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Revision #1 to TR20-023 | 25th June 2020 22:57

Non-Malleability against Polynomial Tampering

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Revision #1
Authors: Marshall Ball, Eshan Chattopadhyay, Jyun-Jie Liao, Tal Malkin, Li-Yang Tan
Accepted on: 25th June 2020 22:57
Downloads: 391
Keywords: 


Abstract:

We present the first explicit construction of a non-malleable code that can handle tampering functions that are bounded-degree polynomials.

Prior to our work, this was only known for degree-1 polynomials (affine tampering functions), due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017). As a direct corollary, we obtain an explicit non-malleable code that is secure against tampering by bounded-size arithmetic circuits.

We show applications of our non-malleable code in constructing non-malleable secret sharing schemes that are robust against bounded-degree polynomial tampering. In fact our result is stronger: we can handle adversaries that can adaptively choose the polynomial tampering function based on initial leakage of a bounded number of shares.

Our results are derived from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors that can handle bounded-degree polynomial tampering functions. Prior to our work, no such result was known even for degree-2 (quadratic) polynomials.



Changes to previous version:

fixed some typos and other minor changes


Paper:

TR20-023 | 10th February 2020 15:16

Non-Malleability against Polynomial Tampering


Abstract:

We present the first explicit construction of a non-malleable code that can handle tampering functions that are bounded-degree polynomials.

Prior to our work, this was only known for degree-1 polynomials (affine tampering functions), due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017). As a direct corollary, we obtain an explicit non-malleable code that is secure against tampering by bounded-size arithmetic circuits.

We show applications of our non-malleable code in constructing non-malleable secret sharing schemes that are robust against bounded-degree polynomial tampering. In fact our result is stronger: we can handle adversaries that can adaptively choose the polynomial tampering function based on initial leakage of a bounded number of shares.

Our results are derived from explicit constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors that can handle bounded-degree polynomial tampering functions. Prior to our work, no such result was known even for degree-2 (quadratic) polynomials.



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