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Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity

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All reports by Author Constantinos Daskalakis:

TR18-002 | 31st December 2017
Constantinos Daskalakis, Gautam Kamath, John Wright

Which Distribution Distances are Sublinearly Testable?

Given samples from an unknown distribution $p$ and a description of a distribution $q$, are $p$ and $q$ close or far? This question of "identity testing" has received significant attention in the case of testing whether $p$ and $q$ are equal or far in total variation distance. However, in recent ... more >>>

TR17-006 | 15th December 2016
Constantinos Daskalakis, Nishanth Dikkala, Gautam Kamath

Testing Ising Models

Revisions: 2

Given samples from an unknown multivariate distribution $p$, is it possible to distinguish whether $p$ is the product of its marginals versus $p$ being far from every product distribution? Similarly, is it possible to distinguish whether $p$ equals a given distribution $q$ versus $p$ and $q$ being far from each ... more >>>

TR11-172 | 20th December 2011
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms

We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined with cyclic-monotonicity our results provide a complete characterization of feasible, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms for this setting.

Our characterization is enabled by a novel, constructive proof of Border's theorem [Border ... more >>>

TR11-170 | 16th December 2011
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a ... more >>>

TR05-139 | 21st November 2005
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Three-Player Games Are Hard

We prove that computing a Nash equilibrium in a 3-player
game is PPAD-complete, solving a problem left open in our recent result on the complexity of Nash equilibria.

more >>>

TR05-115 | 27th September 2005
Constantinos Daskalakis, Paul Goldberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by
showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game
with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD.
Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence
between polynomial-time solvability of normal-form games and
more >>>

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