We show that any concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for a non-trivial
language (i.e., for a language outside $\BPP$), whose security is proven
via black-box simulation, must use at least $\tilde\Omega(\log n)$
rounds of interaction. This result achieves a substantial improvement
over previous lower bounds, and is the first bound to rule ... more >>>

Building on known definitions, we present a unified general framework for
defining and analyzing security of cryptographic protocols. The framework
allows specifying the security requirements of a large number of
cryptographic tasks, such as signature, encryption, authentication, key
exchange, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero-knowledge, secret sharing,
general function evaluation, and ... more >>>

We introduce the notion of Resettable Zero-Knowledge (rZK),
a new security measure for cryptographic protocols
which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge.
In essence, an rZK protocol is one that remains zero knowledge
even if an adeversary can interact with the prover many times, each
time ... more >>>