All reports by Author Grant Schoenebeck:

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TR09-086
| 2nd October 2009
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Arnab Bhattacharyya, Swastik Kopparty, Grant Schoenebeck, Madhu Sudan, David Zuckerman#### Optimal testing of Reed-Muller codes

Revisions: 1

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TR06-132
| 17th October 2006
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Grant Schoenebeck, Luca Trevisan, Madhur Tulsiani#### Tight Integrality Gaps for Lovasz-Schrijver LP Relaxations of Vertex Cover and Max Cut

Revisions: 1

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TR06-098
| 17th August 2006
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Grant Schoenebeck, Luca Trevisan, Madhur Tulsiani#### A Linear Round Lower Bound for Lovasz-Schrijver SDP Relaxations of Vertex Cover

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TR05-052
| 5th May 2005
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Grant Schoenebeck, Salil Vadhan#### The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Concisely Represented Games

Arnab Bhattacharyya, Swastik Kopparty, Grant Schoenebeck, Madhu Sudan, David Zuckerman

We consider the problem of testing if a given function

$f : \F_2^n \rightarrow \F_2$ is close to any degree $d$ polynomial

in $n$ variables, also known as the Reed-Muller testing problem.

Alon et al.~\cite{AKKLR} proposed and analyzed a natural

$2^{d+1}$-query test for this property and showed that it accepts

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Grant Schoenebeck, Luca Trevisan, Madhur Tulsiani

We study linear programming relaxations of Vertex Cover and Max Cut

arising from repeated applications of the ``lift-and-project''

method of Lovasz and Schrijver starting from the standard linear

programming relaxation.

For Vertex Cover, Arora, Bollobas, Lovasz and Tourlakis prove that

the integrality gap remains at least $2-\epsilon$ after

$\Omega_\epsilon(\log n)$ ...
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Grant Schoenebeck, Luca Trevisan, Madhur Tulsiani

We study semidefinite programming relaxations of Vertex Cover arising from

repeated applications of the LS+ ``lift-and-project'' method of Lovasz and

Schrijver starting from the standard linear programming relaxation.

Goemans and Kleinberg prove that after one round of LS+ the integrality

gap remains arbitrarily close to 2. Charikar proves an integrality ...
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Grant Schoenebeck, Salil Vadhan

Games may be represented in many different ways, and different representations of games affect the complexity of problems associated with games, such as finding a Nash equilibrium. The traditional method of representing a game is to explicitly list all the payoffs, but this incurs an exponential blowup as the number ... more >>>