



1 Cryptographic Hardness under Projections for 2 Time-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity

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11 — Abstract —

12 A version of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, denoted KT , has received attention in the past
13 several years, due to its close connection to circuit complexity and to the Minimum Circuit Size
14 Problem $MCSP$. Essentially all results about the complexity of $MCSP$ hold also for $MKTP$ (the
15 problem of computing the KT complexity of a string). Both $MKTP$ and $MCSP$ are hard for SZK
16 (Statistical Zero Knowledge) under BPP -Turing reductions; neither is known to be NP -complete.

17 Recently, some hardness results for $MKTP$ were proved that are not (yet) known to hold for
18 $MCSP$. In particular, $MKTP$ is hard for DET (a subclass of P) under nonuniform $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions.
19 In this paper, we improve this, to show that \overline{MKTP} is hard for the (apparently larger) class $NISZK_L$
20 under not only $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions but even under projections. Also \overline{MKTP} is hard for $NISZK$ under
21 $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions. Here, $NISZK$ is the class of problems with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs,
22 and $NISZK_L$ is the non-interactive version of the class SZK_L that was studied by Dvir et al.

23 As an application, we provide several improved worst-case to average-case reductions to problems
24 in NP , and we obtain a new lower bound on $MKTP$ (which is currently not known to hold for $MCSP$).

25 **2012 ACM Subject Classification** Complexity Classes; Problems, reductions and completeness;
26 Circuit complexity

27 **Keywords and phrases** Kolmogorov Complexity, Interactive Proofs, Minimum Circuit Size Problem,
28 Worst-case to Average-case Reductions

29 **Digital Object Identifier** 10.4230/LIPIcs.CVIT.2016.23

30 **Funding** *Eric Allender*: Supported in part by NSF Grants CCF-1909216 and CCF-1909683.



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42nd Conference on Very Important Topics (CVIT 2016).

Editors: John Q. Open and Joan R. Access; Article No. 23; pp. 23:1–23:26



Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics

LIPICs Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany

31 **1 Preface**

32 Peter Gács has made important contributions to the study of Kolmogorov complexity. Thus
 33 we are pleased to be able to present this investigation into the computational complexity
 34 of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, as part of a special issue celebrating his research
 35 career.

36 **2 Introduction**

37 The study of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity is tightly connected to the study of
 38 circuit complexity. Indeed, the measure that we study most closely in this paper, denoted
 39 KT , was initially defined in order to capitalize on the framework of Kolmogorov complexity in
 40 investigations of the Minimum Circuit Size Problem (MCSP) [4]. If f is a bit string of length
 41 2^k representing the truth-table of a k -ary Boolean function, then $KT(f)$ is polynomially
 42 related to the size of the smallest circuit computing f . Thus the problem of computing KT
 43 complexity (denoted MKTP) was initially viewed as a more-or-less equivalent encoding of
 44 MCSP, and it is still the case that all theorems that have been proved about the complexity
 45 of MCSP hold also for MKTP (such as those in [5, 9, 10, 17, 21–24, 30, 31, 33, 35]).

46 In recent years, however, a few hardness results were proved for MKTP that are not yet
 47 known to hold for MCSP [7, 8]. We believe that these results can be taken as an indication
 48 of what is likely to be true also for MCSP. The present work gives significantly improved
 49 hardness results for MKTP.

50 Reducibility and completeness are the most effective tools in the arsenal of complexity
 51 theory for giving evidence of intractability. However, it is not clear whether MCSP or MKTP
 52 is NP-complete; neither can be shown to be NP-complete — or even hard for ZPP — under
 53 the usual \leq_m^P reductions without first showing that $EXP \neq ZPP$, a long-standing open
 54 problem [17, 31].

55 The strongest hardness results that have been proved thus far for MCSP and MKTP are
 56 that both are hard for SZK under BPP-Turing reductions [5]. SZK is the class of problems
 57 that have Statistical Zero Knowledge Interactive Proofs, and contains many problems of
 58 interest to cryptographers. Indeed, if MCSP (or MKTP) is in P/poly, then there are no
 59 cryptographically-secure one-way functions [26].

60 Our main results involve improving the hardness results for MKTP, by reducing the
 61 number of queries from polynomially-many, to one. In the paragraphs that follow, we explain
 62 the sense in which we accomplish this goal. Along the way, we also obtain a new circuit lower
 63 bound for MKTP; it remains unknown whether this circuit lower bound also holds for MCSP.

64 SZK is not known to be contained in NP; until such a containment can be established,
 65 there is no hope of improving the BPP-Turing reduction of [5] to a \leq_m^P reduction. But
 66 we come close in this paper. NISZK is the “non-interactive” subclass of SZK; it contains
 67 intractable problems if and only if SZK does [18]. We show that \overline{MKTP} is hard for NISZK
 68 under $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions. (Thus, instead of asking many queries, as in [5], a single query
 69 suffices.¹) Our proof also shows that MKTP is hard for NISZK under BPP reductions that
 70 ask only one query. Combined with [18], this shows that MKTP is hard for SZK under
 71 *non-adaptive* BPP reductions, yielding a modest improvement over [5]; this has implications

¹ Some readers may have mistakenly believed that we view our work as a step toward showing that MKTP (or MCSP) is hard for SZK under (uniform) \leq_m^P reductions. We do not. In fact, some of us doubt that hardness under uniform deterministic reductions holds.

72 regarding the study of worst-case to average-case reductions. (See Section 2.1.)

73 But $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions are still quite powerful. There is great interest currently in
 74 proving lower bounds for MCSP, MKTP, and related problems such as MKtP (the problem
 75 of computing a different kind of time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity, due to Levin [28]) on
 76 very limited classes of circuits and formulae, as part of the “hardness magnification” program.
 77 For instance, if modest lower bounds can be shown on the size required to compute MKtP
 78 on de Morgan formulae augmented with PARITY gates at the leaves, then EXP is not
 79 contained in non-uniform NC^1 [32]. Also, there is great interest in finding lower bounds
 80 against a variety of other models, such as depth-three threshold gates, or circuits consisting
 81 of polynomial threshold gates [27]. If a lower bound is known against one of these limited
 82 classes of circuits for some problem A that is reducible to, say, MKTP or MKtP under $\leq_m^{P/poly}$
 83 reductions, it implies nothing about the complexity of MKTP or MKtP, since the circuitry
 84 involved in computing the reduction is much more powerful than the circuitry in the class of
 85 circuits for which the lower bound is known.

86 Thus there is a great deal of interest in considering reductions that are much less powerful
 87 than $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions. For extremely weak (uniform) notions of reducibility (such as
 88 log-time reductions), it is known that MCSP and MKTP are *not* hard for any complexity
 89 class that contains the PARITY function [31]. However, this non-hardness result relies
 90 on uniformity; it was later shown that MKTP is hard for the complexity class DET under
 91 *nonuniform* $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions [8].

92 However, even $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions are too powerful a tool, when one is interested in lower
 93 bounds against the classes of circuits discussed above, since they do not seem to be closed
 94 under $\leq_m^{NC^0}$ reductions. This motivates consideration of the most restrictive type of reduction
 95 that we will be considering: projections.

96 A projection is a reduction that is computed by a circuit consisting only of wires and
 97 NOT gates. Each output bit is either a constant, or is connected by a wire to a (possibly
 98 negated) input bit. All of the classes of circuits mentioned above (and – indeed – most
 99 conceivable classes of circuits) are closed under projections.

100 Prior to our work, the result of [8] showing that MKTP is hard for DET under $\leq_m^{NC^0}$
 101 reductions was improved, to show that MKTP is hard for DET even under projections [3].
 102 Since DET is a subclass of P, this provides little ammunition when one is seeking to prove
 103 that MKTP is intractable. One of our main contributions is to show that $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is hard for
 104 NISZK_L under projections. As a corollary, we obtain that MKTP cannot be computed by
 105 $\text{THRESHOLD}_{\circ}\text{MAJORITY}$ circuits of size $2^{n^{o(1)}}$. This lower bound relies on the fact that
 106 MKTP is hard under projections.

107 The reader will not be familiar with NISZK_L ; this complexity class makes its first ap-
 108 pearance in the literature here. It is the “non-interactive” counterpart to the complexity
 109 class SZK_L that was studied previously by Dvir et al. [15], and was shown there to contain
 110 several important natural problems of interest to cryptographers (such as Discrete Log and
 111 Decisional Diffie-Hellman). NISZK_L contains intractable problems if and only if SZK_L does
 112 (see Section 3). Thus, for the first time, we show that MKTP is hard under projections for
 113 a complexity class that is widely believed to contain intractable problems. Our hardness
 114 results carry over immediately to MKtP and to similar problems defined in terms of general
 115 Kolmogorov complexity; no hardness results under projections had been known previously
 116 for those problems. We present some complete problems for NISZK_L and establish some
 117 other basic facts about this class in Section 5.

118 **2.1 Average-Case Complexity**

119 Building on the techniques introduced in [20], we are able to establish new insights regarding
 120 the relationship between worst-case and average-case complexity. In Theorem 46, capitalizing
 121 on the fact that essentially every circuit complexity class \mathcal{C} is closed under projections, we
 122 show that if NISZK_L does not lie in $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$, then there are problems A in NP that cannot
 123 be solved *in the average case* by errorless heuristics in \mathcal{C} . For instance, if one were able
 124 to show that there is *any* problem NISZK_L (including, but not limited to, some of the
 125 candidate one-way functions believed to reside there) that cannot be solved *in the worst*
 126 *case* by depth-four ACC^0 circuits, it would follow that there are problems in NP that are
 127 hard-on-average for depth-three ACC^0 circuits. Such conclusions would *not* follow if our
 128 reductions to MKTP had merely been computable in AC^0 or NC^0 .

129 We are also able to shed more light on worst-case to average-case reductions, in the form
 130 that they were studied by Bogdanov and Trevisan [14]. Bogdanov and Trevisan showed that
 131 there were severe limits on the complexity of problems whose worst-case complexity could
 132 be reduced to the average-case complexity of problems in NP via *non-adaptive* reductions;
 133 all such problems lie in $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$. But it was not known how large this class of
 134 problems could be. Hirahara showed that every problem in SZK has an *adaptive* worst-case to
 135 average-case reduction to a problem in NP [20], but the upper bound of $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$
 136 proved by Bogdanov and Trevisan does not apply for adaptive reductions. As a consequence
 137 of our Corollary 19, showing that MKTP is hard for SZK under nonadaptive BPP reductions,
 138 we are able to show (in Corollary 49) that the class identified by Bogdanov and Trevisan lies
 139 in the narrow range between SZK and $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$.

140 **Remark:** This is an illustration of the utility of studying MKTP , as an example of a
 141 theorem that does not explicitly mention MKTP or MCSP , but which was proved via the
 142 study of MKTP . No such argument based on MCSP is known. We believe that MKTP can
 143 in fact be viewed as a *particularly convenient* formulation of MCSP , since (a) KT complexity
 144 is closely related to circuit size, (b) essentially all theorems known to hold for MCSP also
 145 hold for MKTP , (c) some arguments that one might intend to formulate in terms of MCSP
 146 elude current approaches, but can instead be successfully carried through by use of MKTP .
 147 Furthermore, theorems proved for MKTP may serve as an indication of what is likely to be
 148 true for MCSP as well.

149 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Our $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ -hardness theorem for MKTP is
 150 proved in Section 4. Then, after establishing some basic facts about NISZK_L in Section 5, in
 151 Section 6 we show that $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is hard for NISZK_L under projections. We present applications
 152 of our reductions and implications for average-case complexity in Section 7.

153 **3 Preliminaries**154 **3.1 Complexity Classes and Reducibilities**

155 We assume familiarity with the complexity classes P , NP , L , BPP , and P/poly . We also make
 156 use of the circuit complexity classes AC^0 and NC^0 . For the purposes of this paper, AC^0 can
 157 be understood as the set of problems for which there is a family of circuits $\{C_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 158 with unbounded-fan-in AND and OR gates (and NOT gates of fan-in 1) of polynomial size
 159 and constant depth. NC^0 is defined similarly, but with AND and OR gates of bounded fan-in
 160 (and thus each output bit depends on only a constant number of bits of the input). We deal
 161 primarily with the “nonuniform” versions of these complexity classes (which means that the
 162 mapping $n \mapsto C_n$ need not be computable).

163 *Branching programs* are a circuit-like model of computation that can be used to charac-
 164 terize logspace computation. A *branching program* is a directed acyclic graph with a single
 165 source and two sinks labeled 1 and 0, respectively. Each non-sink node in the graph is labeled
 166 with a variable in $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and has two edges leading out of it: one labeled 1 and one
 167 labeled 0. A branching program computes a Boolean function f on input $x = x_1 \dots x_n$ by
 168 first placing a pebble on the source node. At any time when the pebble is on a node v labeled
 169 x_i , the pebble is moved to the (unique) vertex u that is reached by the edge labeled 1 if $x_i = 1$
 170 (or by the edge labeled 0 if $x_i = 0$). If the pebble eventually reaches the sink labeled b , then
 171 $f(x) = b$. Branching programs can also be used to compute functions $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$,
 172 by concatenating n branching programs p_1, \dots, p_n , where p_i computes the function $f_i(x) =$
 173 the i -th bit of $f(x)$. For more information on the definitions, backgrounds, and nuances of
 174 these complexity classes, circuits, and branching programs, see the text by Vollmer [37].

175 A *promise problem* Π is a pair of disjoint sets (Π_{YES}, Π_{NO}) . A *solution* to a promise
 176 problem is any set A such that $\Pi_{YES} \subseteq A$ and $\Pi_{NO} \subseteq \bar{A}$. A *don't-care instance* of Π is any
 177 string that is not in $\Pi_{YES} \cup \Pi_{NO}$. A *language* A can be viewed as a promise problem that
 178 has no don't-care instances.

179 Given any class \mathcal{C} of functions, there is an associated notion of *m-reducibility* or *many-one*
 180 *reducibility*: For two languages A and B , we say that $A \leq_m^{\mathcal{C}} B$ if there is a function f in
 181 \mathcal{C} such that $x \in A$ iff $f(x) \in B$. This notion of reducibility extends naturally to promise
 182 problems, mapping yes-instances to yes-instances, and no-instances to no-instances. The
 183 most familiar notion of m-reducibility is Karp reducibility: \leq_m^P ; NP-completeness is most
 184 commonly defined in terms of Karp reducibility. However, in this paper, we will frequently
 185 be reducing problems that are not known to reside in NP to MKTP, which does lie in NP.
 186 Thus it is clear that a more powerful notion of reducibility is required. Some of our results
 187 are most conveniently stated in terms of $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions (i.e., reductions computed by
 188 nonuniform polynomial-size circuits). We also consider restrictions of $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ reductions,
 189 computed by nonuniform AC^0 and NC^0 circuits: $\leq_m^{AC^0}$ and $\leq_m^{NC^0}$. Finally we also consider
 190 *projections* (\leq_m^{proj}), which are functions computed by NC^0 circuits that have only NOT gates.
 191 That is, in a projection, each output bit is either a constant 0 or 1, or is connected by a wire
 192 to an input bit or its negation.

193 We will also make reference to various types of *Turing reducibility*, which are defined in
 194 terms of oracle Turing machines, or in terms of circuit families that are augmented with
 195 “oracle gates”. For instance, we say that $A \leq_T^{BPP} B$ if there is a probabilistic polynomial time
 196 oracle Turing machine M with oracle B that accepts every $x \in A$ with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ and
 197 rejects every $x \in \bar{A}$ with probability $\frac{2}{3}$. Note that the computation tree of such a BPP-Turing
 198 reduction can contain an exponential number of queries to different elements of B . Just as
 199 $BPP \subseteq P/poly$, it also holds that $A \leq_T^{BPP} B$ implies $A \leq_T^{P/poly} B$. Thus, on any input x , the
 200 circuit computing the P/poly-Turing reduction queries only a polynomial number of elements
 201 of B . It was shown in [5] that every problem in SZK (that is, every problem with a statistical
 202 zero knowledge proof system) is \leq_T^{BPP} -reducible (and hence $\leq_T^{P/poly}$ -reducible) to MCSP and
 203 to MKTP. The question of interest to us here is: Is it necessary to ask so many queries?
 204 What can we do if we ask only one query? What can be reduced to MKTP via a $\leq_m^{P/poly}$
 205 reduction?

206 The complexity class with which we are primarily concerned in this paper is the class of
 207 problems that have non-interactive statistical zero knowledge proof systems: NISZK. NISZK
 208 was originally defined and studied by Blum et al. [13]. The definition below (in terms of
 209 promise problems) is due to Goldreich et al. [18].

210 ► **Definition 1.** A non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge proof system for a promise

211 problem Π is defined by a triple of probabilistic machines P , V , and S , where V and S are
 212 polynomial-time and P is computationally unbounded, and a polynomial $r(n)$ (which will
 213 give the size of the random reference string σ), such that:

- 214 1. (Completeness:) For all $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, the probability that $V(x, \sigma, P(x, \sigma))$ accepts is at least
 215 $1 - 2^{-|x|}$.
- 216 2. (Soundness:) For all $x \in \Pi_{NO}$, the probability that $V(x, \sigma, P'(x, \sigma))$ accepts is at most
 217 $2^{-|x|}$, for any prover P' .
- 218 3. (Zero Knowledge:) For all $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, the statistical distance between the following two
 219 distributions bounded by $1/\beta(|x|)$
 - 220 (A) Choose σ uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^{r(|x|)}$, sample p from $P(x, \sigma)$, and output (p, σ) .
 - 221 (B) $S(x)$ (where the coins for S are chosen uniformly at random.)

222 where $\beta(n)$ is superpolynomial, and the probabilities in Conditions 1 and 2 are taken over
 223 the random coins of V and P , and the choice of σ uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^{r(n)}$.

224 NISZK is the class of promise problems for which there is a non-interactive statistical
 225 zero knowledge proof system.

226 NISZK is not known to be closed under complementation; co-NISZK is defined as the class
 227 of promise problems $\Pi = (\Pi_{YES}, \Pi_{NO})$ such that (Π_{NO}, Π_{YES}) is in NISZK. It is known that
 228 $SZK = NISZK$ iff $NISZK = \text{co-NISZK}$, and that every promise problem in SZK efficiently (and
 229 non-adaptively) Turing-reduces to a problem in NISZK [18]. Thus NISZK contains intractable
 230 problems if and only if SZK does.

231 A subclass of SZK, which we will denote by SZK_L , in which the verifier V and simulator
 232 S are restricted to being logspace machines, was defined and studied by Dvir et al. [15].
 233 Among other things, they showed that many of the important natural problems in SZK lie
 234 in SZK_L , including Graph Isomorphism, Quadratic Residuosity, Discrete Log, and Decisional
 235 Diffie-Hellman. The non-interactive version of SZK_L , which we denote by $NISZK_L$, has not
 236 been studied previously, but it figures prominently in our results.

237 ► **Definition 2.** The formal definition of $NISZK_L$ is obtained by replacing each occurrence of
 238 “polynomial-time” in Definition 1 with “logspace”. (It is important to note that, in this model,
 239 the logspace-bounded verifier V and simulator S are allowed two-way access to the reference
 240 string σ and to their polynomially-long sequences of probabilistic coin flips.)

241 The reduction presented in [18] carries over directly to the logspace setting, showing that
 242 $NISZK_L$ contains intractable problems if and only if SZK_L does. In particular, we have:

243 ► **Proposition 3.** Every promise problem in SZK_L is non-adaptively AC^0 -Turing-reducible to
 244 a problem in $NISZK_L$.


245 3.2 KT Complexity

246 The measure KT was defined in [4]. We provide a reproduction of that definition below.

247 ► **Definition 4 (KT).** Let U be a universal Turing machine. For each string x , define $KT_U(x)$
 248 to be

$$249 \min\{|d| + T : (\forall \sigma \in \{0, 1, *\}) (\forall i \leq |x| + 1) U^d(i, \sigma) \text{ accepts in } T \text{ steps iff } x_i = \sigma\}$$

250 We define $x_i = *$ if $i > |x|$; thus, for $i = |x| + 1$ the machine accepts iff $\sigma = *$. The notation
 251 U^d indicates that the machine U has random access to the description d . We fix one universal
 252 Turing machine U , and define $KT(x)$ to be $KT_U(x)$.



■ **Figure 1** Diagram showing the classes NISZK, co-NISZK, and SZK. The shaded oval represents NP. Every problem in co-NISZK is $\leq_m^{P/poly}$ -reducible to MKTP.

253 To understand the motivation for this definition, see [4]. Briefly: KT is a version of time-
 254 bounded Kolmogorov complexity that (in contrast to other notions of resource-bounded
 255 Kolmogorov complexity that have been considered) is polynomially-related to circuit com-
 256 plexity. The minimum KT problem, henceforth MKTP, is defined below.

► **Definition 5 (MKTP).** Suppose $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\theta \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, then

$$\text{MKTP} = \{(y, \theta) \mid \text{KT}(y) \leq \theta\}.$$

257 In this paper when we view MKTP as a promise problem, yes-instances will be considered
 258 those that are in the language, and no-instances those that are not in the language.

259 3.3 Discrete Probability and Entropy

260 ► **Definition 6.** *Discrete Random Variables and Distributions*

261 ■ A random variable $R : S \rightarrow T$ is a function where S is a finite set with a probability
 262 distribution on its elements. We will refer to S as the sample space. R with a uniform
 263 distribution on S will induce a distribution p on T .

264 ■ The support of a distribution X , denoted $\text{Supp}(X)$, is the set of elements in the distribu-
 265 tion with positive probability. Alternatively, the support of a random variable R can be
 266 understood as the set $\text{Im}(R)$.

267 ■ In an abuse of notation, often given a distribution X , we will refer to X as both the
 268 random variable that induces the distribution, and the distribution itself.

269 ■ Given a distribution X , we will use the notation X^k to denote the k -fold direct product
 270 of X . Alternatively, this can be understood as the concatenation of k independent copies
 271 of X .

272 Given a function $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ we write U_m to denote the uniform distribution
 273 on m bits, and $f(U_m)$ for the output distribution of f when evaluated on a uniformly
 274 chosen element of $\{0, 1\}^m$. Throughout this paper, our random variables, and in turn the
 275 distributions they induce, will be of the form $C(U_m)$, where C is a multi-output Boolean
 276 circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

277 The entropy of a distribution can be understood informally as measuring how much
 278 “randomness” is present in the distribution.

279 ► **Definition 7.** *Suppose X is a distribution. The Shannon entropy of X (denoted $H(X)$) is*
 280 *the expected value of $\log(1/\Pr[X = x])$.*

281 4 $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$ is Hard For NISZK

282 In this section, we prove our first hardness result for MKTP; MKTP is hard for co-NISZK
 283 under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions. In order to prove hardness, it suffices to provide a reduction from
 284 the *entropy approximation* problem: EA, which is known to be complete for NISZK under
 285 \leq_m^{P} reductions [18].

► **Definition 8 (Promise-EA).** *Let a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ represent a probability
 distribution X on $\{0, 1\}^n$ induced by the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^m$. We define Promise-
 EA to be the promise problem*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EA}_{\text{YES}} &= \{(C, k) \mid H(X) > k + 1\} \\ \text{EA}_{\text{NO}} &= \{(C, k) \mid H(X) < k - 1\} \end{aligned}$$

286 where $H(X)$ denotes the entropy of X .

287 We will make use of some machinery that was developed in [7], in order to relate the
 288 entropy of a distribution to the KT complexity of samples taken from the distribution.
 289 However, these tools are only useful when applied to distributions that are sufficiently “flat”.
 290 The next subsection provides the necessary tools to “flatten” a distribution.

291 4.1 Flat Distributions

292 A distribution is considered *flat* if it is uniform on its support. Goldreich et al. [18] formalized
 293 a relaxed notion of flatness, termed Δ -flatness, which relies on the concept of Δ -typical
 294 elements. The definitions of both concepts follow:

295 ► **Definition 9 (Δ -typical elements).** *Suppose X is a distribution with element x in its support.*
 296 *We say that x is Δ -typical if*

$$297 \quad 2^{-\Delta} \cdot 2^{-H(X)} < \Pr[X = x] < 2^{\Delta} \cdot 2^{-H(X)}.$$

298 ► **Definition 10 (Δ -flatness).** *Suppose X is a distribution. We say that X is Δ -flat if for*
 299 *every $w > 0$ the probability that an element of the support, x , is $w \cdot \Delta$ -typical is at least*
 300 *$1 - 2^{-w^2+1}$.*

301 ► **Lemma 11 (Flattening Lemma).** [18] *Suppose X is a distribution such that for all x in*
 302 *its support $\Pr[X = x] \geq 2^{-m}$. Then X^k is $(\sqrt{k} \cdot m)$ -flat.*

303 Observe that if X is a distribution represented by a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, then the
 304 hypothesis of the Flattening Lemma holds for m . Note also that, for any distribution X ,
 305 $H(X^k) = k \cdot H(X)$. Thus the entropy of the distribution X^k grows linearly with respect to
 306 k , while the deviation from flatness diminishes much more rapidly with respect to k .

4.2 Encoding and Blocking

The *Encoding Lemma* is the primary tool that was developed in [7] to give short descriptions of samples from a given distribution. Below, we give a precise statement of the version of the Encoding Lemma that is stated informally as Remark 4.3 of [7]. (Although the statement there is informal, the proof of the Encoding Lemma that is given there does yield our Lemma 13.) First, we need to define Λ -encodings.

► **Definition 12** (Λ -encodings). *Let $R : S \rightarrow T$ be a random variable that induces a distribution X . The Λ -heavy elements of T are those elements λ such that $\Pr[X = \lambda] > 1/2^\Lambda$. A Λ -encoding of R is given by a mapping $D : [N] \rightarrow S$ such that for every Λ -heavy element λ , there exists $i \in [N]$ such that $R(D(i)) = \lambda$. We refer to $\lceil \log(N) \rceil$ as the length of the encoding. The function D is also called the decoder for the encoding.*

► **Lemma 13** (Encoding Lemma). *[7, Lemma 4.1] Consider an ensemble $\{R_x\}$ of random variables that sample distributions on strings of some length $\text{poly}_1(|x|)$, where there are circuits C_x of size $\text{poly}_2(|x|)$ representing each R_x . Then there is a polynomial poly_3 such that, for every integer Λ , each R_x has a Λ -encoding of length $\Lambda + \log(\Lambda) + O(1)$ that is decodable by circuits of size $\text{poly}_3(|x|)$.*

By itself, the Encoding Lemma says nothing about KT complexity. The other important ingredient in the toolbox developed in [7] is the *Blocking Lemma*, which refers to the process of chopping a string into blocks. Let y be a string of length tn , which we think of as being the concatenation of t samples y_i of a distribution X on strings of length n . Thus $y = y_1 \dots y_t$. Let $r = \lceil t/b \rceil$. Equivalently, we consider y to be equal to $z_1 \dots z_r$ where each z_i is a string of length bn sampled according to X^b . (In the case when $|y|$ is not a multiple of b , z_r is shorter; this does not affect the analysis. We call the strings z_i the *blocks* of y .)

► **Lemma 14** (Blocking Lemma). *[7, Lemma 3.3] Let $\{T_x\}$ be an ensemble of sets of strings such that all strings in T_x have the same length $\text{poly}(|x|)$. Suppose that for each $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and for each $b \in \mathbb{N}$ there is an integer Λ_b and a random variable $R_{x,b}$ whose image contains $(T_x)^b$, and such that $R_{x,b}$ is computable by a circuit of size $\text{poly}(|x|, b)$ and has a Λ_b -encoding of length $s'(x, b)$ decodable by a circuit of size $\text{poly}(|x|, b)$. Then there are constants c_1 and c_2 so that, for every constant $\alpha > 0$, every $t \in \mathbb{N}$, every sufficiently large x , and every $\lceil t^\alpha \rceil$ -suitable $y \in (T_x)^t$,*

$$\text{KT}(y) \leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot s'(x, \lceil t^\alpha \rceil) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2}.$$

Here, we say that $y \in (T_x)^t$ is b -suitable if each block of y (of length bn) is Λ_b -heavy.

With the Encoding and Blocking Lemmas in hand, we can now show how to give upper and lower bounds on the KT complexity of concatenated samples from a distribution. The following lemma gives the upper bound.

► **Lemma 15.** *Suppose X is a distribution sampled by a circuit $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ of size polynomial in $|x|$. For every polynomial $w = w(|x|)$ with $|x| \leq w$, there exist constants c_0 , c_2 , and α_0 such that for every sufficiently large polynomial t and for all large x , if y is the concatenation of t samples from X , then with probability at least $(1 - 1/2^{2|x|})$,*

$$\text{KT}(y) \leq tH(X) + wm(t^{1-\alpha_0/2}) + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}$$

Proof. Pick c_0 so that $|x|^{c_0} > m + wm + |x|$, and observe that for all large x we have $|x|^{c_0} > H(X) + wm + O(\log(|x|))$. Let $t = t(|x|)$ be any polynomial. Let $b \in \mathbb{N}$ with $b < t$,

349 and let $\Lambda_b = bH(X) + wm\sqrt{b}$. Then, by the Encoding Lemma $X^b = \otimes^b X$ has a Λ_b -encoding
 350 of length $\Lambda_b + \log(\Lambda_b) + O(1)$ that is decodable by circuits of size $\text{poly}(b|x|)$. Let $r = \lceil t/b \rceil$.
 351 Recall that $y = y_1 \dots y_t$ where each y_i is a string of length n sampled according to the
 352 distribution X . Equivalently, we can consider y to be equal to $z_1 \dots z_r$ where each z_i is
 353 a string of length bn sampled according to X^b ; the strings z_i are the blocks of y . By the
 354 Flattening Lemma, the probability that any given z_b is not Λ_b -heavy is at most 2^{-w^2+1} .
 355 Thus, by the union bound, the probability that y is not b -suitable (i.e., the probability that
 356 there is at least one block that is not Λ_b -heavy) is at most $r \cdot 2^{-w^2+1} < t \cdot 2^{-w^2}$. Since
 357 $w \geq |x|$ and t is polynomial in $|x|$, it follows that for all large x , with probability at least
 358 $(1 - 1/2^{2|x|})$, each of the r blocks is Λ_b -heavy and hence, by the Encoding Lemma, each block
 359 has an encoding of length $s'(n, b) = \Lambda_b + \log(\Lambda_b) + O(1)$. Thus, by the Blocking Lemma, for
 360 certain constants c_1 and c_2 (which do not depend on t), for any constant $\alpha > 0$ (for all large
 361 enough y),

$$\begin{aligned}
 362 \quad \text{KT}(y) &\leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot s'(x, \lceil t^\alpha \rceil) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\
 363 \quad &= t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil} + \log(\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil}) + O(1)) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\
 364 \quad &= t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (\lceil t^\alpha \rceil H(X) + wm\sqrt{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil} + \log(\Lambda_{\lceil t^\alpha \rceil}) + O(1)) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2} \\
 365 \quad &\leq t^{1-\alpha} \cdot (t^\alpha H(X) + |x|^{c_0} + wm\sqrt{t^\alpha}) + t^{\alpha \cdot c_1} \cdot |x|^{c_2}
 \end{aligned}$$

366

367

Recall that the inequality above holds for *all* $\alpha > 0$. If we now pick $\alpha_0 \leq 1/(1 + c_1)$, we
 obtain the claimed inequality

$$\text{KT}(y) \leq tH(x) + wmt^{1-\alpha_0/2} + t^{1-\alpha_0}(|x|^{c_0+c_2}).$$

368

◀

369 We now turn to a lower bound on $\text{KT}(y)$.

370 ► **Lemma 16.** *Let $\text{poly}(|x|)$ denote some fixed polynomial in $|x|$ (where $\forall n \text{ poly}(n) \geq 1$),*
 371 *and let α_0 be such that $0 < \alpha_0 < 1/2$. For all large x , if X is a distribution sampled by a*
 372 *circuit $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ of polynomial size, then it holds that for every w and every*
 373 *$t > w^4$, if y is sampled from X^t , then with probability at least $1 - 2^{-w^2}$,*

$$374 \quad \text{KT}(y) \geq tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \text{poly}(|x|)$$

375 **Proof.** Consider the distribution $X^t = \otimes^t X$ and sample y from it. Recall that $H(X^t) =$
 376 $tH(x)$. By the Flattening Lemma, X^t is $\sqrt{t} \cdot m$ -flat. Therefore, the probability that y is
 377 $wm\sqrt{t}$ -typical is at least $1 - 2^{-w^2+1}$. We would like to bound the probability that $\text{KT}(y) <$
 378 $tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$. To bound this probability, note that $\Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k]$ is
 379 equal to

$$\begin{aligned}
 380 \quad &\Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] + \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is atypical}] \\
 381 \quad &\leq \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] + \Pr[y \text{ is atypical}]
 \end{aligned}$$

383

384

where we are interested in $k = tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$ and “ y is typical” means
 “ y is $wm\sqrt{t}$ -typical.” We have already observed above that the second term is bounded by

385 2^{-w^2+1} . For the first term, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 386 \quad \Pr[\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}] &= \sum_{\{y:\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}\}} \Pr[X^t = y] \\
 387 &\leq \sum_{\{y:\text{KT}(y) < k \wedge y \text{ is typical}\}} 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-H(X^t)} \\
 388 &\leq 2^k \cdot 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-H(X^t)} \\
 389 &= 2^{tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} \cdot 2^{wm\sqrt{t}} \cdot 2^{-tH(X)} \\
 390 &= 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)}
 \end{aligned}$$

391
392

393 where the first inequality follows from the definition of typicality, and the second inequality
394 follows since there are only $\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} 2^i < 2^k$ descriptions of strings with complexity less than k .

395 Summarizing, we conclude that the probability that $\text{KT}(y) < tH(x) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot$
396 $\text{poly}(|x|)$ is at most

$$397 \quad 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} + 2^{-w^2+1}.$$

398 To show that the above probability is less than $1/2^{w^2}$ is equivalent to showing that

$$399 \quad 2^{-t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)} < 2^{-w^2+1}.$$

400 Thus we must show that $w^2 - 1 < t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|)$. This holds, since

$$\begin{aligned}
 401 \quad w^2 - 1 &< w^2 \\
 402 &< (t^{1/4})^2 \\
 403 &= \sqrt{t} \\
 404 &\leq t^{1-\alpha_0} \\
 405 &\leq t^{1-\alpha_0} \cdot \text{poly}(|x|). \\
 406
 \end{aligned}$$

407 ◀

408 4.3 Reducing co-NISZK to MKTP

409 ▶ **Theorem 17.** MKTP is hard for co-NISZK under P/poly many-one reductions.

410 **Proof.** We prove the claim by reduction from the NISZK-complete problem EA. Let
411 $x = (C_x, k)$ be an arbitrary instance of Promise-EA, where $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a circuit
412 that represents distribution X . Let $w = 2|x|$, and let α_0, c_0 , and c_2 be the constants from
413 Lemma 15. Let $\lambda = wmt^{1-\alpha_0}/2$. Pick the polynomial t so that $t(|x|) > 2(\lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2})$
414 and $w^4 < t$ (and note that all large polynomials have this property). Construct y as t samples
415 from X . Let $\theta = tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}$. We claim that, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{2^{2|x|}}$, if
416 $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{NO}$ and if $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{YES}$.

417

418 If $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then $H(X) < k$. Then by Lemma 15, we have that, with high
419 probability,

$$\begin{aligned}
 420 \quad \text{KT}(y) &\leq tH(X) + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
 421 &< tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
 422 &= \theta \\
 423
 \end{aligned}$$

424 thus $\text{KT}(y) \leq \theta$, and thus $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{YES}$.

425 If $(X, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then $H(X) > k + 1$. Then by Lemma 16, with probability at least
426 $1 - 2^{-w^2} > 1 - 2^{-2^{|x|}}$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
427 \quad \text{KT}(y) &\geq tH(X) - wm\sqrt{t} - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}, \\
428 \quad &> tH(X) - \lambda - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} && \text{(since } \alpha_0 < 1/2\text{)} \\
429 \quad &> t(k+1) - \lambda - t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} \\
430 \quad &> tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2} && \text{(since } t > 2(\lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2})\text{)} \\
431 \quad &= \theta \\
432
\end{aligned}$$

433 thus $\text{KT}(y) > \theta$, and thus $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{NO}$.

434 We have shown that there is a polynomial-time-computable function f , such that, if
435 $x \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, then with high probability (for random r) $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{NO} , and
436 if $x \in \text{EA}_{NO}$, then with high probability $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{YES} . By a standard
437 counting argument (similar to the proof that $\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{P/poly}$), since the probability of success
438 for either bound is greater than $(1 - 1/2^{2^n})$, we can fix a sequence of random bits to hardwire
439 in to this reduction and obtain a family of circuits computing a $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reduction from any
440 problem in NISZK to $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$. ◀

441 ▶ **Corollary 18.** *MKTP is hard for NISZK under BPP reductions that make at most one
442 query along any path of the BPP machine.*

443 **Proof.** This follows from the proof of Theorem 17. Namely, on input $x = (C_x, k)$, construct
444 the string y consisting of t random samples from C_x and query the oracle on (y, θ) . On
445 Yes-instances, y will have KT complexity greater than θ (with high probability), and on
446 No-instances, y will have KT complexity less than θ (with high probability). ◀

447 ▶ **Corollary 19.** *MKTP is hard for SZK under non-adaptive BPP-Turing reductions.*

448 **Proof.** Recall from [18] that SZK reduces to Promise-EA via non-adaptive (deterministic)
449 reductions. The result is now immediate, from Corollary 18. ◀

450 5 A Complete Problem for NISZK_L

451 Having established a hardness result for MKTP under $\leq_m^{\text{P/poly}}$ reductions, we now establish
452 an analogous hardness result under the much more restrictive \leq_m^{proj} reductions. For this, we
453 first need to present a complete problem for NISZK_L .

454 Recall that the NISZK -complete problem EA deals with the question of approximating
455 the entropy of a distribution represented by a circuit. In order to talk about NISZK_L , we
456 shall need to consider probability distributions that are represented using restricted class of
457 circuits. In particular, we shall focus on a problem that we denote EA_{NC^0} .

458 ▶ **Definition 20** (Promise- EA_{NC^0}). *Promise- EA_{NC^0} is the promise problem obtained from
459 Promise-EA, by considering only instances (C, k) such that C is a circuit of fan-in two gates,
460 where no output gate depends on more than four input gates.*

461 It is not surprising that EA_{NC^0} is complete for NISZK_L . The completeness proof that we
462 present owes much to the proof presented by Dvir et al. [15] (showing that an NC^0 -variant of
463 the SZK-complete problem ENTROPYDIFFERENCE is complete for SZK_L) and to the proof
464 presented by Goldreich et al. [18] showing that EA is complete for NISZK. We will need to

465 make use of various detailed aspects of the constructions presented in this prior work, and
 466 thus we will present the full details here.

467 First, we show membership in NISZK_L .

468 5.1 Membership in NISZK_L

469 ► **Theorem 21.** *Promise- $\text{EA}_{\text{NC}^0} \in \text{NISZK}_L$*

470 **Proof.** In order to show membership, we must show the existence of a non-interactive proof
 471 system where the verifier and simulator are both in logspace. To do this, we adapt the
 472 protocol that is used in [18] to show that EA is in NISZK. Their protocol works by first
 473 transforming an instance (C, k) of EA, of length s , (where C represents a distribution X)
 474 into a representation of a distribution Z on ℓ bits. The transformation consists of four steps:

- 475 1. Take $\text{poly}(s)$ samples from X and concatenate them. Call this distribution X' and let
 476 $C_{X'}$ be the circuit representing X' .
- 477 2. Hash the output of X' with a hash function h chosen at random from a 2-universal family
 478 of hash functions. (The parameters of the hash function depend on the value k of the EA
 479 instance.) Let this distribution be Y , represented by C_Y .
- 480 3. Take $\text{poly}(s)$ copies of Y and concatenate their output. Call this distribution Y' , repre-
 481 sented by $C_{Y'}$.
- 482 4. Hash a sample of Y' with a hash function h' chosen at random from a 2-universal family
 483 of hash functions. Let this distribution be Z , represented by C_Z .

484 Section 2 and Appendix C of [18] give a careful proof of the fact that, with Z defined as
 485 above from the EA instance (C, k) , a NISZK protocol for EA is given by:

- 486 1. With reference string σ , the prover selects a string r uniformly at random from the set
 487 $\{r' : Z(r') = \sigma\}$.
- 488 2. The verifier accepts if $C_Z(r) = \sigma$ and rejects otherwise.

489 They also show that the following simulator satisfies the required zero-knowledge proper-
 490 ties:

- 491 1. Select an input r to Z uniformly at random and let $\sigma = C_Z(r)$.
- 492 2. return (σ, r) .

493 It suffices for us to show that, if (C, k) is an instance of EA_{NC^0} , then the tasks of the
 494 verifier and the simulator in the protocol above can be implemented in logspace.

495 First, we observe that, given (C, k) , a branching program P_Z realizing the distribution
 496 Z can be constructed in logspace. Indeed, it is trivial to construct a branching program
 497 P_X that realizes X (since each output bit of the NC^0 circuit Z has an easy-to-compute
 498 branching program of constant size). Then a branching program $P_{X'}$ realizing X' consists
 499 of several copies of P_X concatenated together (where each copy uses independent random
 500 input bits). The hash functions h considered in [18] are represented by Boolean matrices
 501 M_h , where computing $h(w)$ is simply multiplying M_h by the vector w . Since Boolean matrix
 502 multiplication is easy to compute in $\text{NC}^1 \subseteq \text{L}$, and since the composition of two logspace-
 503 computable functions is also logspace-computable, it is easy to build a branching program P_Y
 504 representing the distribution Y (That is, given a branching program for computing $M_h \cdot w$,
 505 for any node v that queries a bit of w , replace the pair of edges leaving v by a branching
 506 program that computes that bit of w (as a sample from X').) In the same way, branching
 507 programs for Y' and Z are easy to construct, given P_Y .

508 Hence a logspace verifier, with access to r, σ , and an EA_{NC^0} instance (C, k) , can construct
 509 the branching program P_Z and compute $P_Z(r)$ and check if the output is equal to σ . It
 510 is equally easy to see that the simulator can be implemented in logspace. This establishes
 511 membership in NISZK_L . ◀

512 The following corollary is a direct analog to [18, Proposition 1].

513 ▶ **Corollary 22.** *If Π is any promise problem that is \leq_m^L reducible to EA_{NC^0} , then $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}_L$.*

514 We close this section by presenting an example of a well-studied natural problem in
 515 NISZK_L . (A graph is said to be *rigid* if it has no nontrivial automorphism.)

516 ▶ **Corollary 23.** *The Non-Isomorphism Problem for Rigid Graphs lies in NISZK_L*

517 **Proof.** First note that the proof of Theorem 21 carries over to show that a problem that
 518 we may call EA_{BP} (defined just as EA_{NC^0} but where the distribution is represented as a
 519 branching program instead of as an NC^0 circuit) also lies in NISZK_L . Now observe that
 520 the reduction given in Section 3.1 of [7] shows how to take as input two rigid graphs on n
 521 vertices (G_0, G_1) and build a branching program that takes as input a bitstring w of length t
 522 and t permutations π_1, \dots, π_t and output the sequence of t permuted graphs $\pi_i(G_{w_i})$. It is
 523 observed in [7] that this distribution has entropy $t(1 + \log n!)$ if the graphs are non-isomorphic,
 524 and has entropy at most $t \log n!$ otherwise. ◀

525 5.2 Hardness for NISZK_L

526 In order to re-use the tools developed in [18], we will follow the structure of the proof
 527 given there, showing that EA is hard for NISZK . Namely, we introduce the problem SDU
 528 (STATISTICAL DISTANCE FROM UNIFORM) and its NC^0 variant, and prove hardness for
 529 SDU_{NC^0} .

▶ **Definition 24** (SDU and SDU_{NC^0}). *Consider Boolean circuits $C_X : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ representing distributions X . The promise problem*

$$\text{SDU} = (\text{SDU}_{\text{YES}}, \text{SDU}_{\text{NO}})$$

530 *is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} 531 \quad \text{SDU}_{\text{YES}} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C_X : \Delta(X, U_n) < 1/n\} \\ 532 \quad \text{SDU}_{\text{NO}} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C_X : \Delta(X, U_n) > 1 - 1/n\} \end{aligned}$$

533 *where $\Delta(X, Y) = \sum_{\alpha} |\Pr[X = \alpha] - \Pr[Y = \alpha]|/2$.*

534 SDU_{NC^0} *is the analogous problem, where the distributions X are represented by NC^0*
 535 *circuits where no output bit depends on more than four input bits.*

536 It is shown in [18, Lemma 4.1] that C_X is in SDU if and only if $(C_X, n - 3)$ is in EA. This
 537 yields the following corollary:

538 ▶ **Corollary 25.** $\text{SDU}_{\text{NC}^0} \leq_m^{\text{proj}} \text{EA}_{\text{NC}^0}$.

539 **Proof.** This is trivial if we assume an encoding of SDU_{NC^0} instances, such that the NC^0
 540 circuits $C_X : \{0, 1\}^m \mapsto \{0, 1\}^n$ are encoded by strings of length given by the standard
 541 pairing function $\frac{m^2 + 3m + 2mn + n + n^2}{2}$, so that the length of an instance of SDU_{NC^0} completely
 542 determines n . (An NC^0 circuit with m inputs and n outputs has a description of size
 543 $O(n \log m)$, and thus it is easy to devise a padded encoding of this much larger length.)

544 Thus, in the projection circuit computing the reduction $C_X \mapsto (C_X, n - 3)$, the output bits
 545 encoding $n - 3$ are hardwired to constants, and the input bits encoding C_X are copied directly
 546 to the output. ◀

547 ▶ **Theorem 26.** *Promise- EA_{NC^0} and Promise- SDU_{NC^0} are hard for NISZK_{L} under \leq_m^{proj}*
 548 *reductions.*

549 **Proof.** By Corollary 25, it suffices to show hardness for SDU_{NC^0} . In order to establish
 550 hardness, we need to develop the machinery of *perfect randomized encodings*, which were
 551 developed by Applebaum et al. [12] and then were applied in the setting of SZK_{L} by Dvir et
 552 al. [15].

553 5.2.1 Perfect Randomized Encodings

554 ▶ **Definition 27.** *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be a function. We say that $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow$
 555 $\{0, 1\}^s$ is a perfect randomized encoding of f with blowup b if it is:*

- 556 ■ **Input independent:** *for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f(x) = f(x')$, the random*
 557 *variables $\hat{f}(x, U_m)$ and $\hat{f}(x', U_m)$ are identically distributed.*
- 558 ■ **Output Disjoint:** *for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f(x) \neq f(x')$, $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x, U_m)) \cap$
 559 $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x', U_m)) = \emptyset$.*
- 560 ■ **Uniform:** *for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ the random variable $\hat{f}(x, U_m)$ is uniform over $\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x, U_m))$.*
- 561 ■ **Balanced:** *for every $x, x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ $|\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x, U_m))| = |\text{Supp}(\hat{f}(x', U_m))| = b$*

562 The following property of perfect randomized encodings is established in [15].

563 ▶ **Lemma 28 (entropy).** *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be a function and let $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times$
 564 $\{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^s$ be a perfect randomized encoding of f with blowup b . Then $H(\hat{f}(U_n, U_m)) =$
 565 $H(f(U_n)) + \log b$*

566 The following two properties are given in Applebaum et al. [12].

567 ▶ **Lemma 29 (concatenation).** *For $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ let $f_i : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the Boolean function*
 568 *computing the i -th bit of $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. If $\hat{f}_i : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^{m_i} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{s_i}$ is a perfect*
 569 *randomized encoding of f_i , then the function $\hat{f} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^{m_1 + \dots + m_\ell} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{s_1 + \dots + s_\ell}$*
 570 *defined by $\hat{f}(x, (r_1, \dots, r_\ell)) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\hat{f}_1(x, r_1), \dots, \hat{f}_\ell(x, r_\ell))$ is a perfect randomized encoding of*
 571 *f .*

572 ▶ **Lemma 30 (composition).** *Let $g(x, r_g)$ be a perfect randomized encoding of $f(x)$ and*
 573 *let $h((x, r_g), r_h)$ be a perfect randomized encoding of $g(x, r_g)$ (viewed as a single argument*
 574 *function). Then, the function $\hat{f}(x, (r_g, r_h)) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} h((x, r_g), r_h)$ is a perfect randomized encoding*
 575 *of f .*

576 5.2.2 Constructing an NC^0 perfect randomized encoding

577 The first step in showing completeness of EA_{NC^0} is to use the following construction of perfect
 578 randomized encodings of functions computed by branching programs, from [12].

579 ▶ **Definition 31.** *Let Q be a branching program of size ℓ computing a Boolean function*
 580 *$f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Fix some topological ordering of the vertices of Q where the source*
 581 *vertex is labelled 1 and the terminal vertex is labelled ℓ . Let $A(x)$ be the $\ell \times \ell$ adjacency*
 582 *matrix of G_x where entry (i, j) is a degree-1 polynomial $q_{i,j} \in \{x_k, (1 - x_k), 1, 0\}$, such that*
 583 *the transition from node i to node j queries variable x_k and proceeds if $q_{i,j}(x_k) = 1$. Define*
 584 *$L(x)$ as the submatrix of $A(x) - I$ obtained by deleting the first column and last row.*

$$\begin{pmatrix} * & * & * & * & * \\ -1 & * & * & * & * \\ 0 & -1 & * & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & * \end{pmatrix}$$

Let $r^{(1)}$, and $r^{(2)}$ be vectors over $GF(2)$ of length $\binom{\ell-1}{2}$ and $\ell-2$ respectively. Let $R_1(r^{(1)})$ be an $\ell \times \ell$ matrix with 1's on the main diagonal, 0's below it and the elements of $r^{(1)}$ in the remaining $\binom{\ell-1}{2}$ entries above the main diagonal. Let $R_2(r^{(2)})$ be an $\ell \times \ell$ matrix with 1's on the main diagonal, 0's below it, and the elements of $r^{(2)}$ in the last column.

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & r_1^{(1)} & r_2^{(1)} & \cdot & r_{\ell-1}^{(1)} \\ 0 & 1 & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & r_{\binom{\ell-1}{2}}^{(1)} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & r_1^{(2)} \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & r_{\ell-2}^{(2)} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

The following lemma appears as [12, Lemma 4.15].

► **Lemma 32.** Let Q be a branching program of size ℓ computing a Boolean function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Let the function $\hat{f}(x, (r^{(1)}, r^{(2)}))$ produce as output the $\binom{\ell}{2}$ entries on or above the main diagonal of the matrix

$$R_1(r^{(1)})L(x)R_2(r^{(2)}).$$

Then \hat{f} is a perfect randomized encoding of f .

► **Lemma 33.** There is a function computable in AC^0 (in fact, it can be a projection) that takes as input a branching program Q of size ℓ computing a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, and produces as output a list $(q_1, \dots, q_{\binom{\ell}{2}})$ of degree-three polynomials over $GF(2)$, where $q_i(x, (r^{(1)}, r^{(2)}))$ produces the i -th output bit of $\hat{f}(x, (r^{(1)}, r^{(2)}))$. The blowup of the encoding \hat{f} is $2^{\binom{\ell}{2}-1}$.

Proof. The claim regarding blowup follows from inspection of \hat{f} in Definition 31. Constructing the three matrices $L(x)$, R_1 and R_2 can clearly be done in AC^0 , given any reasonable encoding of the branching program Q . Their product cannot be computed in AC^0 (since this involves computing PARITY), but it is easy to compute an *encoding* of the expression for entry (i, m) of the product, which is given by the degree-three polynomial $\sum_{j,k} R_{1(i,k)} L_{(k,j)} R_{2(j,m)}$. To see that this can be a projection, note that the entries of the matrices R_1 and R_2 are entirely determined by the *size* ℓ (and thus they depend only on the length of the encoding of the branching program). The entries of $L(x)$ are essentially the entries of the adjacency matrix encoding the branching program Q , and thus they can be copied directly via a projection. Then, given the encodings of the matrices, the encodings of the terms of each polynomial q_i are simply copied from the encodings of the matrices, and thus this can be done via a projection also. ◀

Note that each polynomial q_i in the statement of the preceding lemma is most conveniently expressed as a sum of terms. We now show how to replace each q_i with NC^0 circuitry, using the following lemma from [12, Lemma 4.17].

613 ► **Lemma 34.** Let $f(x) = T_1(x) + \dots + T_k(x)$ where $f, T_1, \dots, T_k : GF(2)^n \rightarrow GF(2)$, and
 614 summation is over $GF(2)$, and each term T_i has degree at most 3. Let the local encoding $\hat{f} :$
 615 $GF(2)^{n+(2k-1)} \rightarrow GF(2)^{2k}$ be such that $\hat{f}(x, (r_1, \dots, r_k, r'_1, \dots, r'_{k-1}))$ is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} & (T_1(x) - r_1, T_2(x) - r_2, \dots, T_k(x) - r_k, \\ & r_1 - r'_1, r'_1 + r_2 - r'_2, \dots, r'_{k-2} + r_{k-1} - r'_{k-1}, r'_{k-1} + r_k) \end{aligned}$$

617 Then \hat{f} is a perfect randomized encoding of f where each bit of the output depends on at most
 618 4 bits of $(x, (r_1, \dots, r_k, r'_1, \dots, r'_{k-1}))$.

619 ► **Lemma 35.** There is a function computable in AC^0 (in fact, it can be a projection) that
 620 takes as input a branching program Q of size ℓ computing a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$,
 621 and produces as output a list p_i of NC^0 circuits, where p_i computes the i -th bit of a function
 622 \hat{f} that is a perfect randomized encoding of f that has blowup $2^{\binom{\ell}{2}-1(2(\ell-1)^2-1)}$. Each p_i
 623 depends on at most four input bits from (x, r) (where r is the sequence of random bits in the
 624 randomized encoding).

625 **Proof.** This follows immediately by applying the construction of Lemma 34 to the degree-
 626 three polynomials for each entry in the product matrix given by AC^0 -computable function
 627 given by Lemma 33. Each of those polynomials has $(\ell - 1)^2$ terms, and it is apparent from
 628 Lemma 34 that each such entry gives rise to $2(\ell - 1)^2 - 1$ new random bits in the randomized
 629 encoding. The assertion regarding blowup now follows from inspection of the construction.
 630 The assertions regarding the bits upon which each p_i depends follows from inspection. The
 631 construction of Lemma 34 can clearly be accomplished via a projection, and composing that
 632 projection with the projection from Lemma 33 again yields a projection. ◀

633 5.2.3 SDU_{NC^0} is Complete for $NISZK_L$

634 We now have all of the tools required to complete the proof of Theorem 26.

635 Let Π be an arbitrary promise problem in $NISZK_L$ with proof system (P, V) and simulator
 636 S and let x be an instance of Π . Recall that the job of the simulator S is to take a string x
 637 and some uniformly-generated random bits as input, and produce as output a transcript of
 638 the form (σ, p) , such that the probability that any transcript (σ, p) is output by S is very close
 639 to the probability that, on input x with shared randomness σ , the prover P sends message
 640 p to the verifier V . Let $M_x(s)$ denote a routine that simulates $S(x)$ with randomness s to
 641 obtain a transcript (σ, p) ; if $V(x, \sigma, p)$ accepts, then $M_x(s)$ outputs σ , otherwise it outputs
 642 $0^{|\sigma|}$. (We can assume without loss of generality that $|\sigma| = |x|^k$, for some k .) It is shown
 643 in [18, Lemma 4.2] that the map $x \mapsto M_x$ is a reduction of Π to SDU :

644 \triangleright **Claim 36.** If $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/|x|^k$, and $x \in \Pi_{NO}$ implies $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) >$
 645 $1 - 1/|x|^k$.

646 The proof of the preceding claim in [18, Lemma 4.2] actually shows a stronger result. It
 647 shows that, if the statistical difference between the output distribution of the simulator and
 648 the distribution of true transcripts is at most $1/e(n)$, then the statistical difference of M_x
 649 and the uniform distribution is at most $1/e(n) + 2^{-n}$ on inputs of length n . Thus, using
 650 Definition 1 (which is equivalent to the definition of $NISZK$ given in [18]), the simulator
 651 produces a distribution that differs from the uniform distribution by only $1/n^{\omega(1)}$. Thus we
 652 have the following claim:

653 \triangleright **Claim 37.** Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. Then for all large x , if $x \in \Pi_{YES}$, then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/|x|^{kc}$,
 654 and $x \in \Pi_{NO}$ implies $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) > 1 - 1/|x|^{kc}$.

655 Furthermore, it is also shown in [18, Lemma 3.1] that EA has a NISZK protocol in which
 656 the completeness error, soundness error, and simulator deviation are all at most 2^{-m} on
 657 inputs of length m . Furthermore, that proof carries over to show that $\text{EA}_{\text{BP}} \in \text{NISZK}_{\text{L}}$ with
 658 these same parameters. Thus we obtain the following fact, which we will use later in Section 7.
 659

660 \triangleright **Claim 38.** Let $c \in \mathbb{N}$. Then for all large x , if x is a Yes-instance of EA_{BP} , then
 661 $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) < 1/2^{|x|^{-1}}$, and if x is a No-instance of EA_{BP} , then $\Delta(M_x, U_{|x|^k}) > 1 - 1/2^{|x|^{-1}}$.

662 Since S runs in logspace, each bit of $M_x(s)$ can be simulated with a branching program
 663 Q_x . Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that there is an AC^0 -computable function that
 664 takes x as input and produces an encoding of Q_x as output, and it can even be seen that
 665 this function can be a *projection*. (To see this, note that in the standard construction of a
 666 Turing machine from a logspace-bounded Turing machine S (with input (x, s)) each node
 667 of the branching program has a name that encodes a configuration of the machine, a time
 668 step, and the position of the input head. This branching program can be constructed in AC^0 ,
 669 given only the *length* of x . In order to construct Q_x , it suffices merely to hardwire in the
 670 transitions from any node that is “scanning” some bit position x_i . That is, if the transition
 671 out of node v goes to node v_0 if $x_i = 0$ and to node v_1 if $x_i = 1$, then in the adjacency matrix
 672 for Q_x , entry $(v, v_1) = x_i$ and entry (v, v_0) is $\neg x_i$. This is clearly a projection.)

673 Now apply the projection of Lemma 35 to (each output bit of) the branching program
 674 Q_x of size ℓ , to obtain an NC^0 circuit C_x computing a perfect randomized encoding with
 675 blowup $b = 2^{|x|^k \left(\binom{\ell}{2} - 1 \right) (2^{\ell-1})^2 - 1}$. (C_x has $\log b + |x|^k$ output bits.)

676 Now consider $|H(C_x) - H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})|$. By Lemma 28 this is equal to $|H(Q_x) + \log b -$
 677 $H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})|$. Since $H(Q_x) = H(M_x)$ and $H(U_{\log b + |x|^k}) = \log b + H(U_{|x|^k})$, we have that
 678 $|H(C_x) - H(U_{\log b + |x|^k})| = |H(M_x) - H(U_{|x|^k})|$. The proof of Theorem 26 is now complete,
 679 by appeal to Claim 37. \blacktriangleleft

680 **6 Hardness of MKTP under Projections**

681 \blacktriangleright **Theorem 39.** MKTP is hard for $\text{co-NISZK}_{\text{L}}$ under nonuniform $\leq_{\text{m}}^{\text{AC}^0}$ reductions.

682 **Proof.** We build on the proof of Theorem 17, and present a reduction from the NISZK_{L} -
 683 complete problem EA_{NC^0} . Let $x = (C_x, k)$ be an arbitrary instance of Promise- EA_{NC^0} , where
 684 $C_x : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is an NC^0 circuit that represents distribution X . Let $|x| < w < \sqrt[4]{t}$,
 685 and let α_0, c_0 , and c_2 be the constants from Lemma 15. Let $\lambda = wmt^{1-\alpha_0/2}$ and construct y
 686 as t samples from X . Let $\theta = tk + \lambda + t^{1-\alpha_0}|x|^{c_0+c_2}$.

687 As in the proof of Theorem 17, we have that, with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{22^{|x|}}$, if (X, k)
 688 is a Yes-instance of EA_{NC^0} , then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{\text{NO}}$ and if (X, k) is a No-instance of EA_{NC^0} ,
 689 then $(y, \theta) \in \text{MKTP}_{\text{YES}}$.

690 Thus we have shown that there is a uniform AC^0 -computable function f , such that, if
 691 $x \in \text{EA}_{\text{YES}}$, then with high probability (for random r) $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{NO} , and
 692 if $x \in \text{EA}_{\text{NO}}$, then with high probability $f(x, r) = (y, \theta)$ is in MKTP_{YES} . (Namely, the AC^0
 693 function takes $x = (C_x, k)$ and r as input, computes θ from k and $|x|$, and computes y by
 694 feeding t segments of r into the NC^0 circuit C_x .)

695 As in the proof of Theorem 17, we can fix a sequence of random bits to hardwire in to
 696 this reduction and obtain a (nonuniform) $\leq_{\text{m}}^{\text{AC}^0}$ reduction from EA_{NC^0} to $\overline{\text{MKTP}}$. \blacktriangleleft

697 An immediate corollary (making use of the “Gap Theorem” of [1]) is that MKTP is hard
 698 for $\text{co-NISZK}_{\text{L}}$ under $\leq_{\text{m}}^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. Below, we improve this, showing hardness under
 699 projections.

700 ► **Corollary 40.** MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L under nonuniform $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions.

701 **Proof.** Corollary 22, combined with the NISZK_L -completeness of EA_{NC^0} , implies that co-NISZK_L
 702 is closed under \leq_m^L reductions. It is shown in the “Gap Theorem” of [1] that, for any class \mathcal{C}
 703 closed under \leq_m^L reductions, any set that is hard for \mathcal{C} under $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reductions is also hard
 704 under $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. Thus from Theorem 39, we have that MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L
 705 under $\leq_m^{\text{NC}^0}$ reductions. ◀

706 ► **Corollary 41.** MKTP is hard for co-NISZK_L under nonuniform \leq_m^{proj} reductions.

707 **Proof.** We now need to claim that the AC^0 -computable reduction of Theorem 39 can be
 708 replaced by a projection. Note that, since SDU_{NC^0} is complete for NISZK_L under projections,
 709 and since the reduction from SDU_{NC^0} to EA_{NC^0} given in Corollary 25 always uses the same
 710 entropy bound $n - 3$, we have that it suffices to consider EA_{NC^0} instances $x = (C_x, k)$ where
 711 the bound k depends only on the *length* of x . Thus the bound θ produced by our AC^0
 712 reduction also depends only on the length of x , and hence can be hardwired in.

713 We now need only consider the string y . The $\leq_m^{\text{AC}^0}$ reduction presented in the proof of
 714 Theorem 39 takes as input C_x and r and produces the bits of y by feeding bits of r into C_x .
 715 Let us recall where the NC^0 circuitry producing the i -th bit of y comes from.

716 Lemma 33 shows how to take an arbitrary branching program and encode the problem
 717 of whether the program accepts as a question about the entropy of a distribution repre-
 718 sented as a matrix of degree-three polynomials. Each term in this matrix is of the form
 719 $\sum_{j,k} R_1(i,k)L(k,j)R_2(j,m)$, where the matrices R_1 and R_2 are the same for all inputs of the
 720 same length. Thus we need only concern ourselves with the matrix L .

721 In Section 5.2.3, it is observed that, given an instance x of a promise problem in NISZK_L ,
 722 the branching program Q_x that is used, in order to build the matrix L , can be constructed
 723 from x by means of a projection. The “input” to this branching program Q_x is a sequence
 724 of random bits (part of the random sequence r that is hardwired in, in order to create the
 725 nonuniform AC^0 reduction in the proof of Theorem 39). Thus, the only entries of the matrix
 726 L that depend on x are entries of the form (u, v) where u and v are configurations of a
 727 logspace machine, where the machine is scanning x_i in configuration u , and it is possible
 728 to move to configuration v . Lemma 35 then shows how to construct NC^0 circuitry for each
 729 term in the degree-three polynomial constructed from Q_x in the proof of Lemma 33. The
 730 important thing to notice here is that each output bit in the NC^0 circuit depends on at most
 731 one term of one of the degree-three polynomials, and hence it depends on at most one entry
 732 of the matrix L – which means that it depends on at most one bit of the string x .

733 Thus, consider any bit y_i of the string y produced by the nonuniform AC^0 reduction from
 734 Theorem 39. Either y_i does not depend on any bit of x , or it depends on exactly one bit x_j of
 735 x . In the latter case, either $y_i = x_j$ or $y_i = \neg x_j$. This defines the projection, as required. ◀

736 The following corollary was pointed out to us by Rahul Santhanam.

737 ► **Corollary 42.** MKTP does not have $\text{THRESHOLD} \circ \text{MAJORITY}$ circuits of size $2^{n^{o(1)}}$.

738 **Proof.** This is immediate from the lower bound on the Inner Product mod 2 function that
 739 is presented in [16]. (See also [11] for a slightly stronger lower bound.) ◀

740 It should be noted that it remains unknown whether MCSP has $\text{THRESHOLD} \circ \text{MAJORITY}$
 741 circuits of *polynomial size*.

742 **7 An Application: Average-Case Complexity**

743 The efficient reductions that we have presented have some immediate applications regarding
744 worst-case to average-case reductions. First, we recall the definition of errorless heuristics:

745 ► **Definition 43.** *Let A be any language. An errorless heuristic for A is an algorithm (or
746 oracle) H such that, for every x , $H(x) \in \{\text{YES}, \text{NO}, ?\}$, and*

747 ■ $H(x) = \text{YES}$ implies $x \in A$.

748 ■ $H(x) = \text{NO}$ implies $x \notin A$.

749 ► **Definition 44.** *A language A has no average-case errorless heuristics in \mathcal{C} if, for every
750 polynomial p , and every errorless heuristic $H \in \mathcal{C}$ for A , there exist infinitely many n such
751 where $\Pr_{x \in U_n}[H(x) = ?] > 1 - 1/p(n)$.*

752 In order to state our first theorem relating to average-case complexity, we need the
753 following circuit-based definition:

754 ► **Definition 45.** *Let \mathcal{C} be any complexity class. (Usually, we will think of \mathcal{C} being a class
755 defined in terms of circuits, and the definition is thus phrased in terms of circuits, although it
756 can be adapted for other complexity classes as well.) The class $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$ is the class of problems
757 that can be solved by a family of circuits whose output gate is an unbounded fan-in OR gate,
758 connected to the outputs of circuits in the class \mathcal{C} .*

759 If problems in NISZK_L are hard in the worst case, then there are problems in NP that are
760 hard on average:

761 ► **Theorem 46.** *Let \mathcal{C} be any complexity class that is closed under \leq_m^{proj} reductions. If
762 $\text{NISZK}_L \not\subseteq \text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$, then there is a set A in NP that has no average-case errorless heuristics
763 in \mathcal{C} .*

764 **Proof.** Consider the reduction from $\overline{\text{EA}}_{\text{NC}^0}$ to MKTP given in the proof of Corollary 41. This
765 reduction takes as input a pair $(C, n - 3)$ where C is an NC^0 circuit that produces output
766 of length n . The reduction produces as output a string of length tn where $t = t(n)$ is a
767 polynomial in n . The proof of Corollary 41 shows that, if $(C, n - 3)$ is a No-instance (a
768 low-entropy instance) of EA_{NC^0} , then concatenating t samples from $C(r)$ (for independent
769 uniformly random samples r) produces output that, with probability exponentially-close to
770 1, has KT-complexity less than $\theta < (n - 2)t(n)$ for all large n . Let f be a function computed
771 as follows: On input d of length m' , compute the smallest n such that $m' < (n - 2)t(n)$,
772 and then simulate the universal Turing machine U on d for $t(n)^2$ steps, and produce as
773 output the first $nt(n)$ bits of output that $U(d)$ produces in this amount of time. Let
774 $A = \{y : \exists d f(d) = y\}$ be the range of f . Note that A contains all strings y of length $nt(n)$
775 such that $\text{KT}(y) \leq (n - 2)t(n)$. Clearly, $A \in \text{NP}$. We will show that if A has an average-case
776 errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} , then $\text{NISZK}_L \in \text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$.²

777 If A has an average-case errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} , then there is a family $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$ of
778 \mathcal{C} circuits (or other algorithms, if \mathcal{C} is not a circuit family) with the property that, for all
779 large n , for all strings x of length n , $C_n(x) \in \{\text{YES}, \text{NO}, ?\}$, where

780 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{YES}$ implies $x \in A$.

² In fact, A can be taken to be any set in NP that contains all strings of KT complexity below a certain threshold, while still containing only a small fraction of the strings of any length n .

- 781 ■ $C_n(x) = \text{NO}$ implies $x \notin A$.
- 782 ■ $\Pr_x[C_n(x) = ?] < 1 - \frac{1}{p_1(n)}$

783 for some polynomial p_1 .

784 Since there are three possible outputs, there must be two output bits, which we can call a
 785 and b . The encoding of YES, NO and ? below is chosen in order to simplify the statement of
 786 our results. If a different encoding is chosen, then the form of the circuits for NISZK_L might
 787 be slightly different.

a	b	
1	0	YES
0	1	NO
0	0	?
1	1	Illegal

789 Now consider the family $\{C'_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$, where C'_m is just like C_m but has only output
 790 bit b .

791 For any $m = nt(n)$,

$$\begin{aligned}
 792 \Pr_x[C'_m(x) = 1] &= 1 - \Pr[C_m(x) = \text{YES}] - \Pr[C_m(x) = ?] \\
 793 &\geq 1 - \frac{|A \cap \{0, 1\}^m|}{2^m} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1(m)}\right) \\
 794 &\geq 1 - \frac{2^{(n-2)t(n)}}{2^{nt(n)}} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_1(m)}\right) \\
 795 &= \frac{1}{p_1(nt(n))} - \frac{1}{2^{2t(n)}} \\
 796 &> \frac{1}{p_2(n)}
 \end{aligned}$$

797
798

799 for some polynomial p_2 .

800 We now present efficient circuits for promise problems in NISZK_L .

801 Since the NISZK_L -complete problem EA_{NC^0} is a special case of EA_{BP} , we know that EA_{BP}
 802 is also complete for NISZK_L (say, under \leq_m^L reductions). Thus it follows from Claim 38
 803 that, for any problem $\Pi \in \text{NISZK}_L$, and for any instance $x \in \prod_{\text{YES}}$, the distribution M_x
 804 introduced in Section 5.2.3 can actually be assumed to have statistical difference at most
 805 $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$ from the uniform distribution, for some $\epsilon > 0$. This in turn implies that the NC^0
 806 circuit C_x (which is constructed in the paragraphs right after Claim 38) also has statistical
 807 difference at most $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$ from the uniform distribution (again, if $x \in \prod_{\text{YES}}$). We highlight
 808 this fact, so that we can refer to it more easily later:

809 \triangleright Claim 47. If $x \in \prod_{\text{YES}}$, then the NC^0 circuit C_x has statistical difference at most $1/2^{|x|^\epsilon}$
 810 from the uniform distribution.

811 Now consider the circuit family $\{D_{n_0} : n_0 \in \mathbb{N}\}$ that has the following form: The input is
 812 a string x of length n_0 . Recall that the NC^0 circuit C_x from Section 5.2.3 takes “random”
 813 inputs r of length polynomial in $|x|$ and produces output of length n which is also polynomial
 814 in $|x|$. Let $\{E_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ be a circuit family that takes (x, r) as input and computes $C_x(r)$.
 815 (The family E_n can in fact be chosen to be very efficient, but we do not need that; it will
 816 turn out later that E_n can be replaced by a single wire connected to a possibly-negated bit
 817 of x , or by a constant.) The “bottom layer” of D_{n_0} consists of $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)$ copies of E_n ,

818 using $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)$ independent random strings $r_1, \dots, r_{n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n)}$, and producing a string
 819 of length $n_0^2 p_2^2(n) t(n) n$, which is then fed into $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ copies of $C'_{t(n)n}$. Finally, the output
 820 gate of each of the copies of $C'_{t(n)n}$ is fed into an OR gate, which is the output gate of D_{n_0} .

821 If $x \in \prod_{NO}$ then, as in the proof of Theorem 39, with probability (over the random
 822 inputs) exponentially close to 1, the string feeding into the inputs of each of the copies of C'
 823 has low KT complexity, and consequently (by the definition of C') each C' outputs 0, and
 824 thus D_{n_0} outputs 0.

825 If $x \in \prod_{YES}$ then, by Claim 47, the distribution represented by each copy of E_n (using
 826 random inputs r) has statistical difference from the uniform distribution bounded by 2^{-n^ϵ} .
 827 The strings that are fed into each copy of $C'_{nt(n)}$ are generated by $t(n)$ independent copies of
 828 E_n . By [34, Lemma 3.4], we can conclude that the distribution that is fed into each copy of
 829 $C'_{nt(n)}$ has statistical distance from the uniform distribution bounded by $\frac{t(n)}{2^{n^\epsilon}}$. We showed
 830 above that the probability that $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts a uniformly-random string of length $nt(n)$ is
 831 greater than $\frac{1}{p_2(n)}$. It follows that the probability that $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts the string produced
 832 by $t(n)$ independent copies of E_n is no less than $\frac{1}{p_2(n)} - \frac{t(n)}{2^{n^\epsilon}} > \frac{1}{np_2(n)}$. Thus the probability
 833 that *none* of the $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ independent copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$ accepts is at most $2^{-n_0^2}$.

834 A simple counting argument now shows that there is a sequence of probabilistic bits r
 835 that can be hardwired in to D_{n_0} so that, for all x of length n_0 , $D_{n_0}(x, r) = 1$ if $x \in \prod_{YES}$
 836 and $D_{n_0}(x, r) = 0$ if $x \in \prod_{NO}$. It still remains to simplify D_{n_0} so that it lies in $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$.

837 As in the proof of Corollary 41, each bit that feeds into any of the copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$ depends
 838 on *at most one* bit of x ; many of the bits may be set to constants after hardwiring in the
 839 choice of r . Thus we build the circuit family F_{n_0} that takes x as input, and projects the bits
 840 of x into the $n_0^2 p_2^2(n)$ copies of $C'_{nt(n)}$, to obtain a $\text{OR} \circ \mathcal{C}$ circuit family for \prod . ◀

841 The following definition is implicit in the work of Bogdanov and Trevisan [14].

842 ▶ **Definition 48.** A worst-case to errorless average-case reduction from a promise problem \prod
 843 to a language A is given by a polynomial p and BPP machine M , such that A is accepted by
 844 M^H for every oracle errorless heuristic H for A such that $\Pr_{x \in U_n}[H(x) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(n)$.

845 ▶ **Corollary 49.** There is a problem $A \in \text{NP}$ such that there is a non-adaptive worst-case to
 846 errorless average-case reduction from every problem in SZK to A .

847 **Proof.** We mimic the proof of Theorem 46, and use the same set A . Consider the BPP
 848 reduction from the NISZK complete problem EA to MKTP given in Corollary 18. This
 849 reduction takes as input a pair (C, k) (where C is a circuit that produces output of length
 850 n) and makes a single query along each path, where the query is a string y of length tn
 851 where $t = t(n)$ is a polynomial in n . (Since SDU is complete for NISZK, we can assume
 852 that $k = n - 3$, as in the proof of Theorem 46.) Rather than using MKTP as an oracle,
 853 instead we will use an errorless heuristic H for A where the $\Pr_z[H(z) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(|z|)$,
 854 interpreting any answer where $H(y) = \text{“No”}$ as meaning “ $\text{KT}(y) > \theta$ ” and any answer where
 855 $H(y) \in \{?, \text{YES}\}$ as meaning “ $\text{KT}(y) < \theta$ ”. (We will actually replace each query to MKTP by
 856 a polynomial number of independent queries to the heuristic H , and if *any* of these queries
 857 returns $H(y) = \text{“No”}$, we will conclude that $(C, k) \in \text{EA}_{YES}$, and otherwise conclude that
 858 $(C, k) \in \text{EA}_{NO}$.)

859 As in the proof Theorem 46, if the distribution represented by C has low entropy, then
 860 with probability exponentially close to 1, the query y will have low KT complexity, and
 861 thus $H(y)$ will return a value in $\{?, \text{YES}\}$ (and this probability will remain small even if a
 862 polynomial number of independent trials are made). And if C has high entropy, then (as in
 863 the proof of Theorem 46) we can assume that the distribution given by C is exponentially

864 close to the uniform distribution, and thus the distribution on the queries y will have small
 865 statistical difference from the uniform distribution, and hence, with exponentially high
 866 probability, at least one of the queries will return the value NO. Thus every problem in
 867 NISZK has an errorless non-adaptive worst-case to average-case reduction to A .

868 The proof is completed by recalling from [18] that SZK is non-adaptively (deterministically)
 869 polynomial-time reducible to NISZK. ◀

870 **Remark:** It is implicitly shown by Hirahara [20] that Corollary 49 holds under *adaptive*
 871 reductions. The significance of the improvement from adaptive and non-adaptive reductions
 872 lies in the fact that Bogdanov and Trevisan showed that the problems in NP for which there
 873 is a non-adaptive worst-case to errorless average-case reduction to a problem in NP lie in
 874 $\text{NP/poly} \cap \text{coNP/poly}$ [14, Remark (iii) in Section 4]. Thus SZK may be close to the largest
 875 class of problems for which non-adaptive worst-case to errorless average-case reductions to
 876 problems in NP exist.

877 The worst-case to average-case reductions of Definition 48, must work for *every* errorless
 878 heuristic that has a sufficiently small probability of producing “?” as output. If we consider
 879 a less-restrictive notion (allowing a different reduction for different errorless heuristics) then
 880 in some cases we can lower the complexity of the reduction from BPP to AC^0 .

881 ▶ **Definition 50.** Let \mathcal{D} be a complexity class, and let \mathcal{R} be a class of reducibilities. We say that
 882 errorless heuristics for language A are average-case hard for \mathcal{D} under \mathcal{R} reductions if, for every
 883 polynomial p and every errorless heuristic H for A where $\Pr_{x \in U_{|x|}}[H(x) = ?] < 1 - 1/p(|x|)$,
 884 and for every language $B \in \mathcal{D}$, there is a reduction $r \in \mathcal{R}$ reducing B to H .

885 ▶ **Corollary 51.** There is a language $A \in \text{NP}$, such that errorless heuristics for A are
 886 average-case hard for SZK_L under non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reductions.

887 **Proof.** The proof of Theorem 46 introduces a language $A \in \text{NP}$ that is defined in terms of
 888 the parameters of the reduction from the NISZK_L -complete promise problem EA_{NCo} . We show
 889 that errorless heuristics for this same A are average-case hard for SZK_L under non-adaptive
 890 AC^0 -Turing reductions. By Proposition 3 and Theorem 26, every problem in SZK_L is non-
 891 adaptively AC^0 -Turing-reducible to EA_{NCo} ; let this AC^0 -Turing reduction be computed by the
 892 family $\{D_n : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$. In the proof of Theorem 46, if we take the circuit family $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$
 893 to consist of oracle gates for an errorless heuristic H for A , we obtain that every query that
 894 D_n makes to EA_{NCo} can be replaced by an OR of queries consisting of oracle gates from
 895 $\{C_m : m \in \mathbb{N}\}$. This yields the desired non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reduction to the errorless
 896 heuristic for A . ◀

897 ▶ **Corollary 52.** Let \mathcal{C} be any class that is closed under non-adaptive AC^0 -Turing reductions.
 898 If $\text{SZK}_L \not\subseteq \mathcal{C}$, then there is a problem in NP that has no average-case errorless heuristic in \mathcal{C} .

899 **Proof.** If $\text{SZK}_L \not\subseteq \mathcal{C}$, then by Proposition 3, NISZK_L is also not contained in \mathcal{C} . The result is
 900 now immediate from Theorem 46. ◀

901 **Remark:** Building on earlier work of Goldwasser et al. [19], average-case hardness results
 902 for some subclasses of P based on reductions computable by constant-depth threshold circuits
 903 were presented in [2]. We are not aware of any prior work that provides *strong* average-case
 904 hardness results based on reductions computable in AC^0 .³

³ By “strong” average-case hardness, we mean that we rule out algorithms that have error probability as large as $1 - \frac{1}{n^{\sigma(1)}}$. Although certain aspects of the reductions presented in [2, 19] are computable in AC^0 ,

905 **8 Conclusion and Open Problems**

906 By focusing on non-uniform versions of \leq_m^P reductions, we have shed additional light on
 907 how MKTP relates to subclasses of SZK. Some researchers are of the opinion that MCSP
 908 (and MKTP) are likely complete for NP under some type of reducibility, and some recent
 909 progress seems to support this [25]. For those who share this opinion, a plausible first step
 910 would be to show that MKTP is hard not only for co-NISZK, but also for NISZK, under
 911 $\leq_m^{P/\text{poly}}$ reductions. (Work by Lovett and Zhang points out obstacles to providing such a
 912 reduction via “black box” techniques [29].) And of course, it will be very interesting to see if
 913 our hardness results for MKTP hold also for MCSP.

914 **Acknowledgments**

915 A preliminary version of this work appeared as [6]. EA was supported in part by NSF
 916 Grants CCF-1909216 and CCF-1909683. JG and CR were supported in part by the DIMACS
 917 2020 REU program under NSF grants CCF-1852215 and CCF-1836666. We thank Rahul
 918 Santhanam, Oded Goldreich, Salil Vadhan, Harsha Tirumala, Dieter van Melkebeek and
 919 Andrew Morgan for helpful discussions. We also thank the anonymous reviewers who provided
 920 helpful comments.

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in order to obtain strong average-case hardness MAJORITY gates are required in those constructions [36]. The AC^0 -computable Approximate MAJORITY function is adequate for *weak* average-case hardness, ruling out algorithms with very low error probability.

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