Weizmann Logo
ECCC
Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity

Under the auspices of the Computational Complexity Foundation (CCF)

Login | Register | Classic Style



REPORTS > DETAIL:

Revision(s):

Revision #2 to TR13-101 | 16th July 2013 01:41

A Uniform Min-Max Theorem with Applications in Cryptography

RSS-Feed




Revision #2
Authors: Salil Vadhan, Colin Jia Zheng
Accepted on: 16th July 2013 01:41
Downloads: 943
Keywords: 


Abstract:

We present a new, more constructive proof of von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem for two-player zero-sum game --- specifically, an algorithm that builds a near-optimal mixed strategy for the second player from several best-responses of the second player to mixed strategies of the first player. The algorithm extends previous work of Freund and Schapire (Games and Economic Behavior '99) with the advantage that the algorithm runs in $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ time even when a pure strategy for the first player is a distribution chosen from a set of distributions over $\{0,1\}^n$. This extension enables a number of additional applications in cryptography and complexity theory, often yielding uniform security versions of results that were previously only proved for nonuniform security (due to use of the non-constructive Min-Max Theorem).

We describe several applications, including: a more modular and improved uniform version of Impagliazzo's Hardcore Theorem (FOCS '95); regularity theorems that provide efficient simulation of distributions within any sufficiently nice convex set (extending a result of Trevisan, Tulsiani and Vadhan (CCC '09)); an improved version of the Weak Regularity Lemma of Frieze and Kannan; a Dense Model Theorem for uniform algorithms; and showing impossibility of constructing Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions under uniform hardness assumptions (using techniques from Gentry and Wichs (STOC '11) for the nonuniform setting).


Revision #1 to TR13-101 | 16th July 2013 01:34

A Uniform Min-Max Theorem with Applications in Cryptography





Revision #1
Authors: Colin Jia Zheng, Salil Vadhan
Accepted on: 16th July 2013 01:34
Downloads: 847
Keywords: 


Abstract:

We present a new, more constructive proof of von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem for two-player zero-sum game --- specifically, an algorithm that builds a near-optimal mixed strategy for the second player from several best-responses of the second player to mixed strategies of the first player. The algorithm extends previous work of Freund and Schapire (Games and Economic Behavior '99) with the advantage that the algorithm runs in $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ time even when a pure strategy for the first player is a distribution chosen from a set of distributions over $\{0,1\}^n$. This extension enables a number of additional applications in cryptography and complexity theory, often yielding uniform security versions of results that were previously only proved for nonuniform security (due to use of the non-constructive Min-Max Theorem).

We describe several applications, including: a more modular and improved uniform version of Impagliazzo's Hardcore Theorem (FOCS '95); regularity theorems that provide efficient simulation of distributions within any sufficiently nice convex set (extending a result of Trevisan, Tulsiani and Vadhan (CCC '09)); an improved version of the Weak Regularity Lemma of Frieze and Kannan; a Dense Model Theorem for uniform algorithms; and showing impossibility of constructing Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions under uniform hardness assumptions (using techniques from Gentry and Wichs (STOC '11) for the nonuniform setting).


Paper:

TR13-101 | 12th July 2013 06:06

A Uniform Min-Max Theorem with Applications in Cryptography





TR13-101
Authors: Colin Jia Zheng, Salil Vadhan
Publication: 16th July 2013 01:16
Downloads: 1022
Keywords: 


Abstract:

We present a new, more constructive proof of von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem for two-player zero-sum game --- specifically, an algorithm that builds a near-optimal mixed strategy for the second player from several best-responses of the second player to mixed strategies of the first player. The algorithm extends previous work of Freund and Schapire (Games and Economic Behavior '99) with the advantage that the algorithm runs in $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ time even when a pure strategy for the first player is a distribution chosen from a set of distributions over $\{0,1\}^n$. This extension enables a number of additional applications in cryptography and complexity theory, often yielding uniform security versions of results that were previously only proved for nonuniform security (due to use of the non-constructive Min-Max Theorem).

We describe several applications, including: a more modular and improved uniform version of Impagliazzo's Hardcore Theorem (FOCS '95); regularity theorems that provide efficient simulation of distributions within any sufficiently nice convex set (extending a result of Trevisan, Tulsiani and Vadhan (CCC '09)); an improved version of the Weak Regularity Lemma of Frieze and Kannan; a Dense Model Theorem for uniform algorithms; and showing impossibility of constructing Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs) via black-box reductions under uniform hardness assumptions (using techniques from Gentry and Wichs (STOC '11) for the nonuniform setting).



ISSN 1433-8092 | Imprint