In a recent work, Cormode, Dall'Agnol, Gur and Hickey (CCC, 2024) introduced the model of Zero-Knowledge Streaming Interactive Proofs (zkSIPs).
Loosely speaking, such proof-systems enable a prover to convince astreaming verifier that the input $x$, to which it has read-once streaming access, satisfies some property, in such a way that nothing beyond the correctness of the claim is revealed. Cormode et al. also gave constructions of zkSIPs to some specific and notable problems of interest.

In this work, we advance the study of zero-knowledge proofs in the streaming model, by presenting protocols that are significantly more general and more secure. We use a definition of zero-knowledge that is a variation of that used by Cormode et al., which we find more appealing but is technically incomparable.

Our main result is a zkSIP for any NP relation, that can be decided by low-depth polynomial-size circuits. We emphasize that this is the first general purpose protocol in this model, which captures, as a special case, the problems considered by the prior work. We also construct a specialized protocol for the ``polynomial evaluation'' problem considered in that work, with improved parameters.

The protocols constructed by Cormode et al. have an inverse polylogarithmic simulation error (i.e., a gap with which a bounded-space distingiusher can distinguish the simulation from a real execution). This means that their
protocols are entirely insecure if run multiple times (say on different inputs). In contrast, our protocols achieve a negligible zero-knowledge error, a stronger and far more robust security guarantee.