bias the output (bit) of the honest parties by more than $\delta$. A coin-flipping protocol is

1.3.1 Coin Flipping

1.3 Related Work

1.3.1 Coin Flipping

A coin-flipping protocol is $\delta$-fair, if no efficient attacker (controlling any number of parties) can bias the output (bit) of the honest parties by more than $\delta$.

Upper bounds. Blum [9] presented a two-party two-round coin-flipping protocol with bias 1/4. Awerbuch et al. [5] presented an $n$-party $r$-round protocol with bias $O(n/\sqrt{r})$ (the two-party case appears also in Cleve [11]). This was improved to (almost) $O(1/\sqrt{r})$ in [6, 14], for the case where the fraction of honest parties is constant. Moran, Naor, and Segev [29] resolved the two-party case, presenting a two-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol with bias $O(1/r)$. Haitner and Tsfadia [24] resolved the three-party case up to poly logarithmic factor, presenting a three-party coin-flipping protocol with bias $O(\text{polylog}(r)/r)$. Buchbinder et al. [10] constructed an $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol with bias $\tilde{O}(n^2\sqrt{r}/r^{1+\frac{1}{2n^2}})$. In particular, their four-party coin-flipping protocol the bias is $\tilde{O}(1/r^{2/3})$, and for $n = \log \log r$ their protocol has bias smaller than [5].

For the case where less than 2/3 of the parties are corrupt, Beimel et al. [8] have constructed an $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol with bias $2^{2k}/r$, tolerating up to $t = (n + k)/2$ corrupt parties. Alon and Omri [1] constructed an $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol with bias $\tilde{O}(2^{2n}/r)$, tolerating up to $t$ corrupted parties, for constant $n$ and $t < 3n/4$.

Lower bounds. Cleve [11] proved that for every $r$-round two-party coin-flipping protocol there exists is an efficient adversary that can bias the output by $\Omega(1/r)$. Cleve and Impagliazzo [12] proved that for every $r$-round two-party coin-flipping protocol there exists an inefficient fail-stop adversary that biases the output by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r})$. They also showed that a similar attack exists also if

---

7The mapping $\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_r$ are constructed iteratively. After constructing $\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{i-1}$, the value of $\mu_i(z)$ is set by approximating via sampling (a rounding of) $E[f(Z) | Z_i = z_i, \mu_{i-1}(Z) = \mu_{i-1}(z)]$. 

10
the parties have access to an ideal commitment scheme. All above bounds extend to multi-party protocol (with no honest majority) via a simple reduction.

A different line of work examines the minimal assumptions required to achieve an $o(1/\sqrt{r})$-bias two-party coin-flipping protocols. Dachman-Soled et al. [15] have shown that any fully black-box construction of $O(1/r)$-bias two-party protocols based on one-way functions with $r$-bit input and output needs $\Omega(r/\log r)$ rounds. Dachman-Soled et al. [16] have shown that there is no fully black-box and function oblivious construction of $O(1/r)$-bias two-party protocols from one-way functions (a protocol is function oblivious if the outcome of the protocol is independent of the choice of the one-way function used in the protocol). Very recently, Haitner et al. [26] have used an attack in the spirit of the one used in this paper, together with the dichotomy result of Haitner et al. [27], to prove that key-agreement is a necessary assumption for two-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol of bias $o(1/\sqrt{r})$, as long as $r$ is independent of the security parameter.

A different type of lower bound was given by Cohen et al. [13]. They focused on the communication model required for fully secure computation, and in particular showed that in the setting where broadcast is impossible (e.g., peer-to-peer network with $1/3$ fraction of dishonest parties), there exists no many-party coin-flipping protocol with non-trivial bias (i.e., noticeably smaller than $1/2$).

### 1.3.2 $1/p$-Secure Protocols

Cleve [11] result implies that for many functions fully-secure computation without an honest majority is not possible. Gordon and Katz [22] suggested the notion of $1/p$-secure computation to bypass this impossibility result. Very informally, a protocol is $1/p$-secure if every poly-time adversary can harm the protocol with probability at most $1/p$ (e.g., with probability $1/p$ the adversary can learn the inputs of honest parties, get the output and prevent the honest parties from getting the output, or bias the output). Gordon and Katz [22] constructed for every polynomial $p(\kappa)$ (where $\kappa$ is the security parameter) an efficient two-party $1/p(\kappa)$-secure protocol for computing a function $f$, provided that the size of the domain of at least one party in $f$ or the size of the range of $f$ is bounded by a polynomial. Beimel et al. [7] generalized this result to multi-party protocols when the number of parties is constant — for every function $f$ with $O(1)$ inputs such that the domain of each party (or the size of the range of $f$) is bounded by a polynomial and for every polynomial $p(\kappa)$, they presented an efficient $1/p(\kappa)$-secure protocol for computing the function.

Gordon and Katz [22] and Beimel et al. [7] also provided impossibility results explaining why their protocols require bounding the size of the domain or range of the functions. Specifically, Gordon and Katz [22] described a two-party function whose size of domain of each party and size of range is $\kappa^{\omega(1)}$ such that this function cannot be computed by any poly-round protocol achieving $1/3$-security. Beimel et al. [7] used this result to construct a function $f: \{0,1\}^{\omega(\log n)} \rightarrow \kappa^{\omega(1)}$ (i.e., a function with $\omega(\log n)$ parties where the domain of each party is Boolean) such that this function cannot be computed by any poly-round protocol achieving $1/3$-security. They also showed the same impossibility result for a function with $\omega(1)$ parties where the domain of each party is bounded by a polynomial is the security parameter. We emphasize that these impossibility results do not apply to coin-flipping protocols, where the parties do not have inputs.

### 1.3.3 Complete Fairness Without Honest Majority

Cleve [11] result was interpreted as saying that non-trivial functions cannot be computed with
complete fairness without an honest majority. In a surprising result, Gordon et al. [23] have shown that the millionaire problem with a polynomial size domain and other interesting functions can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting. The two-party functions that can be computed with complete fairness were further studied in [3, 2, 28, 4]; in particular, Asharov et al. [4] characterized the Boolean functions that can be computed with complete fairness. Gordon and Katz [21] have studied complete fairness in the multi-party case and constructed completely-fair protocols for non-trivial functions in this setting.

1.3.4 Differential Privacy

Differential privacy, introduced by Dwork et al. [19], provides a provable guarantee of privacy for data of individuals. Assume there is a database containing private information of individuals and there is an algorithm computing some function of the database. We say that such randomized algorithm is differentially private if changing the data of one individual has small affect on the output of the algorithm. For example, if, for a database $D$, a function $f(D)$ returns a numerical value in $[0, 1]$, then an algorithm returning $f(D) + noise$, where noise is distributed according to the Laplace distribution (with suitable parameters), is a differentially private algorithm. Since the introduction of differential privacy in 2006, many algorithms satisfying differential privacy were introduced, see, e.g., Dwork and Roth [18]. In this work we use differential privacy (i.e., Laplace noise) not for protecting privacy, but rather to provide oblivious sampling. This is similar in spirit to the usage of differential privacy, by Dwork et al. [20], to enable adaptive queries to a database.

Open Questions

Our lower bound is only applicable if the number of parties $n$ is greater than $\log(r)$, and it is very close to the $n/\sqrt{r}$-upper bound (protocol) of [5], if the number of parties is $n = r^\epsilon$ for “small” $\epsilon > 0$. For $n < \log\log r$ parties, the upper bounds of [30, 25, 10] tell us that no attack achieving $\tilde{O}(1/\sqrt{r})$-bias exists. For $\log\log(r) < n \leq \log(r)$ parties, we know of no such limitation, yet our attack is either inapplicable, or it yields a bias that is smaller than $1/r$. Thus, for the latter choice of parameters, the only known bound remains the $1/r$-lower bound of [11], which is far from meeting the upper bound of [5].

Paper Organization

Basic definitions and notation used throughout the paper, are given in Section 2, we also prove therein some useful inequalities used by the different sections. Our result for augmented week martingales is stated and proved in Section 3, and the oblivious sampling result is given in Section 4. The proof of the main theorem is given in Section 5.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We use calligraphic letters to denote sets, uppercase for random variables and functions, lowercase for values, and boldface for vectors. All logarithms considered here are in base two. For a vector $v$, we denote its $i$th entry by $v_i$ or $v[i]$. For $a \in \mathbb{R}$ and $b \geq 0$, let $a \pm b$ stand for the interval $[a-b, a+b]$. Given sets $S_1, \ldots, S_k$ and $k$-input function $f$, let $f(S_1, \ldots, S_k) := \{f(x_1, \ldots, x_j) : x_i \in S_i\}$, e.g.,
\( f(1 \pm 0.1) = \{f(x): x \in [0.9, 1.1]\} \). For \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), let \([n] := \{1, \ldots, n\}\) and \((n) := \{0, \ldots, n\}\). Given a vector \( \mathbf{v} \in \{0, 1\}^* \), let \( w(\mathbf{v}) := \sum_{i \in \|\mathbf{v}\|} v_i \). For \( x, \delta \in [0, 1] \) let \( \text{rnd}_\delta(x) = k\delta \), for \( k \in \mathbb{Z} \) being the largest number with \( k\delta \leq x \). For a function \( f: \mathcal{A} \mapsto \mathcal{B} \), let \( \text{Im}(f) = \{f(a): a \in \mathcal{A}\} \).

Let poly denote the set of all polynomials, let PPT stand for probabilistic polynomial time, let \( \text{PPTM} \) denote a PPT algorithm (Turing machine) and let \( \text{PPTM}^{\text{NU}} \) stands for a non-uniform PPTM. A function \( \nu: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1] \) is negligible, denoted \( \nu(n) = \text{neg}(n) \), if \( \nu(n) < 1/p(n) \) for every \( p \in \text{poly} \) and large enough \( n \).

### 2.2 Coin-Flipping Protocols

Since the focus of this paper is showing the non-existence of coin-flipping protocols with small bias, we will only focus on the correctness and bias of such protocols. See [25] for a complete definition of such protocols.

**Definition 2.1** (correct coin-flipping protocols). A multi-party protocol is a correct coin-flipping protocol, if

- When interacting with an efficient adversary controlling a subset of the parties, the honest parties always output the same bit, and
- The common output in a random honest execution of the protocol is a uniform bit.

**Definition 2.2** (Biassing coin-flipping protocols). An adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) controlling a strict subsets of the parties of a correct coin-flipping protocol biases its output by \( \delta \in \{1/2, 1\} \), if when interacting with the parties controlled by \( \mathcal{A} \), the remaining honest parties output some a priori fixed bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) with probability \( 1/2 + \delta \).

Such an adversary is called fail stop, if the parties in its control honestly follow the prescribed protocol, but might abort prematurely. The adversary is a rushing adversary, that is, in each round, first the honest parties send their messages, then the adversary might instruct some of the parties to abort (that is, send a special “abort” message to all other parties), and finally, all corrupt parties that have not aborted send their messages.

### 2.3 Basic Probability Facts

Given a distribution \( D \), we write \( x \leftarrow D \) to indicate that \( x \) is selected according to \( D \). Similarly, given a random variable \( X \), we write \( x \leftarrow X \) to indicate that \( x \) is selected according to \( X \). Given a finite set \( \mathcal{S} \), we let \( s \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \) denote that \( s \) is selected according to the uniform distribution on \( \mathcal{S} \).

Let \( D \) be a distribution over a finite set \( \mathcal{U} \), for \( u \in \mathcal{U} \), denote \( D(u) = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D}[X = u] \) and for \( S \subseteq \mathcal{U} \) denote \( D(S) = \Pr_{X \leftarrow D}[X \in S] \). Let the support of \( D \), denoted \( \text{Supp}(D) \), be defined as \( \{u \in \mathcal{U}: D(u) > 0\} \). The statistical distance between two distributions \( P \) and \( Q \) over a finite set \( \mathcal{U} \), denoted as \( \text{SD}(P, Q) \), is defined as \( \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal{U}} |P(S) - Q(S)| = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{u \in \mathcal{U}} |P(u) - Q(u)| \).

**Fact 2.3** (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let \( \mathcal{X} = \{x_i \in \{0, 1\}\}_{i=1}^n \) and \( \mu = \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \). Let \( E \leftarrow \binom{[n]}{n/2} \), i.e. \( E \) denotes a random subset of \([n]\) of size \( n/2 \). For any \( \varepsilon \geq 0 \), it holds that

\[
\Pr \left[ \left| \mu - \frac{2}{n} \cdot \sum_{i \in E} x_i \right| \geq \varepsilon / \sqrt{n} \right] \leq 2 \exp(-\varepsilon^2) .
\]
2.3.1 The Laplace Distribution

Definition 2.4. The Laplace distribution with parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^+$, denoted $\text{Lap}(\lambda)$, is defined by the density function $f(x) = \exp(-|x|/\lambda)/2\lambda$.

The following facts easily follow from the definition of the Laplace distribution.

Fact 2.5. For every $x \in \mathbb{R}$, it holds that
$$
\Pr[\text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \lambda |x|] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \exp(-|x|),
\Pr[\text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq -\lambda |x|] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \exp(-|x|).
$$

Fact 2.6. Let $\gamma, \gamma' \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^+$. Let $p = \Pr[\text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \lambda \gamma]$ and $p' = \Pr[\text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \lambda \gamma']$. If $|\varepsilon = \gamma' - \gamma| \leq 1$, then $p/p' \in 1 \pm 5\varepsilon$.

For completeness, the proof of Fact 2.6 is given in Appendix A.

2.3.2 Useful Observations about Iterated Bernoulli Trials

The next lemma bounds the statistical distance between the first success for two experiments of $r$ independent Bernoulli trials satisfying a certain notion of closeness.

Lemma 2.7. Consider two iterative sequences, each of $r$ independent Bernoulli trials. Let $p_i, p'_i \in [0,1]$ denote the success probability of the $i$th trial of the first and second sequence, respectively. Assume that $p_r = p'_r = 1$. For $i \in [r]$, let $q_i = p_i \cdot \prod_{j<i}(1-p_j)$ and $q'_i = p'_i \cdot \prod_{j<i}(1-p'_j)$. Let $\varepsilon$ be such that for all $i \in [r]$, it holds that $p_i/p'_i, p'_i/p_i, (1-p_i)/q_i, (1-q'_i)/(1-p'_i) \in (1\pm\varepsilon)$. Then, $\sum_{i=1}^{r-1} |q_i - q'_i| \leq 4\varepsilon(1-q_r)$.

The proof of Lemma 2.7 is given in Appendix A (see Lemma A.4).

2.3.3 Useful Observations about Conditional Expectation

The proofs of the following facts are given in Appendix A.

Fact 2.8. For arbitrary random variables $A$ and $B$, it holds that
$$
\mathbf{E}[AB \mid B] = B \cdot \mathbf{E}[A \mid B].
$$

Fact 2.9 (Tower Law). For arbitrary random variables $A, B$ and $C$, it holds that
$$
\mathbf{E}[\mathbf{E}[A \mid B, C] \mid B] = \mathbf{E}[A \mid B].
$$

Fact 2.10. For arbitrary random variables $A, B$, and arbitrary function $f$, it holds that
$$
\mathbf{E}[A \mid \mathbf{E}[A \mid B], f(B)] = \mathbf{E}[A \mid B].
$$

Fact 2.11. Let $A$, $B$, and $C$ be random variables such that $\text{supp}(B) \subseteq \mathbb{R}$. If $\mathbf{E}[A \mid B, C] = B$ then
$$
\mathbf{E}[A \mid \text{rnd}_\delta(B), C] \in \text{rnd}_\delta(B) \pm \delta.
$$
2.4 Martingales

In this section we define weaker variants of martingales.

**Definition 2.12 (δ-martingales).** Let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a sequence of random variables. We say that the sequence is a **δ-strong martingale sequence** if \( E[X_{i+1} \mid X_{\leq i} = x_{\leq i}] \in x_i \pm \delta \) for every \( i \in [r-1] \).

We say that the sequence is a **δ-weak martingale sequence** if \( E[X_{i+1} \mid X_i = x_i] \in x_i \pm \delta \) for every \( i \in [r-1] \). If \( \delta = 0 \), the above are just called strong and weak martingale sequence respectively.

In plain terms, a sequence is a strong martingale if the expectation of the next point conditioned on the entire history is exactly the last observed point. Analogously, a sequence is a weak martingale if the expectation of the next point conditioned on the previous point is equal to the previous point.

**Definition 2.13 (SoS-augmented δ-weak martingale).** Let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a sequence of random variables. We say that the sequence is a **SoS-augmented δ-weak martingale sequence** if

\[
E[X_{i+1} \mid X_i = x_i, \sum_{j<i}(X_{j+1} - X_j)^2 = \sigma] \in x_i \pm \delta \quad \text{for every } i \in [r-1].
\]

In a sense, a sequence is a SoS-augmented weak martingale if it satisfies the weak martingale property and it is “distance-oblivious”, i.e. the expectation is unaffected by conditioning on the quantity \( \sum_{j<i}(X_{j+1} - X_j)^2 \), which captures the distance the sequence has traveled thus far.

**Definition 2.14 (Associated difference sequence).** Let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be an arbitrary sequence and define \( Y_i = X_i - X_{i-1} \), for every \( i \in [r] \). The sequence \( Y_1 \ldots Y_r \) is referred to as the **difference sequence associated with** \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \).

By Definitions 2.12 and 2.14, it follows immediately that a sequence \( Y_1 \ldots Y_r \) is a **δ-strong martingale difference** if and only if \( E[Y_i \mid Y_1, \ldots, Y_{i-1}] \in \pm \delta \), and that a sequence \( Y_1 \ldots Y_r \) is a **δ-weak martingale difference** if and only if \( E[Y_i \mid \sum_{t<i} Y_t] \in \pm \delta \). By Definitions 2.13 and 2.14, a sequence \( Y_1 \ldots Y_r \) is a **SoS-augmented δ-weak martingale difference** if and only if \( E[Y_i \mid \sum_{t<i} Y_t, \sum_{t<i} Y_t^2] \in \pm \delta \).

Sequences that behave like martingales most of the time. We also define sequences that satisfy the different flavors of the martingale property with high probability. Such sequences are referred to as **(γ, δ)**-martingales.

**Definition 2.15 ((γ, δ)-martingales).** Let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a sequence of random variables. We say that the sequence is a **(γ, δ)**-**strong martingale sequence** if \[
\Pr_{x_{\leq r} \leftarrow x_{\leq r}} \left[ \exists i \text{ s.t. } E[X_{i+1} \mid X_{\leq i} = x_{\leq i}] \notin x_i \pm \delta \right] \leq \gamma.
\]

We say that the sequence is a **(γ, δ)**-**weak martingale sequence** if \[
\Pr_{x_{\leq r} \leftarrow x_{\leq r}} \left[ \exists i \text{ s.t. } E[X_{i+1} \mid X_i = x_i] \notin x_i \pm \delta \right] \leq \gamma.
\]

**Definition 2.16 (SoS-augmented (γ, δ)-weak martingale).** Let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a sequence of random variables. We say that the sequence is a **SoS-augmented (γ, δ)-weak martingale sequence** if \[
\Pr_{x_{\leq r} \leftarrow x_{\leq r}} \left[ \exists i \text{ s.t. } E[X_{i+1} \mid X_i = x_i, \sum_{j<i}(X_{j+1} - X_j)^2 = \sigma] \notin x_i \pm \delta \right] \leq \gamma.
\]
3 Augmented Weak Martingales have Large Gaps

In this section, we prove a result about sequences that satisfy a weaker version of the “martingale property”. Namely, we show that for any sequence satisfying the SoS-augmented $\delta$-weak martingale property, if $X_0 = 1/2$ and $X_r \in \{0, 1\}$, then the quantity $\sum_{i=1}^r (X_i - X_{i-1})^2$ is greater than $1/16$ with constant probability. As a corollary, we obtain a generalization of the result of Cleve and Impagliazzo [12], who showed that (strong) martingales have large gap between consecutive points. We emphasize that our results extend immediately to the usual notion of (strong) martingale sequences. The reader is referred to Section 1.1.1 for an informal discussion and motivation for the present section.

Recall (cf., Section 2.4) that a sequence $X_0, \ldots, X_r$ is a $\delta$-weak martingale, if $\mathbb{E} [X_{i+1} | X_i = x_i] \in x_i \pm \delta$ for every $i \in [r-1]$ and $x_i \in \text{supp}(X_i)$. Further recall that the difference sequence associated with $X_0, \ldots, X_r$ is the sequence $Y_1, \ldots, Y_r$ defined by $Y_i = X_i - X_{i-1}$, for every $i \in [r]$. We begin by extending to weak martingales a result of DasGupta [17] for strong martingales. We will use this result in the proof of our main theorem.

**Lemma 3.1.** Let $X_0 \ldots X_r$ be a $\delta$-weak martingale and let $Y_i = X_i - X_{i-1}$. If $X_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for every $i \in [r]$, then $\mathbb{E} [X_r^2 - X_0^2] \leq 2r \delta$.

**Proof.** Write $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_i Y_i^2 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_i (X_i - X_{i-1})^2 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_i \left(X_i^2 - 2X_iX_{i-1} + X_{i-1}^2\right)\right]$, and let $\Delta_i = -X_{i-1} + \mathbb{E} [X_i | X_{i-1}]$. By the $\delta$-weak martingale property, $\Delta_i \in \pm \delta$. Since $X_{i-1} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\Delta_i \in \pm \delta$, it holds that

$$\mathbb{E} [X_{i-1} \cdot \Delta_i] \in \pm \mathbb{E} [\|\Delta_i\|] \in \pm \delta. \quad (12)$$

Furthermore,

$$\mathbb{E} [X_iX_{i-1}] = \mathbb{E} [\mathbb{E} [X_iX_{i-1} | X_{i-1}]]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} [X_{i-1} \cdot \mathbb{E} [X_i | X_{i-1}]] \quad (13)$$

$$= \mathbb{E} [X_{i-1} \cdot (X_{i-1} - X_{i-1} + \mathbb{E} [X_i | X_{i-1}])]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[X_{i-1}^2\right] + \mathbb{E} [X_{i-1}\Delta_i]$$

$$\in \mathbb{E} \left[X_{i-1}^2\right] \pm \delta. \quad (14)$$

Equations (13) and (14) follow from Fact 2.9 and Fact 2.8, respectively. To conclude, we observe that $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{i \in [r]} Y_i^2 \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{i \in [r]} (X_i^2 - X_{i-1}^2)\right] \pm 2r \delta = \mathbb{E} [X_r^2 - X_0^2] \pm 2r \delta. \square$

Recall that a sequence $X_0 \ldots X_r$ is a SoS-augmented $\delta$-weak martingale if $\mathbb{E} [X_{i+1} | X_i = x_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_i - X_{i-1})^2 = \sigma] \in x_i \pm \delta$ for every $i \in [r-1]$, $x_i \in \text{supp}(X_i)$ and $\sigma \in \text{supp}(\sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_i - X_{i-1})^2)$. Following is the main result of this section.

**Theorem 3.2.** For $\delta < 1/100r$, let $X_0, \ldots, X_r$ be a SoS-augmented $\delta$-weak martingale sequence such that $X_i \in [0, 1]$ for every $i \in [r]$. Assuming $X_0 = 1/2$ and $\mathbb{P} [X_r \in \{0, 1\}] = 1$, then $\mathbb{P} \left[\sum_{i \in [r]} (X_i - X_{i-1})^2 \geq 1/16\right] \geq 1/20.$
Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.2 also holds for the "standard" flavor of martingales, i.e., strong martingales. Readers who are only interested in the strong case are advised to carry on reading by replacing below “SoS-augmented δ-weak” with “strong” and taking δ = 0; the proof remains coherent.

Theorem 3.2 is proven below, but we first sketch its proof. Assume without loss of generality that Pr [X_r = 1] ≥ 1/2 (otherwise apply the argument to the sequence X'_0, . . . , X'_r defined by X'_i = 1 − X_i, for every i ∈ [r]). Notice that if Pr [∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2 ≥ 16] = 0 then E [∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2] ≤ \frac{1}{16}, in contradiction with Lemma 3.1 which states that E [∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2] = E [X_r^2 − X_0^2] ≥ \frac{1}{2}. We argue that a similar contradiction can be derived if Pr [∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2 ≥ 16] < 1/20. Unfortunately, we cannot apply the same inequality as before because we have no control over the quantity ∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2 when it is greater than 1/16 (a crude upper bound is r which is utterly unhelpful). Our solution is to construct a weak martingale sequence U_0, . . . , U_r, which is “coupled” with the X-sequence in the following way: U_i is equal to X_i as long as ∑_{ℓ=1}^{i-1} (X_ℓ − X_{ℓ-1})^2 ≤ \frac{1}{16}, and U_i = U_{i-1} otherwise. Then, we argue that E [U_r^2 − U_0^2] ≥ \frac{1}{4} − Pr [∑_{i=1}^r (X_i − X_{i-1})^2 ≥ \frac{1}{16}] roughly corresponds to the probability that the two sequences diverge. We then upper bound the latter by applying Lemma 3.1 to the sequence U_0, . . . , U_r which we have a much better grasp on, since, by construction, ∑_{i=1}^r (U_i − U_{i-1})^2 can never exceed 1/16 by much.

Proof of Theorem 3.2. Assume without loss of generality that Pr [X_r = 1] ≥ 1/2. Further assume that Pr [∃ i s.t. |Y_i| ≥ \frac{1}{2}] < \frac{1}{20}, as otherwise our theorem is trivially true. Define the sequence U_0 . . . U_r by U_i = X_i if ∑_{j<i} Y_j^2 ≤ \frac{1}{16}, and U_i = U_{i-1} otherwise. We show that U_0, . . . , U_r is a δ-weak martingale, i.e., E [U_i | U_{i-1} = u] ∈ u ± δ. Write Z_i = U_i − U_{i-1} and fix u ∈ supp(U_{i-1}) and σ ∈ supp(∑_{j<i} Z_j^2). Observe that E [Z_i | U_{i-1} = u, ∑_{j<i} Z_j^2 = σ] = 0 if σ > \frac{1}{16}, and E [Z_i | U_{i-1} = u, ∑_{j<i} Z_j^2 = σ] = E [Y_i | X_{i-1} = u, ∑_{j<i} Y_j^2 = σ] otherwise. Thus, by the SoS-augmented property of Y, it holds that

E [Z_i | U_{i-1} = u, ∑_{j<i} Z_i^2 = σ] ∈ ±δ. \tag{15}

Since u and ζ were chosen arbitrarily, we deduce that E [Z_i | U_{i-1} = u] ∈ ±δ, and thus U_0, . . . , U_r is a δ-weak martingale sequence. Furthermore, since U_i ∈ [0, 1], by Lemma 3.1,

E [U_r^2] − \frac{1}{4} \leq E \left[ ∑_{i \in [r]} Z_i^2 \right] + 2rδ \tag{16}

\leq \Pr \left[ ∃ i \in [r] s.t. |Y_i| ≥ \frac{1}{4} \right] \cdot \left( \frac{1}{16} + 1 \right) + \Pr \left[ ∀ i \in [r] |Y_i| < \frac{1}{4} \right] \cdot \left( \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} \right) + 2rδ \tag{17}

\leq \frac{1}{20} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{16} + 1 \right) + 1 \cdot \left( \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} \right) + 2rδ

\leq 0.18 + 2rδ.

Equation (17) follows from the fact that, by construction, the quantity ∑_{i=1}^{Γ+1} Z_i^2 is equal to ∑_{i=1}^{Γ+1} Y_i^2, where Γ is the largest index such that ∑_{i=1}^{Γ} Y_i^2 ≤ \frac{1}{16}. On the other hand, by noting that
\[ \Pr [X_r \neq U_r] \leq \Pr \left[ \sum_{i \in [r]} Y_i^2 > \frac{1}{16} \right], \]

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ U_r^2 \right] \geq 1^2 \cdot \Pr [X_r = 1] \]
\[ \geq 1^2 \cdot \Pr [X_r = 1 \land X_r = U_r] \]
\[ \geq 1^2 \cdot (\Pr [X_r = 1] - \Pr [X_r \neq U_r]) \]
\[ \geq 1/2 - \Pr [X_r \neq U_r] \]
\[ \geq 1/2 - \Pr \left[ \sum_{i \in [r]} Y_i^2 > \frac{1}{16} \right]. \]

Combine Equations (16) and (18) we deduce that
\[ \Pr \left[ \sum_{i \in [r]} Y_i^2 > \frac{1}{16} \right] \geq \frac{1}{4} - 0.18 - 2r\delta \geq \frac{1}{20}, \]
where the last inequality is true since \( \delta \leq 1/100r \).

Theorem 3.2 immediately yields the following corollary.

**Corollary 3.4.** For \( \delta < 1/100r \), let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a SoS-augmented \( \delta \)-weak martingale sequence such that \( X_i \in [0,1] \) for every \( i \in [r] \). If \( X_0 = 1/2 \) and \( \Pr [X_r \in \{0,1\}] = 1 \), then
\[ \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r] \text{s.t. } |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq \frac{1}{4\sqrt{r}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{20}. \]

Ans also the following corollary follows via a simple coupling argument.

**Corollary 3.5.** For \( \gamma < 1/1000 \) and \( \delta < 1/100r \), let \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) be a SoS-augmented \((\gamma, \delta)\)-weak martingale sequence such that \( X_i \in [0,1] \) for every \( i \in [r] \). If \( X_0 = 1/2 \) and \( \Pr [X_r \in \{0,1\}] = 1 \), then
\[ \Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r] \text{s.t. } |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq \frac{1}{4\sqrt{r}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{20} - \gamma. \]

**Remark 3.6.** We mention that for any constant \( \gamma < 1/2 \), it can be shown that the sequence has gaps of order \( 1/\sqrt{r} \), with constant probability. For the specific choice of parameters \( 1/4\sqrt{r} \) and \( 1/20 \), the value of \( \gamma \) should be smaller than \( 1/1000 \).

**Remark 3.7 (Extensions).** We remark that we can replace the requirement \( X_i \in [0,1] \) for the less restrictive \( |X_i - X_{i-1}| \leq 1 \) in Theorem 3.2 and its corollaries. However, the resulting claims offer no gains for the purposes of the present paper and their proofs are significantly longer, as far as we can tell. Therefore, we only prove here the more restrictive versions as stated in the present section.

### 4 Oblivious Sampling via Differential Privacy

Consider the following \( r \)-round game in which your goal is to maximize the revenue of a random “party” \( H \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \). In the beginning, a party \( H \) is chosen with uniform distribution from \( \mathcal{H} \) (where \( \mathcal{H} \) is a finite set of parties). In each round, values \( \{s^h_i \in [0,1]\}_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \) are assigned to the parties of \( \mathcal{H} \), but only the values \( \{s^h_i \}_{h \in \mathcal{H} \setminus \{H\}} \) of the other parties are published. You can decide to abort, and
then party $H$ is rewarded by $s^H_i$, or to continue to the next round. If an abort never occurs, party $H$ is rewarded by $s^H_r$ (last round value). You have the similarity guarantee that $|s^H_i - s^h_i| \leq \sigma$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$, letting $s_i = \mathbf{E}_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[s^h_i]$. You are also guarantee that $\max_i \{s_i\} \geq \gamma$.

In this section we analyze the following “differentially private based” approach for this task, which is described by the following experiment (the basic game described above is captured by the experiment for $p = 1/n$).

**Experiment 4.1 (LapExp: Oblivious sampling experiment).**

**Parameters:** $\mathcal{H} = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $\mathcal{S} = \{s^h_i \in [-1,1] \}_{i \in [r], h \in \mathcal{H}}$, $p \in [0,1/2]$, $\gamma \in [0,1]$ and $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^+$.  

**Notation:** Let $s_i = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} s^h_i$ and for $h \in \mathcal{H}$ let $s^h_i = \frac{1}{1-p}(s_i - p \cdot s^h_i)$.

**Description:**

1. Sample $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$.
2. For $i = 1, \ldots, r - 1$:
   (a) Sample $\nu_i \leftarrow \text{Lap}(\lambda)$.
   (b) If $s^h_i + \nu_i \geq \gamma$, output $s^h_i$ and halt.
3. Output $s^h_r$.

Let $\text{LapExp}(\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma, \lambda)$ denote the above experiment with parameters $\mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{S}$, $\gamma$ and $\lambda$. Theorem 4.2 analyzes the expected value of the output of $\text{LapExp}(\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma, \lambda)$.

**Theorem 4.2 (Quality of the oblivious sampling experiment).** Let $\mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{S}$, $\gamma$, $\lambda$ and $p$ be as in Experiment 4.1, with $s^h_i = s^h_r$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Let $\alpha^h = \max_i \{|s^h_i - s^r_i|\}$, let Similar = \{h \in \mathcal{H} : \alpha^h \leq \lambda \cdot (1-p)/p\} and NonSimilar = \mathcal{H} \setminus \text{Similar}.

Let $H$ be the value of $h$ and $J$ be the halting round (set to $r$ if Experiment 4.1 does not halt in step (2b)) in a random execution of $\text{LapExp}(\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma, \lambda)$. Then $\mathbf{E}[s^H_i] \geq \mathbf{E}[v_H] - r \cdot e^{-\gamma/2\lambda}$, where

$$v_h = \begin{cases} 
\Pr[J \neq r \mid H = h] \cdot \left(\gamma/2 - \frac{40(\alpha^h)^2}{\lambda} \cdot \frac{p}{1-p}\right), & h \in \text{Similar}, \\
-4\alpha^h, & h \in \text{NonSimilar}.
\end{cases}$$

If $s_i \geq \gamma$ for some $i \in [r - 1]$, then $\Pr[J \neq r \mid H = h] \geq 1/6$, for every $h \in \text{Similar}$.

When using Theorem 4.2 in our proofs, the values $\mathcal{S} = \{s^h_i \in [-1,1] \}_{i \in [r], h \in \mathcal{H}}$ are calculated for a fixed transcript of the coin-flipping protocol. Corollary 4.3 analysis the expected value of the output when first a transcript $\tau$ is chosen, then the values $\mathcal{S}_\tau$ are computed, and finally $\text{LapExp}(\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{S}_\tau, \gamma, \lambda)$ is executed.

**Corollary 4.3.** Let $\mathcal{H}$, $\gamma$, $\lambda$ and $p$ be as in Experiment 4.1. Let $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathcal{S}_\tau = \{s^h_i(\tau) \}_{i \in [r], h \in \mathcal{H}} \}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$ denote a set of numbers in $[-1,1]$ indexed by $i \in [r]$, $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\tau$ taking values in some set $\mathcal{T}$. Define $\alpha^h(\tau) = \max_i \{|s_i(\tau) - s^h_i(\tau)|\}$. Let $T$ be a random variable taking values in $\mathcal{T}$, and let $H$ be the value of $h$ and $J$ be the halting round (set to $r$ if Experiment 4.1 does not halt in step (2b)) in a random execution of $\text{LapExp}(\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{S}_{\tau \leftarrow \mathcal{T}}, \gamma, \lambda)$. Further assume that there exist real numbers $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \in [0,1]$ such that
\begin{itemize}
\item \(\alpha \leq \lambda(1 - p)/2p,\)
\item \(\Pr_{\tau\leftarrow T} \left[ \sigma^h(\tau) \geq \rho \cdot \alpha \right] \leq \frac{1}{p} \cdot \beta, \) for every \(h \in \mathcal{H}\) and \(\rho \geq 1,\)
\item \(\Pr_{\tau\leftarrow T} \left[ \max_{i \in [r]} s_i(\tau) \geq \gamma \right] \geq \delta.\)
\end{itemize}

Then,
\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j(T) \right] \geq \frac{1}{6} \cdot (\delta - \beta/2) \cdot \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40 \cdot \alpha^2 p}{\lambda(1 - p)} \right) - 168\alpha\beta - 8\alpha\beta \log(1/\lambda) - \frac{r}{2} \cdot e^{-\gamma/2\lambda}.
\]

In particular, if \(\gamma \geq \frac{1}{256\sqrt{r}}, \lambda = \gamma/(4 \log(r)), \alpha \leq \frac{\gamma \sqrt{(1-p)/p}}{32 \log(r)}\) and \(\beta \leq \frac{\delta}{16 \sqrt{(1-p)/p}},\) then \(\mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j(T) \right] \geq \gamma\delta/125 - \frac{1}{2r},\) for \(r\) large enough.

### 4.1 Proving Theorem 4.2

**Proof of Theorem 4.2.** For \(h \in \mathcal{H}\) and \(i \in [r],\) let \(d^h_i = s^h_i - s^h_i.\) We next compute \(\mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j \right].\)

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j \right] = \sum_{i \in [r], h \in \mathcal{H}} s^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ H = h \land J = i \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{i, h} \left( s^h_i - d^h_i \right) \cdot \Pr \left[ H = h \land J = i \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{i, h} s^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ H = h \land J = i \right] - \sum_{i, h} d^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ H = h \land J = i \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j \right] - \sum_{i, h} d^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ H = h \land J = i \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j \right] - \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{i \in [r], h \in \mathcal{H}} d^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ J = i \mid H = h \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E} \left[ s^H_j \right] - \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{i \in [r-1], h \in \mathcal{H}} d^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ J = i \mid H = h \right].
\]

The last equality holds since, by assumption, \(s_r = s^h_r\) for any \(h,\) thus, \(d^h_0 = 0.\)

We start by upper bounding the right hand term above (i.e., \(\sum_{i, h} d^h_i \cdot \Pr \left[ J = i \mid H = h \right].\)) For \(h \in \mathcal{H}\) and \(i \in [r - 1],\) let

\[
p^h_i = \Pr \left[ \text{Lap}(\lambda) + s^h_i \geq \gamma \right], \quad p^h_i = 1, \quad q^h_i = p^h_i \cdot \prod_{j<i} (1 - p^h_j).
\]

Note that \(q^h_i = \Pr \left[ J = i \mid H = h \right].\) For \(i \in [r],\) let

\[
p_i = \Pr \left[ \text{Lap}(\lambda) + s_i \geq \gamma \right] \text{ and } q_i = p_i \cdot \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j).
\]

Let \(\sigma^h_i = s_i - s^h_i\) and \(\sigma^\gamma_i = s_i - s^\gamma_i.\) Note that \(d^h_i = -\sigma^h_i + \sigma^h_i.\) Since \(s_i = (1-p)\cdot s^h_i + p\cdot s^h_i,\) it holds that \(\sigma^\gamma_i = -p \cdot \sigma^h_i/(1-p).\) In particular, for any \(h \in \mathcal{H}\) similar it holds that \(|\sigma^h_i| \leq \sigma^h_i \leq \lambda(1-p)/p\)
and $|\sigma_i^h| \leq \lambda$. Hence, Fact 2.6 yields that $p_i^h / p_i \in 1 \pm 5\sigma^h / \lambda$ for any $h \in \text{Similar}$. Therefore, by Lemma 2.7

$$\sum_{i \in [r-1]} |q_i - q_i^h| \leq \frac{20}{\lambda} \cdot \sigma^h \cdot (1 - q_i^h) \leq \frac{20p}{\lambda(1 - p)} \cdot \sigma^h \cdot (1 - q_i^h).$$

(20)

for any $h \in \text{Similar}$. Define $d_h = \max_i \{|d_i^h|\}$. It follows that

$$\sum_{i \in [r-1], h \in H} d_i^h \cdot \Pr[J = i \mid H = h] = \sum_{i,h} d_i^h \cdot q_i^h$$

$$= \sum_{i,h} d_i^h \cdot q_i + \sum_{i,h} d_i^h \cdot (q_i^h - q_i)$$

$$= \sum_{i,h} d_i^h \cdot (q_i^h - q_i)$$

$$\leq \sum_{h \in \text{Similar}} d_h \sum_{i \in [r-1]} |q_i^h - q_i| + \sum_{h \in \text{NonSimilar}} 2d_h$$

$$\leq \frac{20p}{\lambda \cdot (1 - p)} \cdot \sum_{h \in \text{Similar}} d_h \cdot \sigma^h \cdot (1 - q_i^h) + \sum_{h \in \text{NonSimilar}} 2d_h$$

$$\leq \frac{20p}{\lambda \cdot (1 - p)} \cdot \sum_{h \in \text{Similar}} 2(\sigma^h)^2 \cdot (1 - q_i^h) + \sum_{h \in \text{NonSimilar}} 4\sigma^h.$$  

The second equality holds since $\sum_{h \in H} \sigma_i^h = 0$ for any $i \in [r]$, and thus $\sum_{h \in H} \sigma_i^h = 0$ and $\sum_{h \in H} d_i^h = 0$. The last inequality holds since $p \leq 1/2$ and thus $d_i^h = | - p\sigma^h / (1 - p) - \sigma^h | \leq 2\sigma^h$.

The next step is to lower bound $\mathbb{E}[s_j^H]$. By Fact 2.5,

$$\Pr[J \neq r \land s_j^H \leq \gamma / 2] = \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \Pr[J = i \land s_i^H \leq \gamma / 2] \leq \frac{r}{2} \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}.$$  

(22)

Hence, since $\Pr[J \neq r] = \Pr[J \neq r \land s_j^H > \gamma / 2] + \Pr[J \neq r \land s_j^H \leq \gamma / 2]$,

$$\mathbb{E}[s_j^H] \geq \Pr[J \neq r \land s_j^H > \gamma / 2] \cdot \gamma / 2 - 1 \cdot \Pr[J \neq r \land s_j^H \leq \gamma / 2]$$

$$\geq \left( \Pr[J \neq r] - \frac{r}{2} \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda} \right) \cdot \gamma / 2 - \frac{r}{2} \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}$$

$$\geq \Pr[J \neq r] \cdot \gamma / 2 - r \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}$$

$$= \mathbb{E}[1 - q_r^H] \cdot \gamma / 2 - r \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}$$

$$\geq \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h \in \text{Similar}} (1 - q_r^h) \cdot \gamma / 2 \right) - r \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}.$$  

(23)

Thus, by Equations (19), (21) and (23),

$$\mathbb{E}[s_j^H] \geq \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{h \in \text{Similar}} (1 - q_r^h) \cdot \left( \gamma / 2 - \frac{40}{\lambda \cdot (1 - p) / p} (\sigma^h)^2 \right) \right) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h \in \text{NonSimilar}} 4\sigma^h - r \cdot e^{-\gamma / 2\lambda}.$$  

(24)
To conclude the proof we need to show that if \( s_i \geq \gamma \) for some \( i \in [r-1] \), then \( 1 - q^h_r \geq 1/6 \) for all \( h \in \text{Similar} \). Let \( i \in [r-1] \) be a round with \( s_i \geq \gamma \). For every \( h \in \text{Similar} \), we have shown that \( |\sigma^{\gamma h}_i| \leq \lambda \), thus, \( s_i^{\gamma h} \geq \gamma - \lambda \). By Fact 2.5, it holds that \( p^h_i \geq \Pr[\text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \lambda] = \exp(-1)/2 \geq 1/6 \). Hence, \( 1 - q^h_r \geq 1/6 \), for all \( h \in \text{Similar} \).

### 4.2 Proving Corollary 4.3

Before proving the theorem, we state and prove two claims regarding the expectation of the similarity gap.

**Claim 4.4.** Under the hypothesis of Corollary 4.3, it holds that

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \sigma^h(T) \mid \sigma^h(T) \geq (1 - p)\lambda/p \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \geq (1 - p)\lambda/p \right] \leq 2\alpha \beta \log(1/\alpha) + 2\alpha \beta, \quad (25)
\]

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\sigma^h(T))^2 \mid \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1 - p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1 - p)\lambda/p] \right] \leq 4(1 - p)\lambda \alpha \beta / p. \quad (26)
\]

for every \( h \in \mathcal{H} \).

**Proof.** We begin by showing (25).

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \sigma^h(T) \mid \sigma^h(T) \geq (1 - p)\lambda/p \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \geq (1 - p)\lambda/p \right] 
\leq \sum_{i=\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)}^{\log(1/\alpha)} \alpha 2^{i+1} \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in \alpha \cdot [2^i, 2^{i+1}] \right] 
\leq \sum_{i=\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)}^{\log(1/\alpha)} \alpha 2^{i+1} \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \geq 2^i \cdot \alpha \right] 
\leq \sum_{i=\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)}^{\log(1/\alpha)} \alpha 2^{i+1} \cdot 2^{-i} \beta 
= 2\alpha \beta (\log(1/\alpha) - \log((1 - p)\lambda/\alpha) + 1) 
= 2\alpha \beta \log(p/(1 - p)\lambda) + 2\alpha \beta \leq 2\alpha \beta \log(1/\alpha) + 2\alpha \beta.
\]

Next, we show (26).

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ (\sigma^h(T))^2 \mid \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1 - p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1 - p)\lambda/p] \right] 
\leq \sum_{i=0}^{\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)-1} \alpha^2 2^{2i+2} \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in \alpha \cdot [2^i, 2^{i+1}] \right] 
\leq \sum_{i=0}^{\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)-1} \alpha^2 2^{2i+2} \cdot 2^{-i} \cdot \beta 
= 4\alpha^2 \beta \sum_{i=0}^{\log((1-p)\lambda/\alpha)-1} 2^i 
= 4\alpha^2 \beta ((1 - p)\lambda/\alpha - 1) \leq 4\alpha \beta (1 - p)\lambda/\alpha.
\]

\( \square \)
Proof of Corollary 4.3. Using the notation from Theorem 4.2, since \( r \cdot e^{-\gamma/2\lambda} \leq -\frac{1}{2r} \), for \( r \) large enough, it suffices to bound \( \mathbb{E}[v_h \mid H = h] \) for an arbitrary \( h \). To prove the claim, we will combine Theorem 4.2 with (25) and (26) from Claim 4.4. Having fixed \( H = h \), all probabilities and expectations below are conditioned on \( H = h \). To alleviate notation, we will omit specifying that \( H = h \), i.e., instead of \( \mathbb{E}[\cdots \mid \cdots \land H = h] \) and \( \Pr[\cdots \mid \cdots \land H = h] \), we write \( \mathbb{E}[\cdots] \) and \( \Pr[\cdots] \). Using the notation from Theorem 4.2, we compute

\[
\mathbb{E}[v_h] = \mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \leq \alpha \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] 
+ \mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] 
+ \mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right].
\]

We compute each of these terms separately. First, by expanding over all possible transcripts,

\[
\mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \leq \alpha \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] 
= \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] \cdot \sum_{\tau \text{ s.t. } \sigma(h)(\tau) \leq \alpha} \mathbb{E}[v_h \mid T = \tau] \cdot \Pr
\left[
T = \tau \mid \sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right].
\]

\[
\geq \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] \cdot \sum_{\tau \text{ s.t. } \sigma(h)(\tau) \leq \alpha} \left(\frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40 \cdot \alpha^2}{\lambda(1-p)/p} \right) \cdot \Pr
\left[
J \neq r \mid T = \tau \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
T = \tau \mid \sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right].
\]

Where the last inequality follows by the definition of \( v_h \) when \( h \) is similar (cf.,). Consequently,

\[
\mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \leq \alpha \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] \geq \left(\frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40 \cdot \alpha^2}{\lambda(1-p)/p} \right) \cdot \Pr
\left[
J \neq r \land \sigma(h) \leq \alpha \right] \tag{27}
\]

Next, write \( p_{\text{sim}} = \Pr \left[ \frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] \). For the second term, again by expanding over all possible transcripts, we compute

\[
\mathbb{E}
\left[
\frac{\sigma(h)}{T} \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr
\left[
\sigma(h) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] 
= p_{\text{sim}} \cdot \sum_{\tau \text{ s.t. } \sigma(h)(\tau) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p]} \mathbb{E}[v_h \mid T = \tau] \cdot \Pr
\left[
T = \tau \mid \sigma(h) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right]
\]

For any fixed \( \tau \) such that \( \sigma(h)(\tau) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \), by the definition of \( v_h \) when \( h \) is similar (cf., Theorem 4.2), it holds that

\[
\mathbb{E}[v_h \mid T = \tau] \geq \Pr
\left[
J \neq r \mid T = \tau \right] \left(\frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40}{\lambda(1-p)/p} \cdot \mathbb{E}
\left[
(\sigma(h))^2 \mid T = \tau \right] \right)
\]

\[
\geq \Pr
\left[
J \neq r \mid T = \tau \right] \cdot \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40}{\lambda(1-p)/p} \cdot \mathbb{E}
\left[
(\sigma(h))^2 \mid T = \tau \right]
\]

\[
\geq \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40}{\lambda(1-p)/p} \cdot \mathbb{E}
\left[
(\sigma(h))^2 \mid T = \tau \right]
\]

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and we deduce that
\[
E \left[ v_h | \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] 
\geq \frac{7}{2} \cdot \Pr \left[ J \neq r \wedge \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] 
- \frac{40}{(1-p)\lambda/p} \cdot E \left[ (\sigma^h(T))^2 | \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \in [\alpha, (1-p)\lambda/p] \right]. \tag{28}
\]

Finally, by the definition of \(v_h\) when \(h\) is non-similar (cf., Theorem 4.2),
\[
E \left[ v_h | \sigma^h(T) \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right] 
\geq -4 \cdot E \left[ \sigma^h(T) | \sigma^h(T) \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ \sigma^h(T) \geq (1-p)\lambda/p \right]. \tag{29}
\]
Add Equations (27) to (29) and replace the relevant expressions using (25) and (26):
\[
E \left[ v_h \right] \geq \Pr \left[ h \in \text{Similar} \wedge J \neq r \right] \cdot \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40 \cdot \alpha^2}{(1-p)\lambda/p} \right) - 40 \cdot 4\alpha\beta - 8\alpha\beta \log(1/\lambda) - 8\alpha\beta.
\]
Next, we lower-bound the quantity \(\Pr \left[ h \in \text{Similar} \wedge J \neq r \right]\).
\[
\Pr \left[ h \in \text{Similar} \wedge J \neq r \right] \geq \Pr \left[ h \in \text{Similar} \wedge J \neq r \wedge \exists s_i(T) \geq \gamma \right] 
= \Pr \left[ J \neq r | h \in \text{Similar} \wedge \exists s_i(T) \geq \gamma \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ h \in \text{Similar} \wedge \exists s_i(T) \geq \gamma \right] 
\geq \frac{1}{6} \cdot (\Pr \left[ \exists s_i(T) \geq \gamma \right] - \Pr \left[ h \in \text{NonSimilar} \right]) 
\geq \frac{1}{6} \cdot (\delta - \beta/2).
\]
The last inequality follows from the fact that \(\Pr \left[ \exists s_i(T) \geq \gamma \right] \geq \delta \) and \(\Pr \left[ h \in \text{NonSimilar} \right] \leq \Pr \left[ \sigma^h \geq 2\alpha \right] \leq \beta/2\). In summary,
\[
E \left[ v_h \right] \geq \frac{\delta - \beta/2}{6} \cdot \left( \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40 \cdot \alpha^2}{(1-p)\lambda/p} \right) - (168\alpha\beta + 8\alpha\beta \log(1/\lambda)).
\]
The last part of the claim follows from the inequalities below, holding for large enough \(r\):
\begin{itemize}
  \item \(\delta - \frac{\beta}{2} \geq \frac{31}{32} \cdot \delta\), since \(\beta \leq \sqrt{\frac{p}{1-p}} \cdot \frac{\delta}{16}\) and \(p \leq 1/2\).
  \item \(\frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{40\alpha^2 p}{\lambda(1-p)} \geq \frac{\gamma}{4}\), since \(\alpha^2 \leq \frac{\gamma\lambda}{64\log(r)} \cdot \frac{1-p}{p}\).
  \item \(168\alpha\beta + 8\alpha\beta \log(1/\lambda) \leq 8\alpha\beta \log(r) \leq \frac{\gamma\delta}{32}\), since the leading term in the far left summand is \(4\alpha\beta \log(r)\) (because of the square root) and \(\alpha\beta \leq \frac{\gamma\delta}{256\log(r)}\).
\end{itemize}
We conclude that \(E \left[ v_h \right] \geq \frac{\gamma\delta}{25} - \frac{\gamma\delta}{32} \geq \frac{\gamma\delta}{125}\). \qed
5 Biasing Coin-Flipping Protocols

In this section we prove our main result, an almost optimal attack on many-party coin-flipping protocols.

**Theorem 5.1** (Main theorem). There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Then, there exists a party $P$ in $\Pi$ such that $A^\Pi$ controlling all parties but $P$ biases the output of $P$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^k)$. The running time of $A^\Pi$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses oracle only access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.

**Remark 5.2** (Interesting choice of parameters). Note that $\sqrt{n} \geq 2 \log(r)^2$ implies $\binom{n}{\sqrt{n}} \geq \sqrt{n}^\sqrt{n} \geq 2^{\sqrt{n}} \log(r)^{2\sqrt{n}} \geq r \log(r)^{2\sqrt{n}}$, and therefore there exists $k \in \{1, \ldots, \sqrt{n}\}$ satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem. On the other hand, if $\sqrt{n} < 2 \log(r)^2$, then it is easy to see that such $k$ does not exist, or $\log(r)^k \geq \sqrt{r}$ and in this case Cleve [11]’s bound overtakes and our theorem is trivial.

Let $n' = \lfloor n/s \rfloor$, for some $s < n/2$. By noting that any $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol is, in particular, an $n'$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, the theorem below follows Theorem 5.1 by simple reduction.

**Theorem 5.3** (Main theorem, fewer corruptions variant.). Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol and let $n' = \lfloor n/s \rfloor$, for some $s < n/2$. There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n'}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Then, there exists parties $P_1, \ldots, P_s$ in $\Pi$ such that $A^\Pi$ controlling all parties but $P_1, \ldots, P_s$ biases the output of $P_1, \ldots, P_s$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k})$. The running time of $A^\Pi$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses oracle only access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.\(^8\)

For presentation purposes, we will prove our theorem for the special case of non-uniform PPT Turing machines. Later, in Section 5.5, we show how to handle the general case. In Sections 5.1 to 5.4, we prove the following weaker variant of Theorem 5.1.

**Theorem 5.4** (Main theorem, non-uniform adversaries variant). There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Then, there exists a party $P$ in $\Pi$ and a string $\text{adv} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $A^\Pi(\text{adv})$ controlling all parties but $P$ biases the output of $P$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k})$. The running time of $A^\Pi$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses only oracle access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.

**Proving Theorem 5.4.** Our proof follows the high-level description given in the introduction. Recall that a backup value associated with a subset of parties with respect to a given round of a protocol execution is the common output these parties would output if all other parties prematurely abort in this round round. More formally,

**Notation 5.5.** We identify the set $[n]$ with the parties of the $n$-party protocol in consideration. We refer to subset of parties (i.e., subset of $[n]$) as tuples, and denote sets of such tuples using “blackboard bold” (e.g., $S$) rather than calligraphic. For a tuple subset $S \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$ and $h \in [n]$, let $S(h) = \{U \in S : h \in U\}$, i.e. $S(h)$ is the set of tuples in $S$ that contain $h$, and $S \setminus h = S \setminus S(h)$.

\(^8\)We require $s < n/2$, otherwise the resulting protocol has an honest majority, and standard MPC techniques would foil the attack.
Definition 5.6 (Backup values). The following definitions are with respect to a fixed honest execution of an $n$-party, $r$-round correct protocol (determined by the parties’ random coins). The $i^{th}$ round backup value of a subset of parties $U \subseteq [n]$ at round $i \in [r]$, denoted $\text{Bckp}(U, i)$, is defined as the common output the parties in $u$ would output, if all other parties abort in the $i^{th}$ round (set to $\bot$ if the execution has not reached this round with all parties of $U$ alive). The average backup value of a tuples subset of $S$, is defined by $\text{AvgBckp}(S, i) = \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{U \subseteq S} \text{Bckp}(U, i)$. Furthermore, for every $S$, we define the random variables $B_1^S, \ldots, B_r^S$ to denote the value of $\text{AvgBckp}(S, 1), \ldots, \text{AvgBckp}(S, r)$ in a random execution of $\Pi$.

Back to the informal proof-sketch. For a subset of parties $S \subseteq [n]$, consider the average backup value of the tuples in $S_1 = S^k$, i.e. $B_1^{S_1}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1}$, where $B_i^{S_1}$ denotes the value of $\text{AvgBckp}(S_1, i)$ in a random execution of $\Pi$. Let $X_0, \ldots, X_r$ be the Doob-like sequence defined by $X_i = \mathbb{E}[\text{out} | B_1^{S_1}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{j \leq i} (X_j - X_{j-1})^2]$. It is easy to see that $X_0, \ldots, X_r$ is a S Os-augmented weak martingale. In Section 3, we showed that such sequences have at least one $1/\sqrt{r}$-gap between consecutive variables, with constant probability. In turn, such a gap enables a $1/\sqrt{r}$-attack, unless the sequence $B_1^{S_2}, \ldots, B_r^{S_2}$ for $S_2 = S^{k-1} \times S$, and the above sequence $B_1^{S_1}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1}$ are non-similar: there is a $1/\sqrt{r}$-gap between $B_i^{S_2}$ and $B_i^{S_1}$ in some round $i$. If so, we can attempt to exploit the non-similarity by applying our differential privacy-based attack, dubbed the oblivious sampling attack, in the spirit of the oblivious sampling experiment described in Section 4. In order for the latest attack to achieve the desired bias, we require that for any two parties $h, h' \in [n]$, the projection of the sequence $B_1^{S_1}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1}$ to $h$ and $h'$, defined by $B_1^{S_1(h)}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1(h)}$ and $B_1^{S_1(h')}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1(h')}$, respectively, yields similar sequences (and the same for $S_2$). If not, i.e. there is a pair of parties $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}$ and $z \in \{1, 2\}$ such that $B_1^{S_1(z)}, \ldots, B_r^{S_1(z)}$ and $B_1^{S_2(z)}, \ldots, B_r^{S_2(z)}$ are non similar, then we can invoke the oblivious sampling attack with $S_1 = S_z(h)$ and $S_2 = S_z(h')$, which yields the desired bias, as long as all relevant pairs of parties induce projected sequences that are similar. If not, we can find another pair of parties that breaks our requirement, i.e. similarity, and repeat the process.

The iterative process described above terminates by finding a non-similar pair of tuple-sets ($S'_1, S'_2$) such that, either every projection is similar, and thus we can apply the oblivious sampling attack, or, $S'_1$ and $S'_2$ consist of tuples in which all-but-one parties are fixed, i.e. every projection describes the distribution of a single bit. If so, we can apply a simple attack that we call the singletons attack. We refer to the “level” where the process stops as the nugget of $\Pi$.

The actual proof is significantly more complicated, as we have to use a different similarity measure for every level, and we have to make sure the projected sets of tuples have the right size.

We formally prove the theorem using the following four lemmas, proved in Sections 5.1 to 5.4. Lemma 5.9 state that any protocol has a nugget (formally defined in Definition 5.8), where Lemmas 5.10 to 5.12 state that there is an effective attack, for all possible values of the nugget.

Notation 5.7. Let $\text{coef}_n(k, \ell) = \frac{(n-1)(n-2)\cdots(n-k+\ell)}{(k-1)(k-2)\cdots \ell}$, letting $\text{coef}_n(k, k) = 1$. For $r \in \mathbb{N}$, let $\mathcal{R}(r) = \{1, 1 + 1/r, 1 + 2/r, 1 + 3/r \ldots, r\}$. We remark that $|\mathcal{R}| = r(r - 1) + 1$.

Definition 5.8 (The Nugget). Let $\Pi$ be an $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Index $k^* \in [k + 1]$ is a nugget for $\Pi$, if there exists $\rho^* \in \mathcal{R}(r)$, set $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$, and tuple sets $S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{n}{k}$ such that the following holds.

For a tuple-set $S \subseteq 2^{[n]}$ and $i \in [r]$, let $B_i^S$ denote the value of $\text{AvgBckp}(S, i)$ in a random execution of $\Pi$. The following holds according to the value of $k^*$:
Lemma 5.10. There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $(\binom{n}{k}) \geq r \log(r) 2^k$.

Suppose $\Pi$ admits a nugget $k^* = k + 1$, then exists party $h \in [n]$ and a string $\text{adv}$ such that $A^\Pi(\text{adv})$ controlling all parties but $h$ biases the output of $h$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k-k^*+1})$. The running time of $A$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses only oracle access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.

Lemma 5.11. Same as Lemma 5.10 with respect to $k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\}$.

Lemma 5.12. Same as Lemma 5.10 with respect to $k^* = 1$.

Proof of Theorem 5.4. Immediately follows from Lemmas 5.9, 5.13, 5.21 and 5.24. \qed

In the following we assume without loss of generality that $r$ is larger than some constant to be determined by the analysis. This latest assumption does not incur any loss of generality, and we use it to make sure that the term $1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k-k^*+1}$ dominates over other terms.
5.1 The Game Value Jump Attack

Lemma 5.13 (Restatement of Lemma 5.10). There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $(\binom{n}{k}) \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Suppose there exist tuple sets $\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{S}' \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$ and set of parties $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$, satisfying

1. $\mathcal{S}(h) = \emptyset$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$, where $\mathcal{S}(h)$ is defined according to Notation 5.5.

2. For every $\mathcal{U}' \in \mathcal{S}'$, $\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{S}(h)} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}'] = \Pr_{\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{S}'} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}']$.

3. $\Pr \left[ \max_i \left| B_i^{\mathcal{S}} - B_i^{\mathcal{S}'} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256 \sqrt{r}} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2 \rho \log(r)}$, for every $\rho \in \{1, 1 + 1/r, \ldots, r\}$, where $B_i^{\mathcal{S}} = B_i^{\mathcal{S}}(\Pi)$ is defined according to Definition 5.6.

Then there exists $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and as a string advice $\text{adv}$ such that $A^\Pi(\text{adv})$ corrupting all parties but $h$ biases the output of $h$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r})$.

Furthermore, the running time of $A^\Pi(\text{adv})$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and only uses oracle access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.

5.1.1 The Game-Value Sequence

The cornerstone of the so-called game value jump attack is that the adversary computes the expected outcome of the protocol, referred to as the game-value and denoted $X_i$, for round $i$. Then, at every round $i \in [r]$, she compares this value to the backup value at hand, and decides to abort if the backup value deviates from the expected outcome of the protocol significantly. Next, we formally define the game-value sequence and follow up with a discussion regarding some of its properties.

Define $g : [0,1]^3 \times \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ by

$$g(x, y, y', \text{NoJump}) = \begin{cases} \text{NoJump} & \text{if } |y - x| < 1/64\sqrt{r} \lor |y' - x| < 1/64\sqrt{r}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases}$$ (30)

Definition 5.14 (Game-value sequence). Let $X_0 = E[\text{out}]$. For $i \in [r]$, define $X_i$ such that

$$X_i = \text{rnd}_\delta \left( E \left[ \text{out} \mid B_i^{\mathcal{S}}, B_{i-1}^{\mathcal{S}}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_{i-1} \right] \right),$$

where $G_i = g(B_i^{\mathcal{S}}, B_{i-1}^{\mathcal{S}}, X_i, G_{i-1})$, letting $G_0 = 1$ and $g$ be defined according to Equation (30).

Notice that $X_i$, for $i \in [r]$, is simply the discretized expected outcome of the protocol given a “short” aggregated accounted of the history so far. Namely, each variable $X_i$ is an approximation of the expected outcome of the protocol given the two preceding points of the backup sequence $B_i^{\mathcal{S}}$ and $B_{i-1}^{\mathcal{S}}$, the previous game-value $X_{i-1}$ and the sum-of-squares $\sum_{\ell < i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2$, as well as a bit $G_{i-1}$ indicating whether either $B_j^{\mathcal{S}}$ or $B_{j-1}^{\mathcal{S}}$ deviated from the value of $X_j$ by more than $1/64\sqrt{r}$, for some $j < i - 1$.

Remark 5.15 (Computing $X_1, \ldots, X_r$). Each $X_i$ is fully determined by the index $i$ and the value of the 5-tuple $(B_i^{\mathcal{S}}, B_{i-1}^{\mathcal{S}}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_{i-1})$. Recall that $n^k \geq r$, $|\text{supp}(B_i^{\mathcal{S}})| = \binom{n}{k} \in O(n^k)$.
We show that the sequence \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) satisfies the martingale property according to Definition 2.13. Such sequences typically have large gaps which we will exploit in our attack.

**Claim 5.16.** The sequence \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) is a SoS-augmented 2\( \delta \)-weak martingale sequence, i.e. for all \( i \in [r] \),

\[
E \left[ X_i \mid X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] \in X_{i-1} \pm 2 \delta.
\]

Proof. Fix \( i \in [r] \) and define \( \tilde{X}_i = E \left[ \text{out} \mid B_i, B_{i-1}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_{i-1} \right] \), \( \tilde{X}_{i+1} = E \left[ \text{out} \mid B_{i+1}, B_i, X_i, \sum_{\ell < i+1} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_i \right] \) i.e. without rounding. By tower law (Fact 2.9),

\[
E \left[ \tilde{X}_{i+1} \mid X_{i}, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] = E \left[ \text{out} \mid X_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right].
\]

Furthermore, by Fact 2.10

\[
E \left[ \text{out} \mid \tilde{X}_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] = X_i.
\]

Consequently, since \( X_i \) is the rounded value of \( \tilde{X}_i \) to the closest \( \delta \)-multiple, by Fact 2.11, \( E \left[ \text{out} \mid X_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] \in X_i \pm \delta \). Finally, since \( X_{i+1} \) is the rounded value of \( \tilde{X}_{i+1} \) to the closest \( \delta \)-multiple, we deduce that

\[
E \left[ X_{i+1} \mid X_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] \in E \left[ \tilde{X}_{i+1} \mid X_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] \pm \delta
\]

\[
\in E \left[ \text{out} \mid X_i, \sum_{\ell \leq i} (X_\ell - X_{\ell-1})^2 \right] \pm \delta
\]

\[
\in X_i \pm 2 \delta.
\]

By Corollary 3.4, since \( X_0, \ldots, X_r \) is a SoS-augmented 2\( \delta \)-weak martingale sequence with \( X_0 = 1/2 \), \( X_r \in \{0, 1\} \), and \( \delta < 1/200r \), it holds that

\[
Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r] \text{ s.t. } |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq \frac{1}{4 \sqrt{r}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{20}.
\] (31)

### 5.1.2 The Attack

We start with a high-level overview of the attack. The adversary biasing party \( h \in H \), to be chosen at random, towards zero is defined as follows (the attack biasing toward one is defined analogously). After receiving the honest party messages for round \( i - 1 \), it computes the values of \( y_i = B_{i}^S \), \( y_{i-1} = B_{i-1}^S \), \( x_i = X_i \) and \( g_i = G_i \), for \( X_i \) and \( G_i \) being according to Definition 5.14.

If \( y_{i-1} \) is below \( x_i \) by more than \( 1/64 \sqrt{r} \), then it aborts all parties but a random tuple of \( S' \) that contains \( h \), without sending the \( i^{\text{th}} \)-round messages of the aborting parties. The surviving corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.
If $y_i$ is below $x_i = X_i$ by more than $1/64\sqrt{r}$, it aborts all parties but a random tuple in $S'$ that contains $h$, after sending the $i$th-round messages of the aborting parties. The surviving corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.

The attacker is formally defined as follows.

**Algorithm 5.17** (The martingale attack MartAttack).

**Parameters:** $S, S' \subseteq \binom{\{n\}}{k}$, $z \in \{0, 1\}$, honest party $h \in [n]$ and a string $\text{adv} \in \{0, 1\}^*$.  

**Description:**

1. Compute $B_1^S$ according to the protocols specifications. If $(−1)^{1−z} \cdot (B_1^S − \frac{1}{2}) > 1/64\sqrt{r}$, without sending their 1st round messages, abort all parties except a random tuple in $S'(h)$.
   - The remaining corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.

2. For $i = 1, \ldots, r$:
   
   (a) Upon receiving the $i$th round messages of $h$, compute $B_i^S$, $B_{i+1}^S$, $X_{i+1}$ and $G_i$ using the messages received so far and the string $\text{adv}$.
   
   (b) If $(−1)^{1−z} \cdot (B_i^S − X_{i+1}) > 1/64\sqrt{r}$ and $G_i = 1$, without sending their messages for round $i$ abort all parties except a random tuple in $S'(h)$.
      - The remaining corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.
   
   (c) If $(−1)^{1−z} \cdot (B_{i+1}^S − X_{i+1}) > 1/64\sqrt{r}$ and $G_i = 1$, after sending their messages for round $i$, abort all parties except a random tuple in $S'(h)$.
      - The remaining corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.

Let $\text{MartAttack}(S, S', z, h, \text{adv})$ denote the martingale attacker with parameters $S, S', z, h, \text{adv}$. We refer to the round in which the adversary instructs some parties in its control to abort as the aborting round, set to $r$ if no abort occurred.

**5.1.3 Success probability of Algorithm 5.17.**

Let $S, S'$ and $H$ be as in Lemma 5.13, and let $H$ denote an element of $\mathcal{H}$ chosen uniformly at random. Following the discussion of Remark 5.15, let $\text{adv}$ denote a string of size polynomial in $n^k$ that fully describes the sequence $X_1, \ldots, X_r$ that is defined according to Definition 5.14. We show that either $A_1(H) = \text{MartAttack}(S, S', 1, H, \text{adv})$ or $A_0(H) = \text{MartAttack}(S, S', 0, H, \text{adv})$ succeeds in obtaining the bias of Lemma 5.13.

Before proceeding with the proof, we introduce a last piece of notation. For $z \in \{0, 1\}$, let $J^z$ denote the round-index where the adversary $A^z$ decided to abort certain parties, and let $J^z$ denote the round-index of the last messages sent by those aborting parties. Namely, in Step 2b of Algorithm 5.17 we have $J^z = J^{z*} − 1 = i$ and in Step 2c of Algorithm 5.17 we have $J^z = J^{z*} = i + 1$. If no abort occurred, $J^z = J^{z*} = r$.

Lemma 5.13 follows from the claims below.

**Claim 5.18.** $\Pr [J^1 \neq r] + \Pr [J^0 \neq r] \geq 1/20$.

**Claim 5.19.** For $z \in \{0, 1\}$, $\mathbb{E} [X_{J^z*}] \in 1/2 \pm \frac{1}{200r}$.  

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Claim 5.20. \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_i |B_i^S - B_i^{S'}| \right] \leq 1/128\sqrt{r}, \) for \( r \) large enough.

Before proving each of these claims, we show how to combine them to obtain the lemma.

**Proof of Lemma 5.13.** By Claim 5.18, we may assume without loss of generality that \( \Pr \left[ J \neq r \right] \geq 1/10. \) Next, we compute the bias caused by the attacker \( A_1(H). \) By Item 2 of Lemma 5.13, the output of the honest party is identically distributed with \( B_j^S. \) Compute

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^{S'} \right] - 1/2 \geq \mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^S \right] - 1/2 - \mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^S \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^{S'} \right] \\
\geq \mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^S \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ X_{J^*} \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_i |B_i^S - B_i^{S'}| \right] \cdot \Pr \left[ J \neq r \right] - \frac{1}{200r} \\
\geq \Pr \left[ J \neq r \right] \cdot \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ B_j^S - X_{J^*} \mid J \neq r \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[ \max_i |B_i^S - B_i^{S'}| \right] \right) - \frac{1}{200r} \\
\geq \Pr \left[ J \neq r \right] \left( \frac{1}{64\sqrt{r}} - \frac{1}{128\sqrt{r}} \right) - \frac{1}{200r} \\
\geq \frac{1}{40} \cdot \frac{1}{128\sqrt{r}} - \frac{1}{200r}. 
\]

Equation (32) follows from triangle inequality, union bound, Claim 5.19 and the fact that \( B_j^S = B_r^S. \) Equation (33) follows from Claim 5.20 and the fact that \( B_j^S - X_{J^*} \geq 1/64\sqrt{r}, \) whenever \( J \neq r. \)

**Proof of Claim 5.18.** First, we lower-bound the probability of abort by the probability of having a large increment in the \( X \)-sequence alone. For convenience, we introduce the following notation. For \( z \in \{0, 1\}, \) let \( \text{trig}_{i+1}^z \) denote the predicate \( (-1)^{1-z}(B_i^S - X_{i+1}) \geq 1/64\sqrt{r} \land (-1)^{1-z}(B_{i+1}^S - X_{i+1}) \geq 1/64\sqrt{r} \) and let \( \text{trig}_i^z \) denote the predicate \( (-1)^{1-z}(B_i^S - \frac{1}{2}) \geq 1/64. \) We remark that \( \text{trig}_i^z \) denotes whether the attack biasing towards \( z \in \{0, 1\} \) is potentially “triggered” at round \( \ell. \) Write \( \text{trig}_i = \text{trig}_i^0 \lor \text{trig}_i^1. \) Recall that

\[
\Pr \left[ J^* \neq r \right] = \Pr \left[ \text{trig}_1^r \lor \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} (G_i = 1 \land \text{trig}_{i+1}^r) \right].
\]

Thus, by union bound,

\[
\Pr \left[ J^0 \neq r \right] + \Pr \left[ J^1 \neq r \right] \geq \Pr \left[ \text{trig}_1 \lor \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} (G_i = 1 \land \text{trig}_{i+1}) \right].
\]

Recall that \( G_i = 1 \) is equivalent to \( \bigwedge_{j=1}^i \neg \text{trig}_j \equiv \neg \left( \bigvee_{j=1}^i \text{trig}_j \right). \) It follows that

\[
\bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} (G_i = 1 \land \text{trig}_{i+1}) \equiv \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} \left( \text{trig}_{i+1} \land \neg \left( \bigvee_{j=1}^i \text{trig}_j \right) \right) \\
\equiv \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} \text{trig}_{i+1}.
\]

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We can thus lower-bound \( \Pr[J^0 \neq r] + \Pr[J^1 \neq r] \) by \( \Pr[\bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} \text{trig}_i] \).

\[
\Pr[J^0 \neq r] + \Pr[J^1 \neq r] \geq \Pr[\text{trig}_1 \lor \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} \text{trig}_i] \\
= \Pr[|B_1^S - X_1| \lor \bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} (|B_i^S - X_{i+1}| \geq 1/64 \sqrt{r} \lor |B_{i+1}^S - X_{i+1}| \geq 1/64 \sqrt{r})] \\
= \Pr[\bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} (|B_i^S - X_i| \geq 1/64 \sqrt{r} \lor |B_i^S - X_{i+1}| \geq 1/64 \sqrt{r})] \\
\geq \Pr[\bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} |X_{i+1} - X_i| \geq 1/32 \sqrt{r}] 
\]

By Equation (31), we conclude that \( \Pr[\bigvee_{i=1}^{r-1} |X_{i+1} - X_i| \geq 1/32 \sqrt{r}] \geq 1/20. \)

**Proof of Claim 5.19.** Recall that \( \delta = 1/200r \) and \( X_i = \text{rnd}\_b(\mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid B_i^S, B_{i-1}^S, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i}(X_{\ell} - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_i]) \). For conciseness, write \( \text{agt}_i \) for the 5-tuple \((B_i^S, B_{i-1}^S, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i}(X_{\ell} - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_i)\). We compute \( \mathbb{E}[X_{J^*}]=\sum_i \mathbb{E}[X_i \mid J^* = i] \cdot \Pr[J^* = i] \).

Let us focus on the term \( \mathbb{E}[X_i \mid J^* = i] \).

\[
\mathbb{E}[X_i \mid J^* = i] = \mathbb{E}[\text{rnd}_b(\mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid \text{agt}_i]) \mid J^* = i] \\
\in \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid \text{agt}_i] \mid J^* = i] \pm \delta.
\]

Since \( \text{agt}_i \) fully determines \( X_i, B_i^S, B_{i-1}^S \) and \( J^* \geq i \), it follows that \( \text{agt}_i \) fully determines \( J^* = i \), which implies that

\[
\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid \text{agt}_i] \mid J^* = i] = \mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid J^* = i].
\]

Since, by assumption, \( \mathbb{E}[\text{out}] = 1/2 \), it follows that \( \mathbb{E}[X_{J^*}] \in \sum_{i \in r} \mathbb{E}[\text{out} \mid J^* = i] \cdot \Pr[J^* = i] \pm \delta = \mathbb{E}[\text{out}] \pm \delta = 1/2 \pm \frac{1}{200r} \).

**Proof of Claim 5.20.** From the hypothesis of Lemma 5.13, it holds that

\[
\forall \rho \in \{1, 1 + 1/r, \ldots, r\}, \quad \Pr[\max_{i \in [r]} |B_i^S - B_i^S| \geq \rho \cdot \frac{1}{256 \sqrt{r}}] \leq \frac{1}{2\rho \log(r)}.
\]
For convenience, write $B_{\text{max}} = \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^S - B_i^S' \right|$ and let us compute $E[B_{\text{max}}]$.

\[
E[B_{\text{max}}] = E[B_{\text{max}} \mid B_{\text{max}} \leq 1/256\sqrt{r}] \cdot \Pr[B_{\text{max}} \leq 1/256\sqrt{r}]
\]

\[
+ \sum_{j=1}^{\log(256\sqrt{r})} E[B_{\text{max}} \mid 256\sqrt{r} \cdot B_{\text{max}} \in [2^{j-1}, 2^j]] \cdot \Pr[256\sqrt{r} \cdot B_{\text{max}} \in [2^{j-1}, 2^j]]
\]

\[
\leq \frac{1}{256\sqrt{r}} + \sum_{j=1}^{\log(256\sqrt{r})} \frac{2^j}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{j-1} \cdot 2 \log(r)}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{256\sqrt{r}} + \frac{1}{256\sqrt{r} \log(r)} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2} \cdot \log(r) + \log(256) \right)
\]

\[
\leq \frac{1}{128\sqrt{r}},
\]

where the last inequality holds for large enough $r$. \hfill \Box

### 5.2 The Differential Privacy Based Attack

**Lemma 5.21** (Restatement of Lemma 5.11). There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Suppose there exists $k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\}$, $\rho^* \in \{1 + 1/r, \ldots, r\}$, tuple sets $S_1$ and $S_0 \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$ and party set $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$, such that

- For every $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}$, $z, z' \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathcal{U}, \mathcal{U}' \in S_z$:
  - $\Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h \in \mathcal{U}] = \Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h' \in \mathcal{U}] \leq \frac{1}{2}$,
  - $\Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h \in \mathcal{U}] = \Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h \in \mathcal{U}]$,
  - $\Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h \notin \mathcal{U}] / \Pr[\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z \mid h \in \mathcal{U}] \geq \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{n-k+k^*-1}{k^*}$.
  - $\Pr[h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow S(z)(h) \mid \mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}'] = \Pr[h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow S(z)(h)]$.

- Letting $B_i^S = B_i^S(\Pi)$ and $\text{coef}_n(k, \cdot)$ be according is according to Definition 5.6 and Notation 5.5:

\[
\Pr\left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^S - B_i^S_0 \right| \geq \frac{\rho^*}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-k^*}} \right] \geq 1 - \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{2\rho^* \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}.
\]  

(36)

- Letting $B_i^{S(h)} = B_i^{S(h)}(\Pi)$ be according to Definition 5.6, for every $z \in \{0, 1\}$, $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\rho \in \{1, 1 + 1/r, \ldots, r\}$, it holds that:

\[
\Pr\left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^{S(h)} - B_i^{S(h')} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^* - 1)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-k^*+1}} \right] \leq 1 - \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{2\rho \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^* - 1)^{1/2}}.
\]

(37)

Then, there exists $h \in \mathcal{H}$ such that $A^\Pi(S_1, S_0, \mathcal{H}, k^*, \rho^*)$ corrupting all parties but $h$ biases the output of $h$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k-k^*_1})$.

Furthermore, the running time of $A^\Pi(S_1, S_0, \mathcal{H}, k^*, \rho^*)$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses only oracle access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.
5.2.1 The Attack

We start with a high-level overview of the attack using the notation of Lemma 5.21.

The adversary corrupts all parties except a random party $h \in \mathcal{H}$. After receiving the honest party $i^{th}$ message, it adds Laplace noise to the quantity $B_i^{S_1 \setminus h} - B_i^{S_0 \setminus h}$, i.e., the difference between the average backup values for those tuples that do not contain $h$. If the resulting quantity is above some value $\gamma$, the adversary aborts all parties except a random tuple in $S_z(h)$, for $z \in \{0, 1\}$ being the direction of the bias the adversary wishes to attack towards\(^9\).

Since, by assumption, the values $B_i^{S_1 \setminus h}$ and $B_i^{S_0 \setminus h}$ are not too far apart, adding Laplace noise “decorrelates” the abort decision from the identity of the honest party party. The direction of the bias the adversary wishes to attack towards $9\gamma$ some value $\lambda$. The formal description of the attack is given below.

Algorithm 5.22 (DpAttack: The differential privacy based attack).

**Parameters:** $S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$, $z \in \{0, 1\}$, party $h \in [n]$ and $\gamma \in [0, 1]$.  

**Notation:** Let $\lambda = \gamma / 4 \log(r)$.

**Description:**

1. For $i = 1, \ldots, r$:
   
   (a) Upon receiving the $i^{th}$-round messages of $h$, compute $B_i^{S_1 \setminus h}$ and $B_i^{S_0 \setminus h}$.
   
   (b) Sample $\nu_i \leftarrow \text{Lap}(\lambda)$.
   
   (c) If $B_i^{S_1 \setminus h} - B_i^{S_0 \setminus h} + \nu_i > \gamma$, without sending their messages for round $i$, abort all parties except a random tuple in $S_z(h)$.

   - The remaining corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.

Let $\text{DpAttack}(S_1, S_0, z, h, \gamma)$ denote the above attacker with parameters $S_1, S_0, z, h, \gamma$. We refer to the round in which the adversary instructs some parties in its control to abort as the aborting round, set to $r$ if not abort happen.

5.2.2 Success probability of Algorithm 5.22

Let $H$ be a uniform element of $\mathcal{H}$, and let $\gamma = \frac{\sigma^*}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_{\text{s}}(k, k^*)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-k^*}}$. We show that either $A_1(H) = \text{DpAttack}(S_1, S_0, 1, H, \gamma)$ or $A_0(H) = \text{DpAttack}(S_1, S_0, 0, H, \gamma)$ succeeds in obtaining the bias of Lemma 5.21. Let $J$ denote the smallest round $i$ such that $B_i^{S_1 \setminus H} - B_i^{S_0 \setminus H} + \text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \gamma$, and $J = r$ if no such round exists. Lemma 5.21 follows from the next claim.

Claim 5.23. $\mathbb{E}\left[ B_{J}^{S_1(H)} - B_{J}^{S_0(H)} \right] \geq \frac{1}{2\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{r} \log r} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{64 \log(r)} \right)^{k-k^*}$.

\(^9\)The choice of $\gamma$ and of the Laplace parameter is dictated by the magnitude of the gap between $B_i^{S_1}$ and $B_i^{S_0}$ as stated in Equation (36).
Proof of Lemma 5.21. If $\mathbb{E}\left[B_J^{S_1(H)} - B_J^{S_0(H)}\right] \geq \varepsilon$, then either $\mathbb{E}\left[B_J^{S_1(H)}\right] \geq 1/2 + \varepsilon/2$ or $\mathbb{E}\left[B_J^{S_0(H)}\right] \leq 1/2 - \varepsilon/2$. By using the appropriate $\varepsilon$ from Claim 5.23 and observing that, under adversary $A_z$, the honest party’s output is identically distributed with $B_J^{S_2(H)}$, we obtain the desired statement.

Proof of Claim 5.23. Define $\delta = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{2\alpha}} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{2\alpha}} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{\text{coef}_n(k,k^*)^{1/2}}$, $\alpha = \frac{\tau}{32\log(r)} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{n-k+k^*}}{\sqrt{k^*}} - 1$ and $\beta = \frac{\delta}{16} - \frac{\sqrt{k^*}}{\sqrt{n-k+k^*}} - 1$. From the hypothesis of Lemma 5.21 and the definition of $\alpha$, $\beta$, $\gamma$ and $\delta$, it holds that $\Pr\left[\max_i B_i^{S_1(h)} - B_i^{S_0} \geq \gamma\right] \geq 2\delta$ and $\Pr\left[\max_i B_i^{S_2(h)} - B_i^{S_2} \geq \rho \cdot \alpha/2 \rho^*\right] \leq \beta \cdot \rho^* / 2\rho$, for every $z \in \{0, 1\}$, $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\rho \in \mathcal{R}$. Thus, by triangle inequality, union bound and the fact that $\rho \in \mathcal{R}$ can be chosen arbitrarily, the following inequalities hold without loss of generality.

$$\Pr\left[\max_i B_i^{S_1} - B_i^{S_0} \geq \gamma\right] \geq \delta,$$

(38)

$$\forall h \in \mathcal{H}, \forall \rho \in \mathcal{R}: \Pr\left[\max_i \left| B_i^{S_1(h)} - B_i^{S_0(h)}\right| - \left( B_i^{S_1} - B_i^{S_0}\right) \geq \rho \cdot \alpha\right] \leq \beta / \rho.$$  

(39)

Let $\tau$ denote an arbitrary transcript of $\Pi$ and let $s_i^h(\tau)$ and $s_i^{h}(\tau)$ denote the value of $B_i^{S_1(h)} - B_i^{S_0}(h)$ and $B_i^{S_1(h) - h} - B_i^{S_0(h)}$, respectively, for transcript $\tau$. Further define $s_i(\tau) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} s_i^h(\tau)$, and, for arbitrary $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}$, let $p = Pr_{U \leftarrow S_i}[h \in U]$. We remark that the value of $p$ does not depend on $h$ or $z$. Next, by the definition of $s_i^h(\tau)$ and the hypothesis of the theorem, we observe that

1. $p \cdot s_i^h(\tau) + (1 - p) \cdot s_i^{h}(\tau) = s_i(\tau)$, and
2. $\frac{1-p}{p} \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{n-k+k^*-1}{k^* - 1}$.

By definition, the adversary $A_z$ aborts (some parties) if it finds out that $s_i^h(\tau) + \text{Lap}(\lambda) \geq \gamma$. Let $T$ be the value of $\tau$, and $J$ be the aborting round in a random execution of $\Pi$ in which the adversary $A_z$ attacking the honest party $H$. Using the terminology of Section 4, the value of $s_f^H(T)$ is equal to the output of an oblivious sampling experiment with parameters $\mathcal{H}$, $\{ s_i^h(\tau \leftarrow T) \}_{h,i}$, $\gamma$, $p$, $\lambda$. From the choice of $\alpha$ and $\beta$, and under the guarantee of Equation (39), Corollary 4.3 yields that $\mathbb{E}\left[s_f^H(T)\right] \geq \gamma \delta / 125 - \frac{1}{2^r} \in \Omega(1/\sqrt{r}\log(r)^{k^*+k+1})$, for $r$ large enough.

\[\square\]

5.3 The Singletons Attack

Lemma 5.24 (Restatement of Lemma 5.12). There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Suppose there exists $\rho^* \geq 1$, tuple sets $S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$ and party set $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ such that:

1. $\mathcal{H} \geq n/3$ and $|S_0| = |S_1| = |\mathcal{H}|$.

For every $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}$:

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2. \(|S_z(h)| = 1\), letting \(S_z(h)\) be according to Notation 5.5.

3. \(\Pr \left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_{i}^{S_1} - B_{i}^{S_0} \right| \geq \frac{\rho^*}{256 \sqrt{r}} \cdot \left( \frac{n-1}{(k-1)^{1/2}} \right) \geq \frac{1}{2^{p^* \log(r)}} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+1}}{(n-1)^{1/2}} \right] \)

letting \(B_i^{S_0}\) be according to Definition 5.6.

Then, there exists \(h \in H\) such that \(A^{\Pi}(S_1, S_0, H, k^*, \rho^*)\) corrupting all parties but \(h\), biases the output of \(h\) by \(\Omega(1/\sqrt{r \log(r)}\).

Furthermore, the running time of \(A^{\Pi}(S_1, S_0, H, k^*, \rho^*)\) is polynomial in the running time of \(\Pi\) and \(n^k\), and it uses only oracle access to \(\Pi\)’s next-message function.

5.3.1 The Attack

We start with a high-level overview of the attack. The adversary biasing a party \(h \in H\), to be chosen at random, towards zero is defined as follows (the attack biasing toward one is defined analogously). Before the protocols starts, the adversary samples half of the tuples in \(S_1\) and \(S_0\) not containing \(h\), denoted \(E_1\) and \(E_0\) respectively. Upon receiving the \(i\)th message from \(h\), it computes the difference between the average backup values of the tuples in \(E_1\) and \(E_0\), denoted \(B_{E_1}^i - B_{E_0}^i\). If the resulting quantity is above \(3\gamma/4\), it aborts all parties except the unique tuple in \(S_z(h)\).

For the attack to go through, it is required that \(B_{i}^{E_1}\) and \(B_{i}^{E_0}\) are not too far apart. Thankfully, standard concentration bounds guarantee that to be the case.

The formal description of the attack is given below.

**Algorithm 5.25** (The singletons attacker \(\text{SingAttack}\)).

**Parameters:** tuple subsets \(S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{n}{k}\), \(z \in \{0,1\}\), honest party \(h \in [n]\) and \(\gamma \in [0,1]\).

**Description:**

1. For \(z \in \{0,1\}\), let \(E_z \subseteq S_z \setminus h\) denote random subset of size \(|S_z|/2\).

2. For \(i = 1, \ldots, r\):
   
   (a) Upon receiving the \(i\)th-round messages of \(h\), compute \(B_{E_1}^i\) and \(B_{E_0}^i\).
   
   (b) If \(B_{E_1}^i - B_{E_0}^i > 3\gamma/4\), without sending their messages for round \(i\), abort all parties except the unique random tuple in \(S_z(h)\).

   - The remaining corrupted parties are instructed to terminate the protocol honestly.

Let \(\text{SingAttack}(S_1, S_0, z, h, \gamma)\) denote the singletons attacker with parameters \(S_1, S_0, z, h\). We refer to the round in which the adversary instructs some parties in its control to abort as the aborting round, set to \(r\) is not abort happen.

\(^{10}\)The choice of \(\gamma\) is dictated by the magnitude of the gap between \(B_{i}^{S_1}\) and \(B_{i}^{S_0}\) as stated in Assumption (3).
5.3.2 Success probability of Algorithm 5.25

Let $H$ be a uniform element of $\mathcal{H}$. Let $\gamma = \alpha / \sqrt{n}$ letting $\alpha = \frac{\rho^*}{256 \sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{n} (n-1)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-1}}$. We show that either $A_1(H) = \text{SingAttack}(S_1, S_0, 1, H, \gamma)$ or $A_0(H) = \text{SingAttack}(S_1, S_0, 0, H, \gamma)$ succeeds in obtaining the bias of Lemma 5.24. Let $J$ denote the smallest round $i$ such that $B_{i}^{S_{1}} - B_{i}^{S_{0}} \geq 3\gamma / 4$, and $J = r$ if no such round exists. Furthermore, define $\beta = \frac{1}{2\rho^* \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{k+1}}{(n-1)^{1/2}}$, let $G_{r, \alpha}$ denote the event (maxi $\{B_{i}^{S_{1}} - B_{i}^{S_{0}}\} \geq \alpha / \sqrt{n}$, let $E_{r, \alpha}$ denote the event (maxi $\{|B_{i}^{E_{1}} - B_{i}^{E_{0}}|\} \geq \alpha / \sqrt{n}$). Lemma 5.24 follows from Claims 5.26 and 5.27.

Claim 5.26. $\Pr[J \neq r \mid G_{r, \alpha} \land \neg E_{r, \alpha}] = 1$.

Claim 5.27. $\Pr[E_{r, \alpha}] \leq 4r \cdot \exp(-\alpha^2 / 192) \leq \frac{1}{7}$, for $r$ large enough.

We prove Lemma 5.24 assuming the two claims above.

Proof of Lemma 5.24. First we observe that, under adversary $A_2(H)$, the honest party’s output is identically distributed with $B_{J}^{S_{1}(H)}$. Thus, like in the proof of Lemma 5.21, it suffices to lower-bound $\mathbb{E}[B_{J}^{S_{1}(H)} - B_{J}^{S_{0}(H)}]$. By the choice of $\alpha$ and $\beta$ and Item 3 of Lemma 5.24, it holds that $\Pr[G_{r, \alpha}] \geq \beta$. Consequently,

$$\mathbb{E}[B_{J}^{S_{1}(H)} - B_{J}^{S_{0}(H)}] \geq \mathbb{E}[B_{J}^{S_{1}(H)} - B_{J}^{S_{0}(H)} \mid G_{r, \alpha} \land \neg E_{r, \alpha}] \cdot \Pr[G_{r, \alpha} \land \neg E_{r, \alpha}] - \Pr[E_{r, \alpha}]$$

$$\geq \left(\mathbb{E}[B_{J}^{E_{1}} - B_{J}^{E_{0}} \mid G_{r, \alpha} \land \neg E_{r, \alpha}] - \frac{\alpha}{2\sqrt{n}}\right) \cdot \Pr[G_{r, \alpha} \land \neg E_{r, \alpha}] - \Pr[E_{r, \alpha}]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\alpha}{\sqrt{n}} \cdot \Pr[G_{r, \alpha}] - 2 \cdot \Pr[E_{r, \alpha}] \geq \frac{\alpha \beta}{2\sqrt{n}} - 2 \cdot \Pr[E_{r, \alpha}]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{1024 \sqrt{T} \log(r)} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{64^2 \cdot \log(r)}\right)^{k-1} - \frac{2}{r^2} \cdot \Pr[E_{r, \alpha}]$$

Proof of Claim 5.26. If $E_{r, \alpha}$ did not occur, then $B_{i}^{E_{1}} - B_{i}^{E_{0}}$ differs from $B_{i}^{S_{1}} - B_{i}^{S_{0}}$ by at most $\frac{\alpha}{4\sqrt{n}}$. If the latter is greater than $\alpha / \sqrt{n}$, then the former is greater than $\frac{3\alpha}{4\sqrt{n}} = 3\gamma / 4$.

Proof of Claim 5.27. By assumption, $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. It follows that

$$\alpha = \rho^* \cdot \frac{\sqrt{k} \cdot (\binom{n}{k})^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-1}} \geq \rho^* \cdot \frac{\sqrt{k} \cdot \log(r)}{2^{6k+8}}$$

Thus, by noting that $|\mathcal{H}| \geq n / 3$, apply union bound and Hoeffding’s inequality (Fact 2.3)\textsuperscript{11}, and deduce that

$$\Pr[E_{r, \alpha}] \leq 4r \cdot \exp(-\alpha^2 / 192) \leq 4r \cdot \exp(-2 \log(2r)),$$

where the last inequality holds for $r$ large enough, since $\exp(-\alpha^2 / 192) \leq e^{O(-\log(r)^2)}$.

\textsuperscript{11}Hoeffding’s inequality holds for any fixing of the random inputs, and thus it also holds over the probability space of those random inputs.

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5.4 Proof of Lemma 5.9

Notation 5.28. The concatenation of two tuple subsets $S_1, S_0 \subseteq 2^n$, denoted $S_1 \| S_0$, is defined by $\{U_1 \cup U_0 : U_1 \in S_1, U_0 \in S_0\}$.

For reference, we recall of the nugget Definition 5.8.

Definition 5.29 (Restatement of Definition 5.8). Let $\Pi$ be an $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Index $k^* \in [k + 1]$ is a nugget for $\Pi$, if there exists $\rho^* \in \mathcal{R}(r)$, set $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$, and tuple sets $S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{n}{k}$ such that the following holds.

For a tuple-set $S \subseteq 2^n$ and $i \in [r]$, let $B_i^S$ denote the value of $\text{AvgBckp}(S, i)$ in a random execution of $\Pi$. The following holds according to the value of $k^*$:

$k^* = 1$:

1. $\Pr\left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^{S_1} - B_i^{S_0} \right| \geq \frac{\rho^*}{256\sqrt{\tau}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-k^*}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{2r \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}$.

2. $\mathcal{H} \geq n/3$, $|S_1| = |S_0| = |\mathcal{H}|$, and $|S_z(h)| = 1$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}$.

$k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\}$:

1. Same as Item 1 for $k^* = 1$.

2. For every $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}$, $z, z' \in \{0, 1\}$, $U' \subseteq S_z$ and $\rho \in \mathcal{R}(r)$:

   a. $\Pr\left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^{S_z(h)} - B_i^{S_z(h')} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{\tau}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-k^*+1}} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2r \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*+1}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}$.

   b. $\Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [h \in U] = \Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [h' \in U] \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

   c. $\Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [h \in U] = \Pr_{U \subseteq S_{z'}} [h \in U]$.

   d. $\Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [h \notin U] / \Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [h \in U] \geq \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{n-k+k^*+1}{k-1}$.

   e. $\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}, U \subseteq S_z} [h = U'] = \Pr_{U \subseteq S_z} [U = U']$.

$k^* = k + 1$:

1. $S_1(h) = \emptyset$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$.

2. $\Pr_{h \in \mathcal{H}, U \subseteq S_0} [U = U'] = \Pr_{U \subseteq S_0} [U = U']$ for every $U' \subseteq S_0$.

3. $\Pr\left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_i^{S_0} - B_i^{S_1} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{\tau}} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2r \log(r)}$ for every $\rho \in \mathcal{R}(r)$.

Next we prove that any protocol admits a nugget.

Proof of Lemma 5.9. We prove the lemma by explicitly constructing the sets (in Figure 1). The algorithm stops as soon as it finds $S_1, S_0$ and $\mathcal{H}$ such that $\max_i \left| B_i^{S_z(h)} - B_i^{S_z(h)} \right|$ is small with the probability specified by Figure 1, for every $z \in \{0, 1\}$ and $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Furthermore, if $k^* < k$, the construction guarantees that $\max_i \left| B_i^{S_1} - B_i^{S_0} \right|$ is large with probability specified by Figure 1. We verify that all the other technical requirements of Lemma 5.9 are met. By construction, there exists
\[ Q \subseteq P \text{ of size } (k - k^* - 1), \text{ parties } p_1, p_0 \in (P \setminus Q) \text{ and tuple set } C \in \{A_1, A_0\}, \text{ such that } S_z \text{ and } H \text{ are of the form} \]

\[
S_z = \begin{cases} 
\binom{P}{k-1} \binom{A_z}{1} & \text{if } k^* \in \{k, k+1\} \\
Q \binom{p_z}{k^* - 1} (P \setminus (Q \cup \{p_z\})) & \text{if } k^* \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
H = \begin{cases} 
A_0 & \text{if } k^* \in \{k + 1\} \\
\binom{P}{k^* - 1} (Q \cup \{p_1, p_0\}) & \text{if } k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\} \\
C & \text{if } k^* = 1
\end{cases}
\]

It is easy to verify that the case \( k^* = k + 1 \). For \( k^* = 1 \), we remark that because \( S_z \) is of the form \( Q \binom{p_z}{1} \binom{H}{1} \), for some fixed set of parties \( Q \) and party \( p_z \), it is immediate that \( |S_z(h)| = 1 \), for every \( h \in H \). It remains to verify the conditions for \( k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\} \). We remind the reader that \( k^* \leq k < \sqrt{n} \). Clearly, for every \( h \in H \), \( \Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z} [h \in U] = \frac{k^* - 1}{|H|} \) or \( \frac{k^* - 1}{|H| + 1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \), and \( \Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z} [h \in U] = \Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z'} [h \in U] \). Furthermore,

\[
\frac{\Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z} [h \notin U]}{\Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z} [h \in U]} \geq \frac{1 - (k^* - 1)/|H|}{(k^* - 1)/|H|} = \frac{|H|}{k^* - 1} - 1
\]

\[
\geq \frac{n/3 - (k - k^* - 1) - 2}{k^* - 1} - 1 = \frac{n/3 - k + k^* - 1}{k^* - 1} - 1
\]

\[
\geq \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{n - k + k^* - 1}{k^* - 1},
\]

where the last follows from \( n/3 \geq 4k + 1 \), for \( n \) large enough since \( \sqrt{n} > k \). Finally, \( \Pr_{h \leftarrow H, U \leftarrow S_z(h)} [U = U'] = \Pr_{U \leftarrow S_z} [U = U'] \) follows immediately from the definition \( S_z \) and \( H \). \( \square \)
Let $A_1, A_0, P \subseteq [n]$ denote an arbitrary equal-size partition of $[n]$ (i.e., $A_1, A_0$ and $P$ are pairwise disjoint and $A_1 \cup A_0 \cup P = [n]$, without loss of generality $n$ is a multiple of 3).

Define $k^* \in [k + 1], S_1, S_0 \subseteq \binom{[n]}{k}$, $H \subseteq [n]$ and $\rho^* \in R(r)$ by the following iterative process:

1. Let $S_1^k = (A_1 \setminus P)^k, S_0^k = (A_0 \setminus P)^k, H_k = A_0$.

2. Let $S_1^1 = (A_1 \setminus P), S_0 = (A_0 \setminus P), H_k = P$, and $c_1^k = c_0^k = 0$.

3. If $\exists \rho \in R(r)$ such that $\Pr \left[ \max_{i \in \mathbb{R}} \left| B_i^{\text{c}_1^k} - B_i^{\text{c}_0^k} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{r}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{2\rho \log(r)}$:
   
   (a) Set $\rho_k = \rho$.
   
   (b) For $\ell = k, \ldots, 2$:
      
      If $\exists z \in \{0, 1\}, h, h' \in H_{\ell} \setminus c_1^\ell \cup c_0^\ell$, $\rho \in R(r)$ such that
      
      $$
      \Pr \left[ \max_{i \in \mathbb{R}} \left| B_i^{\text{c}_1^\ell(h)} - B_i^{\text{c}_0^\ell(h')} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, \ell - 1)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-\ell+1}} \right] \geq \frac{1}{2\rho \log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+\ell-1}}{	ext{coef}_n(k, \ell - 1)^{1/2}}
      $$

      define:
      
      i. $S_1^{\ell-1} = S_2^\ell(h), S_0^{\ell-1} = S_2^\ell(h')$,
      
      ii. $H_{\ell-1} = H_{\ell} \setminus c_1^\ell$,
      
      iii. $c_{1}^{\ell-1} = \{h\} \text{ and } c_{0}^{\ell-1} = \{h'\}$,
      
      iv. $\rho_{\ell-1} = \rho$.

      Else, define $k^* = \ell, \rho^* = \rho_{\ell}, (S_1, S_0) = (S_1^{\ell}, S_0^{\ell})$ and $H = H_{k^*} \setminus c_{1}^{k^*} \cup c_{0}^{k^*}$.

   (c) If $k^*$ was not assigned, set $k^* = 1, \rho^* = \rho_1, (S_1, S_0) = (S_1^1, S_0^1)$, and let $H = A_1$ if $S_1$ and $S_0$ are obtained as a concatenation of $A_1$ with some other tuple set, and $H = A_0$ otherwise.

   Else, let $k^* = k + 1, \rho^* = 1$ and $(S_1, S_0, H) = (S_1^{k+1}, S_0^{k+1}, H_{k+1})$.

**Figure 1:** The Nugget

### 5.5 Uniform Adversaries

In this section, we show how to replace the nonuniform adversary with a uniform one. For reference, we restate our main theorem.

**Theorem 5.30** (Restatement of Theorem 5.1). *There exists a fail-stop adversary $A$ such that the following holds. Let $\Pi$ be a correct $n$-party $r$-round coin-flipping protocol, and let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ be the smallest integer such that $\binom{n}{k} \geq r \log(r)^{2k}$. Then, there exists a party $P$ in $\Pi$ such that $A^\Pi$ controlling all parties but $P$ biases the output of $P$ by $\Omega(1/\sqrt{r} \log(r)^{k})$. The running time of $A^\Pi$ is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $n^k$, and it uses oracle only access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.*

There are two barriers when emulating the proof of the nonuniform case; the first one is finding
uniformly the nugget and its parameters $k^*$ and $\rho^*$ according to Definition 5.8. The second barrier is mounting the “martingale” attack with a uniform variant of the game-value sequence $X_0, \ldots, X_r$, in the case that $k^* = k + 1$. In Section 5.5.1, we show that there is an algorithm **NuggetFinder** that finds the nugget with some “$\varepsilon$-loss”, i.e. the gap and similarity are guaranteed modulo $\varepsilon$, with probability $1 - e^{-1/\varepsilon}$. That being said, because $\varepsilon$ can be taken arbitrarily small, say $1/\tau^{1000}$, it bears no consequence to the analysis of our attacks. Thus, if $k^* \neq k + 1$, we can already deduce a bias of magnitude $1/\sqrt{\tau \log(r)}^k$ for the uniform adversary setting. The case $k^* = k + 1$ requires careful treatment because of the game-value sequence, and we address it in Section 5.5.2.

### 5.5.1 Finding the Right Nugget

We show that there is an algorithm **NuggetFinder** that finds the nugget with some “$\varepsilon$-loss”, i.e. the gap and similarity are guaranteed modulo $\varepsilon$, with probability $1 - e^{-1/\varepsilon}$.

**Proposition 5.31.** There exists an algorithm **NuggetFinder** taking input a coin-tossing protocol $\Pi$ and a number $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ such that the following holds. With probability $1 - e^{-1/\varepsilon}$, **NuggetFinder($\Pi, \varepsilon$)** outputs $(k^*, \rho^*, S_0, S_1, \mathcal{H})$ such that the following holds according to the value of $k^*$:

$k^* = 1$:

1. $\Pr\left[\max_{i \in [r]} |B_i^{S_1} - B_i^{S_0}| \geq \frac{\rho^*}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}}{(64\log(r))^{k^*-k}}\right] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{2\rho\log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^*)^{1/2}} - \varepsilon.$

2. $\mathcal{H} \geq n/3$, $|S_1| = |S_0| = |\mathcal{H}|$, and $|S_z(h)| = 1$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}$.

$k^* \in \{2, \ldots, k\}$:

1. Same as Item 1 for $k^* = 1$.

2. For every $h, h' \in \mathcal{H}$, $z, z' \in \{0, 1\}$, $\mathcal{U}' \in S_z$ and $\rho \in \mathcal{R}(r)$:

   (a) $\Pr\left[\max_{i \in [r]} |B_i^{S_z(z)} - B_i^{S_z(z')}| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{r}} \cdot \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, k^* - 1)^{1/2}}{(64\log(r))^{k^*-k+1}}\right] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{2\rho\log(r)} \cdot \frac{64^{-k+k^*-1}}{\text{coef}_n(k, k^* - 1)^{1/2}} + \varepsilon.$

(b) $\Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h \in \mathcal{U}] = \Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h' \in \mathcal{U}] \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

(c) $\Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h \in \mathcal{U}] = \Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h \in \mathcal{U}]$.

(d) $\Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h \notin \mathcal{U}] = \Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z} [h \in \mathcal{U}] \geq \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{n-k+k^*-1}{k^* - 1}$.

(e) $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z(h)} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}'] = \Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_z(h)} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}']$.

$k^* = k + 1$:

1. $S_1(h) = \emptyset$ for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$.

2. $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_0(h)} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}'] = \Pr_{\mathcal{U} \leftarrow S_0} [\mathcal{U} = \mathcal{U}']$ for every $\mathcal{U}' \in S_0$.

3. $\Pr\left[\max_{i \in [r]} |B_i^{S_0} - B_i^{S_1}| \geq \frac{\rho}{256\sqrt{r}}\right] \leq \frac{1}{2\rho\log(r)} + \varepsilon$ for every $\rho \in \mathcal{R}(r)$.

The running time **NuggetFinder** is polynomial in the running time of $\Pi$ and $1/\varepsilon$, and it uses only oracle access to $\Pi$’s next-message function.
The proof, sketched below, follows standard approximation via sampling argument.

**Proof’s sketch.** NuggetFinder samples a random partition $\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{P}$ of $[n]$ and simply follows the steps of Figure 1 with the following caveats:

- In Item 3, NuggetFinder approximates the value of $\Pr \left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_{i}^{s_{k+1}} - B_{i}^{s_{k+1}} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256 \sqrt{r}} \right]$, by running $\Pi$ a number of $1/\epsilon^8$ times, for some constant $s$.

- Similarly, in Item 3b, NuggetFinder approximates the value of $\Pr \left[ \max_{i \in [r]} \left| B_{i}^{s_{k}(h)} - B_{i}^{s_{k}(h')} \right| \geq \frac{\rho}{256 \sqrt{r}} \frac{\text{coef}_n(k, \ell - 1)^{1/2}}{(64 \log(r))^{k-\ell+1}} \right]$, by running $\Pi$ a number of $1/\epsilon^8$ times, for some constant $s$.

For suitable choice of $s$, Hoeffding’s inequality guarantees that, with probability $1 - e^{-1/\epsilon}$, NuggetFinder’s approximation is within $\epsilon$ of the “true” value, at every step. □

### 5.5.2 Computing the Game-Value Sequence

We now explain how to give a uniform variant of the game-value sequence to mount a successful “martingale” attack. At the heart of the non-uniform attack is the sequence of random variable $X_1, \ldots, X_r$ defined as follows, with respect to the sequence of backup values $B_1^\mathcal{S}, \ldots, B_r^\mathcal{S}$ and output of the protocol $\text{out}$. Recall function $g : \{0, 1\}^3 \times \{0, 1\} \mapsto \{0, 1\}$ defined by

$$g(x, y, y', \text{NoJump}) = \begin{cases} \text{NoJump} & \text{if } |y - x| < 1/64 \sqrt{r} \lor |y' - x| < 1/64 \sqrt{r}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise}; \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

**Definition 5.32** (Restatement of Definition 5.14). Let $X_0 = E[\text{out}]$. For $i \in [r]$, define $X_i$ such that

$$X_i = \text{rnd}_\delta \left( E \left[ \text{out} \mid B_i^\mathcal{S}, B_{i-1}^\mathcal{S}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_{\ell} - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_{i-1} \right] \right),$$

where $G_i = g(B_i^\mathcal{S}, B_{i-1}^\mathcal{S}, X_i, G_{i-1})$, letting $G_0 = 1$ and $g$ be defined according to Equation (40).

The attacked used the following two properties of $X$:

1. $X_i \in E[\text{out} \mid B_i^\mathcal{S}, B_{i-1}^\mathcal{S}, X_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell < i} (X_{\ell} - X_{\ell-1})^2, G_{i-1}] \pm 1/200r$, and

2. $\Pr[\exists i \in [r]: |X_i - X_{i-1}| \geq 1/32 \sqrt{r}] \in \Omega(1)$.

The first item holds by definition. The second item follows by the SoS-augmented weak martingale property of $X$. Hence, to prove the uniform case, all we need to find is a uniformly constructed sequence $\hat{X} = (\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_r)$ for which the above two properties hold.

We show how to construct a sequence that almost achieves the above properties, and still suffices for our purposes. Specifically, we show that with high probability (i.e., $1 - e^{-r}$) over a choice of some initialization randomness $\mu$, there exists a a sequence of random variables $\hat{X} = (\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_r)$ where each $\hat{X}_i \in [0, 1]$ is efficiently constructed from $B_{\leq i}^\mathcal{S}$, and the following holds for every $i \in [r]$:...
\[
\Pr \left[ \hat{X}_i \not\in E \left[ \text{out} | B_i^S, B_i^S, \hat{X}_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell<i} (\hat{X}_\ell - \hat{X}_{\ell-1})^2, \hat{G}_{i-1} \right] \pm 1/200r \right] \leq 1/r^2 \tag{41}
\]

letting \( \hat{G}_i = g(\hat{X}_i, B_i^S, B_i^{S-1}, \hat{X}_{i-1}, \hat{G}_{i-1}) \). Namely, \( \hat{X} \) is close to being a SoS-augmented weak martingales sequence. Fortunately, we prove that such a sequence still has a jump with constant probability. Specifically, Corollary 3.5 yields that

\[
\Pr \left[ \exists i \in [r]: |\hat{X}_i - \hat{X}_{i-1}| \geq 1/32\sqrt{r} \right] \in \Omega(1) \tag{42}
\]

It is easy to verify that the proof of Lemma 5.13 still goes through with respect to such a sequence.

In the rest of this section we define a uniformly constructed sequence \( \hat{X} \) for which Equation (41) holds.

**Remark 5.33.** We emphasize that our goal is to construct a sequence \((\hat{X}_1, \ldots, \hat{X}_r)\) satisfying Equations (41) and (42), with little regard to how close it is to the “real” sequence \(X_1, \ldots, X_r\). As mentioned in the introduction, because of the recursive nature of \(X_1, \ldots, X_r\), approximating such a sequence may be hopeless. For further discussion, we refer the reader to Section 1.1.1.

**Notation 5.34.** Let \(B\) and \(D\) denote the sets \(\text{supp}(B_S)\) and \(\{0, \frac{1}{(200r)^2}, \frac{2}{(200r)^2}, \ldots, r\}\), respectively.

**Algorithm 5.35** (Algorithm BuildX for constructing \(\{\mu_i\}_{i=0}^r\)).

**Parameters:** \(S \subseteq \left(\binom{r}{k}\right)\)

**Description:**

1. Sample \(\{ (b_i^\ell, \ldots, b_i^r) \leftarrow (B_1^S, \ldots, B_r^S) \}_{i=0, \ldots, r} \), by running \(r \cdot r^{50}\) instances of protocol II.

2. For \(i = 0, \ldots, r\):
   
   \[
   \mu_i = \text{BuildXLoop}(i, \{ \mu_j \}_{j<i}, \{ (b_i^\ell, \ldots, b_i^r) \}_{\ell=1, \ldots, r^{50}}).
   \]

**Output:** \(\{\mu_i\}_{i=0}^r\)

**Algorithm 5.36** (Algorithm BuildXLoop).

**Parameters:** \(i \in [r], \{ \mu_j : B^2 \times D^2 \times \{0, 1\} \mapsto D \}_{j<i}, \{ (b_i^\ell, \ldots, b_i^r) \}_{\ell=1, \ldots, r^{50}}\)

**Description:**

1. Set \(\mu_i = 0\)

2. For \(\ell = 1, \ldots, r^{50}\)
   
   (a) Set \(\sigma_0^\ell = 0, \tau_0^\ell = 1\).

   (b) For \(j = 1, \ldots, i - 1\), compute
      
      i. \(x_j^\ell = \mu_j(b_j^\ell, b_j^{\ell-1}, x_j^{\ell-1}, \sigma_j^{\ell-1}, \tau_j^{\ell-1})\),
      ii. \(\sigma_j^\ell = (x_j^\ell - x_j^{\ell-1})^2 + \sigma_j^{\ell-1}\),
iii. \( \tau^f_j = g(b^f_j, b^f_{j-1}, x^f_j, \tau^f_{j-1}) \).

3. For every \( \mathbf{c} = (b, b', x, \sigma, \tau) \in \mathcal{B}^2 \times \mathcal{D}^2 \times \{0, 1\} \), compute

\[
\begin{align*}
q_{\mathbf{c}} &= \left\{ \ell \in [r^{50}] : (b^f_j, b^f_{j-1}, x^f_j, \sigma^f_{i-1}, \tau^f_{i-1}) = (b, b', x, \sigma, \tau) \right\} \\
p_{\mathbf{c}} &= \left\{ \ell \in [r^{50}] : (b^f_j, b^f_{j-1}, x^f_j, \sigma^f_{i-1}, \tau^f_{i-1}) = (b, b', x, \sigma, \tau) \land b^f_i = 1 \right\}.
\end{align*}
\]

(b) If \( q_{\mathbf{c}} \neq 0 \), set \( \mu_i(b, b', x, \sigma, \tau) = \text{rnd} \eta/200r \left( p_{\mathbf{c}}/q_{\mathbf{c}} \right) \).

Output: \( \mu_i \).

Namely, Algorithm 5.35 operates in a sequence of \( r \) iterations as follows. At iteration \( i \), the algorithm outputs a function of \( \mu_i \) such that \( \mu_i(b, b', x, \sigma, \tau) \) approximates \( \mathbb{E} \left[ \text{out} \mid B^S_i = b, B^S_{i-1} = b', \text{agt}_{\mu_{<i}}(B^S_{<i}) = (x, \sigma, \tau) \right] \), where \( \mu_{<i} = \mu_0, \ldots, \mu_{i-1} \) corresponds to the functions constructed at the previous iterations and the function \( \text{agt}_{\mu_{<i}} \) maps sequences \( B^S_{<i} \) to 3-tuples in \( \mathcal{D}^2 \times \{0, 1\} \). Intuitively, the function \( \text{agt}_{\mu_{<i}} \) encodes an aggregated account of the sequence \( B^S_{<i} \) consisting of – the previous (approximated) game-value – the sum of (approximated) squares – and the “trigger” of the attack, i.e. whether a backup value diverged significantly from the (approximated) game-value at any given round of the protocol.

**Remark 5.37** (Running time of BuildX). It is immediate to see that Algorithm 5.36 runs in time polynomial in the running time of \( \Pi \) and \( r \).

Formally, for an output \( \mu = \{ \mu_i \}_{i \in [r]} \) of BuildX, we define the sequence \( \hat{X}^\mu = (\hat{X}^\mu_0, \ldots, \hat{X}^\mu_r) \) as follows.

**Definition 5.38** (\( \hat{X}^\mu \)). For fixed value of \( \mu = \{ \mu_i \}_{i \in [r]} \) output by BuildX, the sequence \( \hat{X}^\mu = (\hat{X}^\mu_0, \ldots, \hat{X}^\mu_r) \) is defined as follows. Let \( \hat{X}^\mu_0 = 1/2 \). For \( i \in [r] \), define \( \hat{X}^\mu_i \) such that

\[
\hat{X}^\mu_i = \mu_i(B^S_i, B^S_{i-1}, \hat{X}^\mu_{i-1}, \sum_{j \leq i-1} (\hat{X}^\mu_j - \hat{X}^\mu_{j-1})^2, \hat{G}^\mu_{i-1})
\]

where \( \hat{G}^\mu_i = g(B^S_i, B^S_{i-1}, \hat{X}^\mu_i, \hat{G}^\mu_{i-1}) \), letting \( \hat{G}_0 = 1 \) and \( g \) be defined according to Equation (40).

We conclude the section by proving the following claim.

**Claim 5.39.** With save but probability \( O(e^{-r}) \) over \( \mu \leftarrow \text{BuildX}(\Pi, S) \), the following holds for every \( i \in [r] \):

\[
\Pr \left[ \hat{X}^\mu_i \notin \mathbb{E} \left[ \text{out} \mid B^S_i, B^S_{i-1}, \hat{X}^\mu_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell \leq i-1} (\hat{X}^\mu_\ell - \hat{X}^\mu_{\ell-1})^2, \hat{G}^\mu_{i-1} \right] \pm 1/200r \right] \leq 1/r^2.
\] (43)

**Proof.** Let \( \varepsilon = r^{-10} \). For conciseness, write \( Z^\mu_i \) for the 5-tuple \( (B^S_i, B^S_{i-1}, \hat{X}^\mu_{i-1}, \sum_{\ell \leq i-1} (\hat{X}^\mu_\ell - \hat{X}^\mu_{\ell-1})^2, \hat{G}^\mu_{i-1}) \) and notice that \( |\text{supp}(Z^\mu_i)| \leq |\mathcal{B}^2 \times \mathcal{D}^2 \times \{0, 1\}| \leq r^8 \). Using the notation from Algorithm 5.36, for every \( i \in [r] \) and \( \mathbf{c} \in \text{supp}(Z_i) \), it holds that

\[
\Pr_{\mu_i} \left[ \Pr \left[ \text{out} = 1 \land Z^\mu_i = \mathbf{c} \right] - \frac{p_{\mathbf{c}}}{r^{50}} \right] \geq \varepsilon^2 \right] \leq 2 \cdot \exp(-2 \cdot r^{50} \cdot \varepsilon^4),
\]

\[
\Pr_{\mu_i} \left[ \Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = \mathbf{c} \right] - \frac{q_{\mathbf{c}}}{r^{50}} \right] \geq \varepsilon^2 \right] \leq 2 \cdot \exp(-2 \cdot r^{50} \cdot \varepsilon^4).
\]

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Both inequalities follow by Hoeffding’s inequality. Consequently, for every $c \in \text{supp}(Z^\mu)$, we deduce that
\[
\Pr_{\mu_0, \ldots, \mu_r} \left[ \exists i \in [r] : \left| \Pr \left[ \text{out} = 1 \land Z^\mu_i = c \right] - \frac{pc}{r^{50}} \right| \geq \varepsilon^2 \lor \left| \Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right] - \frac{qc}{r^{50}} \right| \geq \varepsilon^2 \right] \leq e^{-r}
\]
Hereafter, we fix a mapping $\mu = (\mu_0, \ldots, \mu_r)$ satisfying, for every $i \in [r]$ and $c \in \text{supp}(Z_i)$,
\[
\left| \Pr \left[ \text{out} = 1 \land Z^\mu_i = c \right] - \frac{pc}{r^{50}} \right| < \varepsilon^2,
\left| \Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right] - \frac{qc}{r^{50}} \right| < \varepsilon^2.
\tag{44}
\]
Next, we fix $i$ and $c$ such that $\Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right] \geq \varepsilon$. Using the fact that $1/(1 + x) \in 1 \pm 2x$, for small enough $x$, we deduce that
\[
\frac{pc}{qc} \in \frac{\Pr \left[ \text{out} = 1 \land Z^\mu_i = c \right] \pm \varepsilon^2}{\Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right] \pm \varepsilon^2} \in \frac{\Pr \left[ \text{out} = 1 \land Z^\mu_i = c \right] \pm \varepsilon^2}{\Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right]} \pm 2 \cdot \varepsilon
\tag{45}
\]
Our choice of $\varepsilon$ yields that $\hat{X}^\mu(c) = \text{rnd}_{1/200}(pc/qc) \in \Pr \left[ \text{out} \mid Z^\mu_i = c \right] \pm 1/200r$. We conclude by noticing that the probability of running into an element $c$ at round $i$ such that $\Pr \left[ Z^\mu_i = c \right] < \varepsilon$ is bounded above by $\varepsilon \cdot |\text{supp}(Z^\mu_i)| \leq \frac{1}{r^2}$.

\section*{References}


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A Missing Proofs

Proof of Fact 2.6. We distinguish four cases, depending on the signs of \( \gamma \) and \( \gamma' \).

Case 1. \((\gamma \geq 0, \gamma' \geq 0)\). \( p/p' = \frac{\frac{1}{2} e^{-\gamma}}{e^{-\gamma + t}} = e^{-\varepsilon} \in 1 \pm 2\varepsilon.\)
Case 2. \((\gamma \geq 0, \gamma' < 0)\). \(p/p' = \frac{1}{2}e^{-\gamma} = \frac{1}{2e^{\gamma} - e^{\gamma - \varepsilon}}\). Since \(\gamma \geq 0\) and \(\gamma - \varepsilon < 0\), it follows that \(0 \leq \varepsilon < 1\) and thus \(-\varepsilon < \gamma - \varepsilon < \varepsilon\). Thus \(\frac{1}{2e^{\gamma} - e^{\gamma - \varepsilon}} = e^{-\varepsilon} \cdot \frac{1}{2e^{\gamma - e^{(\gamma - \varepsilon)}}} \in e^\varepsilon \cdot (1 \pm \varepsilon^2) \in 1 \pm 5\varepsilon\).

Case 3. \((\gamma < 0, \gamma' \geq 0)\). \(p/p' = \frac{1}{2}e^{-\gamma} = 2 \cdot e^{\gamma - \varepsilon} - e^{2\gamma - \varepsilon}\). Similarly to the previous case, since \(\gamma < 0\) and \(\gamma - \varepsilon \geq 0\), it follows that \(0 > \gamma \geq \varepsilon > -1\) and thus \(\varepsilon < \gamma < -\varepsilon\). Thus \(2 \cdot e^{\gamma - \varepsilon} - e^{2\gamma - \varepsilon} = e^{-\varepsilon} \cdot (2e^{\gamma} - e^{2\gamma}) \in e^\varepsilon \cdot (1 \pm \varepsilon^2) \in 1 \pm 5\varepsilon\).

Case 4. \((\gamma < 0, \gamma' < 0)\): \(p/p' = \frac{1}{2}e^{-\gamma} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{2} e^{\gamma - \varepsilon}} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{2} e^{\gamma - \varepsilon}}\). Let \(\mu = 1 - \frac{1}{2} e^{-\gamma}\) and notice that \(\mu \in [1/2, 1]\). Compute \(\frac{1}{\mu} = 1 + \frac{1}{\mu} - \frac{1}{\mu} e^{-\varepsilon'} \in 1 + \frac{1}{\mu} - \frac{1}{\mu} e^{-\varepsilon'} \in 1 \pm 2\varepsilon\).

Lemma A.1. Consider an iterative sequence of \(r\) independent Bernoulli trials, where the success probability of the \(i^{th}\) trial is \(p_i \in [0, 1]\). Assume that \(p_r = 1\). For \(i \in [r]\), let \(q_i = p_i \cdot \prod_{j < i} (1 - p_j)\) be the probability of the first success occurring in the \(i^{th}\) trial. It holds that \(\sum_{i=1}^{r} q_i \cdot (\sum_{j \leq i} p_j) = 1\).

Proof. We prove the claim by proving a stronger statement. Namely, for arbitrary \(p_r \in [0, 1]\), we show that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{r} q_i \left( \sum_{j \leq i} p_j \right) = 1 - \left( \prod_{i \leq r} (1 - p_i) \right) \left( 1 + \sum_{i \leq r} p_i \right) . \tag{46}
\]

Notice that our claim is a special case of Equation (46) for \(p_r = 1\). We proceed to prove the equation by induction on \(r\). For \(r = 1\), take arbitrary \(p_1 \in [0, 1]\) and notice that \(q_1 p_1 = 1 - (1 - p_1)(1 + p_1)\). Next, assume that Equation (46) is true and let \(p_{r+1} \in [0, 1]\). The calculation below concludes the proof.

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{r+1} q_i \left( \sum_{j \leq i} p_j \right) = 1 - \left( \prod_{i \leq r} (1 - p_i) \right) \left( 1 + \sum_{i \leq r} p_i \right) + p_{r+1} \left( \prod_{i \leq r} (1 - p_i) \right) \left( p_{r+1} + \sum_{i \leq r} p_i \right)
\]

\[
= 1 - \left( \prod_{i \leq r} (1 - p_i) \right) \left( 1 - p_{r+1}^2 + (1 - p_{r+1}) \sum_{i \leq r} p_i \right)
\]

\[
= 1 - \left( \prod_{i \leq r+1} (1 - p_i) \right) \left( 1 + \sum_{i \leq r+1} p_i \right) ,
\]

where the last transition follows using \(1 - p_{r+1}^2 = (1 - p_{r+1})(1 + p_{r+1})\).

Lemma A.2. Consider two iterative sequences, each of \(r\) independent Bernoulli trials. Let \(p_i, p'_i \in [0, 1]\) denote the success probability of the \(i^{th}\) trial of the first and second sequence, respectively. Assume that \(p_r = p'_r = 1\). Let \(\varepsilon\) be such that for all \(i \in [r]\), it holds that \(\frac{p_i}{p'_i} \cdot \frac{1 - p'_i}{1 - p_i} \cdot \frac{p - 1}{p'_i} \in (1 + \varepsilon)\). Then, for every \(i \in [r]\),

\[
\left| \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - p'_j) - \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - p_j) \right| \leq 3\varepsilon \left( \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - \min(p_j, p'_j)) \right) \left( \sum_{j \leq i} \min(p_j, p'_j) \right) . \tag{47}
\]

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Proof. First, observe that $1 - p_i \in (1 \pm 3\varepsilon \cdot p_i)(1 - p_i')$ and $1 - p_i' \in (1 \pm 3\varepsilon \cdot p_i')(1 - p_i)$, for every $i \in [r]$. We hint on how to verify the former (the latter is symmetric). If $p_i \geq 1/3$ or if $p_i' \leq 2/3$, then verifying $1 - p_i \in (1 \pm 3\varepsilon \cdot p_i)(1 - p_i')$ is easy. Otherwise, if $p_i < 1/3$ and $p_i' > 2/3$, then $\varepsilon p_i > 1/3$, and hence $3\varepsilon p_i > 1$. Thus, $(1 \pm 3\varepsilon \cdot p_i)(1 - p_i') > 1 > 1 - p_i$.

We prove Equation (47) by induction on $i$. For every $j \in [i]$, let $\bar{p}_j = \min(p_j, p_j')$. For the base case, $|\prod(1 - p_i - (1 + p_i'))| \leq 2\varepsilon \bar{p}_1(1 - \bar{p}_1)$. Next, assume that Equation (47) is true up to some $i \in [r]$. Without loss of generality, further assume that $\bar{p}_{i+1} = p_{i+1}$ and let $u \in [0, 1]$ such that $1 - p_{i+1} = (1 + 3\varepsilon u\bar{p}_{i+1})(1 - p_{i+1})$. For the induction step, compute

$$\left| \prod_{j \leq i+1} (1 - p_j') - \prod_{j \leq i+1} (1 - p_j) \right| \leq (1 - p_{i+1}') \left| \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - p_j') - \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - p_j) \right| + 3\varepsilon u\bar{p}_{i+1} \left| \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - p_j) \right|$$

$$\leq (1 - \bar{p}_{i+1}) 3\varepsilon \left( \prod_{j \leq i} (1 - \bar{p}_j) \right) \left( \sum_{j \leq i} \bar{p}_j \right) + 3\varepsilon \bar{p}_{i+1} \prod_{j \leq i+1} (1 - \bar{p}_j)$$

$$= 3\varepsilon \left( \prod_{j \leq i+1} (1 - \bar{p}_j) \right) \left( \bar{p}_{i+1} + \sum_{j \leq i} \bar{p}_j \right).$$

The second inequality is by the triangle inequality. The third inequality follows by the induction hypothesis and the fact that for every $j \in [i+1]$ it holds that $1 - p_j, 1 - p_j' \leq 1 - \bar{p}_j$. The last transition is true by the assumption that $\bar{p}_{i+1} = p_{i+1}$. \hfill \Box

Lemma A.3. Consider two iterative sequences, each of $r$ independent Bernoulli trials. Let $p_i, p_i' \in [0, 1]$ denote the success probability of the $i$th trial of the first and second sequence, respectively. Assume that $p_r = p_r' = 1$. For $i \in [r]$, let $q_i = p_i \cdot \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j)$ and $q_i' = p_i' \cdot \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j')$. Let $\varepsilon$ be such that for all $i \in [r]$, it holds that $\frac{q_i}{p_i}, \frac{q_i'}{p_i'} \in (1 \pm \varepsilon)$. Then, for every $i \in [r]$, it holds that

$$|q_i - q_i'| \leq 3\varepsilon \cdot \min(p_i, p_i') \cdot \left( \prod_{j<i} (1 - \min(p_j, p_j')) \right) \left( \frac{1}{3} + \sum_{j<i} \min(p_j, p_j') \right). \ (48)$$

Proof. For every $j \in [i]$, let $\bar{p}_j = \min(p_j, p_j')$. Without loss of generality, assume that $\bar{p}_i = p_i$ and let $u \in [0, 1]$ such that $p_i' = (1 + u\varepsilon)p_i$ (there exists such $u$ since $p_i' \in p_i(1 \pm \varepsilon)$).

$$\left| p_i \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j) - p_i' \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j') \right| \leq p_i \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j) - \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j') + \varepsilon u p_i \prod_{j<i} (1 - p_j')$$

$$\leq 3\varepsilon \bar{p}_i \left( \prod_{j<i} (1 - \bar{p}_j) \right) \left( \sum_{j<i} \bar{p}_j \right) + \varepsilon u \bar{p}_i \prod_{j<i} (1 - \bar{p}_j)$$

$$\leq 3\varepsilon \bar{p}_i \left( \prod_{j<i} (1 - \bar{p}_j) \right) \left( \frac{1}{3} + \sum_{j<i} \bar{p}_j \right).$$
The first inequality is by the triangle inequality. The second inequality follows by Lemma A.2 and the fact that for every \( j \in [i] \) it holds that \( 1 - p'_j \leq 1 - \bar{p}_j \).

**Lemma A.4** (Restating Lemma 2.7). Consider two iterative sequences, each of \( r \) independent Bernoulli trials. Let \( p_i, p'_i \in [0,1] \) denote the success probability of the \( i \)th trial of the first and second sequence, respectively. Assume that \( p_r = p'_r = 1 \). For \( i \in [r] \), let \( q_i = p_i \cdot \prod_{j<i}(1 - p_j) \) and \( q'_i = p'_i \cdot \prod_{j<i}(1 - p'_j) \). Let \( \varepsilon \) be such that for all \( i \in [r] \), it holds that \( \frac{p_i}{p'_i}, \frac{p'_i}{p_i}, (1 - p_i), (1 - p'_i) \in (1 \pm \varepsilon) \). Then, \( \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} |q_i - q'_i| \leq 4\varepsilon(1 - q_r) \).

**Proof.** For every \( j \in [r] \), let \( \bar{p}_j = \min(p_j, p'_j) \), and for every \( i \in [r] \) let \( \bar{q}_i = \bar{p}_i \cdot \prod_{j<i}(1 - \bar{p}_j) \). Since the \( \bar{p}_j \)'s define an iterative sequence of Bernoulli trials, from Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.1 it follows that,

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{r-1} |q_i - q'_i| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} 3\varepsilon \cdot \bar{p}_j \cdot \left( \prod_{j<i} (1 - \bar{p}_j) \right) \left( \frac{1}{3} + \sum_{j\leq i} \bar{p}_j \right) 
\]

\[
\leq 3\varepsilon \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \bar{q}_j \left( \frac{1}{3} + \sum_{j\leq i} \bar{p}_j \right) 
\]

\[
= \varepsilon \left( \sum_{i=1}^{r-1} \bar{q}_j \right) + 3\varepsilon \cdot \left( \sum_{i=1}^{r} \bar{q}_j \left( \sum_{j\leq i} \bar{p}_j \right) \right) - 3\varepsilon \cdot \bar{q}_r \left( \sum_{j\leq r} \bar{p}_j \right) 
\]

\[
\leq 4\varepsilon - 4\varepsilon \bar{q}_r \leq 4\varepsilon(1 - q_r).
\]

The second to last inequality uses the fact that \( \bar{p}_r = p_r = p'_r = 1 \). The last inequality follows since \( 1 - \bar{q}_r \leq 1 - q_r \). \( \square \)

**Proof of Fact 2.9.** Straightforward computation. Fix \( b \in \text{supp}(B) \)

\[
\mathbf{E}[\mathbf{E}[A \mid B, C] \mid B = b] = \sum_c \mathbf{E}[A \mid B = b, C = c] \Pr[C = c \mid B = b] 
\]

\[
= \sum_c \sum_a a \cdot \Pr[A = a \mid B = b, C = c] \Pr[C = c \mid B = b] 
\]

\[
= \sum_a \sum_c a \cdot \Pr[A = a \cap C = c \mid B = b] 
\]

\[
= \sum_a a \cdot \Pr[A = a \mid B = b] 
\]

\[
= \mathbf{E}[A \mid B = b] \]

\( \square \)

**Proof of Fact 2.10.** Immediate consequence of the fact that \( \mathbf{E}[A \mid \mathbf{E}[A \mid B], f(B)] = \mathbf{E}[\mathbf{E}[A \mid B] \mid \mathbf{E}[A \mid B], f(B)] \), since \( B \) fully determines \( \mathbf{E}[A \mid B] \) and \( f(B) \). \( \square \)
Proof of Fact 2.11. Let $B' = \text{rnd}_\delta(B)$ and fix $b' \in \text{supp}(B) \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ and $c \in \text{supp}(C)$.

$$
\mathbb{E}[A \mid B' = b' \land C = c] = \sum_a a \cdot \Pr[A = a \mid B' = b' \land C = c]
$$

$$
= \sum_a a \cdot \sum_{b \in [b', b' + \delta]} \Pr[A = a \land B = b \mid B' = b' \land C = c]
$$

$$
= \sum_a a \cdot \frac{1}{\Pr[B' = b' \mid C = c]} \sum_{b \in [b', b' + \delta]} \Pr[A = a \land B = b \mid C = c]
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{\Pr[B' = b' \mid C = c]} \sum_{b \in [b', b' + \delta]} \Pr[B = b \mid C = c] \cdot \sum_a a \cdot \Pr[A = a \mid B = b \land C = c]
$$

$$
= \frac{1}{\Pr[B' = b' \mid C = c]} \sum_{b \in [b', b' + \delta]} b \cdot \Pr[B = b \mid C = c] \cdot \mathbb{E}[A \mid B = b, C = c]
$$

$$
\in [b', b' + \delta]
$$

□