Secret sharing schemes allow sharing a secret between a set of parties in a way that ensures that only authorized subsets of the parties learn the secret. Evolving secret sharing schemes (Komargodski, Naor, and Yogev [TCC ’16]) allow achieving this end in a scenario where the parties arrive in an ... more >>>
Two of the most useful cryptographic primitives that can be constructed from one-way functions are pseudorandom generators (PRGs) and universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs). The three major efficiency measures of these primitives are: seed length, number of calls to the one-way function, and adaptivity of these calls. Although a long ... more >>>
A distribution is k-incompressible, Yao [FOCS ’82], if no efficient compression scheme compresses it to less than k bits. While being a natural measure, its relation to other computational analogs of entropy such as pseudoentropy, Hastad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [SICOMP 99], and to other cryptographic hardness assumptions, was unclear.
... more >>>In distributed differential privacy, the parties perform analysis over their joint data while preserving the privacy for both datasets. Interestingly, for a few fundamental two-party functions such as inner product and Hamming distance, the accuracy of the distributed solution lags way behind what is achievable in the client-server setting. McGregor, ... more >>>
We study time/memory tradeoffs of function inversion: an algorithm, i.e., an inverter, equipped with an $s$-bit advice for a randomly chosen function $f\colon [n] \mapsto [n]$ and using $q$ oracle queries to $f$, tries to invert a randomly chosen output $y$ of $f$ (i.e., to find $x$ such that $f(x)=y$). ... more >>>
Consider a PPT two-party protocol ?=(A,B) in which the parties get no private inputs and obtain outputs O^A,O^B?{0,1}, and let V^A and V^B denote the parties’ individual views. Protocol ? has ?-agreement if Pr[O^A=O^B]=1/2+?. The leakage of ? is the amount of information a party obtains about the event {O^A=O^B}; ... more >>>
Key-agreement protocols whose security is proven in the random oracle model are an important alternative to the more common public-key based key-agreement protocols. In the random oracle model, the parties and the eavesdropper have access to a shared random function (an "oracle"), but they are limited in the number of ... more >>>