All reports by Author Guy Rothblum:

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TR23-161
| 1st November 2023
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Tal Herman, Guy Rothblum#### Doubly-Efficient Interactive Proofs for Distribution Properties

Revisions: 1

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TR23-081
| 1st June 2023
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Noga Amit, Guy Rothblum#### Constant-Round Arguments from One-Way Functions

Revisions: 1

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TR22-124
| 9th September 2022
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Oded Goldreich, Guy Rothblum, Tal Skverer#### On Interactive Proofs of Proximity with Proof-Oblivious Queries

Revisions: 4

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TR22-052
| 18th April 2022
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Tal Herman, Guy Rothblum#### Verifying The Unseen: Interactive Proofs for Label-Invariant Distribution Properties

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TR21-146
| 19th October 2021
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Guy Goldberg, Guy Rothblum#### Sample-Based Proofs of Proximity

Revisions: 1

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TR20-176
| 26th November 2020
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Cynthia Dwork, Michael Kim, Omer Reingold, Guy Rothblum, Gal Yona#### Outcome Indistinguishability

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TR20-157
| 21st October 2020
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Guy Rothblum, Ron Rothblum#### Batch Verification and Proofs of Proximity with Polylog Overhead

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TR20-147
| 24th September 2020
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Inbar Kaslasi, Prashant Nalini Vasudevan, Guy Rothblum, Ron Rothblum, Adam Sealfon#### Batch Verification for Statistical Zero Knowledge Proofs

Revisions: 1

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TR20-058
| 24th April 2020
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Shafi Goldwasser, Guy Rothblum, Jonathan Shafer, Amir Yehudayoff#### Interactive Proofs for Verifying Machine Learning

Revisions: 1

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TR19-176
| 4th December 2019
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Gal Arnon, Guy Rothblum#### On Prover-Efficient Public-Coin Emulation of Interactive Proofs

Revisions: 4

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TR19-074
| 22nd May 2019
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Arka Rai Choudhuri, Pavel HubĂˇ?ek, Chethan Kamath, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Alon Rosen, Guy Rothblum#### Finding a Nash Equilibrium Is No Easier Than Breaking Fiat-Shamir

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TR19-060
| 18th April 2019
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Scott Aaronson, Guy Rothblum#### Gentle Measurement of Quantum States and Differential Privacy

Tal Herman, Guy Rothblum

Suppose we have access to a small number of samples from an unknown distribution, and would like learn facts about the distribution.

An untrusted data server claims to have studied the distribution and makes assertions about its properties. Can the untrusted data server prove that its assertions are approximately correct? ...
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Noga Amit, Guy Rothblum

We study the following question: what cryptographic assumptions are needed for obtaining constant-round computationally-sound argument systems? We focus on argument systems with almost-linear verification time for subclasses of $\mathbf{P}$, such as depth-bounded computations.

Kilian's celebrated work [STOC 1992] provides such 4-message arguments for $\mathbf{P}$ (actually, for $\mathbf{NP}$) using collision-resistant hash ...
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Oded Goldreich, Guy Rothblum, Tal Skverer

Interactive proofs of proximity (IPPs) offer ultra-fast

approximate verification of assertions regarding their input,

where ultra-fast means that only a small portion of the input is read

and approximate verification is analogous to the notion of

approximate decision that underlies property testing.

Specifically, in an IPP, the prover can make ...
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Tal Herman, Guy Rothblum

Given i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution over a large domain $[N]$, approximating several basic quantities, including the distribution's support size, its entropy, and its distance from the uniform distribution, requires $\Theta(N / \log N)$ samples [Valiant and Valiant, STOC 2011].

Suppose, however, that we can interact with a powerful ... more >>>

Guy Goldberg, Guy Rothblum

Suppose we have random sampling access to a huge object, such as a graph or a database.

Namely, we can observe the values of \emph{random} locations in the object, say random records in the database or random edges in the graph.

We cannot, however, query locations of our choice. Can ...
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Cynthia Dwork, Michael Kim, Omer Reingold, Guy Rothblum, Gal Yona

Prediction algorithms assign numbers to individuals that are popularly understood as individual ``probabilities''---what is the probability of 5-year survival after cancer diagnosis?---and which increasingly form the basis for life-altering decisions. Drawing on an understanding of computational indistinguishability developed in complexity theory and cryptography, we introduce Outcome Indistinguishability. Predictors that are ... more >>>

Guy Rothblum, Ron Rothblum

Suppose Alice wants to convince Bob of the correctness of k NP statements. Alice could send k witnesses to Bob, but as k grows the communication becomes prohibitive. Is it possible to convince Bob using smaller communication (without making cryptographic assumptions or bounding the computational power of a malicious Alice)? ... more >>>

Inbar Kaslasi, Prashant Nalini Vasudevan, Guy Rothblum, Ron Rothblum, Adam Sealfon

A statistical zero-knowledge proof (SZK) for a problem $\Pi$ enables a computationally unbounded prover to convince a polynomial-time verifier that $x \in \Pi$ without revealing any additional information about $x$ to the verifier, in a strong information-theoretic sense.

Suppose, however, that the prover wishes to convince the verifier that $k$ ... more >>>

Shafi Goldwasser, Guy Rothblum, Jonathan Shafer, Amir Yehudayoff

We consider the following question: using a source of labeled data and interaction with an untrusted prover, what is the complexity of verifying that a given hypothesis is "approximately correct"? We study interactive proof systems for PAC verification, where a verifier that interacts with a prover is required to accept ... more >>>

Gal Arnon, Guy Rothblum

A central question in the study of interactive proofs is the relationship between private-coin proofs, where the verifier is allowed to hide its randomness from the prover, and public-coin proofs, where the verifier's random coins are sent to the prover.

In this work, we study transformations ...
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Arka Rai Choudhuri, Pavel HubĂˇ?ek, Chethan Kamath, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Alon Rosen, Guy Rothblum

The Fiat-Shamir heuristic transforms a public-coin interactive proof into a non-interactive argument, by replacing the verifier with a cryptographic hash function that is applied to the protocolâ€™s transcript. Constructing hash functions for which this transformation is sound is a central and long-standing open question in cryptography.

We show that ... more >>>

Scott Aaronson, Guy Rothblum

In differential privacy (DP), we want to query a database about $n$ users, in a way that "leaks at most $\varepsilon$ about any individual user," even conditioned on any outcome of the query. Meanwhile, in gentle measurement, we want to measure $n$ quantum states, in a way that "damages the ... more >>>