Revision #2 Authors: Paul Spirakis, haralambos tsaknakis

Accepted on: 23rd August 2007 00:00

Downloads: 2618

Keywords:

In this paper we propose a new methodology for determining approximate

Nash equilibria of non-cooperative bimatrix games and, based on that, we

provide an efficient algorithm that computes 0.3393-approximate

equilibria, the best approximation till now. The methodology is based

on the formulation of an appropriate function of pairs of mixed

strategies reflecting the maximum deviation of the players' payoffs

from the best payoff each player could achieve given the strategy

chosen by the other. We then seek to minimize such a function using

descent procedures. As it is unlikely to be able to find global

minima in polynomial time, given the recently proven intractability

of the problem, we concentrate on the computation of stationary points

and prove that they can be approximated arbitrarily close in

polynomial time and that they have the above mentioned approximation

property. Our result provides the best epsilon till now for

polynomially computable epsilon-approximate Nash equilibria of

bimatrix games. Furthermore, our methodology for computing

approximate Nash equilibria has not been used by others.

Revision #1 Authors: Paul Spirakis, haralambos tsaknakis

Accepted on: 24th July 2007 00:00

Downloads: 2646

Keywords:

In this paper we propose a new methodology for determining approximate Nash equilibria of non-cooperative bimatrix games and , based on that , we provide an efficient algorithm that computes 0.3393-approximate equilibria, the best approximation till now. The methodology is based on the formulation of an appropriate function of pairs of mixed strategies reflecting the maximum deviation of the players' payoffs from the best payoff each player could achieve given the strategy chosen by the other. We then seek to minimise such a function using descent procedures. As it is unlikely to be able to find global minima in polynomial time, given the recently proven intractability of the problem , we concentrate on the computation of stationary points and prove that they can be approximated arbitrarily close in polynomial time and that they have the above mentioned approximation property. Our result provides the best epsilon till now for polynomially computable epsilon-approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games. Furthermore, our methodology for computing approximate Nash equilibria has not been used by others.

TR07-067 Authors: Paul Spirakis, haralampos tsaknakis

Publication: 23rd July 2007 17:33

Downloads: 2309

Keywords:

In this paper we propose a methodology for determining approximate Nash equilibria of non-cooperative bimatrix games and, based on that, we provide a polynomial time algorithm that computes $\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{p(n)} $ -approximate equilibria, where $p(n)$ is a polynomial controlled by our algorithm and proportional to its running time. The methodology is based on the formulation of an appropriate function of pairs of mixed strategies reflecting the maximum deviation of the players' payoffs from the best payoff each player could achieve given the strategy chosen by the other. We then seek to minimize such a function using descent procedures. As it is unlikely to be able to find global minima in polynomial time, gievn the recently proved intractability of the problem, we concentrate on the computation of local minima and prove that they can be approximated arbitrarily close in polynomial time and that they have the above mentioned approximation property. Our result provides the best $\epsilon$ till now for polynomially computable $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games.