Revision #3 Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tomasz Kazana , Maciej Obremski

Accepted on: 18th September 2015 07:42

Downloads: 944

Keywords:

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs~\cite{DPW10}, provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely ``unrelated value''. Although such codes do not exist if the family of ``tampering functions'' $\cF$ allowed to modify the original codeword is completely unrestricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families $\cF$.

The family which received the most attention~\cite{DPW10,LL12,DKO13,ADL14,CG14a,CG14b} is the family of tampering functions in the so called {\em split-state} model: here the message $x$ is encoded into two shares $L$ and $R$,

%of length $N$ each,

and the attacker is allowed to {\em arbitrarily} tamper with each $L$ and $R$ {\em individually}.

%

Despite this attention, the following problem remained open:

\begin{center}

{\em Build efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the split-state model with constant encoding rate}: $|L|=|R|=O(|x|)$.

\end{center}

In this work, we resolve this open problem. Our technique for getting our main result is of independent interest. We

\begin{itemize}

\item[(a)] develop a generalization of non-malleable codes, called {\em non-malleable reductions};

\item[(b)] show simple composition theorem for non-malleable reductions;

\item[(c)] build a variety of such reductions connecting various (independently interesting) tampering families $\cF$ to each other; and

\item[(d)] construct our final, constant-rate, non-malleable code in the split-state model by applying the composition theorem to a series of easy to understand reductions.

\end{itemize}

Revision #2 Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tomasz Kazana , Maciej Obremski

Accepted on: 17th October 2014 13:43

Downloads: 1035

Keywords:

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10], provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely "unrelated value". Although such codes do not exist if the family of ``tampering functions'' F allowed to modify the original codeword is completely unrestricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families F. The family which received the most attention [DPW10,LL12,DKO13,ADL14,CG14a,CG14b] is the family of tampering functions in the so called (2-part) *split-state* model: here the message x is encoded into two shares L and R, and the attacker is allowed to arbitrarily tamper with each L and R *individually*. Despite this attention, the following problem remained open:

*** Build efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the split-state model with constant encoding rate: |L|=|R|=O(|x|). ***

In this work, we resolve this open problem. Our technique for getting our main result is of independent interest. We (a) develop a generalization of non-malleable codes, called *non-malleable reductions*; (b) show simple composition theorem for non-malleable reductions; (c) build a variety of such reductions connecting various (independently interesting) tampering families F to each other; (d) construct several new non-malleable codes in the split-state model by applying the composition theorem to a series of easy to understand reductions.

Most importantly, we show several "independence amplification" reductions, showing how to reduce split-state tampering of very few parts to an easier question of split-state tampering with a much larger number of parts. In particular, our final, constant-rate, non-malleable code composes one of these reductions with the very recent, "9-split-state" code of Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14].

Revision #1 Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tomasz Kazana , Maciej Obremski

Accepted on: 17th October 2014 11:31

Downloads: 1327

Keywords:

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs~\cite{DPW10}, provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely ``unrelated value''. Although such codes do not exist if the family of ``tampering functions'' $\cF$ allowed to modify the original codeword is completely unrestricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families $\cF$.

The family which received the most attention~\cite{DPW10,LL12,DKO13,ADL14,CG14a,CG14b} is the family of tampering functions in the so called {\em split-state} model: here the message $x$ is encoded into two shares $L$ and $R$,

%of length $N$ each,

and the attacker is allowed to {\em arbitrarily} tamper with each $L$ and $R$ {\em individually}.

%

Despite this attention, the following problem remained open:

\begin{center}

{\em Build efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the split-state model with constant encoding rate}: $|L|=|R|=O(|x|)$.

\end{center}

In this work, we resolve this open problem. Our technique for getting our main result is of independent interest. We

\begin{itemize}

\item[(a)] develop a generalization of non-malleable codes, called {\em non-malleable reductions};

\item[(b)] show simple composition theorem for non-malleable reductions;

\item[(c)] build a variety of such reductions connecting various (independently interesting) tampering families $\cF$ to each other; and

\item[(d)] construct our final, constant-rate, non-malleable code in the split-state model by applying the composition theorem to a series of easy to understand reductions.

\end{itemize}

TR14-128 Authors: Divesh Aggarwal, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tomasz Kazana , Maciej Obremski

Publication: 17th October 2014 11:13

Downloads: 1132

Keywords:

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs~\cite{DPW10}, provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely ``unrelated value''. Although such codes do not exist if the family of ``tampering functions'' $\cF$ allowed to modify the original codeword is completely unrestricted, they are known to exist for many broad tampering families $\cF$.

The family which received the most attention~\cite{DPW10,LL12,DKO13,ADL14,CG14a,CG14b} is the family of tampering functions in the so called {\em split-state} model: here the message $x$ is encoded into two shares $L$ and $R$,

%of length $N$ each,

and the attacker is allowed to {\em arbitrarily} tamper with each $L$ and $R$ {\em individually}.

%

Despite this attention, the following problem remained open:

\begin{center}

{\em Build efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the split-state model with constant encoding rate}: $|L|=|R|=O(|x|)$.

\end{center}

In this work, we resolve this open problem. Our technique for getting our main result is of independent interest. We

\begin{itemize}

\item[(a)] develop a generalization of non-malleable codes, called {\em non-malleable reductions};

\item[(b)] show simple composition theorem for non-malleable reductions;

\item[(c)] build a variety of such reductions connecting various (independently interesting) tampering families $\cF$ to each other; and

\item[(d)] construct our final, constant-rate, non-malleable code in the split-state model by applying the composition theorem to a series of easy to understand reductions.

\end{itemize}