

Cryptographic Hardness under Projections for Time-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity

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Abstract

A version of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, denoted KT , has received attention in the past several years, due to its close connection to circuit complexity and to the Minimum Circuit Size Problem $MCSP$. Essentially all results about the complexity of $MCSP$ hold also for $MKTP$ (the problem of computing the KT complexity of a string). Both $MKTP$ and $MCSP$ are hard for SZK (Statistical Zero Knowledge) under BPP -Turing reductions; neither is known to be NP -complete.

Recently, some hardness results for $MKTP$ were proved that are not (yet) known to hold for $MCSP$. In particular, $MKTP$ is hard for DET (a subclass of P) under nonuniform $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions. In this paper, we improve this, to show that \overline{MKTP} is hard for the (apparently larger) class $NISZK_L$ under not only $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions but even under projections. Also \overline{MKTP} is hard for $NISZK$ under $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions. Here, $NISZK$ is the class of problems with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and $NISZK_L$ is the non-interactive version of the class SZK_L that was studied by Dvir et al.

As an application, we provide several improved worst-case to average-case reductions to problems in NP .

2012 ACM Subject Classification Complexity Classes; Problems, reductions and completeness; Circuit complexity

Keywords and phrases Kolmogorov Complexity, Interactive Proofs, Minimum Circuit Size Problem, Worst-case to Average-case Reductions

Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.CVIT.2016.23

Funding *Eric Allender*: Supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1909216.

Acknowledgements EA was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1909216. JG and CR were supported in part by the DIMACS 2020 REU program under NSF grant CCF-1836666. We thank Oded Goldreich, Salil Vadhan, Harsha Tirumala, Dieter van Melkebeek and Andrew Morgan for helpful discussions.



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42nd Conference on Very Important Topics (CVIT 2016).

Editors: John Q. Open and Joan R. Access; Article No. 23; pp. 23:1–23:25



Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics

LIPICS Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany

41 **1** Introduction

42 The study of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity is tightly connected to the study of
 43 circuit complexity. Indeed, the measure that we study most closely in this paper, denoted
 44 KT , was initially defined in order to capitalize on the framework of Kolmogorov complexity in
 45 investigations of the Minimum Circuit Size Problem (MCSP) [4]. If f is a bit string of length
 46 2^k representing the truth-table of a k -ary Boolean function, then $\text{KT}(f)$ is polynomially
 47 related to the size of the smallest circuit computing f . Thus the problem of computing KT
 48 complexity (denoted MKTP) was initially viewed as a more-or-less equivalent encoding of
 49 MCSP, and it is still the case that all theorems that have been proved about the complexity
 50 of MCSP hold also for MKTP (such as those in [5, 8, 9, 14, 18–21, 26, 27, 29, 31]).

51 In recent years, however, a few hardness results were proved for MKTP that are not yet
 52 known to hold for MCSP [6, 7]. We believe that these results can be taken as an indication
 53 of what is likely to be true also for MCSP. The present work gives significantly improved
 54 hardness results for MKTP .

55 Reducibility and completeness are the most effective tools in the arsenal of complexity
 56 theory for giving evidence of intractability. However, it is not clear whether MCSP or MKTP
 57 is NP -complete; neither can be shown to be NP -complete – or even hard for ZPP – under
 58 the usual \leq_m^{P} reductions without first showing that $\text{EXP} \neq \text{ZPP}$, a long-standing open
 59 problem [14, 27].

60 The strongest hardness results that have been proved thus far for MCSP and MKTP are
 61 that both are hard for SZK under BPP -Turing reductions [5]. SZK is the class of problems
 62 that have Statistical Zero Knowledge Interactive Proofs, and contains many problems of
 63 interest to cryptographers. Indeed, if MCSP (or MKTP) is in P/poly , then there are no
 64 cryptographically-secure one-way functions [23].

65 SZK is not known to be contained in NP ; until such a containment can be established,
 66 there is no hope of improving the BPP -Turing reduction of [5] to a \leq_m^{P} reduction. But
 67 we come close in this paper. NISZK is the “non-interactive” subclass of SZK ; it contains
 68 intractable problems if and only if SZK does [15]. We show that $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is hard for NISZK
 69 under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions. (Thus, instead of asking many queries, as in [5], a single query
 70 suffices.) Our proof also shows that MKTP is hard for NISZK under BPP reductions that
 71 ask only one query. Combined with [15], this shows that MKTP is hard for SZK under
 72 *non-adaptive* BPP reductions, yielding a modest improvement over [5]; this has implications
 73 regarding the study of worst-case to average-case reductions. (See Section 1.1.)

74 But $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions are still quite powerful. There is great interest currently in
 75 proving lower bounds for MCSP, MKTP , and related problems such as MKtP (the problem
 76 of computing a different kind of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, due to Levin [25]) on
 77 very limited classes of circuits and formulae, as part of the “hardness magnification” program.
 78 For instance, if modest lower bounds can be shown on the size required to compute MKtP
 79 on de Morgan formulae augmented with PARITY gates at the leaves, then EXP is not
 80 contained in non-uniform NC^1 [28]. Also, there is great interest in finding lower bounds
 81 against a variety of other models, such as depth-three threshold gates, or circuits consisting
 82 of polynomial threshold gates [24]. If a lower bound is known against one of these limited
 83 classes of circuits for some problem A that is reducible to, say, MKTP or MKtP under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$
 84 reductions, it implies nothing about the complexity of MKTP or MKtP , since the circuitry
 85 involved in computing the reduction is much more powerful than the circuitry in the class of
 86 circuits for which the lower bound is known.

87 Thus there is a great deal of interest in considering reductions that are much less powerful

88 than $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions. For extremely weak (uniform) notions of reducibility (such as
 89 log-time reductions), it is known that MCSP and MKTP are *not* hard for any complexity
 90 class that contains the PARITY function [27]. However, this non-hardness result relies
 91 on uniformity; it was later shown that MKTP is hard for the complexity class DET under
 92 *nonuniform* $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions [7].

93 However, even $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions are too powerful a tool, when one is interested in lower
 94 bounds against the classes of circuits discussed above, since they do not seem to be closed
 95 under $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions. This motivates consideration of the most restrictive type of reduction
 96 that we will be considering: projections.

97 A projection is a reduction that is computed by a circuit consisting only of wires and
 98 NOT gates. Each output bit is either a constant, or is connected by a wire to a (possibly
 99 negated) input bit. All of the classes of circuits mentioned above (and – indeed – most
 100 conceivable classes of circuits) are closed under projections.

101 Prior to our work, the result of [7] showing that MKTP is hard for DET under $\leq_m^{NC^0}$
 102 reductions was improved, to show that MKTP is hard for DET even under projections [3].
 103 Since DET is a subclass of P, this provides little ammunition when one is seeking to prove
 104 that MKTP is intractable. One of our main contributions is to show that $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is hard for
 105 NISZK_L under projections.

106 The reader will not be familiar with NISZK_L ; this complexity class makes its first ap-
 107 pearance in the literature here. It is the “non-interactive” counterpart to the complexity
 108 class SZK_L that was studied previously by Dvir et al. [13], and was shown there to contain
 109 several important natural problems of interest to cryptographers (such as Discrete Log and
 110 Decisional Diffie-Hellman). NISZK_L contains intractable problems if and only if SZK_L does
 111 (see Section 2). Thus, for the first time, we show that MKTP is hard under projections for
 112 a complexity class that is widely believed to contain intractable problems. Our hardness
 113 results carry over immediately to MKtP and to similar problems defined in terms of general
 114 Kolmogorov complexity; no hardness results under projections had been known previously
 115 for those problems. We present some complete problems for NISZK_L and establish some
 116 other basic facts about this class in Section 4.

117 1.1 Average-Case Complexity

118 Building on the techniques introduced in [17], we are able to establish new insights regarding
 119 the relationship between worst-case and average-case complexity. In Theorem 47, capitalizing
 120 on the fact that essentially every circuit complexity class \mathcal{C} is closed under projections, we
 121 show that if NISZK_L does not lie in $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$, then there are problems A in NP that cannot be
 122 solved *in the average case* by errorless heuristics in \mathcal{C} . For instance, if one were able to show
 123 that some of the candidate one-way functions in NISZK_L cannot be solved by depth-four
 124 ACC^0 circuits, it would follow that there are problems in NP that are hard-on-average for
 125 depth-three ACC^0 circuits. Such conclusions would *not* follow if our reductions to MKTP had
 126 merely been computable in AC^0 or NC^0 .

127 We are also able to shed more light on worst-case to average-case reductions, in the form
 128 that they were studied by Bogdanov and Trevisan [12]. Bogdanov and Trevisan showed that
 129 there were severe limits on the complexity of problems whose worst-case complexity could
 130 be reduced to the average-case complexity of problems in NP via *non-adaptive* reductions;
 131 all such problems lie in $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$. But it was not known how large this class of
 132 problems could be. Hirahara showed that every problem in SZK has an *adaptive* worst-case
 133 to average-case reduction to a problem in NP, but the upper bound of $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$
 134 proved by Bogdanov and Trevisan does not apply for adaptive reductions. As a consequence

135 of our Corollary 19, showing that MKTP is hard for SZK under nonadaptive BPP reductions,
 136 we are able to show (in Corollary 50) that the class identified by Bogdanov and Trevisan lies
 137 in the narrow range between SZK and $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$.

138 **Remark:** This is an illustration of the utility of studying MKTP, as an example of a
 139 theorem that does not explicitly mention MKTP or MCSP, but which was proved via the
 140 study of MKTP. No such argument based on MCSP is known. We believe that MKTP can in
 141 fact be viewed as a *particularly convenient* formulation of MCSP, since (a) KT complexity is
 142 closely related to circuit size, (b) essentially all theorems known to hold for MCSP also hold
 143 for MKTP, (c) some arguments that one might intend to formulate in terms of MCSP elude
 144 current approaches, but can instead be successfully carried through by use of MKTP instead.
 145 Furthermore, theorems proved for MKTP may serve as an indication of what is likely to be
 146 true for MCSP as well.

147 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Our $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ -hardness theorem for MKTP is
 148 proved in Section 3. Then, after establishing some basic facts about NISZK_L in Section 4, in
 149 Section 5 we show that $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is hard for NISZK_L under projections. We present applications
 150 of our reductions and implications for average-case complexity in Section 6.

151 2 Preliminaries

152 2.1 Complexity Classes and Reducibilities

153 We assume familiarity with the complexity classes P, NP, L, BPP, and P/poly. We also make
 154 use of the circuit complexity classes AC^0 and NC^0 . For the purposes of this paper, AC^0 can
 155 be understood as the set of problems for which there is a family of circuits $\{C_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 156 with unbounded-fan-in AND and OR gates (and NOT gates of fan-in 1) of polynomial size
 157 and constant depth. NC^0 is defined similarly, but with AND and OR gates of bounded fan-in
 158 (and thus each output bit depends on only a constant number of bits of the input). We deal
 159 primarily with the “nonuniform” versions of these complexity classes (which means that the
 160 mapping $n \mapsto C_n$ need not be computable).

161 *Branching programs* are a circuit-like model of computation that can be used to charac-
 162 terize logspace computation. A *branching program* is a directed acyclic graph with a single
 163 source and two sinks labeled 1 and 0, respectively. Each non-sink node in the graph is labeled
 164 with a variable in $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and has two edges leading out of it: one labeled 1 and one
 165 labeled 0. A branching program computes a Boolean function f on input $x = x_1 \dots x_n$ by
 166 first placing a pebble on the source node. At any time when the pebble is on a node v labeled
 167 x_i , the pebble is moved to the (unique) vertex u that is reached by the edge labeled 1 if $x_i = 1$
 168 (or by the edge labeled 0 if $x_i = 0$). If the pebble eventually reaches the sink labeled b , then
 169 $f(x) = b$. Branching programs can also be used to compute functions $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$,
 170 by concatenating n branching programs p_1, \dots, p_n , where p_i computes the function $f_i(x) =$
 171 the i -th bit of $f(x)$. For more information on the definitions, backgrounds, and nuances of
 172 these complexity classes, circuits, and branching programs, see the text by Vollmer [32].

173 A *promise problem* Π is a pair of disjoint sets (Π_{YES}, Π_{NO}) . A *solution* to a promise
 174 problem is any set A such that $\Pi_{YES} \subseteq A$ and $\Pi_{NO} \subseteq \overline{A}$. A *don't-care instance* of Π is any
 175 string that is not in $\Pi_{YES} \cup \Pi_{NO}$. A *language* A can be viewed as a promise problem that
 176 has no don't-care instances.

177 Given any class \mathcal{C} of functions, there is an associated notion of *m-reducibility* or *many-one*
 178 *reducibility*: For two languages A and B , we say that $A \leq_m^{\mathcal{C}} B$ if there is a function f in
 179 \mathcal{C} such that $x \in A$ iff $f(x) \in B$. This notion of reducibility extends naturally to promise
 180 problems, mapping yes-instances to yes-instances, and no-instances to no-instances. The

181 most familiar notion of m -reducibility is Karp reducibility: \leq_m^P ; NP-completeness is most
 182 commonly defined in terms of Karp reducibility. However, in this paper, we will frequently
 183 be reducing problems that are not known to reside in NP to MKTP, which does lie in NP.
 184 Thus it is clear that a more powerful notion of reducibility is required. Some of our results
 185 are most conveniently stated in terms of $\leq_m^{P/\text{poly}}$ reductions (i.e., reductions computed by
 186 nonuniform polynomial-size circuits). We also consider restrictions of $\leq_m^{P/\text{poly}}$ reductions,
 187 computed by nonuniform AC^0 and NC^0 circuits: $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ and $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$. Finally we also consider
 188 *projections* (\leq_m^{proj}), which are functions computed by NC^0 circuits that have only NOT gates.
 189 That is, in a projection, each output bit is either a constant 0 or 1, or is connected by a wire
 190 to an input bit or its negation.

191 We will also make reference to various types of *Turing reducibility*, which are defined in
 192 terms of oracle Turing machines, or in terms of circuit families that are augmented with
 193 “oracle gates”. For instance, we say that $A \leq_T^{\text{BPP}} B$ if there is a probabilistic polynomial time
 194 oracle Turing machine M with oracle B that accepts every $x \in A$ with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ and
 195 rejects every $x \in \bar{A}$ with probability $\frac{2}{3}$. Note that the computation tree of such a BPP-Turing
 196 reduction can contain an exponential number of queries to different elements of B . Just as
 197 $\text{BPP} \subseteq P/\text{poly}$, it also holds that $A \leq_T^{\text{BPP}} B$ implies $A \leq_T^{P/\text{poly}} B$. Thus, on any input x , the
 198 circuit computing the P/poly -Turing reduction queries only a polynomial number of elements
 199 of B . It was shown in [5] that every problem in SZK (that is, every problem with a statistical
 200 zero knowledge proof system) is \leq_T^{BPP} -reducible (and hence $\leq_T^{P/\text{poly}}$ -reducible) to MCSP and
 201 to MKTP. The question of interest to us here is: Is it necessary to ask so many queries?
 202 What can we do if we ask only one query? What can be reduced to MKTP via a $\leq_m^{P/\text{poly}}$
 203 reduction?

204 The complexity class with which we are primarily concerned in this paper is the class of
 205 problems that have non-interactive statistical zero knowledge proof systems: NISZK. NISZK
 206 was originally defined and studied by Blum et al. [11]. The definition below (in terms of
 207 promise problems) is due to Goldreich et al. [15].

208 ► **Definition 1.** A non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof system for a promise
 209 problem Π is defined by a triple of probabilistic machines P , V , and S , where V and S are
 210 polynomial-time and P is computationally unbounded, and a polynomial $r(n)$ (which will
 211 give the size of the random reference string σ), such that:

- 212 1. (Completeness:) For all $x \in \Pi_{\text{YES}}$, the probability that $V(x, \sigma, P(x, \sigma))$ accepts is at least
 213 $1 - 2^{-|x|}$.
- 214 2. (Soundness:) For all $x \in \Pi_{\text{NO}}$, the probability that $V(x, \sigma, P(x, \sigma))$ accepts is at most
 215 $2^{-|x|}$.
- 216 3. (Zero Knowledge:) For all $x \in \Pi_{\text{YES}}$, the statistical distance between the following two
 217 distributions bounded by $1/\beta(|x|)$
 - 218 (A) Choose σ uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^{r(|x|)}$, sample p from $P(x, \sigma)$, and output (p, σ) .
 - 219 (B) $S(x)$ (where the coins for S are chosen uniformly at random.)

220 where $\beta(n)$ is superpolynomial, and the probabilities in Conditions 1 and 2 are taken over
 221 the random coins of V and P , and the choice of σ uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^{r(n)}$.

222 NISZK is the class of promise problems for which there is a non-interactive statistical
 223 zero knowledge proof system.

224 NISZK is not known to be closed under complementation; co-NISZK is defined as the
 225 class of promise problems $\Pi = (\Pi_{\text{YES}}, \Pi_{\text{NO}})$ such that $(\Pi_{\text{NO}}, \Pi_{\text{YES}})$ is in NISZK. It is
 226 known that $\text{SZK} = \text{NISZK}$ iff $\text{NISZK} = \text{co-NISZK}$, and that every promise problem in SZK


227 efficiently (and non-adaptively) Turing-reduces to a problem in NISZK [15]. Thus NISZK
 228 contains intractable problems if and only if SZK does.

229 A subclass of SZK, which we will denote by SZK_L , in which the verifier V and simulator
 230 S are restricted to being logspace machines, was defined and studied by Dvir et al. [13].
 231 Among other things, they showed that many of the important natural problems in SZK lie
 232 in SZK_L , including Graph Isomorphism, Quadratic Residuosity, Discrete Log, and Decisional
 233 Diffie-Helman. The non-interactive version of SZK_L , which we denote by $NISZK_L$, has not
 234 been studied previously, but it figures prominently in our results.

235 **► Definition 2.** *The formal definition of $NISZK_L$ is obtained by replacing each occurrence of*
 236 *“polynomial-time” in Definition 1 with “logspace”. (It is important to note that, in this model,*
 237 *the logspace-bounded verifier V and simulator S are allowed two-way access to the reference*
 238 *string σ and to their polynomially-long sequences of probabilistic coin flips.)*

239 The reduction presented in [15] carries over directly to the logspace setting, showing that
 240 $NISZK_L$ contains intractable problems if and only if SZK_L does. In particular, we have:

241 **► Proposition 3.** *Every promise problem in SZK_L is non-adaptively AC^0 -Turing-reducible a*
 242 *problem in $NISZK_L$.*



243 **■ Figure 1** Diagram showing the classes NISZK, co-NISZK, and SZK. The shaded oval represents
 244 NP. Every problem in co-NISZK is $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ -reducible to MKTP.

243 **2.2 KT Complexity**

244 The measure KT was defined in [4]. We provide a reproduction of that definition below.

245 **► Definition 4 (KT).** *Let U be a universal Turing machine. For each string x , define $KT_U(x)$*
 246 *to be*

247
$$\min\{|d| + T : (\forall \sigma \in \{0, 1, *\}) (\forall i \leq |x| + 1) U^d(i, \sigma) \text{ accepts in } T \text{ steps iff } x_i = \sigma\}$$

248 We define $x_i = *$ if $i > |x|$; thus, for $i = |x| + 1$ the machine accepts iff $\sigma = *$. The notation
 249 U^d indicates that the machine U has random access to the description d .

250 To understand the motivation for this definition, see [4]. The minimum KT problem,
 251 henceforth MKTP, is defined below.

► **Definition 5 (MKTP).** Suppose $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\theta \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, then

$$\text{MKTP} = \{(y, \theta) \mid \text{KT}(y) \leq \theta\}.$$

252 In this paper when we view MKTP as a promise problem, yes-instances will be considered
 253 those that are in the language, and no-instances those that are not in the language.

254 2.3 Discrete Probability and Entropy

255 ► **Definition 6.** Discrete Random Variables and Distributions

256 ■ A random variable $R : S \rightarrow T$ is a function where S is a finite set with a probability
 257 distribution on its elements. We will refer to S as the sample space. R with a uniform
 258 distribution on S will induce a distribution p on T .

259 ■ The support of a distribution is the set of elements in the distribution with positive
 260 probability. Alternatively, the support of a random variable R can be understood as the
 261 set $\text{Im}(R)$.

262 ■ In an abuse of notation, often given a distribution X , we will refer to X as both the
 263 random variable that induces the distribution, and the distribution itself.

264 ■ Given a distribution X , we will use the notation X^k to denote the k -fold direct product
 265 of X . Alternatively, this can be understood as the concatenation of k independent copies
 266 of X .

267 Given a function $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ we write U_m to denote the uniform distribution
 268 on m bits, and $f(U_m)$ for the output distribution of f when evaluated on a uniformly
 269 chosen element of $\{0, 1\}^m$. Throughout this paper, our random variables, and in turn the
 270 distributions they induce, will be of the form $C(U_m)$, where C is a multi-output Boolean
 271 circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

272 The entropy of a distribution can be understood informally as measuring how much
 273 “randomness” is present in the distribution.

274 ► **Definition 7.** Suppose X is a distribution. The Shannon entropy of X (denoted $H(X)$) is
 275 the expected value of $1/\log(\Pr[X = x])$.

276 3 $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is Hard For NISZK

277 In this section, we prove our first hardness result for MKTP; MKTP is hard for co-NISZK
 278 under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions. In order to prove hardness, it suffices to provide a reduction from
 279 the entropy approximation problem: EA, which is known to be complete for NISZK under
 280 \leq_m^{P} reductions [15].

► **Definition 8 (Promise-EA).** Let a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ represent a probability
 distribution X on $\{0, 1\}^n$ induced by the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^m$. We define Promise-
 EA to be the promise problem

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EA}_{\text{YES}} &= \{(C, k) \mid H(X) > k + 1\} \\ \text{EA}_{\text{NO}} &= \{(C, k) \mid H(X) < k - 1\} \end{aligned}$$

281 where $H(X)$ denotes the entropy of X .

282 We will make use of some machinery that was developed in [6], in order to relate the
 283 entropy of a distribution to the KT complexity of samples taken from the distribution.
 284 However, these tools are only useful when applied to distributions that are sufficiently “flat”.
 285 The next subsection provides the necessary tools to “flatten” a distribution.

286 3.1 Flat Distributions

287 A distribution is considered *flat* if it is uniform on its support. Goldreich et al. [15] formalized
 288 a relaxed notion of flatness, termed Δ -flatness, which relies on the concept of Δ -typical
 289 elements. The definitions of both concepts follow:

290 ► **Definition 9** (Δ -typical elements). *Suppose X is a distribution with element x in its support.*
 291 *We say that x is Δ -typical if,*

$$292 \quad 2^{-\Delta} \cdot 2^{-H(X)} < \Pr[X = x] < 2^{\Delta} \cdot 2^{-H(X)}.$$

293 ► **Definition 10** (Δ -flatness). *Suppose X is a distribution. We say that X is Δ -flat if for*
 294 *every $t > 0$ the probability that an element of the support, x , is $t \cdot \Delta$ -typical is at least*
 295 *$1 - 2^{-t^2+1}$.*

296 ► **Lemma 11** (Flattening Lemma). *[15] Suppose X is a distribution such that for all x in*
 297 *its support $\Pr[X = x] \geq 2^{-m}$. Then X^k is $(\sqrt{k} \cdot m)$ -flat.*

298 Observe that if X is a distribution represented by a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, then the
 299 hypothesis of the Flattening Lemma holds for m . Note also that, for any distribution X ,
 300 $H(X^k) = k \cdot H(X)$. Thus the entropy of the distribution X^k grows linearly with respect to
 301 k , while the deviation from flatness diminishes much more rapidly with respect to k .

302 3.2 Encoding and Blocking

303 The *Encoding Lemma* is the primary tool that was developed in [6] to give short descriptions
 304 of samples from a given distribution. Below, we give a precise statement of the version
 305 of the Encoding Lemma that is stated informally as Remark 4.3 of [6]. (Although the
 306 statement there is informal, the proof of the Encoding Lemma that is given there does yield
 307 our Lemma 13.) First, we need to define Λ -encodings.

308 ► **Definition 12** (Λ -encodings). *Let $R : S \rightarrow T$ be a random variable that induces a distribution*
 309 *X . The Λ -heavy elements of T are those elements λ such that $\Pr[X = \lambda] > 1/2^\Lambda$. A Λ -*
 310 *encoding of R is given by a mapping $D : [N] \rightarrow S$ such that for every Λ -heavy element*
 311 *λ , there exists $i \in [N]$ such that $R(D(i)) = \lambda$. We refer to $\lceil \log(N) \rceil$ as the length of the*
 312 *encoding. The function D is also called the decoder for the encoding.*

313 ► **Lemma 13** (Encoding Lemma). *[6, Lemma 4.1] Consider an ensemble $\{R_x\}$ of random*
 314 *variables that sample distributions on strings of some length $\text{poly}_1(|x|)$, where there are*
 315 *circuits C_x of size $\text{poly}_2(|x|)$ representing each R_x . Then there is a polynomial poly_3 such*
 316 *that, for every integer Λ , each R_x has a Λ -encoding of length $\Lambda + \log(\Lambda) + O(1)$ that is*
 317 *decodable by circuits of size $\text{poly}_3(|x|)$.*

318 By itself, the Encoding Lemma says nothing about KT complexity. The other important
 319 ingredient in the toolbox developed in [6] is the *Blocking Lemma*, which refers to the process
 320 of chopping a string into blocks. Let y be a string of length tn , which we think of as being the
 321 concatenation of t samples y_i of a distribution X on strings of length n . Thus $y = y_1 \dots y_t$.

322 Let $r = \lceil t/b \rceil$. Equivalently, we consider y to be equal to $z_1 \dots z_r$ where each z_i is a string of
 323 length bn sampled according to X^b . (In the case when $|y|$ is not a multiple of b , z_r is shorter;
 324 this does not affect the analysis. We call the strings z_i the *blocks* of y .)

325 **► Lemma 14 (Blocking Lemma).** [6, Lemma 3.3] *Let $\{T_x\}$ be an ensemble of sets of strings*
 326 *such that all strings in T_x have the same length $\text{poly}(|x|)$. Suppose that for each $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$*
 327 *and for each $b \in \mathbb{N}$ there is an integer Λ_b and a random variable $R_{x,b}$ whose image contains*
 328 *$(T_x)^b$, and such that $R_{x,b}$ is computable by a circuit of size $\text{poly}(|x|, b)$ and has a Λ_b -encoding*
 329 *of length $s'(x, b)$ decodable by a circuit of size $\text{poly}(|x|, b)$. Then there are constants c_1 and*
 330 *c_2 so that, for every constant $\alpha > 0$, every $t \in \mathbb{N}$, every sufficiently large x , and every*
 331 *$\lceil t^\alpha \rceil$ -suitable $y \in (T_x)^t$,*

$$332 \quad \text{KT}(y) \leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot s'(x, \lceil t^\alpha \rceil) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2}.$$

333 *Here, we say that $y \in (T_x)^t$ is b -suitable if each block of y (of length bn) is Λ_b -heavy.*

334 With the Encoding and Blocking Lemmas in hand, we can now show how to give upper
 335 and lower bounds on the KT complexity of concatenated samples from a distribution. The
 336 following lemma gives the upper bound.

337 **► Lemma 15.** *Suppose X is a distribution sampled by a circuit $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ of*
 338 *size polynomial in $|x|$. For every polynomial $w = w(|x|)$ with $|x| \leq w$, there exist constants*
 339 *c_0 , c_2 , and α_0 such that for every sufficiently large polynomial t and for all large x , if y is*
 340 *the concatenation of t samples from X , then*

$$341 \quad \text{KT}(y) \leq tH(X) + wm(t^{1-\alpha_0/2}) + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}$$

342 **Proof.** Pick c_0 so that $|x|^{c_0} > m + wm + |x|$, and observe that for all large x we have
 343 $|x|^{c_0} > H(X) + wm + O(\log(|x|))$. Let $t = t(|x|)$ be any polynomial. Let $b \in \mathbb{N}$ with $b < t$,
 344 and let $\Lambda_b = bH(X) + wm\sqrt{b}$. Then, by the Encoding Lemma $X^b = \otimes^b X$ has a Λ_b -encoding
 345 of length $\Lambda_b + \log(\Lambda_b) + O(1)$ that is decodable by circuits of size $\text{poly}(b|x|)$. Let $r = \lceil t/b \rceil$.
 346 Recall that $y = y_1 \dots y_t$ where each y_i is a string of length n sampled according to the
 347 distribution X . Equivalently, we can consider y to be equal to $z_1 \dots z_r$ where each z_i is
 348 a string of length bn sampled according to X^b ; the strings z_i are the blocks of y . By the
 349 Flattening Lemma, the probability that any given z_b is not Λ_b -heavy is at most 2^{-w^2+1} .
 350 Thus, by the union bound, the probability that y is not b -suitable (i.e., the probability that
 351 there is at least one block that is not Λ_b -heavy) is at most $r \cdot 2^{-w^2+1} < t \cdot 2^{-w^2}$. Since
 352 $w \geq |x|$ and t is polynomial in $|x|$, it follows that for all large x , with probability at least
 353 $(1 - 1/2^{2^{|x|}})$, each of the r blocks is Λ_b -heavy and hence, by the Encoding Lemma, each block
 354 has an encoding of length $s'(n, b) = \Lambda_b + \log(\Lambda_b) + O(1)$. Thus, by the Blocking Lemma, for
 355 certain constants c_1 and c_2 (which do not depend on t), for any constant $\alpha > 0$ (for all large
 356 enough y),

$$357 \quad \begin{aligned} \text{KT}(y) &\leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot s'(x, \lceil t^\alpha \rceil) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\ 358 &= t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil} + \log(\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil}) + O(1)) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\ 359 &= t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (\lceil t^\alpha \rceil H(X) + wm\sqrt{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil} + \log(\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil}) + O(1)) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\ 360 &\leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (t^\alpha H(X) + |x|^{c_0} + wm\sqrt{t^\alpha}) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \end{aligned}$$

361
362

Recall that the inequality above holds for *all* $\alpha > 0$. If we now pick $\alpha_0 \leq 1/(1 + c_1)$, we obtain the claimed inequality

$$\text{KT}(y) \leq tH(x) + wmt^{1-\alpha_0/2} + t^{1-\alpha_0}(|x|^{c_0+c_2}).$$

363

364 We now turn to a lower bound on $\text{KT}(y)$.

365 ► **Lemma 16.** *Let $\text{poly}(|x|)$ denote some fixed polynomial in $|x|$, and let α_0 be such that $0 <$
 366 $\alpha_0 < 1/2$. For all large x , if X is a distribution sampled by a circuit $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
 367 of polynomial size, then it holds that for every w and every $t > w^4$, if y is sampled from X^t ,
 368 then with probability at least $1 - 2^{-w^2}$,*

$$369 \quad \text{KT}(y) \geq tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0}\text{poly}(|x|)$$

370 **Proof.** Consider the distribution $X^t = \otimes^t X$ and sample y from it. Recall that $H(X^t) =$
 371 $tH(x)$. By the Flattening Lemma, X^t is $\sqrt{t} \cdot m$ -flat. Therefore, the probability that y is
 372 $wm\sqrt{t}$ -typical is at least $1 - 2^{-w^2+1}$. We would like to bound the probability that $\text{KT}(y) <$
 373 $tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$. To bound this probability, note that $\Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k]$ is
 374 equal to

$$375 \quad \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] + \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is atypical}]$$

$$376 \quad \leq \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] + \Pr[y \text{ is atypical}]$$

378 where we are interested in $k = tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$ and “ y is typical” means
 379 “ y is $wm\sqrt{t}$ -typical.” We have already observed above that the second term is bounded by
 380 2^{-w^2+1} . For the first term, we have

$$381 \quad \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] = \sum_{\{y: \text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}\}} \Pr(y)$$

$$382 \quad \leq \sum_{\{y: \text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}\}} 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-H(X^t)}$$

$$383 \quad \leq 2^k \cdot 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-H(X^t)}$$

$$384 \quad = 2^{tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} \cdot 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-tH(X)}$$

$$385 \quad = 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)}$$

386
387

388 where the first inequality follows from the definition of typicality, and the second inequality
 389 follows since there are only $\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} 2^i < 2^k$ descriptions of strings with complexity less than k .

390 Summarizing, we conclude that the probability that $\text{KT}(y) < tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot$
 391 $\text{poly}(|x|)$ is at most

$$392 \quad 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} + 2^{-w^2+1}.$$

393 To show that the above probability is less than $1/2^{w^2}$ is equivalent to showing that

$$394 \quad 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} < 2^{-w^2+1}.$$

395 Thus we must show that $w^2 - 1 < t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$. This holds, since

$$\begin{aligned}
 396 \quad w^2 - 1 &< w^2 \\
 397 \quad &< (t^{1/4})^2 \\
 398 \quad &= \sqrt{t} \\
 399 \quad &\leq t^{1-\alpha_0} \\
 400 \quad &\leq t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|). \\
 401
 \end{aligned}$$

402

403 3.3 Reducing co-NISZK to MKTP

404 ► **Theorem 17.** *MKTP is hard for co-NISZK under P/poly many-one reductions.*

405 **Proof.** We prove the claim by reduction from the NISZK-complete problem EA. Let
 406 $x = (C_x, k)$ be an arbitrary instance of Promise-EA, where $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a circuit
 407 that represents distribution X . Let $w = 2|x|$, and let α_0, c_0 , and c_2 be the constants from
 408 Lemma 15. Let $\lambda = wm t^{1-\alpha_0}/2$. Pick the polynomial t so that $t(|x|) > 2(\lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2})$
 409 and $w^4 < t$ (and note that all large polynomials have this property). Construct y as t samples
 410 from X . Let $\theta = tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}$. We claim that, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{2^{2|x|}}$, if
 411 $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{NO}$ and if $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{YES}$.

412

413 If $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then $H(X) < k$. Then by Lemma 15, we have that, with high
 414 probability,

$$\begin{aligned}
 415 \quad \text{KT}(y) &\leq tH(X) + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
 416 \quad &< tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
 417 \quad &= \theta \\
 418
 \end{aligned}$$

419 thus $\text{KT}(y) \leq \theta$, and thus $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{YES}$.

420 If $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then $H(X) > k + 1$. Then by Lemma 16, with probability at least
 421 $1 - 2^{-w^2} > 1 - 2^{-2|x|}$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
 422 \quad \text{KT}(y) &\geq tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}, \\
 423 \quad &> tH(X) - \lambda - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} && \text{(since } \alpha_0 < 1/2\text{)} \\
 424 \quad &> t(k+1) - \lambda - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
 425 \quad &> tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} && \text{(since } t > 2(\lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2})\text{)} \\
 426 \quad &= \theta \\
 427
 \end{aligned}$$

428 thus $\text{KT}(y) > \theta$, and thus $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{NO}$.

429 We have shown that there is a polynomial-time-computable function f , such that, if
 430 $x \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then with high probability (for random r) $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{NO} , and
 431 if $x \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then with high probability $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{YES} . By a standard
 432 counting argument (similar to the proof that $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{P/poly}$), since the probability of success
 433 for either bound is greater than $(1 - 1/2^{2^n})$, we can fix a sequence of random bits to hardwire
 434 in to this reduction and obtain a family of circuits computing a $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reduction from any
 435 problem in NISZK to $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$. ◀

436 ► **Corollary 18.** *MKTP is hard for NISZK under BPP reductions that make at most one*
 437 *query along any path.*

438 **Proof.** This follows from the proof of Theorem 17. Namely, on input $x = (C_x, k)$, construct
 439 the string y consisting of t random samples from C_x and query the oracle on (y, θ) . On
 440 Yes-instances, y will have KT complexity greater than θ (with high probability), and on
 441 No-instances, y will have KT complexity less than θ (with high probability). ◀

442 ▶ **Corollary 19.** MKTP is hard for SZK under non-adaptive BPP-Turing reductions.

443 **Proof.** Recall from [15] that SZK reduces to Promise-EA via non-adaptive (deterministic)
 444 reductions. The result is now immediate, from Corollary 18. ◀

445 **4 A Complete Problem for NISZK_L**

446 Having established a hardness result for MKTP under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions, we now establish
 447 an analogous hardness result under the much more restrictive \leq_m^{proj} reductions. For this, we
 448 first need to present a complete problem for NISZK_L.

449 Recall that the NISZK-complete problem EA deals with the question of approximating
 450 the entropy of a distribution represented by a circuit. In order to talk about NISZK_L, we
 451 shall need to consider probability distributions that are represented using restricted class of
 452 circuits. In particular, we shall focus on a problem that we denote EA_{NC⁰}.

453 ▶ **Definition 20** (Promise-EA_{NC⁰}). *Promise-EA_{NC⁰} is the promise problem obtained from*
 454 *Promise-EA, by considering only instances (C, k) such that C is a circuit of fan-in two gates,*
 455 *where no output gate depends on more than four input gates.*

456 It is not surprising that EA_{NC⁰} is complete for NISZK_L. The completeness proof that we
 457 present owes much to the proof presented by Dvir et al. [13] (showing that an NC⁰-variant of
 458 the SZK-complete problem ENTROPYDIFFERENCE is complete for SZK_L) and to the proof
 459 presented by Goldreich et al. [15] showing that EA is complete for NISZK. We will need to
 460 make use of various detailed aspects of the constructions presented in this prior work, and
 461 thus we will present the full details here.

462 First, we show membership in NISZK_L.

463 **4.1 Membership in NISZK_L**

464 ▶ **Theorem 21.** Promise-EA_{NC⁰} ∈ NISZK_L

465 **Proof.** In order to show membership, we must show the existence of a non-interactive proof
 466 system where the verifier and simulator are both in logspace. To do this, we adapt the
 467 protocol that is used in [15] to show that EA is in NISZK. Their protocol works by first
 468 transforming an instance (C, k) of EA, of length s , (where C represents a distribution X)
 469 into a representation of a distribution Z on ℓ bits. The transformation consists of four steps:

- 470 1. Take $\text{poly}(s)$ samples from X and concatenate them. Call this distribution X' and let
 471 $C_{X'}$ be the circuit representing X' .
- 472 2. Hash the output of X' with a hash function h chosen at random from a 2-universal family
 473 of hash functions. (The parameters of the hash function depend on the value k of the EA
 474 instance.) Let this distribution be Y , represented by C_Y .
- 475 3. Take $\text{poly}(s)$ copies of Y and concatenate their output. Call this distribution Y' , repre-
 476 sented by $C_{Y'}$.
- 477 4. Hash a sample of Y' with a hash function h' chosen at random from a 2-universal family
 478 of hash functions. Let this distribution be Z , represented by C_Z .

479 Section 2 and Appendix C of [15] give a careful proof of the fact that, with Z defined as
 480 above from the EA instance (C, k) , a NISZK protocol for EA is given by:

- 481 1. With reference string σ , the prover selects a string r uniformly at random from the set
 482 $\{r' : Z(r') = \sigma\}$.
- 483 2. The verifier accepts if $C_Z(r) = \sigma$ and rejects otherwise.

484 They also show that the following simulator satisfies the required zero-knowledge proper-
 485 ties:

- 486 1. Select an input r to Z uniformly at random and let $\sigma = C_Z(r)$.
- 487 2. return (σ, r) .

488 It suffices for us to show that, if (C, k) is an instance of EA_{NC^0} , then the tasks of the
 489 verifier and the simulator in the protocol above can be implemented in logspace.

490 First, we observe that, given (C, k) , a branching program P_Z realizing the distribution
 491 Z can be constructed in logspace. Indeed, it is trivial to construct a branching program
 492 P_X that realizes X (since each output bit of the NC^0 circuit Z has an easy-to-compute
 493 branching program of constant size). Then a branching program $P_{X'}$ realizing X' consists
 494 of several copies of P_X concatenated together (where each copy uses independent random
 495 input bits). The hash functions h considered in [15] are represented by Boolean matrices
 496 M_h , where computing $h(w)$ is simply multiplying M_h by the vector w . Since Boolean matrix
 497 multiplication is easy to compute in $\text{NC}^1 \subseteq \text{L}$, and since the composition of two logspace-
 498 computable functions is also logspace-computable, it is easy to build a branching program P_Y
 499 representing the distribution Y (That is, given a branching program for computing $M_h \cdot w$,
 500 for any node v that queries a bit of w , replace the pair of edges leaving v by a branching
 501 program that computes that bit of w (as a sample from X' .) In the same way, branching
 502 programs for Y' and Z are easy to construct, given P_Y .

503 Hence a logspace verifier, with access to r, σ , and an EA_{NC^0} instance (C, k) , can construct
 504 the branching program P_Z and compute $P_Z(r)$ and check if the output is equal to σ . It
 505 is equally easy to see that the simulator can be implemented in logspace. This establishes
 506 membership in NISZK_{L} . ◀

507 The following corollary is a direct analog to [15, Proposition 1].

508 ▶ **Corollary 22.** *If Π is any promise problem that is \leq_m^{L} reducible to EA_{NC^0} , then $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}_{\text{L}}$.*

509 We close this section by presenting an example of a well-studied natural problem in
 510 NISZK_{L} . (A graph is said to be *rigid* if it has no nontrivial automorphism.)

511 ▶ **Corollary 23.** *The Non-Isomorphism Problem for Rigid Graphs lies in NISZK_{L}*

512 **Proof.** First note that the proof of Theorem 21 carries over to show that a problem that
 513 we may call EA_{BP} (defined just as EA_{NC^0} but where the distribution is represented as a
 514 branching program instead of as an NC^0 circuit) also lies in NISZK_{L} . Now observe that
 515 the reduction given in Section 3.1 of [6] shows how to take as input two rigid graphs on n
 516 vertices (G_0, G_1) and build a branching program that takes as input a bitstring w of length t
 517 and t permutations π_1, \dots, π_t and output the sequence of t permuted graphs $\pi_i(G_{w_i})$. It
 518 is observed in [6] that this distribution has entropy $t(1 + \log n!)$ if the graphs are non-isomorphic,
 519 and has entropy at most $t \log n!$ otherwise. ◀

520 **4.2 Hardness for NISZK_L**

521 In order to re-use the tools developed in [15], we will follow the structure of the proof
 522 given there, showing that EA is hard for NISZK. Namely, we introduce the problem SDU
 523 (STATISTICAL DISTANCE FROM UNIFORM) and its NC⁰ variant, and prove hardness for
 524 SDU_{NC⁰}.

► **Definition 24** (SDU and SDU_{NC⁰}). *Consider Boolean circuits $C_X : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ representing distributions X . The promise problem*

$$\text{SDU} = (\text{SDU}_{YES}, \text{SDU}_{NO})$$

525 *is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SDU}_{YES} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C_X : \Delta(X, U_n) < 1/n\} \\ \text{SDU}_{NO} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C_X : \Delta(X, U_n) > 1 - 1/n\} \end{aligned}$$

526 where $\Delta(X, Y) = \sum_{\alpha} |\Pr[X = \alpha] - \Pr[Y = \alpha]|/2$.

527 SDU_{NC⁰} is the analogous problem, where the distributions X are represented by NC⁰
 528 circuits where no output bit depends on more than four input bits.

529 It is shown in [15, Lemma 4.1] that C_X is in SDU if and only if $(C_X, n - 3)$ is in EA. This
 530 yields the following corollary:

531 ► **Corollary 25.** $\text{SDU}_{\text{NC}^0} \leq_m^{\text{proj}} \text{EA}_{\text{NC}^0}$.

532 **Proof.** This is trivial if we assume an encoding of SDU_{NC⁰} instances, such that the NC⁰
 533 circuits $C_X : \{0, 1\}^m \mapsto \{0, 1\}^n$ are encoded by strings of length given by the standard
 534 pairing function $\frac{m^2 + 3m + 2mn + n + n^2}{2}$, so that the length of an instance of SDU_{NC⁰} completely
 535 determines n . (An NC⁰ circuit with m inputs and n outputs has a description of size
 536 $O(n \log m)$, and thus it is easy to devise a padded encoding of this much larger length.)
 537 Thus, in the projection circuit computing the reduction $C_X \mapsto (C_X, n - 3)$, the output bits
 538 encoding $n - 3$ are hardwired to constants, and the input bits encoding C_X are copied directly
 539 to the output. ◀

540 ► **Theorem 26.** *Promise-EA_{NC⁰} and Promise-SDU_{NC⁰} are hard for NISZK_L under \leq_m^{proj}
 541 reductions.*

542 **Proof.** By Corollary 25, it suffices to show hardness for SDU_{NC⁰}. In order to establish
 543 hardness, we need to develop the machinery of *perfect randomized encodings*, which were
 544 developed by Applebaum et al. [10] and then were applied in the setting of NISZK by Dvir
 545 et al. [13].

548 **4.2.1 Perfect Randomized Encodings**

549 ► **Definition 27.** *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$ be a function. We say that $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow$
 550 $\{0, 1\}^s$ is a perfect randomized encoding of f with blowup b if it is:*

- 551 ■ **Input independent:** *for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f(x) = f(x')$, the random*
 552 *variables $\hat{f}(x, U_m)$ and $\hat{f}(x', U_m)$ are identically distributed.*
- 553 ■ **Output Disjoint:** *for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f(x) \neq f(x')$, $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x, U_m)) \cap$
 554 $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x', U_m)) = \emptyset$.*
- 555 ■ **Uniform:** *for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ the random variable $\hat{f}(x, U_m)$ is uniform over $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x, U_m))$.*

556 ■ **Balanced:** for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ $|Supp(\hat{f}(x, U_m))| = |Supp(\hat{f}(x', U_m))| = b$

557 The following property of perfect randomized encodings is established in [13].

558 ► **Lemma 28 (entropy).** Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be a function and let $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times$
 559 $\{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^s$ be a perfect randomized encoding of f with blowup b . Then $H(\hat{f}(U_n, U_m)) =$
 560 $H(f(U_n)) + \log b$

561 The following two properties are given in Applebaum et al. [10].

562 ► **Lemma 29 (concatenation).** For $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ let $f_i : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the Boolean function
 563 computing the i -th bit of $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. If $\hat{f}_i : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^{m_i} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{s_i}$ is a perfect
 564 randomized encoding of f_i , then the function $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^{m_1 + \dots + m_\ell} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{s_1 + \dots + s_\ell}$
 565 defined by $\hat{f}(x, (r_1, \dots, r_\ell)) \stackrel{def}{=} (\hat{f}_1(x, r_1), \dots, \hat{f}_\ell(x, r_\ell))$ is a perfect randomized encoding of
 566 f .

567 ► **Lemma 30 (composition).** Let $g(x, r_g)$ be a perfect randomized encoding of $f(x)$ and
 568 let $h((x, r_g), r_h)$ be a perfect randomized encoding of $g(x, r_g)$ (viewed as a single argument
 569 function). Then, the function $\hat{f}((x, r_g), r_h) \stackrel{def}{=} h((x, r_g), r_h)$ is a perfect randomized encoding
 570 of f .

571 The following claim is not formally stated in [10] but can be found in their discussion of
 572 perfect randomized encodings in section 4.1 of that paper.

573 ▷ **Claim 31.** Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be a function. If $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^s$ is a
 574 perfect randomized encoding of f , then \hat{f} has blowup 2^m .

575 The following is apparent from Lemma 29, Lemma 30, and Claim 31.

576 ▷ **Claim 32.** The blowup of a perfect randomized encoding \hat{f} created by composing or
 577 concatenating perfect randomized encodings $\hat{f}_1, \dots, \hat{f}_\ell$ is $\prod_{i=1}^\ell b_i$.

578 4.2.2 Constructing an NC^0 perfect randomized encoding

579 The first step in showing completeness of EA_{NC^0} is to use the following construction of perfect
 580 randomized encodings of functions computed by branching programs, from [10].

581 ► **Definition 33.** Let Q be a branching program of size ℓ computing a Boolean function
 582 $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Fix some topological ordering of the vertices of Q where the source
 583 vertex is labelled 1 and the terminal vertex is labelled ℓ . Let $A(x)$ be the $\ell \times \ell$ adjacency
 584 matrix of G_x where entry (i, j) is a degree-1 polynomial $q_{i,j} \in \{x_k, (1 - x_k), 1, 0\}$, such that
 585 the transition from node i to node j queries variable x_k and proceeds if $q_{i,j}(x_k) = 1$. Define
 586 $L(x)$ as the submatrix of $A(x) - I$ obtained by deleting the first column and last row.

$$587 \begin{pmatrix} * & * & * & * & * \\ -1 & * & * & * & * \\ 0 & -1 & * & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & * \end{pmatrix}$$

588 Let $r^{(1)}$, and $r^{(2)}$ be vectors over $GF(2)$ of length $\binom{\ell-1}{2}$ and $\ell - 2$ respectively. Let $R_1(r^{(1)})$
 589 be an $\ell \times \ell$ matrix with 1's on the main diagonal, 0's below it and the elements of $r^{(1)}$ in the
 590 remaining $\binom{\ell-1}{2}$ entries above the main diagonal. Let $R_2(r^{(2)})$ be an $\ell \times \ell$ matrix with 1's on
 591 the main diagonal, 0's below it, and the elements of $r^{(2)}$ in the last column.

624 depends on at most four input bits from (x, r) (where r is the sequence of random bits in the
625 randomized encoding).

626 **Proof.** This follows immediately by applying the construction of Lemma 36 to the degree-
627 three polynomials for each entry in the product matrix given by AC^0 -computable function
628 given by Lemma 35. Each of those polynomials has $(\ell - 1)^2$ terms, and it is apparent from
629 Lemma 36 that each such entry gives rise to $2(\ell - 1)^2 - 1$ new random bits in the randomized
630 encoding. The assertion regarding blowup now follows from Claim 31. The assertions
631 regarding the bits upon which each p_i depends follows from inspection. The construction of
632 Lemma 36 can clearly be accomplished via a projection, and composing that projection with
633 the projection from Lemma 35 again yields a projection. ◀

634 4.2.3 SDU_{NC^0} is Complete for NISZK_L

635 We now have all of the tools required to complete the proof of Theorem 26.

636 Let Π be an arbitrary promise problem in NISZK_L with proof system (P, V) and simulator
637 S and let x be an instance of Π . Let $M_x(s)$ denote a routine that simulates $S(x)$ with
638 randomness s to obtain a transcript (σ, p) ; if $V(x, \sigma, p)$ accepts, then $M_x(s)$ outputs σ ,
639 otherwise it outputs $0^{|\sigma|}$. (We can assume without loss of generality that $|\sigma| = |x|^k$.) It is
640 shown in [15, Lemma 4.2] that the map $x \mapsto M_x$ is a reduction of Π to SDU :

641 \triangleright **Claim 38.** If $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/|x|^k$, and $x \in \Pi_{NO}$ implies $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) >$
642 $1 - 1/|x|^k$.

643 The proof of the preceding claim in [15, Lemma 4.2] actually shows a stronger result. It
644 shows that, if the statistical difference between the output distribution of the simulator and
645 the distribution of true transcripts is at most $1/e(n)$, then the statistical difference of M_x
646 and the uniform distribution is at most $1/e(n) + 2^{-n}$ on inputs of length n . Thus, using
647 Definition 1 (which is equivalent to the definition of NISZK given in [15]), the simulator
648 produces a distribution that differs from the uniform distribution by only $1/n^{\omega(1)}$. Thus we
649 have the following claim:

650 \triangleright **Claim 39.** Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. Then for all large x , If $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/|x|^{kc}$,
651 and $x \in \Pi_{NO}$ implies $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) > 1 - 1/|x|^{kc}$.

652 Furthermore, it is also shown in [15, Lemma 3.1] that EA has a NISZK protocol in which
653 the completeness error, soundness error, and simulator deviation are all at most 2^{-m} on
654 inputs of length m . Furthermore, that proof carries over to show that $\text{EA}_{\text{BP}} \in \text{NISZK}_L$ with
655 these same parameters. Thus we obtain the following fact, which we will use later in Section 6.
656

657 \triangleright **Claim 40.** Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. Then for all large x , If x is a Yes-instance of EA_{BP} , then
658 $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/2^{|x|^{c-1}}$, and if x is a No-instance of EA_{BP} , then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) > 1 - 1/2^{|x|^{c-1}}$.

659 Since S runs in logspace, each bit of $M_x(s)$ can be simulated with a branching program
660 Q_x . Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that there is an AC^0 -computable function that
661 takes x as input and produces an encoding of Q_x as output, and it can even be seen that
662 this function can be a *projection*. (To see this, note that in the standard construction of a
663 Turing machine from a logspace-bounded Turing machine S (with input (x, s)) each node
664 of the branching program has a name that encodes a configuration of the machine, a time
665 step, and the position of the input head. This branching program can be constructed in AC^0 ,
666 given only the *length* of x . In order to construct Q_x , it suffices merely to hardwire in the

667 transitions from any node that is “scanning” some bit position x_i . That is, if the transition
 668 out of node v goes to node v_0 if $x_i = 0$ and to node v_1 if $x_i = 1$, then in the adjacency matrix
 669 for Q_x , entry $(v, v_1) = x_i$ and entry (v, v_0) is $\neg x_i$. This is clearly a projection.)

670 Now apply the projection of Lemma 37 to (each output bit of) the branching program
 671 Q_x of size ℓ , to obtain an NC^0 circuit C_x computing a perfect randomized encoding with
 672 blowup $b = 2^{|x|^k \binom{\ell}{2} - 1} (2^{\ell-1})^{2-1}$. (C_x has $\log b + |x|^k$ output bits.)

673 Now consider $|H(C_x) - H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})|$. By Lemma 28 this is equal to $|H(Q_x) + \log b -$
 674 $H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})|$. Since $H(Q_x) = H(M_x)$ and $H(U_{\log b + |x|^k}) = \log b + H(U_{|x|^k})$, we have that
 675 $|H(C_x) - H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})| = |H(M_x) - H(U_{|x|^k})|$. The proof of Theorem 26 is now complete,
 676 by appeal to Claim 39. ◀

677 5 Hardness of MKTP under Projections

678 ▶ **Theorem 41.** *MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L under nonuniform $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reductions.*

679 **Proof.** We build on the proof of Theorem 17, and present a reduction from the NISZK_L -
 680 complete problem EA_{NC^0} . Let $x = (C_x, k)$ be an arbitrary instance of $\text{Promise-EA}_{\text{NC}^0}$, where
 681 $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is an NC^0 circuit that represents distribution X . Let $|x| < w < \sqrt[4]{t}$,
 682 and let α_0, c_0 , and c_2 be the constants from Lemma 15. Let $\lambda = wmt^{1-\alpha_0/2}$ and construct y
 683 as t samples from X . Let $\theta = tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0} |x|^{c_0+c_2}$.

684 As in the proof of Theorem 17, we have that, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{2^{2|x|}}$, if (X, k)
 685 is a Yes-instance of EA_{NC^0} , then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{\text{NO}}$ and if (X, k) is a No-instance of EA_{NC^0} ,
 686 then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{\text{YES}}$.

687 Thus we have shown that there is a uniform AC^0 -computable function f , such that, if
 688 $x \in \text{EA}_{\text{YES}}$, then with high probability (for random r) $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{NO} , and
 689 if $x \in \text{EA}_{\text{NO}}$, then with high probability $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{YES} . (Namely, the AC^0
 690 function takes $x = (C_x, k)$ and r as input, computes θ from k and $|x|$, and computes y by
 691 feeding t segments of r into the NC^0 circuit C_x .)

692 As in the proof of Theorem 17, we can fix a sequence of random bits to hardwire in to
 693 this reduction and obtain a (nonuniform) $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reduction from EA_{NC^0} to $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$.
 694 ◀

695 An immediate corollary (making use of the “Gap Theorem” of [1]) is that MKTP is hard
 696 for co-NISZK_L under $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. Below, we improve this, showing hardness under
 697 projections.

698 ▶ **Corollary 42.** *MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L under nonuniform $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions.*

699 **Proof.** Corollary 22, combined with the NISZK_L -completeness of EA_{NC^0} , implies that co-NISZK_L
 700 is closed under \leq_m^L reductions. It is shown in the “Gap Theorem” of [1] that, for any class \mathcal{C}
 701 closed under \leq_m^L reductions, any set that is hard for \mathcal{C} under $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reductions is also hard
 702 under $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. Thus from Theorem 41, we have that MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L
 703 under $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. ◀

704 ▶ **Corollary 43.** *MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L under nonuniform \leq_m^{proj} reductions.*

705 **Proof.** We now need to claim that the AC^0 -computable reduction of Theorem 41 can be
 706 replaced by a projection. Note that, since SDU_{NC^0} is complete for NISZK_L under projections,
 707 and since the reduction from SDU_{NC^0} to EA_{NC^0} given in Corollary 25 always uses the same
 708 entropy bound $n - 3$, we have that it suffices to consider EA_{NC^0} instances $x = (C_x, k)$ where

709 the bound k depends only on the *length* of x . Thus the bound θ produced by our AC^0
 710 reduction also depends only on the length of x , and hence can be hardwired in.

711 We now need only consider the string y . The $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reduction presented in the proof of
 712 Theorem 41 takes as input C_x and r and produces the bits of y by feeding bits of r into C_x .
 713 Let us recall where the NC^0 circuitry producing the i -th bit of y comes from.

714 Lemma 35 shows how to take an arbitrary branching program and encode the problem
 715 of whether the program accepts as a question about the entropy of a distribution repre-
 716 sented as a matrix of degree-three polynomials. Each term in this matrix is of the form
 717 $\sum_{j,k} R_1(i,k)L(k,j)R_2(j,m)$, where the matrices R_1 and R_2 are the same for all inputs of the
 718 same length. Thus we need only concern ourselves with the matrix L .

719 In Section 4.2.3, it is observed that, given an instance x of a promise problem in NISZK_L ,
 720 the branching program Q_x that is used, in order to build the matrix L , can be constructed
 721 from x by means of a projection. The “input” to this branching program Q_x is a sequence
 722 of random bits (part of the random sequence r that is hardwired in, in order to create the
 723 nonuniform AC^0 reduction in the proof of Theorem 41). Thus, the only entries of the matrix
 724 L that depend on x are entries of the form (u, v) where u and v are configurations of a
 725 logspace machine, where the machine is scanning x_i in configuration u , and it is possible
 726 to move to configuration v . Lemma 37 then shows how to construct NC^0 circuitry for each
 727 term in the degree-three polynomial constructed from Q_x in the proof of Lemma 35. The
 728 important thing to notice here is that each output bit in the NC^0 circuit depends on at most
 729 one term of one of the degree-three polynomials, and hence it depends on at most one entry
 730 of the matrix L – which means that it depends on at most one bit of the string x .

731 Thus, consider any bit y_i of the string y produced by the nonuniform AC^0 reduction from
 732 Theorem 41. Either y_i does not depend on any bit of x , or it depends on exactly one bit x_j of
 733 x . In the latter case, either $y_i = x_j$ or $y_i = \neg x_j$. This defines the projection, as required. ◀

734 6 An Application: Average-Case Complexity

735 The efficient reductions that we have presented have some immediate applications regarding
 736 worst-case to average-case reductions. First, we recall the definition of errorless heuristics:

737 ▶ **Definition 44.** *Let A be any language. An errorless heuristic for A is an algorithm (or*
 738 *oracle) H such that, for every x , $H(x) \in \{\text{YES}, \text{NO}, ?\}$, and*

- 739 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{YES}$ implies $x \in A$.
- 740 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{NO}$ implies $x \notin A$.

741 ▶ **Definition 45.** *A language A has no average-case errorless heuristics in \mathcal{C} if, for every*
 742 *polynomial p , and every errorless heuristic $H \in \mathcal{C}$ for A , there exist infinitely many n such*
 743 *where $\Pr_{x \in U_n}[H(x) = ?] > 1 - 1/p(n)$.*

744 In order to state our first theorem relating to average-case complexity, we need the
 745 following circuit-based definition:

746 ▶ **Definition 46.** *Let \mathcal{C} be any complexity class. (Usually, we will think of \mathcal{C} being a class*
 747 *defined in terms of circuits, and the definition is thus phrased in terms of circuits, although it*
 748 *can be adapted for other complexity classes as well.) The class $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$ is the class of problems*
 749 *that can be solved by a family of circuits whose output gate is an unbounded fan-in OR gate,*
 750 *connected to the outputs of circuits in the class \mathcal{C} .*

751 If problems in NISZK_L are hard in the worst case, then there are problems in NP that are
 752 hard on average:

753 ► **Theorem 47.** *Let \mathcal{C} be any complexity class that is closed under \leq_m^{proj} reductions. If*
 754 *$\text{NISZK}_L \not\subseteq \text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$, then there is a set A in NP that has no average-case errorless heuristics*
 755 *in \mathcal{C} .*

756 **Proof.** Consider the reduction from $\overline{\text{EA}}_{\text{NC}^0}$ to MKTP given in the proof of Corollary 43. This
 757 reduction takes as input a pair $(C, n - 3)$ where C is an NC^0 circuit that produces output
 758 of length n . The reduction produces as output a string of length tn where $t = t(n)$ is a
 759 polynomial in n . The proof of Corollary 43 shows that, if $(C, n - 3)$ is a No-instance (a
 760 low-entropy instance) of EA_{NC^0} , then concatenating t samples from $C(r)$ (for independent
 761 uniformly random samples r) produces output that, with probability exponentially-close to
 762 1, has KT-complexity less than $\theta < (n - 2)t(n)$ for all large n . Let f be a function computed
 763 as follows: On input d of length m' , compute the smallest n such that $m' < (n - 2)t(n)$,
 764 and then simulate the universal Turing machine U on d for $t(n)^2$ steps, and produce as
 765 output the first $nt(n)$ bits of output that $U(d)$ produces in this amount of time. Let
 766 $A = \{y : \exists d f(d) = y\}$ be the range of f . Note that A contains all strings y of length $nt(n)$
 767 such that $\text{KT}(y) \leq (n - 2)t(n)$. Clearly, $A \in \text{NP}$. We will show that if A has an average-case
 768 errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} , then $\text{NISZK}_L \in \text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$.¹

769 If A has an average-case errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} , then there is a family $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$ of
 770 \mathcal{C} circuits (or other algorithms, if \mathcal{C} is not a circuit family) with the property that, for all
 771 large n , for all strings x of length n , $C_n(x) \in \{\text{YES}, \text{NO}, ?\}$, where

772 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{YES}$ implies $x \in A$.

773 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{NO}$ implies $x \notin A$.

774 ■ $\Pr_x[C_n(x) = ?] < 1 - \frac{1}{p_1(n)}$

775 for some polynomial p_1 .

776 Since there are three possible outputs, there must be two output bits, which we can call a
 777 and b . The encoding of YES, NO and ? below is chosen in order to simplify the statement of
 778 our results. If a different encoding is chosen, then the form of the circuits for NISZK_L might
 779 be slightly different.

a	b	
1	0	YES
0	1	NO
0	0	?
1	1	Illegal

781 Now consider the family $\{C'_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$, where C'_m is just like C_m but has only output
 782 bit b .

¹ In fact, A can be taken to be any set in NP that contains all strings of KT complexity below a certain threshold, while still containing only a small fraction of the strings of any length n .

783 For any $m = nt(n)$,

$$\begin{aligned}
784 \Pr_x[C'_m(x) = 1] &= 1 - \Pr[C_m(x) = \text{YES}] - \Pr[C_m(x) = ?] \\
785 &\geq 1 - \frac{|A \cap \{0, 1\}^m|}{2^m} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1(m)}\right) \\
786 &\geq 1 - \frac{2^{(n-2)t(n)}}{2^{nt(n)}} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1(m)}\right) \\
787 &= \frac{1}{p_1(nt(n))} - \frac{1}{2^{2t(n)}} \\
788 &> \frac{1}{p_2(n)}
\end{aligned}$$

789
790

791 for some polynomial p_2 .

792 We now present efficient circuits for promise problems in NISZK_L .

793 Since the NISZK_L -complete problem EA_{NC^0} is a special case of EA_{BP} , we know that EA_{BP}
794 is also complete for NISZK_L (say, under \leq_m^L reductions). Thus it follows from Claim 40
795 that, for any problem $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}_L$, and for any instance $x \in \prod_{YES}$, the distribution M_x
796 introduced in Section 4.2.3 can actually be assumed to have statistical difference at most
797 $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$ from the uniform distribution, for some $\epsilon > 0$. This in turn implies that the NC^0
798 circuit C_x (which is constructed in the paragraphs right after Claim 40) also has statistical
799 difference at most $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$ from the uniform distribution (again, if $x \in \prod_{YES}$). We highlight
800 this fact, so that we can refer to it more easily later:

801 \triangleright Claim 48. If $x \in \prod_{YES}$, then the NC^0 circuit C_x has statistical difference at most $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$
802 from the uniform distribution.

803 Now consider the circuit family $\{D_{n_0} : n_0 \in \mathbb{N}\}$ that has the following form: The input is
804 a string x of length n_0 . Recall that the NC^0 circuit C_x from Section 4.2.3 takes “random”
805 inputs r of length polynomial in $|x|$ and produces output of length n which is also polynomial
806 in $|x|$. Let $\{E_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ be a circuit family that takes (x, r) as input and computes $C_x(r)$.
807 (The family E_n can in fact be chosen to be very efficient, but we do not need that; it will
808 turn out later that E_n can be replaced by a single wire connected to a possibly-negated bit
809 of x , or by a constant.) The “bottom layer” of D_{n_0} consists of $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)$ copies of E_n ,
810 using $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)$ independent random strings $r_1, \dots, r_{n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)}$, and producing a string
811 of length $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n) n$, which is then fed into $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ copies of $C'_{t(n)n}$. Finally, the output
812 gate of each of the copies of $C'_{t(n)n}$ is fed into an OR gate, which is the output gate of D_{n_0} .

813 If $x \in \prod_{NO}$ then, as in the proof of Theorem 41, with probability (over the random
814 inputs) exponentially close to 1, the string feeding into the inputs of each of the copies of C'
815 has low KT complexity, and consequently (by the definition of C') each C' outputs 0, and
816 thus D_{n_0} outputs 0.

817 If $x \in \prod_{YES}$ then, by Claim 48, the distribution represented by each copy of E_n (using
818 random inputs r) has statistical difference from the uniform distribution bounded by 2^{-n^ϵ} .
819 The strings that are fed into each copy of $C'_{nt(n)}$ are generated by $t(n)$ independent copies of
820 E_n . By [30, Lemma 3.4], we can conclude that the distribution that is fed into each copy of
821 $C'_{nt(n)}$ has statistical distance from the uniform distribution bounded by $\frac{t(n)}{2^{n^\epsilon}}$. We showed
822 above that the probability that $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts a uniformly-random string of length $nt(n)$ is
823 greater than $\frac{1}{p_2(n)}$. It follows that the probability that $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts the string produced

824 by $t(n)$ independent copies of E_n is no less than $\frac{1}{p_2(n)} - \frac{t(n)}{2^{n^\epsilon}} > \frac{1}{np_2(n)}$. Thus the probability
 825 that *none* of the $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ independent copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts is at most $2^{-n_0^2}$.

826 A simple counting argument now shows that there is a sequence of probabilistic bits r
 827 that can be hardwired in to D_{n_0} so that, for all x of length n_0 , $D_{n_0}(x, r) = 1$ if $x \in \prod_{YES}$
 828 and $D_{n_0}(x, r) = 0$ if $x \in \prod_{NO}$. It still remains to simplify D_{n_0} so that it lies in $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$.

829 As in the proof of Corollary 43, each bit that feeds into any of the copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$ depends
 830 on *at most one* bit of x ; many of the bits may be set to constants after hardwiring in the
 831 choice of r . Thus we build the circuit family F_{n_0} that takes x as input, and projects the bits
 832 of x into the $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$, to obtain a $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$ circuit family for \prod . ◀

833 The following definition is implicit in the work of Bogdanov and Trevisan [12].

834 ▶ **Definition 49.** A worst-case to errorless average-case reduction *from a promise problem*
 835 \prod *to a language* A is given by a polynomial p and BPP machine M , such that A is accepted
 836 by M^h for every oracle errorless heuristic H for A such that $\Pr_{x \in U_n}[H(x) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(n)$.

837 ▶ **Corollary 50.** *There is a problem* $A \in \text{NP}$ *such there is a non-adaptive worst-case to*
 838 *errorless average-case reduction from every problem in SZK to* A .

839 **Proof.** We mimic the proof of Theorem 47, and use the same set A . Consider the BPP
 840 reduction from the NISZK complete problem EA to MKTP given in Corollary 18. This
 841 reduction takes as input a pair (C, k) (where C is a circuit that produces output of length
 842 n) and makes a single query along each path, where the query is a string y of length tn
 843 where $t = t(n)$ is a polynomial in n . (Since SDU is complete for NISZK, we can assume
 844 that $k = n - 3$, as in the proof of Theorem 47.) Rather than using MKTP as an oracle,
 845 instead we will use an errorless heuristic H for A where the $\Pr_z[H(z) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(|z|)$,
 846 interpreting any answer where $H(y) = \text{“No”}$ as meaning “ $\text{KT}(y) > \theta$ ” and any answer where
 847 $H(y) \in \{?, \text{YES}\}$ as meaning “ $\text{KT}(y) < \theta$ ”. (We will actually replace each query to MKTP by
 848 a polynomial number of independent queries to the heuristic H , and if *any* of these queries
 849 returns $H(y) = \text{“No”}$, we will conclude that $(C, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, and otherwise conclude that
 850 $(C, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$.)

851 As in the proof Theorem 47, if the distribution represented by C has low entropy, then
 852 with probability exponentially close to 1, the query y will have low KT complexity, and
 853 thus $H(y)$ will return a value in $\{?, \text{YES}\}$ (and this probability will remain small even if a
 854 polynomial number of independent trials are made). And if C has high entropy, then (as in
 855 the proof of Theorem 47) we can assume that the distribution given by C is exponentially
 856 close to the uniform distribution, and thus the distribution on the queries y will have small
 857 statistical difference from the uniform distribution, and hence, with exponentially high
 858 probability, at least one of the queries will return the value NO. Thus every problem in
 859 NISZK has an errorless non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction to A .

860 The proof is completed by recalling from [15] that SZK is non-adaptively (deterministically)
 861 polynomial-time reducible to NISZK. ◀

862 **Remark:** It is implicitly shown by Hirahara [17] that Corollary 50 holds under *adaptive*
 863 reductions. The significance of the improvement from adaptive and non-adaptive reductions
 864 lies in the fact that Bogdanov and Trevisan showed that the problems in NP for which there
 865 is a non-adaptive worst-case to errorless average-case reduction to a problem in NP lie in
 866 $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$ [12, Remark (iii) in Section 4]. Thus SZK may be close to the largest
 867 class of problems for which non-adaptive worst-case to errorless average-case reductions to
 868 problems in NP exist.

869 The worst-case to average-case reductions of Definition 49, must work for *every* errorless
 870 heuristic that has a sufficiently small probability of producing “?” as output. If we consider
 871 a less-restrictive notion (allowing a different reduction for different errorless heuristics) then
 872 in some cases we can lower the complexity of the reduction from BPP to AC^0 .

873 ► **Definition 51.** *Let \mathcal{D} be a complexity class, and let \mathcal{R} be a class of reducibilities. We say that*
 874 *errorless heuristics for language A are average-case hard for \mathcal{D} under \mathcal{R} reductions if, for every*
 875 *polynomial p and every errorless heuristic H for A where $\Pr_{x \in U_{|x|}}[H(x) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(|x|)$,*
 876 *and for every language $B \in \mathcal{D}$, there is a reduction $r \in \mathcal{R}$ reducing B to H .*

877 ► **Corollary 52.** *There is a language $A \in NP$, such that errorless heuristics for A are*
 878 *average-case hard for SZK_L under non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reductions.*

879 **Proof.** The proof of Theorem 47 introduces a language $A \in NP$ that is defined in terms of
 880 the parameters of the reduction from the $NISZK_L$ -complete promise problem EA_{NC^0} . We show
 881 that errorless heuristics for this same A are average-case hard for SZK_L under non-adaptive
 882 AC^0 -Turing reductions. By Proposition 3 and Theorem 26, every problem in SZK_L is non-
 883 adaptively AC^0 -Turing-reducible to EA_{NC^0} ; let this AC^0 -Turing reduction be computed by the
 884 family $\{D_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$. In the proof of Theorem 47, if we take the circuit family $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 885 to consist of oracle gates for an errorless heuristic H for A , we obtain that every query that
 886 D_n makes to EA_{NC^0} can be replaced by an OR of queries consisting of oracle gates from
 887 $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$. This yields the desired non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reduction to the errorless
 888 heuristic for A . ◀

889 ► **Corollary 53.** *Let \mathcal{C} be any class that is closed under non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reductions.*
 890 *If $SZK_L \not\subseteq \mathcal{C}$, then there is a problem in NP that has no average-case errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} .*

891 **Proof.** If $SZK_L \not\subseteq \mathcal{C}$, then by Proposition 3, $NISZK_L$ is also not contained in \mathcal{C} . The result is
 892 now immediate from Theorem 47. ◀

893 **Remark:** Building on earlier work of Goldwasser et al. [16], average-case hardness results
 894 for some subclasses of P based on reductions computable by constant-depth threshold circuits
 895 were presented in [2]. (Although certain aspects of the reductions presented in [2, 16] are
 896 computable in AC^0 , in order to obtain deterministic worst-case algorithms, MAJORITY gates
 897 are required in those constructions.) We are not aware of any prior work that provides average-
 898 case hardness results based on reductions computable in AC^0 , particularly for classes that
 899 are believed to contain problems whose complexity is suitable for cryptographic applications.

900 7 Conclusion and Open Problems

901 By focusing on non-uniform versions of \leq_m^P reductions, we have shed additional light on how
 902 MKTP relates to subclasses of SZK. Some researchers are of the opinion that MCSP (and
 903 MKTP) are likely complete for NP under some type of reducibility, and some recent progress
 904 seems to support this [22]. For those who share this opinion, a plausible first step would
 905 be to show that MKTP is hard not only for co-NISZK, but also for NISZK, under $\leq_m^{P/poly}$
 906 reductions. And of course, it will be very interesting to see if our hardness results for MKTP
 907 hold also for MCSP.

908 **Acknowledgments**

909 EA was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF-1909216. JG and CR were supported in part
 910 by the DIMACS 2020 REU program under NSF grants CCF-1852215 and CCF-1836666. We
 911 thank Dieter van Melkebeek and Andrew Morgan for helpful discussions.

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