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REPORTS > AUTHORS > DAVE BUCHFUHRER:
All reports by Author Dave Buchfuhrer:

TR09-068 | 1st September 2009
Dave Buchfuhrer, Chris Umans

Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms

Many commonly-used auction mechanisms are ``maximal-in-range''. We show that any maximal-in-range mechanism for $n$ bidders and $m$ items cannot both approximate the social welfare with a ratio better than $\min(n, m^\eta)$ for any constant $\eta < 1/2$ and run in polynomial time, unless $NP \subseteq P/poly$. This significantly improves upon ... more >>>




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